

Z. Lica dla Zbigniewa Grabowskiego

CREATIVE PEACE

INTEGRATION OF EUROPE A NECESSITY

BY

ZBIGNIEW GRABOWSKI

MACLELLAN

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BY THE SAME AUTHOR

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'JOSEPH CONRAD', Poznan, 1927.
'WALTER PATER', Poznan, 1929.
'THE SILENCE OF THE WOODS' (novel), Cracow, 1931.
'ENGLAND—AN UNKNOWN ISLAND', London, 1940.
'FLOWERS AND STONES—A SENTIMENTAL GUIDE OVER
GREAT BRITAIN' (in preparation).

Translations into Polish

Ernest Hemingway : 'A FAREWELL TO ARMS'.
Sigrid Undset : 'JENNY'.
Sinclair Lewis : 'DR. ARROWSMITH'.
Paul de Kruif : 'MEN AGAINST DEATH'.
Nis Petersen : 'THE STREET OF SANDAL-MAKERS'.
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
A POLITICAL ESSAY
by
ZBIGNIEW GRABOWSKI



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'The price of greatness is responsibility. . .

'We now have reached a point in the journey where there can be no pause. We must go on. It must be world anarchy or world order. . .

'We do not war primarily with races as such. Tyranny is our foe whatever trappings or disguise it wears. Whatever language it speaks, be it external or internal, we must forever be on our guard, ever mobilized and vigilant, always ready to spring at its throat. . .'

Mr. WINSTON CHURCHILL in a speech at Harvard University,
Cambridge (Mass.), on September 6th, 1943.

'All peoples who, with a decent respect to the opinions of mankind, have qualified themselves to assume and to discharge the responsibilities of liberty are entitled to its enjoyment. Each sovereign nation, large or small, is in law and under law the equal of every other nation. All nations, large and small, which respect the rights of others are entitled to freedom from outside interference in their internal affairs. Willingness to settle international disputes by peaceful means and acceptance of international law and observance of its principles are the bases of order among nations and of mankind's continuing search for enduring peace. Non-discrimination in economic opportunity and treatment is essential to the maintenance and promotion of sound international relations. Co-operation between nations in the spirit of good neighbours founded on the principles of liberty, equality, justice, morality and law is the most effective method of safeguarding and promoting the political, the economic, the social and the cultural well-being of our nation and of all nations. . . It is abundantly clear that a system of organized international co-operation for the maintenance of peace must be based upon the willingness of the co-operating nations to use force, if necessary, to keep peace. There must be certainty that adequate and appropriate means are available and will be used for this purpose. Readiness to use force, if necessary, for the maintenance of peace is indispensable, if effective substitutes for war are to be found.'

Mr. CORDELL HULL, the United States Secretary of State, in an address on American foreign policy, on September 12th, 1943.

FOREWORD

The remarks contained in this pamphlet are mainly based on lectures delivered between the spring, 1941, and May, 1943, to various audiences in this country. These lectures covered the problems of the small nations and their relations to the Great Powers, of the post-war planning and democracy. Only minor changes were introduced and the original character of these marginal notes and remarks was retained; and some new quotations were added to bring the pamphlet up-to-date. I hope that although my lectures have been planned and written during the period between March, 1941, and May, 1943, they have not lost altogether their topicality. Subsequent events have justified some of the fears and apprehensions expressed in these pages.

My essays are only to a certain extent political studies. Although I spent several years in political journalism, I have always regarded politics as the result of many changing, different, and complicated factors, and not as a detached science. The psychological elements in the life of nations, the irrational motives in political moves and decisions, the emotional background of the great revolutionary movements of our time attracted me more than diplomatic messages and notes. Hence the psychological approach of these marginal notes, hence the stressing of the importance of the so-called imponderabilia in the life of nations.

My remarks are not limited to one country and they are not to be taken as an expression of the attitude of one country only. Although it is a shop-soiled word, I consider myself a European, and I am proud of a citizenship for which another Nansen will one day perhaps find some legal status and the reconstructed Europe a more suitable ground. I cannot see any future for my country without a Europe rebuilt on foundations of culture, order and respect for human rights. I frankly admit that it would have been impossible for me to taste freedom in my own country, if I knew that France was no longer an abode of culture, that Denmark, Holland, Sweden, Switzerland and Norway, those splendid laboratories of democracy, were in bondage and that the peoples of the Balkans were unable to regain their independence.

Z.G.

London, September 14th, 1943.

been perhaps to-day trying to dislodge the enemy from Afghanistan. Had Sweden fought when Norway was invaded . . . but this is not the end of the astounding tale. Had France, in June 1940, not capitulated, and continued to fight, Hitler would have seized the whole of France and would have landed in North Africa without meeting any serious opposition. The whole Mediterranean would have been opened to him. And so the French capitulation, which is to be condemned on moral grounds, saved by a curious irony of fate our common cause.

But above all, what saved this world of ours is the confidence of the British people who could not consider themselves beaten when they were beaten, judging by all principles of reason. They have refused to admit defeat; they have relied on their instinct, rejecting the councils of logic. They put their confidence in their staying power, they were sure that they could take it and that they would hit back in time. You have waited patiently for the entering of Soviet Russia into this war and for the intervention of the United States. But your reaction was not guided by rational calculations: you have reacted spontaneously with the sure confidence of a healthy organism. Your reaction was fundamentally a moral gesture for which the whole world will never cease to be grateful to you.

2.

It would be idle to suppose that this war is already won. It is not won either in the military or in the political sense. Nor is it won in the domain of ideas. The defeat of Germany is a tough proposition, not only because she will fight to the bitter end, but also because the chances of a crack-up seem to be rather remote. Germany will fight not only on the approaches to the Reich—and the whole of occupied Europe is now transformed into an approach to Germany—but she may also fight on her own soil. It is obvious that Germany would not shrink from anything in order to continue the struggle, hoping that by prolonging the conflict she may extort better terms from the Allies. Recently one of the French papers controlled by the Germans, while exhorting the reluctant Frenchman to rally to the side of the invaders, warned the French that "should Germany collapse

she will fall over the dead body of France". There is a good deal of truth in this grim threat, and German propaganda is exploiting it to the utmost. Some European countries fear that before the Germans would retreat from their native soil they would rob and destroy everything and they would even take the male population by batches as hostages to Germany. Europe to-day is in a state of almost hysterical fear and it is praying for an Allied invasion, fully realising that only by speeding it the framework of Europe could be saved.

3.

An enormous mental and moral confusion is to-day rampant on the Continent. The peoples there live behind closed walls, cut off from the knowledge of facts, poisoned by German propaganda, exposed to all sorts of fears. The German propaganda has been offering recently to Europe a rather limited choice: either a German victory or a reign of chaos and anarchy. But the nations of Europe refuse to accept the German interpretation. They hope that a European solution might be found and that the Allies will not compel Europe to surrender to one or another domination. Europe is a devastated place, destitute and in the depth of despair, but it is still a proud place. Nations of the Continent feel that every attempt to submit them to one or another domination is a confession of disbelief in the soundness of European structure. They see in any effort of throwing upon Europe an alien domination the nucleus of a new conflict. An eminent Turkish writer and member of the Turkish parliament recently expressed the opinion that 'Europe would never accept any forced solution or the domination of any Power. Whether such a domination comes from the West or from the East—he wrote—is of minor importance. The right of all the nations must be safeguarded and all the States should be reconstituted in their full integrity. Otherwise we are heading for another world war.'

4.

Modern diplomacy is suffering from many shortcomings because it does not want to admit that the world is in a state of enormous commotion, that the social changes wrought

upon the face of Europe are stupendous, and that some States cannot be judged by normal standards. Diplomats try to ignore the fact that we are in a whirl-pool of mighty changes, where the emotional factors are sometimes more powerful than economics, that modern man, discarding the guidance of religion and replacing it by political creeds, has embarked upon a dangerous voyage and that we have to reckon with the possibility of disruption of our culture and of our Christian heritage.

During my stay in Germany I saw the slow destruction of spiritual resistance and I remember that one of my strongest impressions of Germany was of a book written by a German professor who declared that "Germany was liquidating the remnants of mediaeval and feudal culture". I still consider Spengler's book *Untergang des Abendlandes* a far more farsighted work than many political essays.

My analysis here is based mainly on psychological factors and stresses the importance of cultural and human elements. And just as I regard the political issue as only the surface of the problem, so in my opinion, the political cure would only be a superficial sort of treatment. In fact, a cosmetic cure for a deep-set disease.

5.

Volumes have been written on the problem of war guilt in the last conflict. When seen in true perspective the situation before the outbreak of the last war was such that all Powers who took part in it were more or less prepared for war. There was an eager competition in trade between Germany and this country. Austria and Russia were anxious to secure the Balkans as their sphere of influence. The war-guilt cannot be put entirely at Germany's doorstep: the inflammable material was to be found everywhere, although it was Germany who took the decision to strike.

In this war the picture was completely different. France was a disillusioned country, militarily unprepared and bled to death; this country was willing to buy peace at almost any price. The responsibility for war lies this time entirely with Germany. And the reason for such a state of affairs is not so difficult to find.

To every observer who wished to go deeper under the surface of the political events, it became obvious that even by 1930 humanity was on the brink of dangerous changes. In Russia a system was built up which based its aims on the theory that the Western world is decadent and decrepit. Russia started a social experiment rather alien to European tradition. In Germany, under Hitler, a similar experiment was begun. It amounted to an astounding revolution which aimed at transforming Germany into a tribal community and at breaking off its relations with the outer world. The Nazis were determined to rebarbarize the German nation. This attempt was much more stupendous than the Soviet experiment because Germany occupies a central position in Europe and has for centuries been a sort of clearing-house for European ideas.

Unless we realise that the cause of the present war is the fact of the creation in Germany of a revolutionary force alien to European culture and heritage, we shall not understand the real cause of this war. Germany did not prepare this war for years to strike at some militarily weak country like Czechoslovakia or Poland. It was obvious to every keen observer that the revolutionary German force was directed against Russia, against the country which has stolen the march on Hitlerism by staging an enormous social experiment and by her bid for world revolution. It was obvious that those two tremendous forces must clash one day. They wanted to come to grips already before the war; Spain provides the best example for that hidden desire of the two contending revolutions. Eventually they surmounted all the obstacles and after many deceiving manoeuvres they eventually came to grips over the body of Poland. This was the tragic necessity of two dynamic Powers, a necessity which was much more powerful than any political reasoning.

Those two powers were bound to clash and try to destroy each other. It doesn't mean at all that at a certain juncture those two Powers, after losing their initial impetus, exhausted and bled white, could not come to an agreement or renew the policy of Rapallo. But it seems that the tremendous revolutionary urge of those two Powers had to be spent.

6.

It is certainly significant that Germany which, when divided into small principalities, was a producer of culture, was the first country who evolved the theory of the omnipotence of the State. Nietzsche warned his readers some decades ago against that most cruel beast—the State. But this did not stop the drive towards the bee-hive ideal. Germany became more and more imbued with the materialistic outlook and to every observer of the Nazi revolution the amount of materialism professed by the leaders came as a shock. Hitler's revolution was a purely materialistic revolution, with no great ideas inspiring it, no great poets nor writers, no declaration of the rights of man. In contrast to this appallingly dull and materialistic attitude, the Russian revolution produced great writers and poets and a certain amount of idealism, quickly submerged by bureaucratic ideology.

It seems that this is the real cause of this war: the dynamic energy of revolt against the established pattern of culture, a revolt against the heritage of centuries, a process of rebarbarization and an attempt to turn back the stream of human culture. Both attempts are a grave warning that great expanses are able to breed creeds which are dangerous to the survival of European culture.

7.

To anybody who stayed in Germany for a prolonged period it was obvious that Germany was preparing for war not only out of revenge for the 1918 defeat. Germany must always work on the basis of some great idea or philosophy. The philosophy which ruled the German mind before the war could be summed up in the following slogans: Europe is decadent; Western civilisation is dead; France and England are in a state of lethargy. The chance of striking at the so-called 'haves' and creating a German Empire is thus unique. This chance must be grasped as this world is actually a world to let.

This crude philosophy of Spengler translated into practical terms has been the ruling factor in all decisions taken by Hitler and his associates. Germany has voluntarily left the

domain of European culture. She arrived at the conclusion that the only possible way to save the German nation from the disaster which (in her opinion) was threatening Western civilisation, was to sever relations with the outer world and to prepare in a more or less watertight seclusion for a huge assault on 'decrepit Europe' and reinforce the energy and vitality of the Reich by a scientific process of rebarbarization. Concentration camps, an amazing outburst of sadistic exploits, the training of young people for the task of hangmen, the fully conscious attempt to evoke the cruellest reactions in the human breast—here is the pattern which is astounding in its thoroughness and its complete disregard for human and Christian culture.

This German attempt which is to-day bearing its appalling fruits is one of the most tragic sights in the world. Germany has not only destroyed her own culture and her spiritual heritage, but has also infected other nations with hate and reactions of cruelty. Small wonder that the nations of Europe fear a complete landslide of civilisation and that a historical fear, similar to that which once seized ancient Rome on the eve of the onslaught of the Germanic tribes, is to-day alive on the Continent of Europe.

8.

In spite of the cruelty of the German régime and their ruthless record in this war, some fallacies about Germany still persist in this country. One of them is a rather widespread opinion that Germany is 'a country just like any other' and that 'eighty million Germans or so cannot all be brutes'.

The trouble is that Germany is not a country like any other: it is a most remarkable country. Its capacity for work is tremendous; its genius for organisation almost unequalled; it is at the same time perhaps the greatest military nation in history, as General Wavell put it. This formidable nation nearly defeated in the first World War the greatest combination of power in history. In this war Germany came uncomfortably near winning against a considerable array of forces and she is holding out against the greatest combine of might known in history, surpassing the

combine of the last war. For that reason Germany must be considered a 'special case' and treated accordingly.

Nobody will deny that there are Germans in Germany bitterly opposed to the Nazi régime. There are Germans who hate some qualities of their mentality more bitterly than even their worst enemies. But the problem boils down to a very simple question: why are the German masses always subservient to every doctrine of might, why is there always a ready and fertile soil in Germany for acceptance of brutal force? The answer is that an average German is almost completely uneducated emotionally. There is a curious lack of balance between his highly developed intellectual faculties and his sphere of instincts and feelings—a lack of balance which has been deepened by the Nazi preaching of force. In the last instance a German will nearly always sacrifice his moral and intellectual scruples for his impulses. Not only that: he is astonishingly clever in inventing highly-sounding theories and ideologies for his most brutal and base acts. This is the inner tragedy of the German soul, both brutal, unbalanced and steeped in hypocrisy.

9.

Why did Germany resort to war? The Third Reich embarked upon a policy aimed at the economic conquest of Europe long before it embarked on military conquest. The economic penetration effected by Germany in the years preceding the war was stupendous. Actually, the Continent of Europe was fairly in the grip of the German economy even by 1938. It is safe to assume that in another ten years or so Germany could have conquered Europe in the economic field.

Why did Germany not wait for the results of that conquest? Because economic measures could not possibly satisfy the German appetite, nor outweigh their urge to fight, to conquer, to oppress; the Germans could not resist the temptation to exhaust their completely uncultivated feelings in sadistic exploits.

The theory that war is a direct result of economic conditions and that economic factors are all-important, seems inadequate. Nations are by no means exclusively governed

by economics. Feelings, tradition and culture, the way and style of life, manners, likes and dislikes—in short, the spiritual and irrational factors are sometimes more important than economics.

The countries of Europe continue their resistance, hoping against hope. What are the stimuli which keep their tormented bodies and souls together? It seems that the main source of their resistance is their national spirit, their consciousness that they belong to ancient races and proud communities and that they have created spiritual values. Only on this idealistic basis can the fight of Europe be explained. Had Europe succumbed to the slogans of economics backed by terrorism, had the nations of Europe shown less pride, had the nations of Europe possessed a purely materialistic outlook, Hitler's 'New Order' would already have been an accomplished fact. Hitler's initial blunder in tackling the problem of Europe was his deeply materialistic attitude: he is a man full of contempt for human beings, deeply convinced that they can be kept in check by satisfying their purely material needs and desires.

10.

No doubt the German theory of *Lebensraum*, and another German pet idea, that of *Grossraum*, have made a deep impression on the minds of people all over the world. To-day many people are intoxicated with the *Grossraum* hooch, without realising from which shop this intoxicant has been purveyed. Let us state that this drink was on sale in Germany some years ago. A vast literature of some hundreds of books was written and a special science called *Geopolitik* was busy practising this new creed. We know this branch of knowledge by heart. It is based essentially on the Prussian contempt for all other nations and on a deeply materialistic conception of life. This trend of thought found easy acceptance among all those who hold the view that once economic problems have been solved, we shall enter an earthly paradise. This religion is propagated by a special kind of mind which might be called the colonising mind and which is by no means restricted to Prussia. The Third Reich entered this war clearly convinced that Europe could be transformed into a German colony. This campaign has

failed, and all the prophets of *Grossraum*, from whatever part of the world they hail, should be reminded of this painful failure.

All those, too, who are inclined to judge the greatness of a nation by its material resources, the extent of its territories, and its war potential, should be reminded that if we were to accept such a point of view, it should be admitted in all fairness that Germany is *the* greatest of all nations, because Germany nearly defeated the mightiest combination of Powers in the last war and is still holding a terrific concentration of Powers at bay in this conflict. But even Germany has found it impossible to subdue Europe against its will and to rule it by colonial methods.

It is imperative that this country should realise clearly the dangers which are inherent in any attempt to dominate Europe by sheer weight either of metal, ideology or economics, or all three.

11.

Great Britain is a great power by virtue of her association with the British Empire. The British Commonwealth of Nations derives its force and strength not from centralised power but from its freedom of association. We do not know what fate is reserved for all great combines, but it is by no means certain that they will continue their centralised existence and the process of modern culture must not inevitably lead to the creation of great uniform areas. It is equally possible that after this war we shall witness the process of disruption of great areas into their component parts (as, for instance, in Germany; a trend towards federation in the formerly centralised States as, for instance, in Yugoslavia), and the emancipation of the controlled territories into new entities. The process is by no means finished and it is better to reserve judgment as to the future of the great Powers.

In the meantime, the fact remains that Great Britain gained a prestige in the world not by her material riches, nor wealth, nor vast territories, but by her moral qualities. Great Britain evolved all these values, jealously guarding her independence, strongly defending her national character. In this respect Great Britain behaved like many small

countries. She has relied on quality rather than on quantity and this is the trait of a small nation. She has distrusted all state-worship, which is one of the characteristics of great Powers with enormous territories. She has respect for the individual, which is a typical attitude of small communities, for in great communities and vast countries the individual of necessity does not count for much. In spite of the fact that Great Britain was lamentably under-armed and unprepared to meet the German onslaught, this country rose to her true greatness exactly at the time when she fought as ancient Greece did: during the Battle of Britain. She fought then as every small nation fights: desperately, for the ideals which made her great.

12.

As far as numbers are concerned, this country is in the medium class, together with France and Italy. The problem of birth-rate is in this country as alarming as it is in France. For that reason the position of this country as a first-class Power is by no means secure; it is dependent, too, on the development of the Empire, which, as many leading men of this country admit, has been sorely neglected. Many parts of the Empire are under-populated, and recently the Australian Minister for External Affairs declared that that country must increase its population from over seven millions to some twenty-five millions. It is clear that other parts of the Empire should open their gates to immigration. It is also obvious that this country is more dependent than ever on the outer world and that the future of the British Empire rests on the solution of the formula of that interdependence.

The British Empire in its evolution towards the ideal of the British Commonwealth of Nations is obviously striving towards a federation of essentially small nations (with the only exception of India which cannot be regarded as a small nation although it lacks both war potential and some material riches; on the other hand it is doubtful whether India could be transformed into a centralised State: everything points to the creation of a federation of Indian States).

Recently Germany has been hammering into the heads of European nations the idea that there is such a thing as



European community and European solidarity; even the Nazi press splutters and stammers about "national pride" and speaks about the "integrity of small nations". The old slogan of *Herrenvolk* is put into cold storage. Germany is fully aware that she must switch her policy over to some new ideas; she is in fact adopting the last war slogans of the Allies. But while Germany cannot count on any support for this new trend of her policy, she still hopes that eventually she will be able to achieve supremacy on the Continent in the event of attempts being made to impose another domination in Europe. Germany believes that some European nations might still prefer her domination to an Eastern supremacy and that after the destruction of the Nazi régime and the sudden re-emergence of the so-called good Germans, kept in cold storage for the lean years, Europe may be lured into the trap and try to come to an agreement with Germany. She knows that her central position gives her tremendous advantages and that despair is a bad counsellor.

This country should not give Europe the necessity of choosing either a German or any other domination—because such a choice would not only be rejected, but also might prove the cause of another war in which Germany would play for so-called European solidarity.

13.

Great Britain has always relied on the help and assistance of the so-called small nations, and this has actually proved the surest shield of her security. The policy of the Balance of Power is by no means an artificial scheme, but a natural reaction of British policy towards Europe. It seems that in spite of the claims that this policy is dead and buried, it still retains its fundamental validity. A Continent of Europe dominated by one Power is a potential danger to this country. A friendly and well-organised Europe is the optimum which this country can wish for.

Great Britain helped such countries as Greece and Italy to regain their independence; these acts coincided with the period of Britain's true political greatness. This cannot be said of the pre-war period which was crowned by the Munich Agreement, regarded by some at that time as one of the wisest political moves of Britain. But Munich, which was a

trial share-out between four great Powers, proved only a major political defeat. A Four Power pact on a world scale might prove a similar disaster, only of far greater dimensions. It seems a hasty solution inspired by impatience; it appears a patched-up scheme, too.

We are assured that once the Big Four seize control of the world we shall enter an era of peace and security. We may well doubt it; and we do doubt it, because the Great Powers did not make a good showing on the Treaty of Versailles nor in the League of Nations which was the domain of the Great Powers, not of the small nations. The two great Powers which remained in the European field after the last war, Great Britain and France, did not provide an example of fruitful collaboration—on the contrary, it was poisoned by suspicion and the French system of security, which France wanted to impose on the Continent of Europe, and which was largely torpedoed by Great Britain.

In the pre-war period some great Powers did not show too many signs of political perspicacity and far-sightedness: on the contrary, they gave evidence of wishful thinking and of amazing blindness to the obvious signs of impending catastrophe.

All those facts must lead the so-called small States to the conclusion that political wisdom is by no means restricted to the great Powers and that a common effort of good-will by all nations is needed to ensure peace and security for all.

14.

No doubt the great Powers enjoy many privileges by virtue of their very greatness—physical greatness, I mean. It seems that this world is ruled by some sort of poetic justice, and while the strong and influential can commit many blunders and nevertheless earn some praise, the poor and less influential and less fortunate have to behave.

This explains, in my opinion, the position of the so-called small countries. They suffer in many respects from an inferiority complex vis-à-vis their more powerful neighbours. And their powerful neighbours in their turn impose on them their values and make them believe that they are something unique. So when this country produces a Beveridge plan, people here are convinced that this plan

should be hailed as a Gospel by the Continent of Europe. They forget that in some European countries social insurance was introduced many years ago and that some small countries like Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland were in many respects far in advance of the great Powers in social development and genuine democracy, too. This leads us to the conclusion that small countries are essential for the preservation of democracy and that democracy is better taught and learned, as it were, in the small classes than in big groups. The great Powers are, unfortunately, breeding places for the idea of state-worship and it is to be feared that after this war the high wind of "Economic Fascism" will blow from the shores of the great Powers. Against all these excesses of economic domination and planning, the small countries are a very necessary defence.

15.

When the British Prime Minister declares that England wants to hold her own, this is accepted by all small countries of Europe as a reasonable statement and is criticised only in the U.S.A.; but when a smaller country expresses the same opinion about its pre-war frontiers, this is attacked as megalomania. When the British Labour Party rejects the repeated offers of the Communists for affiliation, this is acclaimed by the British Press, but when Continental countries view the Communists with suspicion and decline to admit them to their political life, they are abused as reactionary.

When a great Power like this country follows a policy of cajoling Germany, it is called appeasement, or bidding for time; but when a smaller state concludes a pact of non-aggression with Germany, it is called pro-German.

In this conflict the great Powers have shown that they are by no means self-sufficient. This country was helped by small nations in the defence of the British Isles against the *Luftwaffe*, and even Belgian gold helped Britain. But for the aid and assistance of the United States the defence of these Isles would have been almost impossible. Russia has been helped with food and munitions, although for nearly twenty years she was preparing for the day of war. China is now being helped by the United States.

This shows the strict interdependence of the small and the great, an interdependence which casts doubts on the proud claims of the great.

16.

We have to bear in mind the fundamental historical truth that nearly all European nations were once great also in the material sense of the word. The Norsemen, the Swedes, the Dutch, all of them had vast empires and conquered large spaces in Europe and overseas. Danes had also once their rather powerful 'sphere of influence' before they decided to settle down and to lay the foundations of a model democracy. The Bulgarians had their Empire too, the Moravian Kingdom once stretched afar, the Hungarians also tasted some of the pleasures of conquest; so did the Turks for many centuries; Poland with her attempt to create a confederation of three races; Spain with her amazing stretch of cultural influence embracing the Americas, and Portugal. Empires either changed hands, collapsed or disintegrated; many countries now regarded as small are merely the result of the shrinkage of their territories, a process which cannot be explained only by their physical inability to retain their possessions. This process is a much more complicated matter—and luck plays a much greater part in it, than most people suppose. In the personal fortunes of an individual it is often not his abilities and values which are the decisive factor, but his birth and privileges, or luck—and thus in the life of nations it is not the ablest who are at the top; many nations have been carried to success by some inexplicable tide of fortune.

This being so, the small nations cannot accept the lecturing and the treatment allotted to them by the so-called great Powers. The small nations have their pride, as they are nearly all results of the process of shrinkage of territories and all of them were once great conquering nations with a considerable war potential. They feel that heritage in their bones and they are unwilling to succumb to any domination. Their tradition and their belief in the values of their culture are in fact the greatest obstacle to the victorious onrush of the semi-barbaric idea of domination by great Powers.

The small nations are often accused of acute nationalism. We have to realize that in most cases this acute nationalism developed as a result of the pressure exerted by the great Powers, especially by the oppressing Powers. A Pole of the XVIth century or a Lithuanian of the same period was undoubtedly a much more liberally-minded man than a Pole or a Lithuanian of the XXth century. Foreign rule, whether exerted by Russia, Turkey or Germany, called for a concentration of all energies for the maintenance of national life and absorbed all forces in defence of national integrity. Small wonder that few energies remained to develop other qualities, especially an international spirit. All the nations who lived under foreign rule were crippled by it and suffered grievous spiritual losses; they have neither the ease, nor the self-confidence which are characteristic of free countries. Poland, the Baltic and the Balkan countries were neglected by their rulers; those countries missed the great period of industrial development, of political liberalism, of the free trade drive. They were deprived of the right to breathe freely, reduced in their sphere of interests. They developed many deformities; this is the legacy left to them by the so-called great Powers.

But it is amazing how these communities have awakened to a new independent life bursting with energy; it was a real pleasure to watch the onrush of new life in the Baltic countries, in Yugoslavia and in Czechoslovakia. It was astounding to witness their desire to accumulate new riches—not only material, but also spiritual. For it must be admitted that neither Russia nor Turkey brought any revival in cultural life among the conquered nations. Countries subjugated by these two Powers lived on their own cultural and moral resources; small wonder that they were impoverished, lacking the possibility of replenishing themselves by the free exchange of ideas. It is quite clear that these countries, because they were treated by Russia or Turkey as suburbia of their vast Empires and left economically under-developed, can be educated into fully democratic communities only by enjoying a longer span of peace and acquiring a better standard of living. They have not yet

attained the Western standard of democracy, but for that the occupying Powers are to be blamed.

Some advocates of the great spaces argue that the new peace scheme will be something of the nature of the *pax romana*. They seem to forget that there is an essential difference between the Europe of ancient Rome and Europe of to-day. Roman legions brought material civilisation into conquered lands. But what sort of culture and even civilisation could the legions of the great Powers bring into Europe? Hardly any. More than that, even the material civilisation in some parts of Europe, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and Holland is sometimes in advance even of this country, and in Eastern Europe definitely in advance of Russia. It seems that a civilising expedition into Europe is belated by some 2000 years.

The Germans could not offer to Europe any culture comparable to that which Napoleon wanted to offer Europe in his time; but even Napoleon's dream collapsed although the French culture was a truly universal culture. German culture is not a universal culture. It also lacks charm which is an essential condition for the penetration of a foreign culture in conquered lands. Germany tried to conquer Europe at a time, too, when her culture was at its lowest. But even from the material point of view Germany had little to offer Europe; the standard of living was higher in several countries of Europe than in Germany.

European nations are often reproached by some American circles for their quarreling too much and it is pointed out that the United States has solved its many difficulties in a very short time. But it should be remembered that the people from Europe who flocked into the States founded a community on a soil still unturned, and tried out a new formula in a sort of *vacuum*, while in Europe we are working on a soil rich in tradition. And so a laboratory cannot be compared with an old manor house where care has to be taken of many valuable objects. One may also point out in answer to these charges that even European convicts succeeded in creating a decent community in Australia where they were working on a virgin soil.

The Swiss paper '*Arbeiter Zeitung*' of Schaffhausen in its issue of April 21st, 1943, remarked: 'If the various States of Europe were again asked the question which Roosevelt once asked them: 'Do you feel you are threatened?' they would probably once again give an evasive answer or none at all; yet the worries and anxieties of the small States are to-day even greater than before the outbreak of war.'

Swiss have a fine eye for true democracy and for the values of a small state. The Swiss Confederation is the only State in Europe which started as a small country and decided to keep that character. Switzerland sought no advantages by conquering foreign lands; she cherished no imperialistic ambitions. But Switzerland is the foremost country in all fields of international collaboration and the home of a truly international spirit.

The famous Swiss historian, Jacob Burckhardt, said once: 'Small States are irresistibly compelled to solve their own problems, otherwise they are bound to be crushed; and they have to confine their essential problems to the cultural sphere, which is the only sphere in which all their citizens can take an active part. Large States, on the other hand, rather lend themselves to achievements in the material sphere, in which the individual citizen is merely an anonymous figure.'

'The small States—wrote another Swiss, Koegi—are the only places in the world where the greatest possible percentage of inhabitants are real citizens in the full sense of the word, actively sharing the responsibility of public life. The small States, therefore are productive, whilst the Great Powers merely protect and preserve culture, and pass it on to the vast multitude of their passive citizens.'

The distinguished Dutch historian, Dr. Johan Huizinga, now in exile in Switzerland, wrote a book '*The Growth of National Conscience in Modern Europe*', published recently in Switzerland. The work is a defence of small nations, maintaining that they alone can give richness to society. 'The highest and best values in the spheres of wisdom, beauty and culture have originated within narrow political

frontiers. . . . Our time is so much inclined to pay an almost religious veneration to quantity as such, that a defence of small States is more than opportune. . . . None of the really great and lasting values in the world are due to what we would call the Great Powers. The Empires of Alexander the Great and Rome rested entirely on the cultural foundations laid by the small political units of ancient Greece and Rome. The greatest period of German culture was when Germany consisted of three hundred States; and it was in fact chiefly the product of one of the smallest of them—the tiny Duchy of Weimar. . . . If the foundations of culture are to remain intact, and if right and justice are to attain again their validity, the term 'Great Power' will easily become a derogatory one.'

The small countries are undoubtedly victims to that queer poetic justice which rules our world. I do not suppose that this poetic justice will disappear after the war, but I shall be only too happy to see it at least reduced. When a great Power speaks about its strategic frontiers, people regard this as a just claim. But when a small country speaks about strategic frontiers such claim is treated with suspicion. Nobody in Europe would question the necessity of maintaining the British domination in Gibraltar, Malta and Aden and scores of other places, although they cannot be defended by any ethnographical claim or reason, but when a small country defends its borderland territory, ethnographic arguments are immediately raised against it. When a great Power treats its minorities in a most dismal way it is claimed that in the interests of centralisation such a treatment is unavoidable—but woe to a small country which treats its minorities as Czechoslovakia did her unruly Sudeten Germans. They lived and thrived in Czechoslovakia while Germany abused Czechoslovakia for alleged inhumanity and treated her own minorities in an abominable way. This pattern proved very successful as the propaganda machine of a great Power, especially of a totalitarian Power, which is so much more powerful than the counter-action of a small country. The treatment of the Ukrainians in Poland was a matter of long and angry disputes, while the lot of over

30 million Ukrainians in Soviet Russia was obviously a negligible affair. The appeal of the Polish Government in London to the international Red Cross to investigate the matter of the Polish officers murdered in the Katyn Wood was criticised by many, while the American condemnation of the murder of some 10 American airmen by the Japanese was acclaimed as a just reminder that our civilisation has deteriorated to the level of the primitive tribes.

The principle of administering one justice to the great and another to the small should be at least rationed, if we mean to enter a world of limited justice and honesty.

21.

The military unpreparedness of the Western Powers spelt doom on the small nations of Europe. The only cause open to them was to allow themselves to be eaten one by one by the crocodile. By doing so they gave the western Powers time to prepare; their sacrifice proved the first line of defence for these Powers. Personally I even doubt the wisdom of appealing to the small countries to move against Germany in a concentrated action. Had they moved against Germany they would have been smashed immediately. Had Sweden moved with Norway she would already have been Hitler's domain. The same applies to Turkey. This policy may be called immoral, but it was necessitated by the lamentable state of military strength of some great Powers.

22.

Let us examine now the mutual relations of the four proposed partners of the Grand Coalition: Great Britain, Russia, United States and China.

There is a growing realisation of the fact that this country and the United States must work together; their community of aims is by no means established yet and the United States is showing tendencies which are rather disturbing to the British. The enormous drive of American expansion from Jamaica down to Turkey, the work of the Pan-American Airways, which may be compared to the conquest of the *Compagnie des Indes* of the remote period, the coming struggle for the share-out in the air, the fact that the American influence is being felt more and more distinctly

in Australia, Canada and in the Pacific, these are facts which call for accommodation. I do not doubt that those two great nations will find a formula of compromise, but the fact remains that the United States with its 130 million inhabitants, with its newly awakened consciousness of being a great Power and its terrific dynamic urge, is a rather difficult partner for this country. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suppose that in this war both countries can create a true union, a sort of *Pax AnglAmericana* as one writer expressed it recently, a common culture as universal as French culture once was. If America is not driven into isolation again, such a union might materialize.

The progress of the British and American forces has been watched with hope and rejoicing by all the subjugated nations of the Continent. In the determination of the British and American troops to force their way to Europe and to invade the oppressed Continent, the countries of Europe see the best guarantee of order and of the preservation of those essential human values and liberties which have been mortally threatened by the totalitarian States.

The average man on the Continent remembers that the British Army behaves well and that it was the United States who, after the last war, came to the rescue of many European countries by sending food and medical help. "Great Britain"—wrote recently the *Daily Mail* in an article 'Britain must hold the Balance of Power'—"is the only European great Power who, in modern times, has consistently repudiated the very idea of domination in Europe, although of all the European Powers she is the one whose domination would be least repugnant." "Great Britain"—explained the same paper on July 13th in an article 'We Must Not Let These People Down'—"must retain her leadership in Europe. She alone of the great Powers is neither hated, nor feared, nor distrusted."

For these reasons the average man on the Continent looks to Great Britain for the promise of a better future. In setting great hopes on a British-American alliance both in war and peace, Mr. Churchill expresses also the hopes of the nations of Europe. They know from bitter experience that British indifference towards the affairs of Europe in

the period after World War No. 1, brought disastrous consequences and encouraged the German rattlesnake; they know also that the withdrawal of the U.S. from the European scene and from active participation in world affairs robbed the peace established at Versailles of one of its greatest driving forces and *raison d'être*. The fullest British-American collaboration can create the greatest civilised power known in history; a circuit of free nations embracing the globe endowed with all the benefices and natural riches, and bent on the constructive task of promoting the ideas of peace and the free community of men.

No true alliance can be created without a close community of ends and means. Deep affinities and cultural ties existed between France and this country before the last war; genuine community of aims gave girth to the *Entente Cordiale*. Unfortunately, this community of aims ceased to work after Versailles and France and Great Britain drifted apart. The political misery which ensued is a familiar tale to all the European nations and it is needless to recall here the sad story of that disunion.

Great Britain can create a community of aims with the U.S. and stick to it. Mutual mistrust and some divergencies of opinion which sometimes poison the relations between the two Anglo-Saxon powers can be smoothed out by good will and the determination to make the alliance of the two nations into a complete success. It remains to be seen whether this country will be able to forge such a community of aims and ideas with other nations and Allies. But it is most imperative that it should create such a link with the U.S. This is the natural alliance of the British Empire, as the alliance with France was once the natural alliance of the British Isles.

The theory of the Big Four still remains a political scheme, a political conjecture; events will show whether such a scheme can be transformed into a real community of aims and into a working proposition. But the unity of the British Empire and the States remains a practical possibility, an urgent necessity. Such a union is the true basis for any political line-up in the future; such a union is a true rallying point for all nations desiring peace and the preservation of European order.

The nations of Europe are pinning great hopes on the realisation of the British-American alliance; they see in the five letters B.E., U.S.A. the magic formula for solving the many troubles of the world. They accept the British and American military intervention as a welcome necessity; they have seen how the British and American military and civilian authorities behaved in French North Africa; they have seen with what tact and patience the political issue in French North Africa has been tackled by the Allies. The Allies did not impose any hasty solution, but they encouraged a slow elimination of all undesirable elements and the reaching of a working agreement. This is the creative way; the experiment of French North Africa has made the best impression on the nations of Europe.

23.

We know that the British Empire will undergo changes; but in the very will to promote those changes we see the guarantee of its vitality. We know that the neglect of the Empire in the sad pre-war days contributed greatly to the deterioration of the cause and chances of democracy. Lady Rhondda in her brilliant analysis of the position and of the future of the British Empire published recently in *Time and Tide*, pointed out that the British Empire should combine 'order and integration with freedom'. She rightly concluded that 'upon the success of the British solution depends more than the fate of the British Empire.' Mr. Winston Churchill stressed in his Guildhall speech that he was not ashamed of using the old notion of the British Empire although many people nowadays prefer to speak about the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Prime Minister is right; the British Empire has almost infinite possibilities for changing its framework, for improving its institutions; it is by no means a finished product, but a huge work in progress, and the nations of Europe wish to see the continuance of that progress with that wisdom and sense of tolerance which has won for the British Empire a proud name in the world.

Quinton Varley in an article 'What We Need Now is Faith in Britain' published in the *Daily Mail* of March 30th, rightly pointed out that 'Europe fears nothing so much as the break up of the British Empire'. He analysed justly the

feelings of the masses in Europe, stressing that these masses have confidence in British political wisdom, and in the British ability to govern in the most civilised manner. Quinton Varley is right; the nations of Europe believe in Great Britain, provided that this country believes in herself. The most tragic sight for the nations of Europe in the gloomy pre-war period was the disbelief in herself manifested by many moves in British policy. The moment Britain shows full confidence in her strength—a strength wisely used—and in her political abilities, the moment this confidence is strengthened by a full association with the United States, the Continent of Europe will be morally won and will fully support both Anglo-Saxon powers.

A tremendous opportunity is pressed by Fate into the hands of Great Britain and of the United States. May this opportunity not be wasted.

24.

The association of this country with Russia is of a more recent date and nobody can predict how it will develop. The American apprehensions towards Russia are by no means appeased, however hard some British papers try to convince us of this. The United States has adopted China as its favourite child. Nobody can risk a prophecy how Russia will react to the strengthening of China's war and industrial potential. The United States is determined to help China to become a great military power; but once armed China might become a formidable proposition. Whether such a development would please other semi-Asiatic countries, nobody can say. Let us bear in mind the fact that China was left out of the picture for many years and nobody cared about her solitary fight against Japan. China was sold down the river Yangtse to the Japanese as the first victim of appeasement; it should be recalled that only the Germans supplied China with arms and generals and the Russians wanted to influence the course of events by creating the Communist army. The fight between Germany and Russia was carried on not only in Spain but also in China.

Russian and Chinese war aims are by no means identical. Recently an eminent Chinese politician, Prof. T. S. Chien, wrote in the American paper *Foreign Affairs* that 'China watches the policy of the Soviet Union with great

uneasiness. The support that Russia may give to the Chinese Communist Party is always a source of anxiety. The status of Mongolia is an exasperation. The Soviet Union clung tenaciously to the interests which Tsarist Russia had acquired in North Manchuria; then in 1934, under threat, it sold or otherwise ceded them to Japan. That did not help to correct the impression that Communist Russia, too, is capable of imperialist manoeuvres.'

The same Chinese politician expresses some apprehensions vis-à-vis Great Britain in stating as follows: 'The British Government has not expressed a readiness to relax its hold on Tibet, a Chinese territory, or on Burma; nor has it ever declared itself in favour of the full restoration of Manchuria to China.' Mme Chang-Khai-Chek, the wife of the famous Chinese generalissimo, criticised severely during her recent American tour the attitude of Britain towards China. It is significant that recently China has slowly dropped out of the political picture and in the last declarations only the Big Three are mentioned. This demonstrates how unstable is the whole scheme of domination by the Big Four or Big Three. It seems, too, that Russia was by no means pleased with the favourable attitude of the United States towards China.

25.

Both England and the United States are determined to draw Russia into full collaboration and this policy is a sound and wise one. Both countries are adopting the methods of empirical study in their policies; they want to see whether collaboration with Russia is possible, whether Russia after the inhuman ordeal of war will come out of the isolation into which she was forced not only by the fact that before the war Western Powers adopted no clear-cut policy towards Russia and were positively afraid of her, but also by the fact that she wanted to evolve her own system in watertight seclusion and complete isolation from any foreign influence.

26.

The discussions of the future rôle of the small nations revived fears and apprehensions among the countries of Europe. The reaction to all *Machpolitik* suggestions was

definitely hostile from Sweden to Turkey. This reaction must be taken into account in every serious survey of the European situation. It cannot be neglected nor ignored by any responsible statesman.

The recent Russo-Polish controversy has been watched by all European States with keen interest. On the attitude of Poland depended much. Had Poland in the last few months accepted the lead in the German anti-Bolshevik crusade, events in Europe might have taken a slightly different course. By her refusal to take the German bait and her attitude of contempt for the German offers, Poland has once more underlined her uncompromising attitude.

At the same time the Russo-Polish dispute gave food for thought to many European nations. The German campaign conducted against Soviet Russia with a really devastating fury, misfired, but it served as a sort of touch-stone for the reactions of European nations towards the idea of Russian domination.¹ It is completely wrong to regard the Russo-

¹ 'What is happening between Russia and Poland is far better understood in Angora than it is in London! The Polish-Russian crisis has come to be regarded as a kind of test—a test of the validity of treaties signed by the Allied Governments, and especially by the British Government—a test, ultimately, of the balance of power in Europe and of Britain's ability to maintain it. All continental nations are following the Polish-Russian crisis with close attention, for they know that it may lead to events that will, if they are allowed to take their course, decide who is to be the master not merely of Eastern Poland, or even of all Poland, but of the Skoda works, of the Rumanian oilfields, of the Straits, and of Iran, and even Iraq. The "Schweizer Monats-Hefte" wrote, as far back as February, 1943: "Now that Russia is showing her true power, the old historic antitheses are rising everywhere out of the ideological fog, quite irrespective of the systems by which the Powers concerned are governed." To say this is to say that the Polish-Russian crisis has a far greater importance than is generally realised in this country. A deepening antithesis between British and Russian foreign policy either during the Second World War or after would be most dangerous. It can be avoided, all the more so as Great Britain can make sure of one thing in Europe that is all-important to Russia, namely, the permanent elimination of the German menace. She, more than any other Power, can give Russia security in the west. Indeed, she is the only Power that can do so. And, to Russia, security in the West means security everywhere, for if she is not preoccupied with the German menace she will have an unchallenged ascendancy in the Far East.'

(The Editor, *The XIXth Century and After*, June 1943.)

Polish dispute as a sort of a 'private war' conducted by Poland against Russia. Such an approach only narrows the true dimensions of the problem and in fact does injustice to Russia herself. Russia is much too powerful a country to be a problem for one State only. In spite of all the efforts of some circles to camouflage the real difficulties and obstacles, the fact remains that Russia's attitude towards the world of the future is one of paramount importance to everybody. All those who object to Poland's allegedly apprehensive attitude towards Russia should read the Swedish press and watch the reactions of the Swiss papers and of public opinion in Turkey. Sweden reacted in a very similar way to the possibilities of Russian domination in Europe as did the Poles, and the Turks, who occupy a key position in Europe, very much similar to that of Poland, have shown an attitude of stern opposition to any suggestions of Russia's supremacy.²

The dissolution of the Comintern has not alleviated the fears of Europe as Comintern had for a long time fallen into disrepute and had actually no successes to its account. A revolutionary body which hails revolution for a too protected time cannot be called successful. Even a delayed action bomb has to explode some time. The nations of Europe are afraid that new slogans—such as Pan Slavism—may replace the Comintern in a much more efficient way. International

² The Turkish Press attacked violently ideas sponsored by the now famous articles of 'The Times'. The Turkish paper 'Vatan' in its issue of March 24th published an article under the title 'The Greatest Step Back in History' where it states that the same political circles which were responsible for engineering the Munich agreement are now in favour of submission to Russia. 'The Times'—said 'Vatan'—'wants to rule out the principle of the independence of small States. . . . Nobody would deny Russia equality of rights with other States, but it is impossible to see in Russia a factor in world security. . . .'

The Turkish Foreign Minister, M. Menemenjoglu in his inaugural address delivered at the opening of the new Institute of International Law in Istanbul, said on May 16th: 'Turks, from the highest placed to the most modest peasant, fought in the past against attempts to impose a 'directory' on them, and likewise their ideal for the future is to arrive at a community of nations without privileges or class distinctions, respectful of individual rights and solidarity in pursuance of a common ideal. Turks believe that each nation should be free to determine the requirements of her vital interests and to adopt them to the particular conditions of her national life. Those

slogans are not too powerful in their appeal to the masses : national and racial slogans have proved more successful. The French revolution swept Europe under the nationalistic banner and Hitler started his Napoleonic conquest under the slogan of uniting all Germans. There is a strong analogy between the German manoeuvres in creating the unity of Deutschland and the Russian moves in setting up the Pan-Slav movement.

The nations of Europe desire to collaborate with Russia and they hope that Russia will emerge from this war a much more world-minded nation. They will be only too happy to drop their apprehensions vis-à-vis Russia, but the only way in convincing them that their fears are unfounded is to create such an order where even the strongest will not be able to resort to force. The problem of Russia is by no means limited to Poland or to the Baltic States. The sooner Russia's attitude to Europe and to the whole world is more clearly defined, the better for our common course; otherwise this problem is bound to weigh on the minds of the people of Europe and inevitably produce recurrent spasms of anxiety. It can eventually lead to another world conflagration.

27.

It seems that the proposed Four-Power scheme lacks the fundamental community of aims; it is a war-time necessity, coupled with the good will and determination of the two

principles must remain intact in future on condition that this right of self-determination does not in its essence constitute a danger of aggression against others, and that there will be a supreme law which will frame and govern everything.'

Hr. Bagge, the Swedish Minister of Education and leader of the Conservative Party in a speech delivered in Stockholm on May 16th said : 'Some quarters have loudly proclaimed that the existence of small neutral States is no longer tolerable or even imaginable. What the German 'new order' would mean we have been clearly told in detail. We know less about what the Allied international organisation for the preservation of peace entails. Though the Atlantic Charter was greeted with joy and hopefulness, not least from the smaller peoples, we have also seen authoritative statements in the opposite sense in the British and American Press. A new Holy Alliance blandly basing inroads on the smaller States independence and integrity on the so-called security need of the great Powers, and dividing Europe into spheres of interest, would be a very unwholesome atmosphere for the small States, who must take all precautions to maintain their freedom and independence.'

34

Anglo-Saxon Powers to make the best of the job after the war. But whether such a policy will succeed or not, it is much too early to decide. We do not know how this war will end, whether all the United Nations will adopt the same attitude towards the principles of the Atlantic Charter, whether war-aims will stand the test of peace or armistice. While the Anglo-American alliance is firmly based on facts and deeds (as United States is helping this country to a great extent and without the active help of the U.S. victory would have been simply unthinkable), while the Franco-British alliance of the world war No. 1 was based on the true community of interests, the Soviet-British alliance has no such basis yet.

Last, but not least, a combination of Four Powers of which three are outsiders as far as Europe is concerned, and one, Great Britain, is only close to Europe but not in Europe, leaves a gap between Russia and England; in this void the whole of Europe is actually situated. The artificiality of such a scheme is too obvious to need to be stressed. The whole plan lacks logical connection. It leaves out Europe, too, as a great centre of human and cultural values.

Unless the Big Four or the Big Three establish a similarity of views and aims (for an identity is almost unobtainable and even undesirable in this world), unless they adopt a similar code of behaviour and a similar attitude towards the fundamental issues of peace, freedom and human rights, we must well doubt whether the Big Four will be able to guarantee the peace of the world. The fact that they will be the most powerful States left in the field by the end of the war is by no means a proof they will be in accord and that they can evolve a wise and broad-minded system. This association might be a basis for very useful work, if all the nations are asked to collaborate, or it might prove only a preparation for a much bigger onslaught.

28.

It is a lamentably short-sighted policy to conceal differences and obstacles, to practise a sort of political Coué system by repeating that "everything is fine, must be fine and will be fine." This system of political camouflage, of silencing the warnings and of making light of the apprehen-

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sions of some European countries, failed completely during the depressing pre-war period of delusions. It is a positive disservice to the cause of truth and to the cause of post-war reconstruction, to try to hide the real discrepancies and differences in outlook which exist between the Western world and the Soviet Union.³

No amount of reasoning and arguments can explain away the fact that people on the Continent of Europe are nervous of Communism and it should not be assumed that they will accept explanations and ideas sponsored by some influential circles in this country. "In one matter in particular"—wrote *The Tablet* recently—"English writers should be careful not to commit themselves. They cannot assume that they will be accepted on the continent as the best people to explain either Bolshevism or Russia or the relations between the Comintern and the Government of the U.S.S.R."

Let us hope that time will bring a change in that attitude which, by discouraging plain speaking, creates an atmosphere of suspicion and mystery. Europe is tired of mystery, of more or less camouflaged threats and of the agonising

³ It is to be feared that new slogans, such as Pan Slavism, are going to replace old and discredited ones like Comintern and Communism of the Moscow brand. National and racial slogans and war-cries proved very efficient in Hitler's imperialistic campaign; there is a strong resemblance between the German campaign for uniting the 'Deutschtum' and the Pan Slavonic drive engineered by Moscow. But while Germany could have posed as a champion of Germanism it is infinitely more difficult for Russia to claim the leadership in the Slavonic world. The Soviet Union is a federation of Republics of various racial origin, composed of many races (like the Tartars, Tadzys, Turkmen and others), and cannot be regarded as a 'Slav' country. Russian claims about the Slav brother-races in the Balkans should be treated with full reserve.

Recently the Russian authorities took steps to reconstitute the Synod of the Orthodox Church. Some papers in this country interpreted this step as being taken 'in response to popular feeling'. Said the 'Tribune' of September 10th: 'The Synod of the Orthodox Church would become a rallying point for all 'believers' outside Russia. They are numerous and influential in the Balkans and not insignificant in Poland. . . This is another political blow in the battle for the soul of the Balkans. . .'

The political action of rallying the 'Deutschtum' constituted the operational base for German expansion; it remains to be seen whether the Moscow drive of Pan Slavism will be followed by expansionist plans.

suspense. It wants clarity and a clear statement of aims.⁴

The continuation of a state of suspense favours only the policy of Germany who is hammering into the heads of the populations of Europe that the collapse of the Reich will inevitably bring a reign of chaos and that the Allies want to hand over the small nations of Eastern and South Eastern Europe to Russia.

The nations of Europe desire peace and stability. The redundant proclamations of some arm-chair revolutionaries do not appeal to them; the countries of Europe fear social unrest and all sorts of revolutionary experiments. They do believe that the Allies will not promote revolutions but order.⁵

⁴ The attitude of the British Press towards problems of European security and Russia's aims in Europe underwent recently a marked change. "Daily Mail" of August 23rd said: "What we need is a little more open diplomacy and plain speaking. Their absence creates an atmosphere beloved by rumourmongers and mischief-makers. We do not know what effect all this mystery is having on the enemy, but frankly it scares us." The same paper in an article published on August 28th: "The Russians in particular would do well to be less enigmatic. Their present aloofness, though to some extent understandable in view of their terrific military task, has ceased to be helpful. The complete lack of knowledge of Russian hopes and intentions after the war keeps the governments of Finland and Rumania bound the more closely to Germany, sustains doubts in the minds of the Poles, and encourages well-disposed neutrals like Sweden and Turkey to remain outside the struggle if they can. It further encourages the diehards of Britain and America to withdraw still more closely into their outworn political shells." The London correspondent of the "New York Times" stated recently: "Russia is fighting to-day on the side of freedom and democracy, but it does not follow that her aims and aspirations are completely in harmony with those of the United States and Britain. The three countries have a common enemy, but it is by no means certain they have a common purpose. Marshal Stalin wants to embrace within the Soviet Union all the Baltic States and parts of Poland and the Balkans which he believes will ensure post-war Soviet impregnability. It is in part this political manoeuvring that makes Russian and Anglo-American Communists so vocal in their demand for an immediate opening of a large-scale offensive in the West. . . The Russians, however, can overplay their hand. For a long time there was a feeling of shame among some people here that Britain was doing so little and Russia so much to win the war. But the people of the United States and Britain rightly regard their struggle against the German submarines, their opposition of North Africa and the conquest of Sicily as a considerable achievement.

The growing uncertainty about Russia's aims is playing indirectly into Germany's hands. The chances of the so-called 'good Germans' will increase and the many illusions about Germany will be revived. Germany after the war might become a battlefield of contending policies of the Great Powers; and from such a turn of events only Germany will profit.

'Spheres of interest'—wrote *The New Statesman* of August 21st—'are an unpleasant relic from the older technique of imperialism. The solution at which we ought to aim, however difficult it may seem, is the integration of Europe as a single whole. We are glad to note that the

They have been taught to believe that the Anglo-American air offensive over Germany is a direct contribution to German defeat and they are getting somewhat fed up with the constant belittling of their war effort from Moscow."

"The Economist" of August 28th in the article "Uncertain Alliance" wrote: "Behind all that the British and American can do there lies a question of confidence. No one can compel the Russians to accept the proofs of Allied sincerity. No one can compel them to take a co-operative and not an isolationist view of their long-term interests. . . . The withdrawal of one of the greatest military and industrial Powers into moody and suspicious isolation would have as disastrous an effect on any attempt to build an ordered world as had the withdrawal of the United States after the last war. But such an outcome would be tragic not only for the nations outside Russia, but most of all for the Russian people themselves. . . . Marshal Stalin is great enough to cut through the tangle of resentment and suspicion. He, least of all men, needs to be hagridden by the kind of fears that made Hitler a maniac of encirclement."

The Editor of the "XIXth Century and After" writes in the September issue of the paper: "Russian aspirations contain the stuff of the Anglo-Russian tension for the last 100 years. They would, if realised, overthrow the Balance of Power. They would, in the end, compel Great Britain, whether she liked it or not, to modify her attitude towards Germany. Is an Anglo-Russian conflict therefore inevitable? It is not, though it will certainly come if the issue is not faced, if the English press continues to conceal it (whereas the American and the neutral Press expounds it freely and at length) and if the conduct of British foreign policy, by its compliance and its ingrained habit of appeasement lead, or rather mislead, Russia into belief that Great Britain and the Empire are much weaker than they are in reality and much more accommodating than they are likely to remain."

Times, which once toyed with the idea of bisection, rejected it. . . . A solution on these lines would be short-lived: before many years were up, Moscow and London, or both of them, would be angling and competing for Germany's weight to redress the sagging balance of power. The prosperity of this mainly agrarian Eastern borderland depends on its economic relations with Central Europe: the key to its future is to industrialise it on some plan suggested by the Tennessee Valley model. It can live and thrive only within an integrated Europe. That some of its inhabitants are Slavs who have a fraternal feeling for Russia, should serve, with the sentiments of the whole European Left, to reassure her that an integrated continent cannot become her enemy.'

'Relations between the Atlantic Powers'—wrote Peter F. Drucker, author of the well-known and brilliant book *The End of Economic Man*, in an article 'Europe After the

⁵ 'There are people in England—wrote "The Tablet" of September 4th in the article "The English Tradition and Europe"—whose idea of liberating Europe is to bribe or beat the liberated peoples into having proletarian revolutions. The effect of the war, enhancing national feeling, will not help that type of revolution if it tries to keep its old international forces; and if the revolution is also fiercely nationalist, it offers no basis for achieving or maintaining peace.'

'We should present our country to Europe, not as the country which likes to encourage violent revolutionaries on the mainland, sitting high and dry like Lucretius' mariner and watching the turmoil and crises of others with a less stable national and political tradition. Our greatest asset on the Continent is needlessly squandered if we do not present ourselves in our true colours, as a nation which believes in a slow and gradual change, and an almost fanatical respect for the rights of the private man against the executive.'

("The Tablet" of August 14th, 1943.)

Fortunately enough, the British and American authorities followed a different line in French North Africa; this policy of a slow elimination of undesirable elements was crowned with success. A similar method was adopted in dealing with Italy. Claims, put up by some radical circles in this country, that Italy will be swept by revolution and that the country is seething with unrest, proved completely unfounded. The Italian nation did show no desire to start a civil war; the Spanish experience provided a proper lesson. The policy of the Allies vis-à-vis Italy, marked by patience and full understanding for the difficult position of Italy, brought results. The Allies did not resort to the policy of proclaiming a revolution in Italy and they were rewarded for adopting a wise and far-sighted course.

War' published in *Harper's Magazine* of April, 1943—'can be only those of fear, mutual suspicion and open antagonism unless the question of the Continent is out of the way. Neither side can allow the other to dominate the Continent; yet both would have to try to do just that if Europe were in a state of chaos. . . . An unsettled Continent of Europe would therefore at once become the world's Balkans. . . . The stabilization of the Continent . . . would solve none of the great problems of international politics. . . . But precisely because in international politics the war is primarily a war of the European succession, a stable Continent of Europe is the pre-requisite to any post-war order.'

'It is always better to rely on one's own strength'—wrote the Editor of the *XIXth Century and After* in the September, 1943, issue of that paper—'than on the weakness of others. The future European order must be based on its own intrinsic strength rather than on the weakness of one of its members. A certain reduction of Germany's exorbitant power having been accomplished, it will be necessary to build up the strength—political and economic, as well as military—that will constitute the new European order. Far more important than the forcible disintegration of Germany is the free integration of Europe as a whole. Far more important than the impoverishment of Germany is the increased prosperity of the other European nations. It will be found that European integration is, in a last analysis, the concomitant of the Balance of Power. Without European integration the Balance of Power cannot be maintained. Without the Balance of Power there can be no integrated Europe. It is a common error—and one persistently propagated by the Germans—to suppose that the Balance of Power divides Europe. The opposite is true—it unites Europe against every attempt at domination. The Balance is not the cause of war—the failure to maintain it is the cause of war. Europe, balanced and integrated, means an enduring peace and security for all.'

30.

The best way to appease the legitimate fears of Europe is to declare clearly and unequivocally that the Atlantic Charter is binding to all the Allies and that a system of

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European federations is essential for the stability of peace. Otherwise the United Nations stand a good chance of drifting apart.

The United Nations must work out a real community of aims based on the respect for each other's integrity and they must lead to the freedom of each country to choose her own way. That does not mean a return to the *laissez faire* slogan or parochial nationalism. It is obvious that countries after this war must unite their forces and create larger units, but those units should grow little by little, region by region, by the free consent of the parties concerned. It takes time to create such a community. Every interference with this delicate process would end in a catastrophe.

One cannot unite regions which are completely different in their manners and ways of life, in their conception of the very values of life. This is a fundamental problem and every attempt to overrule it, by dividing Europe only, on the basis of political or economic slogans, would result in a new conflict.

It is definitely not in the interests of the Anglo-Saxon democracies to confront Europe with a choice between a domination from the West or from the East. It would only mean splitting up Europe into two inimical camps, it means nothing less and nothing more than setting up a pattern for civil war.

31.

The nations of Europe live on faith—faith in their own values and merits, in spiritual and moral values, in the dignity of the human individual crushed by the totalitarian machine of conquest. They cherish more than ever their former free life, although they are well aware that they have sinned heavily against the spirit of international co-operation and that their political life was by no means free from blunders and errors. But nevertheless the spirit which is to-day alive among the European nations is that of almost desperate belief that they cannot lose and that this war will be a senseless monstrosity, if all their efforts and ordeals are to be in vain.

This attitude was best expressed in a message written by Jan Masaryk to one of the leading American papers: "We

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are fighting, when all is said and done, for freedom and independence . . . domination is hateful even when the dominating power is paternal, solicitous and beneficent. Europe is not a *kindergarten*, and as a wise British statesman once put it, self-government is better than good government."

In spite of the fact that the countries of Europe are holding with an almost fanatical faith to their ideas of nationalism they have not lost sight of the necessity of international collaboration. It is to be assumed that there exists a genuine movement for international collaboration among all the European countries and that the essentials of such a collaboration are far better understood by the masses than they used to be before the outbreak of war. But it is only natural that this feeling is, so to speak, unorganised, and has not yet assumed any definite forms.

32.

The leadership of Germany in Eastern Europe has been tacitly admitted by the Munich agreement which spelt doom to all countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Great Britain abandoned the line taken at Munich not only because of the repeated perjury of Berlin but also because she realised at the eleventh hour that the German combine which will emerge after the conquest of Eastern Europe will prove too strong and too dangerous for the Western powers.

The other alternative: Russia's leadership in Eastern Europe is certainly not a safe solution for this country. Russia is rather poorly equipped for the task of leadership among the countries which from the point of view of material civilization and prosperity compare favourably with Russia. The leadership of Russia would inevitably mean a rapid deterioration in the standard of living of the Eastern-European area and impoverishment of that region.*

The choice for Europe should not lie between Germany and Russia, two enormous reservoirs of energy and dynamic strength. They should be separated by a layer of states which are destined to assume a rôle of mediator between

* The remarks contained in this chapter are a reprint of my article published in September, 1941, in the "Fortnightly".

Germany and Russia both in an economic and political sense.

It is only too clear that the chaotic conditions which prevailed in the area of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe before this war cannot be allowed to continue. Neither an independent Poland nor a free Czechoslovakia is a sufficient barrier to Germany. But even a Polish-Czechoslovak union gives no proper guarantee that Eastern Europe can resist the German pressure. Eighty million Germans must be counterbalanced by some eighty or ninety million Slavs and other national groups. It seems that the wisest possible course would be to reconstruct a bloc of states stretching from the Baltic down to the Adriatic and Black Seas. The Baltic States would bring into such a federation their industriousness and highly developed social sense, Poland her moral and cultural traditions combined with the consciousness of her mission in the East of Europe, and Czechoslovakia her splendidly organized industry and hard-working masses. Poland and Czechoslovakia are in many respects complementary countries, and they can help each other enormously by keeping the closest possible contact. Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia would be assets of most promising material.

Such a federation based on the lifeline of the Danube and on the shores of the Baltic and Adriatic Seas would have every chance of avoiding the blunders of the old Austrian monarchy and to develop an economic and political life more harmonious and happy than did the Hapsburgs. This federation could, and indeed must, collaborate closely with Russia. One of the greatest disasters of the post-war period was the exclusion of Russia from the economic framework of the world. Russia's retreat from the world market was felt for the twenty years of the *Zwischenkrieg* period. Russia must be included again into the economic framework of Europe and a federation of the Eastern-European states would be the best medium and intermediary between Russia and Western Europe.

In all the post-war plans the help of this country and of the United States would be essential. Not only the material help in carrying out the work of reconstruction but, above all, the moral help, the wise and steady influence of this

country which must be constantly felt in Eastern Europe to educate that area politically. Great Britain must impart her great political wisdom and knowledge, her manners and her style of life to the peoples of Eastern Europe which should not look to this country in vain for a real political leadership. This country must believe in its great political and educational mission and put it into practice immediately after the conclusion of this conflict, if not before. All voices which betray signs of a certain resignation are detrimental to the prestige of this country. They are a confession of weakness.

33.

The creation of a bloc of states in Central-Eastern Europe seems to be the best way of demonstrating to the Anglo-Saxon world that that region is not a sort of political Wild West—as the Germans would make us believe—but rather a composite and harmonised unit.

It appears that the problem of re-education of the whole of Europe—because all Europe will need quite a lot of re-education after the devastation of war—will constitute one of the major tasks of the post-war reconstruction. This re-education should be carried out in small groups rather than in big classes. And this fact favours also regional federations and unions.

There is another factor which speaks for the regional federation in Europe. Some spheres are bound together by historic links and by the fact that they resisted certain pressures throughout many ages. The region which lies between Russia and Germany seems to be a natural entity. The fact that such nations as Finland or Estonia or Latvia emerged after so many centuries of a foreign rule as energetic nations, proves that they possess a genuine and creative vitality. The fact that Bulgaria, Rumania and Serbia emerged from the Turkish tide, proves that these states are by no means mere products of the disruption of the great Ottoman State, but living units which cannot be swallowed either by the Powers of the East or of the West, or of the South. In short, the region between Germany and Russia has proved that it possesses its own national and historic consciousness and that it belongs neither to Germany nor to

Russia. This region by its adhesion to certain ideals both national, religious and cultural has proved that it strives towards a free expression of its lawful ambitions and rights. In other words the region between Russia and Germany has been made coherent and self-conscious to a great extent by the very fact of the pressure exerted by both states.

For that reason the countries stretching from the Adriatic to the Black and Baltic Seas can be considered a certain unity, although that unity was never achieved or put into practice. But we have to bear in mind the fact that in the past one of the greatest obstacles working against that unity was the necessity of fighting too many adversaries and foes. The region between Russia and Germany has fought against Austria, Germany, Russia and Turkey. If Russia remains friendly disposed towards this region, the whole sphere will have to defend its Western wall only—that against Germany. This fact should facilitate enormously the chances of uniting that region.

34.

The sphere between Russia and Germany conducted wars mainly against those two Powers with the addition of the Turkey of the old days. In other words, wars between nations of Central Europe are infrequent and far between. It does not mean that there are no enmities among the nations of that region. Such a statement would be much too optimistic. But it means only that wars between those nations have been conducted rather on minor issues, while the wars they conducted against Germany or Russia or Turkey were wars where major issues—that of survival and existence—were involved. This is only natural as the nations of that belt between Germany and Russia are too small to swallow and destroy each other. But they can be absorbed by such vast States as Germany or Russia.

From these remarks the conclusion can be drawn that the countries stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea have all the chances of uniting their forces not only in the economic but also in the political domain. The access to the three seas and the great life-line of the Danube constitute great assets of such a union. Historic reminiscences and cultural links can help enormously in the creation of that

feeling of community of fate which is an essential precondition of any genuine political union.

The belt of States between Germany and Russia did show in the past several attempts at uniting their forces. Efforts have been made by the Great Moravian State and by the Hungarian State and then by the Polish Kingdom, to unite some parts of this region. These attempts have been more or less successful, and I suppose, without indulging in national pride and vanity, that the Polish attempt of creating a union with Lithuania and Ruthenia and at the same time maintaining the most friendly relations with Bohemia and Hungary, was by far the most durable. Another attempt was made by the Hapsburg Monarchy, which undoubtedly constituted a barrier against the expansion of the German Reich.

It remains to be seen in what respect those efforts could be repeated and perfected. But actually it is not the problem of putting the clock back and of coming on the old tracks of history which have been wind-swept and buried under the quicksands of events. It is a problem of creating among the nations of the region between Russia and Germany a feeling of community and of telling those nations that in the past they have made successful efforts to unite their forces and that their unity is the best and only guarantee of survival. I would not like to suggest that Austria-Hungary is *the* pattern on which we should rebuild the region between the Adriatic and the Black Sea. I only would like to point out that Austro-Hungary was yet another attempt at organising this region and that that constitutes another case for the theory that the unity of the region from the Baltic to the Adriatic, is based on some natural factors.

The favourite theory of the German propaganda was to represent this region as a hot-bed of political intrigues and disorder. German efforts have been directed towards convincing the European opinion that this whole sphere east and south of Germany is incapable of organising itself and that it will constitute a constant and recurrent danger to the security of Europe. This theory was accepted by many States and by public opinion in the West, because the war in the Balkans proved to be the prelude to the first world

war, which started later in Serbia. The second world war started also, not in the West, but in the East of Europe.

The region between Germany and Russia has to show to the world that it is capable of building a unity and that the German theory about the rebellious spirit of that sphere does not correspond to the facts.⁶

"The middle zone will give Russia permanent security but only if the countries of this zone form a strong association, for if that association is weak, through disunity, above all, it will invite, instead of repelling German eastern expansion. The middle zone is the only possible basis of collaboration between England and Russia . . . they have a common and vital interest in defending this zone." (*The XIXth Century*, November 1941.)

Peter F. Drucker in his already quoted article on "Europe After the War" (*Harper's Magazine*, April 1943) comes to the conclusion that the only solution for Europe is "to make the nations of Eastern Europe between Germany and Russia so strong and unified that they could balance a strong Germany and that they would be immune to social and political unrest emanating from a weak Germany."

35.

"A strong Poland is more, and not less necessary to Europe than in 1919"—wrote *The Tablet* in May, 1943—"but the definition of strength has altered. Poland, like the other states of Central Europe, will only be strong in some larger framework of a confederation. Frontier questions divide in greater or lesser degree all the Central-European

⁶ In his recently published book, "U.S. Foreign Policy", Walter Lippmann, the eminent American commentator and publicist, expressed the opinion that the only possible solution for the countries West of Russia is to try to steer towards a policy of neutrality. While being obviously in favour of such a solution, Lippmann is fully aware of the many difficulties in putting this idea into practice. Lippmann realizes the necessity of coming to an understanding with Russia; he is aware, too, of the fact that Russia's attitude towards the world is of paramount importance to the problem of peace and security. 'If the post-war settlement', says Lippmann, 'discloses a conflict of interests between Russia and the Western Allies, then every nation must get ready and choose sides in the eventual but unavoidable next war.'

peoples who have this common over-riding interest in a continuing association for mutual defence and support. It is to the interest of them all to humanize the idea of the frontier, and not to approach frontiers as they were approached after the last war in which the sovereign States eagerly collected minorities and tried to set a national stamp on them. If the utility services of Europe are organized internationally that in itself will quicken the conception of a European citizenship. Economic questions ought to be approached with the same aim in view."

"It is a most dangerous error to assume that the German problem exhausts the European problem"—wrote the Editor of the *XIXth Century* of September 1943—"and that the European problem will have been solved when Germany has been reduced to permanent impotence. The European problem cannot be solved unless the Eastern European problem is solved. What is the Eastern European problem? It is the maintenance of the countries between the Baltic and Aegean as independent communities and their integration as an organic whole. Because those countries were not independent during the period when Germany became a great Power, and because, although independent as a result of the first world war, they were not integrated, Europe achieved neither balance nor integration and the European problem remained unsolved. Europe cannot submit to a general, uniform federation, for a Europe that is not multiform is no Europe at all. Europe demands variety. . . ."

"Whatever power is master of that region—which has been called the middle zone—is master of all Europe. That is why this region is the most contested and coveted of all. . . . To be master of Eastern Europe is, therefore, to be master of all Europe. If England were to abdicate in Eastern Europe she would be abdicating in all Europe. Such a policy would lead to her isolation, it would destroy the British ascendancy in the Near and Middle East. . . . It would compel England to reconsider her attitude towards Germany. . . . It would also establish a gigantic rivalry in Europe. The Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area would be in one sphere, the Central-European in another. The Germans would be in between and, however weak they might be, they will hold the balance."

The chances of integrating Europe are by no means bright. There are forces working in Europe which are definitely opposed to the idea of integration and order. In Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, in Greece and other parts of Europe there are forces at work which do not want the stability being introduced in the community of Europe. Recently the Moscow paper, "Working Masses and the War", explained that there are some schemes which Russia cannot look upon favourably. One of those schemes, explained the Moscow paper, is the plan of federation of states of Eastern Europe, another a plan of a Pan-Europe, or a huge European merger.⁷

From these explanations it follows that Soviet Russia is not in favour of any integration of European spheres.⁸

I do not offer any practical suggestions of what to do with Germany after the war. But, in my humble opinion, it is wrong to ask in a plaintive and often helpless voice what to do with the Reich. Certainly, Germany is *the* central problem of Europe, but she is not the only problem. Our first care should be Europe as a whole, which is a much bigger entity than Germany. Our first care is how to

⁷ It has been argued in some circles in this country and in the U.S. that the federation of Eastern European States might, to Russian nostrils, smell of "cordon sanitaire". From the explanations of the Moscow paper it is to be assumed that any system of security and federation in Europe is viewed by Russia with suspicion and that an integrated Europe is regarded by some Russian circles as a "cordon sanitaire" on a larger scale.

⁸ "Her aims in Europe are made clear by her declared policies and her propaganda and by the support she gives to various armed Partisan movements, and to political parties that are Communist in all but name. The Comintern, which was officially disbanded a short while ago, is now a permanent Congress, representing the Communist and pro-Russian movements of all countries, but following a national rather than a social programme. In Germany, Russia, in her propaganda supports a prospective Conservative, rather than a prospective Socialist opposition, and is evidently preparing for a special arrangement with the Germany that will emerge from the war. Broadly speaking, Russia is promoting the disintegration of all Europe and, in particular, of the region

strengthen the framework of Europe in such an efficient way that it will make any new break-out by Germany impossible. I do think that by the strengthening of the whole European framework and of the spheres bordering on Germany we will come nearer to the solution of the problem than we did the last time. Those spheres must be considerably coherent and strong to serve their purpose.

38.

The Europe of to-morrow must grow up as an organic unit, as a living thing. For that reason this Europe should grow, as it were, bit by bit, region by region. Only from a slow and organic growth of these regions, united in themselves, there can arise the sound body of a united, but multi-form Continent.

It seems that Germany, much against her will, is doing some valuable work for our common cause. First of all, she is responsible for that community of hate which seems to be something without parallel in the history of Europe. Secondly, she is responsible for that community of fate which has been created in Europe out of misery and poverty and starvation. Thirdly, she is responsible for the spirit of European brotherhood through the fact that against her very will she brings together millions of foreign workers who are now working in the Reich. Fourthly, she helps in

between the Baltic and Aegean. She has declared the future annexation of the eastern half of Poland and has carried out a clandestine occupation of that half by means of secret emissaries. By the activities of the Polish Workers Party (which is directed from Russia) in western Poland and by her attempt to stir up premature insurrection, it is evident that she means to make western Poland a Russian dependency. By thwarting every attempt at collaboration between Poland and Czechoslovakia and by promoting the disintegration of Yugoslavia in particular and of the Balkans in general, she has isolated Czechoslovakia. Russia is determined to control the industries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, especially those of Bohemia. Control of the latter would enable her to transfer the movable plant to the Urals and to direct Czech skilled labour, of which she will be in great need, to the Russian interior. She is also promoting the disintegration of Rumania, with a view, no doubt, to controlling the delta of the Danube and the oil-fields. She is determined to secure direct, unimpeded access to the Mediterranean and perhaps even the Adriatic." (The XIXth Century and After, August, 1943.)

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imparting into the heads of the nations of Europe the truth that they must unite.

These are positive factors which work for the unity of Europe. Let us hope that as Napoleon by trampling on the German principalities, united (much against his will) those principalities into one German Reich—so Hitler, by subjugating the whole of Europe will bring to it this sense of unity which is by no means an unknown thing to us, as Europe in the Middle Ages was united by religious ideas. It seems that the time has come when Europe can be united by economic and political as well as cultural ideas.

39.

One of the greatest tasks which we shall face after the war is how to transform the negative qualities such as hate with which Europe to-day is imbued, if not saturated, into positive qualities, such as the will to build up a better future. Our greatest asset seems to be the fact that the regeneration of all healthy organisms can be effected much more quickly than physicians suppose, given a proper diet and a healthy climate. If these two conditions are secured, and if the European nations come to the conclusion that life is worth living and that it means responsibility and the sharing of new duties—we can reckon with a steady, if slow, recuperation. But if the nations of Europe are presented with the possibility of another bondage or even with an economic and political supremacy, if they are confronted with the prospect of mental subservience to some domination, then the recuperation will be not only retarded but may be completely thwarted. Human beings and human communities can thrive and flourish only when they face the prospect of a free life, when they feel that they are needed, that they must undertake new responsibilities and that they count for something in the world. That is the only sure method of revitalizing Europe's energy.

40.

The discussion on the rôle of the small nations has been a useful one. The reaction of the neutral countries to the suggestion sponsored by some circles in this country and

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America, serves as an indication that Europe is viewing with suspicion all attempts at mechanical superseding of one power element by another and that it does not believe in such arrangements. Undoubtedly, it is tempting—because it is so easy—to apply mechanical remedies in politics. The creative way, by which all the nations of Europe should share the responsibility for the security of Europe and add their energies to the common toil, is immensely more difficult. But it is worth trying. For only by the free consent of nations can we build up a solid structure of peace; all “orders” which are imposed on nations are bound to break down sooner or later. The first attitude is dictated by impatience and political pessimism; the latter needs patience and a belief in the creative energies of Europe. Any idea that the greatness of nations can be judged solely by their war potentials and by the numbers of their populations, must be rejected. Something more is needed to make a nation great; and this war would have been fought in vain if some moral and spiritual values were not rescued from the depressing materialistic outlook which has been threatening the culture of modern man.

41.

A dangerous tendency can be discovered among some writers and politicians both in this country and in the United States; its aim is to differentiate between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe. Thus the Continent of Europe is being divided into two spheres to which different ways and rules of conduct should be applied. These attempts are by no means a recent invention; it should be recalled that immediately after the conclusion of hostilities in 1918 the theory of dividing Europe into two different spheres was embraced by some political circles in the West. Germany was sponsoring such a trend almost instinctively; every honest observer of European history is aware of the fact that Germany was always anxious to demonstrate to the world that she is the last outpost of European culture and that all countries east and south-east of Germany cannot be treated on the same footing as the countries west of the Reich. Even to-day German rule in such countries as

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France, Belgium, Holland or Denmark compares favourably with the German rule in Yugoslavia, Greece or Poland.

The tendency to adopt a different policy towards the West and towards the East found an expression in the Treaty of Locarno. Eastern European countries were left out of the picture while Western European States tried to establish for themselves a firm system of security. The Treaty of Locarno divided Europe into a more stable and secure region and into a sphere where conditions are regarded as rather unstable and as being at the mercy of uncalculated factors.

From the same source the Munich Agreement originated; Western Powers wanted to buy peace for themselves sacrificing the Eastern marches of Europe and creating thus a sort of political no-man's-land there.

This system of differentiation between the security and stability in the West and in the East brought about lamentable results. To-day we are witnessing new attempts being made exactly on the same lines. The division of Europe into two spheres: one more privileged and another less secure will, it might be feared, result in another catastrophe.

42.

First of all there is the inveterate conviction that some States in Europe must exist while others may not; there are countries in Europe about which there seems to be no finality, no necessity. They are regarded as political possibilities which may emerge under favourable conditions but may be submerged by any surging tide of imperialism.

Such a state of affairs is highly undesirable from the point of view of European stability and peace. How can we ever hope to secure stability on the Continent of Europe when certain States and countries are being regarded as undefined communities, with changeable frontiers? How can we ever establish peace in Europe when some States east and south-east of Germany are treated as entities which may be moved freely and handed over either to Germany or to Russia?

France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark are all well defined State organisms and

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their boundaries are settled. No reasonable writer or politician advances the theory that half of France, Sweden or Norway should be handed over to this or that country; everybody is inclined to look upon those countries as inviolable in their frontiers. The Western sphere of Europe is well-defined in its boundaries.

As long as the same principles do not apply to the Eastern sphere of Europe, we can hardly expect stability to reign over the whole Continent.

43.

Another example of that duality—if not duplicity—of standards is becoming evident in the recent claims of certain Great Powers that they must insist on having 'friendly' countries and governments on their borders.

Human memory is short and deficient. This line of attack is not original. Many will remember the charges levelled against Czechoslovakia and the Prague Government by the Nazi press and Hitler in the days preceding Munich. Czechoslovakia was then accused of harbouring 'unfriendly' feelings towards the Reich. Germany, wrote the Nazi newspapers, could not tolerate the existence of a State that was a menace to the Reich. It was even said that Czechoslovakia was a kind of Soviet 'aircraft carrier' right on Germany's doorstep. 'Benes must go', the German press demanded. 'He does not represent the true feelings of the Czechoslovak nation', shouted the Nazi broadcasting stations. At the same time, however, German propaganda insisted that the unfriendly attitude of the Czechs must cease and that they must change their attitude towards the Reich; and the Reich, added benevolently Berlin, wants only to protect the Czechs against all threats and dangers, themselves included.

This was the line taken by German propaganda before Munich; Germany then put forward the general theory that a great Power has the right to control the attitude of all governments in the countries bordering on it. The totalitarian idea was launched that the State is omnipotent, and must control all the reactions of its citizens. 'Even your dreams belong to the Fuehrer', cried Dr. Ley in 1938.

At the time of the Munich crisis Germany advanced for the first time the theory that a totalitarian State must control also the attitude of its neighbours. Exactly five years later this Nazi theory is being revived and presented to the world as a political *dernier cri*.

Human memory is short and deficient.

44.

Now let us turn to Western Europe. Does Great Britain claim the right to control the sentiments of the citizens of France, to bring pressure to bear on the Belgian or Dutch Government to change their attitude towards this country? Does any responsible person in this country claim for Britain the right to threaten Eire that unless she changes her attitude to the English she will be punished? Does Whitehall claim the right to change the Government in Dublin? If it did the same people who speak of the 'Polish emigré menace' would denounce such demands from London as a revival of the old imperialism.

French papers before the war were often violently critical of the policy of this country; the attitude of some Irish politicians and newspapers towards Great Britain has been and still is, to say the least, unfriendly. But Great Britain does not threaten Eire with any sort of reprisals.

It is clear that different standards are applied to the conduct of totalitarian and democratic Great Powers.

45.

It is rather fashionable nowadays to accuse the so-called small nations bordering on Russia of 'unfriendly feelings towards Moscow'. But the fact remains that those 'small countries' had agreements with Russia at a time when most Western European countries were reluctant to have any dealings with the Soviet Union. The fears and apprehensions of the Western Powers vis-à-vis Russia were much stronger than prejudices of the countries bordering on Russia. There was a deep resentment in the West due to the fact that Russia deserted in the last war the ranks of the Allies. This resentment reinforced by suspicions was responsible for various interventions of the Western Powers in Russia swept by the tide of revolution.

These attempts are historical facts as well as the 'Zinovieff letter' affair, the Arcos story and many other incidents which were not invented by some people 'unfriendly' to the Soviet Union and hailing from the Eastern marches of Europe. People who are now ready to blame Poland for her action taken in 1920 should remember that hers was not the first intervention in Soviet Russia and that the dangers she was confronted with were greater by far than those that threatened the Western Powers. Speaking in Moscow on October 8th, 1920, Lenin said:

'By attacking Poland we are attacking also the Allies; by destroying the Polish Army we are destroying the Versailles Peace upon which rests the whole system of present international relations. Had Poland become sovietised . . . the Versailles Peace would have been terminated, and the system built on victory over Germany would have been destroyed likewise.'⁹

Sir Bernard Pares who cannot be accused of any anti-Russian tendencies writes in his *History of Russia* (p. 483):

'Militant International Bolshevism urgently required contact with revolutionary Germany, and this could only be won over the body of Poland.'

Mr. Winston Churchill in his account of the events of 1920 expressed the following viewpoint:

'The difficulties of Poland in dealing with a Government like the Soviet Government should not be underrated. The same difficulties have been experienced by every other country which is in direct contact with Bolshevik Russia. In no case has anything like a satisfactory peace been arranged by such countries with Soviet Russia. . . The Bolsheviks . . . while loudly professing a desire for peace, have, since the end of the last year (1919) been preparing for an offensive on the Polish front. . . There is no doubt that the Bolsheviks hoped that, what with their propaganda and their reinforced front, they would be able to beat the Polish troops and overthrow the Government behind them, and, if so a most difficult situation would have arisen. . .' (*The World Crisis; The Aftermath*, 1929, pp. 264-266.)

⁹ See 'Sobranje Socinenij', Vol. XVII, p. 334.

The idea of the *cordon sanitaire* around Russia did not originate in Eastern Europe, but is the product of certain political circles in the West. It is now easily forgotten that Communist propaganda was most violent in its attacks on the Western Powers. The Western world was described as 'degenerate' and 'decrepid'; 'senile' was by far the mildest expression used by that propaganda. Western countries were abused as 'bloodthirsty Capitalistic countries', as 'engineers of wars' and 'war-mongers'. Small countries bordering on Russia were chiefly blamed for being 'tools' and 'lackeys' to the 'Capitalistic West'; at the same time Communist propaganda hinted that those countries are neither independent in their actions nor as rich and stuffed with gold and goods as the arch-enemy, the West.

The countries in Eastern Europe have never regarded themselves as barrier, buffer or bulwark against Russia. It was Nazi Germany who for years claimed that she was 'a bulwark against Bolshevism' even though she had no common frontiers with the Soviet Union and she had several million Communists at home.

The countries east and south of Germany want to regain their independence and to join their scattered and dispersed resources for their common benefit. They desire to live in peace with Russia, and the proposed federation of the Middle Zone is not a negative idea, directed against Soviet Union, but arises from the realisation that these countries have many things in common, that they can be happier and wealthier if they pool their energies and resources.

Does anybody try to explain the existence of Belgium or Holland, Switzerland or Denmark, as a *cordon sanitaire* thrown around Germany? These countries exist as political and historical realities, regardless of this or that interpretation of their existence; why are countries east of Germany to be regarded only in relation to some Great Powers, and not as historical realities? Why two different standards in Europe?

It is really high time to realise that one uniform principle should be applied to all the liberated regions of Europe and that the Eastern and South-Eastern countries cannot be

treated on a different footing from Western or Southern Europe. A federation in the West or a regional federation of the Scandinavian countries are being discussed impartially; why should only a federation in the East of Europe be regarded with suspicion and treated with obvious bias?

47.

In that excellent paper *The Manchester Guardian* of October 12th, 1943, there appeared a story worth quoting: 'The great thing,' said the Red Queen affably, 'is Control.'

'What sort of control?' inquired Alice patiently. 'Would self-control be any use to you?'

'Not a bit of use', declared the Red Queen emphatically. 'That's a positively dangerous form of control.'

'Well, what do you want to control?' asked Alice. 'Everything,' explained the Red Queen genially. 'Morals, social welfare, applied economics, medicine, fine arts, planning for future betterment, industry and commerce, dog-racing, ballroom dancing, religious beliefs and convictions. . .'

The advocates of the rights of the Great Powers who put the blame for war and all the miseries of this world on the so-called small countries would do well to remember that the events of autumn, 1938, are still vivid in the memory of many people. Let them remember, too, that the claim that the feelings of the small countries should be controlled by the Great Powers is an invention of the Third Reich.

'What sort of control?' inquires Small Nations-Alice in Powerland. 'Would self-control be any use to you?'

Maybe Alice is right.

48.

It would be idle not to recognise the great changes which have occurred in the Soviet Union's attitude to the world. Under the tremendous stress of the war the Russian outlook is undergoing various fluctuations. And so, for instance, the re-installing of the Orthodox Church hierarchy is a sign that Russia is affected by some spiritual unrest which cannot be satisfied by the political religion of Communism. The

nationalistic spirit is very much alive in Russia to-day.¹⁰ The appeal to the old glory of the country found an easy response among the Soviet masses; the whole nation takes pride in its victories over the invader.

These are facts which cannot be dismissed by any honest observer. On the contrary, every European who wants to see Russia happy and prosperous and who is fully aware both of the splendid qualities of the Russian race and of their almost super-human exertions to build up their armed forces, will welcome all the signs of Russia's rebirth. At the same time, every honest European is compelled to ask himself the question what Russia's relations to the world and Europe will be and whether the new Russia which is going to emerge from the devastation and the sufferings of war will be willing to collaborate in the shaping of the world's destiny?

There can be no better demonstration and proof of this will of collaboration than the adoption of a common standard of international behaviour. 'Russia'—writes Alastair Forbes in the *Daily Mail* of October 20th, 1943—'has subscribed to the Atlantic Charter, but only on the assumption that her 1941 frontiers will be respected. Yet these frontiers themselves represent violation of the principles of the Charter. . . The Western Allies would certainly accept and support any Russian demands for warm water ports and for the sharing of joint naval, military, or air bases which could assist in protecting the world from aggression. But it hardly seems possible for Britain to approve what might be termed 'Aggression in a good cause.' We cannot deny that Russia's security was a good cause. But there should be a single standard of international behaviour. Britain has not fought for four years in order to occupy Holland, Belgium, France or Denmark.'

¹⁰ 'The Moscow Conference is not concerned with political ideologies. It is concerned with the international policies of the three great national States. . . Russia is the most fiercely nationalist of the three. . . It is in this burning belief in Russian national destiny and not in any intransigent adherence to Marxism that the democratic Foreign Secretaries will encounter the chief political obstacle to agreement.' ('Eden and Hull Will Tell Moscow' by Alastair Forbes, 'Daily Mail', Oct. 20th, 1943.)

The German idea of *Lebensraum* which used to play such a prominent part in Nazi propaganda cannot be applied to Russia. Writing on October 24th about the Russia's share in the future settlement the Moscow paper *War and the Working Classes* admits that the Soviet Union 'occupies a sixth of the world and is the most powerful land power'. What can be the use for such a world Power, in fact an Empire composed of different races and by no means homogeneous racially, of the possession of some hundreds of square miles of territory? What does it mean in modern warfare with the almost uncanny development of airforce, to have advanced air-bases 100 miles deeper inland? The meaning of strategic frontiers has undergone a deep change since the invention of using the airforce as a powerful weapon of attack. Arguments for establishing strategic frontiers have lost nearly all their validity in the four years of war.

The Soviet Union does not need *Lebensraum*. It cannot fear any 'encirclement' or, to use the German word for it, *Einkreisung*. This theory can be justified to a certain extent in the case of Germany; the fear of encirclement is something almost instinctive in the policy of the German Reich, and the events of this war have demonstrated once again that Germany cannot escape the trap of *Einkreisung* and that the lack of the command of the seas is mainly responsible for that fact. But in the case of Russia any idea of encirclement sounds silly; Russia cannot be conquered and she cannot be encircled.

For that reason the bogey of the *cordon sanitaire* is completely unconvincing.

Czarist Russia was bitterly opposed to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Russian trend of Pan-Slavism found in the existence of the Austro-Hungary the chief obstacle on the way of the realization of the Pan-Slavist plans. Serbia became a centre where the Pan-Slavist schemes were welcome and it is by no means an accident that the first shot in the world war, 1914-1918, was fired in Sarajevo. The Austrian Empire which was yet another attempt to create a certain unity and stability in the Danubian basin and which

was on the way to develop its institutions in a more liberal spirit, was regarded by the Pan-Slavists as a structure which should be destroyed.¹¹

To-day Moscow looks with suspicion on any plans which in her opinion, may bring about a revival of the old Hapsburg monarchy. These apprehensions seem to be completely unfounded. The Pan-Germanist centre of the old dual monarchy, Austria, has disappeared; new national energies have been liberated; new social classes have come to the surface and the countries west of Russia cannot now be classed as 'feudal'. There is no enmity towards Russia in countries west of her borders.

Is Russia, moved by suspicions, going to frustrate the efforts to unite that region? Is Russia, acting under the stress of unnecessary fears, going to drive a wedge between the countries which are drawing together by common traditions and ways of life? Is Russia going to steer against the stream of integration of certain regions and of creating larger units in Europe?

'The task is to convince the Soviet Government that the survival of Russia is in no way menaced by European civilization', writes H. Foster Anderson in the October issue of *The Fortnightly*.¹² 'We regard the present spirit of Germany as animated by the will to destroy European civilization but it is more than probable that the Russians see the Germans as the culmination of that materialistic, mechanical and expansionist, way of life, which for them has represented European civilization. Once Germany is rendered

¹¹ 'In the old Tsarist days the Pan-Slavist policy was mainly directed against the Hapsburg monarchy. The Czechs were chief adherents of Pan-Slavism among the Western Slavs, while the Poles—oppressed by Tsardom—were its principal opponents. Here, too, the traditional pattern reasserts itself now. Schemes for eastern and central European federations are regarded in Moscow merely as a new version of the Hapsburg monarchy, with its centre of gravity in Warsaw instead of Vienna. The old shadow of Pan-Slavism must have fallen on the agenda of the Three Power Conference as it used to fall on the agenda of so many diplomatic gatherings in the course of the nineteenth century.' ('The Economist, Russia at War,' October 16th, 1943.)

¹² 'Russia and Europe'. *The Fortnightly*, October, 1943. Mr. H. Foster Anderson lived for over twenty years in the U.S.S.R.

permanently powerless to start a new expansion drive, we imagine that Russia has nothing to fear from an agglomeration of small and disunited nations which goes by the name of Europe. . . . The Soviet Government wants to keep Russia clear of a non-Russian attitude to life. . . . The first step towards removing the fear and suspicion of the Soviet Government is for us to admit that our civilization is not world-embracing in its aim but limited as far as Russia is concerned. . . . Our one hope of valuable collaboration with Russia after the war lies in convincing the Soviet Government that release from potential or actual menace to Russia is assured since European or Western civilization in itself is undergoing transformation from being dominated by the impulse of expansion to being inspired by the spirit of creative consolidation. . . .

'The Soviet Government, by its aim of expansion implied in its declared annexation of the Baltic States and part of Poland, is keeping alive a spirit of expansion, when its own release from menace ultimately depends on the vital nations of the world renouncing the spirit of expansion. If Europe were decadent, annexation of part of it would not have much consequence. If Europe were disintegrated, annexation of some units would not have repercussion. If men were not suffering from a sense of frustration due to the strain of adjustment to new conditions, they would not gladly seize on some simple and false reason of their frustration. But none of these factors is present. In a sense quite contrary to his intentions, Hitler is uniting Europe. By trying to destroy the spiritual basis of European civilization he has made Europeans realize that they have a common standard of human values for which they are prepared to suffer and to die. Hitler has linked the people of Belgium to the people of Poland. He may even be the cause of friendship between Lithuanians and Poles since Lithuania refused his 'request' to make a common attack on Poland. And the Danish people have forgotten that the aim of life is to make money. The noncalculating action of the Polish people, the noncalculating decision of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the non-calculating spirit of the U.S.A. Lease-Lend aid, reflect an aspect of European civilization that the materialism of the last two centuries overlaid. Yet it was always there,

for even in the industrial age European civilization expanded the idea of freedom and justice.

'The Russian way of life has a contribution to make to our common humanity and contact with it in the post-war world will be stimulating. Security, at which we are aiming, is not for an isolated part of the globe. We want security for Russia to develop its own way of life so savagely interrupted. In its preoccupation with the security of Russia, the Soviet Government by its declared annexation of the Baltic States and part of Poland may produce the very result to avoid which these measures have been taken. The trend of European civilization is towards creative, constructive consolidation. This trend will make itself felt in Continental Europe. The growing unity of Europe will be peaceful and co-operative, if it springs from an inner spirit of free service and willing collaboration. If Europe in the post-war years unites owing to the fear, imaginary or real of Russian expansion, consolidation will take place but with the spirit of consolidation negatived and warped. We cannot stop the Soviet Government acting as it thinks fit nor the peoples of Europe reacting as their impulses dictate.

'The Russian people, for the last two years, have vindicated the truth that the deciding factor in the ultimate survival of a way of life is its spiritual values. We can only hope that the Soviet Government may become sufficiently detached in its survey of the political future to realize that this war has shown that the European has spiritual values which can take precedence over material gain or even personal survival. There is one aspect of humanity, confusing or consoling, according to one's outlook on life. The most thoroughly calculated plans often go awry due to that incalculable factor of spiritual resilience. No greater example of this fact can be found than in the German failure to conquer Russia.'

I have quoted at greater length the article by Mr. H. Foster Anderson because it puts the case in an extremely clear and impartial way. Mr. H. Foster Anderson in his penetrating remarks exposes the very core of the problem. He is not concerned with topicalities and with the actual

situation but tries to treat the whole subject from a somewhat detached but deeply human point of view. Translated into political language his analysis boils down to the following statement :

There is every reason to suppose that Germany is entering a critical stage. While it is impossible to forecast when the German collapse will take place, it is becoming more and more clear that the choice left to Germany is either to capitulate to the Western Powers (as Italy did) or to try to prolong the struggle in the hope that some time next spring she will be able to muster new divisions and will be able to strike against the Russian Armies. It seems that the German General Staff is quite busy studying the lessons of two major battles : these of the battle at Tannenberg in East Prussia in 1914 and of the Battle of Warsaw in 1920. Germany may harbour the hope that the only chance in a war against Russia is to try to defeat her forces on foreign soil with the Russian lines of communication dangerously lengthened and then to offer immediately peace to Russia. But it seems that the chances of any sort of armistice between Russia and Germany are now receding fast and that it is no longer in the interest of Russia to conclude a separate peace with Germany.

This being so, the chances of Germany capitulating in the West under the disintegrating air blows of the Allies and under the tremendous surge of the Russian offensives, are increasing with every day passing. The German problem is going to constitute the major issue of peace, as it did constitute the central problem of war.

Russia is presented with an almost unparalleled opportunity to show her political wisdom and far-sightedness, based on restraint. If she will abstain from sowing the seeds of disintegration in Europe and of promoting unrest she will be looked at as a real supporter of peace. If, on the contrary, she embarks upon a policy of disintegrating Europe's unity and the will of collaboration which exists between the sorely tried nations, she is running the risk of strengthening in Europe sentiments and feelings of fear and even antagonism. If Russia decided upon a policy of partitioning countries bordering on her and of creating there systems and governments subservient to Moscow, then we will be facing a situa-

tion which may develop extremely dangerously. From certain moves of Russia it might be concluded that she is now abandoning her former designs and that she is no longer willing to hoist the flag of Communism in neighbouring countries. It seems that Russia is becoming more and more conscious of her historical past and that she regards some chapters of her recent history with less favour. She seems to be of the opinion that such organisations as the Comintern are by no means an asset to a 'respectable' country; it appears that for Russia it is much more important to set a system of vassal States on her borders and that at the same time she will look unfavourably on a Communist Germany. The reason for such a change is that a Communist Germany may become a rallying point for all the Communist forces in Europe; in that case not Moscow but Berlin will become the centre of a Continental brand of Communism. Russia would rather favour a very weak Germany, a sort of Weimar Germany or even a monarchist Germany; it is rather significant that the Free Germans Committee in Moscow is sponsoring the old colours of Imperial Germany.

If Russia decided on the course of policy governed by self-restraint and respect for the independence of other countries, we can hope that Europe would be able to enter a period of stability and reconstruction. If, however, Russia will obey her impulses of imperialism and that dangerous urge of expansion which is inherent in some systems, then peace will be only a passage towards another world conflict.¹³

Germany will undoubtedly profit by such a course of events. She will try to organise a European unity under the flag of a 'democratic' Germany. She might succeed in

¹³ Mr. Hore Belisha, M.P., speaking at Plymouth on October 4th said 'Realism must take account of the fact that Russia, if she desired to act in isolation, would be militarily strong enough to impose a settlement on the countries which the Red Army is on the way to liberate from the Germans. It is in the light of this fact that the question is anxiously asked : 'What is to happen to Poland and the other States neighbouring on Russia?' There is no need to despair of the solution of such problems. Either boundaries will be settled in a way that commends itself to mankind's sense of justice or they will be settled by force. If by the former method there is hope for a permanent peace. If by the latter method, then we may as well take up our stations for the next war.'

her post-war attempts, as Europe, confronted by the imperialistic tendencies of the East, plunged in unrest and even civil wars, might respond to a call to unity from whatever quarters they may come. These are the truly tragic prospects but they must be faced and reckoned with. In that case Germany would escape real defeat and enter the stage of victory by a back-door.

To frustrate such a German manoeuvre, the Allied Nations have to work out a formula which will satisfy all the just claims and rights of Europe. They have to reconstruct a healthy Europe based on respect for the individuality of nations, but at the same time permeated with the idea of international collaboration. The line adopted by some politicians and political writers in this country and on the other side of the Atlantic seems to be rather dangerous. Some utterances of the Allied writers and politicians remind us too vividly of the declarations of the Nazi Reich.¹⁴ If the two Western Powers are going to adopt the attitude of spon-

¹⁴ A typical example of that mentality can be found in a recent statement in the 'New Statesman and Nation': 'For several years the State Department has stoutly championed the claims of the former Baltic States. . . . To us it seems meaningless to talk of the independence of these dwarf States, rent with class divisions. They preserved a show of sovereignty only as long as they could trade on Russo-German rivalry. They cannot be used, as some American commentators hint, for bargaining purposes in a deal with Russia. Stalin's laughter, if Mr. Hull should endeavour to play this game, would shake the Kremlin' (Oct. 34rd, 1943). In reply to this statement, Mr. J. Hampden Jackson pointed out ('The New Statesman and Nation' of Oct. 30th, 1943) that the view expressed by the London paper 'was the Hapsburg view of Serbia, the Hohenzollerns view of Belgium, and the Nazis' view of half the States of Europe. . . . The first Government to recognise the "de jure" sovereignty of the Baltic States was the Soviet Government in 1920, a recognition which was reiterated from the Kremlin as recently as October, 1939. The only Government which has officially recognised their incorporation in the Soviet Union is, I believe, Hitler's. . . .'

Replying to this letter, the Editor of the 'New Statesman' reiterates his belief that 'even States much bigger and stronger' than the Baltic States 'can defend themselves only by becoming the satellites of a Great Power.'


It seems that certain British writers do not recognise the state of peace among the nations of Europe. All their assumptions and statements are being made on the basis that war is the supreme law regulating all international relations and that only from that point of view all interests of Europe and of the world should be judged.

soring the rights of the Great Powers to the detriment of the cause of the so-called small nations, then the whole meaning of this war is heavily compromised. If the Grand Alliance proclaims the 'holy right' of the Great Powers and sponsors the old German theory that 'might is right', then we will enter a dark period of European history; this war will lose its sense and purpose and all high sounding slogans of democracy and freedom will become not only meaningless but very suspect. The countries of Europe will turn in disgust from such a show of hypocrisy and the Allied cause will never be retrieved. The moral prestige of this country is at stake and it is only safe to assume that a Europe confronted with another bondage will be cemented and consolidated in a violent dislike of all democratic war cries and declarations.

These are prospects which will emerge if the reactionary ideas of a 'Holy Alliance' and of the Congress of Vienna are adopted. The consequences of such a policy may be disastrous for the world and bear the fruit of another conflict.

The warning is by no means unreadable: it is clear and obvious to all honest observers and to all frank and free men who decline to bow to a new high wind of Great Powers 'Fascism'. It is their duty to repeat that warning however unpopular their voices may appear to those in power. It is their duty to appeal not only to the sense of justice of the world and to protest against the show of hypocrisy but also to point out that common sense itself commends a solution which will not compromise beyond the hope of repair the ideals of democracy, freedom and human progress, and pave the way to another conflict.

Peace cannot be bought by any sort of capitulation; it should be created in decent toil. Weakness is not a creative faculty and it increases only the chances of war. If we betray our cause and if we fail in this our responsible task, we will indirectly assist Nazi Germany in winning this double posthumous victory: by pressing into Germany's hand a chance of uniting Europe, rent by fear and discord, and by taking over the doubtful legacy of Prussian mentality which we were pledged to defeat.



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A EUROPEAN

WHAT EUROPE IS THINKING

Zbigniew Grabowski, a leading Polish journalist and political writer of the younger generation, in this essay puts the case for an integrated Europe with force and conviction. At a time when the Russo-Polish problem has been eagerly discussed in this country and when the mood and reactions of Europe should be closely watched on the eve of the Allied invasion of Europe, this pamphlet by Mr. Grabowski should be read by all people who want to be informed by a European about the state of mind of Europe and concerning future relations between the Continent and Great Britain.

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