


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




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THE
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By

Czeslaw Poznanski




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RIGHTS & NATIONALS

Czesław Pocztański



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
"The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded, if it is to last, must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak."

WOODROW WILSON,
Address to Congress on January 22, 1917.

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BY THE AUTHOR

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Introduction

IN Professor E. H. Carr's book, *CONDITIONS OF PEACE*, there is a particularly illuminating passage. Professor Carr writes: "The industries of Upper Silesia on one side, and of the Ruhr and Lorraine on the other, are natural economic units. It would be futile to break up these units on grounds of self-determination, and equally futile to attempt to exclude Germans from an effective share in their management and exploitation."

Professor Carr was one of the artificers of the Munich agreement and one of the enthusiasts for it. To this day he considers Munich a major and a beneficent diplomatic achievement. The only fault he finds with the policy of Neville Chamberlain is that Chamberlain condemned the annexation of Austria. Professor Carr does not believe that there can be any moral principles in foreign policy. "There are no simple and infallible rules of 'principle' and 'right' to determine foreign policy in a given situation." Not even the criterion of aggression "was either equitably applicable or morally valid." He does not believe in human rights: "Thus for the realist the equality of man is the ideology of the underprivileged seeking to raise themselves to the level of the privileged; the indivisibility of peace the ideology of States which, being particularly exposed to attacks, are eager

to establish the principle that an attack on them is a matter of concern to other States more fortunately situated. . . .” For Professor Carr the self-determination of nations is simply a corollary of the *laissez-faire* economic policy, without any intrinsic validity. The only “realist” approach for him is that of power politics.

It is not to people who concur in these opinions that this book is addressed. Nothing I say will convince them. For the underlying assumption of this book is that the rights of man are more important than the rights of iron and coal. I, for one, believe that the supreme values we are fighting for are human values. I believe that we are fighting for a world in which the rights of man, proclaimed by the American and the French Revolutions, and suppressed by the totalitarian regimes, will not only be established as paramount, but enlarged to embrace the economic rights of man as well as his political and human rights. And I know that national rights are a necessary part of the rights of man.

Professor Carr and his friends consider these opinions reactionary. I, for one, shall always prefer to be a reactionary professing the ideals of Mazzini and Mickiewicz, rather than a progressive with the men of Munich and the admirers of Franco.

The acceptance, however, of the fallacies of “economic necessities,” and the lack of comprehension of the interdependence between national rights and national statehood, and of the difference between a world based on the necessary voluntary collaboration of all nations, great and small alike, and a world based on the principle of the “hegemony”

of the Great Powers, are widespread even among those people who recognize the principles of the rights of man and of international morality. It is to these people that I appeal.

This book does not pretend to make an exhaustive study of the problems concerned. It is, as Mr. Cole wrote of one of his books, "an uncompleted process of thinking aloud."

It has been originally written in some haste for I considered it necessary that in the discussions of the future of the Continent of Europe a voice from the Continent should intervene.

Since the English edition of this book was published, other voices from the Continent have been heard. In books, in articles, European statesmen, writers, and journalists have defended the same thesis. So if I venture to-day to submit to the American public a revised version of my book, it is for two reasons.

First of all the propaganda for the "Big Power" policy is still going strong and has won in the United States new and distinguished supporters, to mention only Walter Lippmann.

Secondly the favourable reception of my book by progressive British opinion and still more by the French, Belgian, Polish, Dutch and Norwegian press in Great Britain encourages me to believe that it may be a useful contribution to the great discussion about the new, better world for which we fight.

CZESLAW POZNANSKI

CHAPTER III

The first part of the book is devoted to a description of the various forms of government which have existed in the world. It begins with a general definition of government, and then proceeds to a detailed account of the different kinds of monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies. The author discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each form, and compares them with one another. He also touches upon the subject of mixed governments, and the influence of religion and philosophy on the development of political institutions. The second part of the book is a history of the various revolutions which have taken place in the world, from the time of the first settlement of the globe to the present day. It traces the progress of human civilization, and the changes which have taken place in the various parts of the world. The author discusses the causes and consequences of these revolutions, and the influence of the various powers which have arisen in the world. The third part of the book is a history of the various empires which have existed in the world, from the time of the first settlement of the globe to the present day. It traces the progress of human civilization, and the changes which have taken place in the various parts of the world. The author discusses the causes and consequences of these revolutions, and the influence of the various powers which have arisen in the world.

I

THE PATTERN of the First World War was very similar to the pattern of other wars; the difference lay only in its scale. The clash of 1914 was mainly a clash between contending Great Powers—Germany, which wanted to establish its hegemony over the Continent of Europe and the Middle East, and the Allied Powers, which opposed this bid for supremacy. It might have been a purely continental war, a contest between Germany and Austria on the one side and Russia allied with France on the other. Great Britain was dragged into the war only by the violation of the neutrality of Belgium; the United States by the unrestricted submarine warfare. Even so, British Ministers resigned in opposition to the war, a section of the Labour Party opposed it to the end, and in the United States there was likewise a strong anti-war minority. As for the European neutrals, they were mere onlookers whose sympathies were divided and dictated by scores of different reasons, but who were all persuaded of one thing—that it did not greatly matter to them which of the belligerents emerged as victor.

Toward the end of the war, however, ideological factors made their appearance. The appalling destruction of the war, and above all the destruction of millions of young lives,

produced a revulsion of feeling in the civilized countries. People realized the madness of this wholesale slaughter; and they realized that something must be done to prevent its repetition. From the water-logged trenches, where the French *poilu* suffered unspeakable hardships, came the slogan "*la dernière guerre*"—the very last war. And in Great Britain the same feeling found expression in the slogan "the war to end the war."

It was out of this desire never to see another such dreadful holocaust of youth that the realization of the necessity of an international organization arose in nearly all the belligerent countries. In Great Britain, Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts, and others, worked at the plans of this future world organization; in France, the veteran of French radicalism, the man who had several times refused to become President of the French Republic, Leon Bourgeois; in the United States the leader of the nation, Woodrow Wilson. It was Wilson who proclaimed in an official document, his "Fourteen Points," the necessity of an organization to ensure a lasting peace. And it was thanks to Wilson's insistence that the Covenant of the League of Nations was embodied in the Peace Treaties. The League of Nations was to guarantee that "freedom from fear" which is one of the essential freedoms of the nations.

This first attempt to eliminate war by means of world organization was based on three main principles. The first of these was the self-determination of nations. A real League of Nations could only be a League of free nations. The domination of one nation over another was inconsistent with a

new and just world order. It was obviously impossible to draw frontier lines in ethnographically mixed areas without including certain national minorities in the framework of certain States, but the principle was laid down that every nation had the right to independence, the right to live in its own Nation-State.

It was not only a consideration of abstract justice that linked the idea of self-determination of nations with the idea of security from war; more realistic factors were involved. A subjugated nation was a permanent menace to peace, for it was primarily the irrepressible national struggles for independence that had made it impossible for nineteenth-century Europe to live at peace. The wars for the unity of Italy and the Balkan wars were wars of independence. From the first days of its partition Poland was an open wound in the body of Europe; as Ireland was in the body of Great Britain. A Hungary unconcerned with the suppression of the Croats could have lived in good-neighbourly terms with Serbia instead of being bent on the crushing of the Serbs. And just as within a nation the *juridical and political equality* of all citizens, without regard to differences of birth, wealth, or even education, is the basis of a democratic order, so the equality of all nations, irrespective of the number of warships, tanks or guns they could muster, irrespective of their power and wealth, was the only sound basis for an international order. Great and small nations alike were to be equal in partnership, equally protected by the new international law against aggression from more powerful neighbours. The rule of unanimity in the deliberations of

the League Council and the League Assembly, whatever its merits and demerits in practice, was the symbolic expression of this equality of all nations.

Collective security and the independence and equality of nations were thus closely correlated. The second principle associated with the collective security, with the freedom from fear, was democracy. When in 1917 Woodrow Wilson spoke of the war "to make the world safe for democracy," the full implications of this statement were well understood by the masses. The responsibility of the autocratic rulers of Germany and Austria, afterwards obscured by a deluge of propaganda, was not yet forgotten. There was no doubt at that moment that a dictatorial, irresponsible ruler was much more easily tempted to wage war than the government of a democratic country.

Finally, the new organization was to be based on "freedom from want." The rights of labour were linked up with the principles of self-determination of nations and of democracy. The organization of the I.L.O. was embodied in Part 13 of the Versailles Treaty. Each Member-State of the League of Nations was automatically a member of the I.L.O., and automatically committed to the grant of a certain minimum of social security to its own subjects. Article 23 of the Covenant states that the Members of the League

"will endeavour to secure fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will estab-

lish and maintain the necessary international organizations."

Thus the ideas of national independence, of democracy, and of social security appeared as the only basis on which a lasting peace could be founded. In the minds of the people of 1919 they were intimately correlated, just as they were intimately correlated in the minds of Karl Marx and the founders of the First International, who put on the same plan the fight for the liberation of the proletariat and the fight for the liberation of the oppressed nationalities. The full text of the slogan of the First International was, in fact, "Workers of the world and oppressed nationalities, unite."

These fundamental issues and their intimate interconnection were, however, first obscured in the haggings of the Peace Conference and then gladly and completely forgotten. The recognition of the necessary connection between collective security and democracy was the first to be obliterated. It disappeared almost entirely from the text of the Covenant. Only in Article I, in the first words of the sentence "Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony not named in the annex may become a Member of the League" can a faint echo be caught of President Wilson's promise to "make the world safe for democracy." As it was, this sentence was invoked only once, when Great Britain questioned the advisability of admitting Ethiopia to the League. But nobody appealed to the League when Mussolini seized power in Italy, or when Hitler established his rule in Ger-

many. The nineteenth-century doctrine of "non-interference in internal affairs," the doctrine of the mischievousness of "ideological blocs," reigned supreme and unchallenged, culminating in the tragic farce of "non-intervention" in Spain.

The equality of nations remained inscribed in the texts of the Covenant, but was never acknowledged in fact. The very constitution of the Council of the League, with its distinction between permanent and elected members, bore the imprint of the discrimination between Great Powers and Powers of "limited interests," as the smaller nations were politely called. And the Great Powers did not hesitate to indicate quite clearly that it was for them, and for them alone, to settle the big issues and to act accordingly.

At first, while Germany was outside the League and was not treated on terms of equality, the technique consisted in referring an awkward or controversial question to the organ of the principal Allied Powers: the Conference of Ambassadors. It will be remembered that the first characteristic breach of the Covenant, the first flagrant act of aggression—the bombardment of Corfu by Mussolini—was referred to this Conference.

After 1926 there was a series of attempts to use the League simply as a rubber stamp for decisions arrived at by the Great Powers in direct negotiations. There were even attempts to set up permanent mechanisms which would supersede the League of Nations. It is instructive to-day to survey these attempts and their regular failure, for is it not said that *historia magistra vitae*?

THE LAUSANNE AGREEMENT


THE FIRST attempt was made in July, 1932. The Lausanne Conference, which was to make a final settlement of the Reparations question, was a Conference of Great Powers only, though certain smaller States were also to receive reparation payments.

At the close of this Conference on July 9, 1932, a joint Franco-British declaration was signed which said that the two Governments had agreed on the following:

“First, in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations they intend to exchange views with one another with complete candour and to keep each other mutually informed of any question coming to their notice similar in origin to that now so happily settled at Lausanne which may affect the European regime. It is their hope that other Governments will join them in adopting this procedure.”

Prima facie, it was a reaffirmation of Franco-British collaboration; in fact, however, the declaration was meant to establish a kind of directorate of Great Powers. For the invitations to subscribe to this declaration to consult on any question “which may affect the European regime” were sent only to Germany, Italy and Belgium.

Sir John Simon made no mystery about this meaning of the declaration. In a press conference at Geneva he mentioned expressly the revision of boundaries as one of the questions which would come under the agreement.



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
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This plan failed, for, as *THE TIMES*¹ stated at the time, it was "an annoyance to the smaller nations," of which at least one—Poland—protested vigorously.

And in the official report of the Session of the Council of the League on July 15, Sir John Simon is credited with the following declaration:

"He was very glad to say that the Italian and Belgian Governments had already expressed their adherence to this declaration and he wished to make it plain to the Council of the League that the invitation was not limited to the invited Powers at Lausanne, but was open for the adherence of other European States. There was one other feature of the matter which he wished to emphasize. Those who were responsible for making this declaration were doing so in loyalty to the prescriptions laid down in the Preamble of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the hope that it might contribute to the influence and the work of the League. There was, of course, no question of creating any new organization."

Thus, instead of a pact between five Powers able afterwards to impose their will on other, reluctant, nations the declaration of July 9 became a consultative pact open to all. And in fact a number of nations immediately declared their adherence.

In these circumstances, however, it lost all interest for its promoters. And in all the span of years between 1932 and the Second World War nobody ever heard a single allusion

¹ *The Times* of London.

to the consultative machinery established by the declaration of July 9, 1932.

A second attempt in the same direction was, however, very soon to follow. It was the Four-Power Pact foreshadowed in a speech by Mussolini on October 23, 1932. Mussolini said:

“I think that if to-morrow on the basis of justice, of recognition of our sacrosanct rights . . . it were possible to recognize the premises necessary and sufficient for the collaboration of the Four Great Western Powers Europe would be tranquil from the political standpoint and, perhaps, the end would be in sight of the economic crisis by which we are gripped.”

But even before the materialization of this Four-Power Pact another Great Power agreement was to be concluded, only afterwards to fail.

THE FIVE-POWER DECLARATION ON GERMAN REARMAMENT

ON JULY 22, 1932, that is less than two weeks after the signature of the Lausanne Agreement which had cancelled the German Reparation payments and was intended to bring Germany back into intimate collaboration with the Western Powers, Nadolny, Chief German Delegate in the Disarmament Conference, declared at a meeting of this Conference:

“The German Government must point out at once that it cannot undertake to continue its collaboration if a satis-

factory solution of this point, i.e., the German equality in matter of armaments, which for Germany is a decisive one, is not reached by the time the Conference resumes its work."

This declaration meant the withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference. Immediately afterwards General Schleicher proposed to the French Government direct negotiations on the armament question. But Edouard Herriot, then Prime Minister of France, rejected bilateral conversations. In fact, the question of Germany's rearmament was far from being a purely Franco-German one. The other States neighbouring on Germany, Belgium, Holland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria were just as much interested in the extent of German armaments as France. One can even affirm that the Eastern neighbours of Germany were more interested.

The Treaty in Locarno had in fact divided Europe into two distinct zones of security. The security of the Western zone, France and Belgium, was to be absolute. Not only was the Rhineland demilitarized, but this demilitarization was guaranteed by Great Britain and Italy, who were bound to come immediately to the help of France and Belgium.

In the East the security of Germany's neighbours was not guaranteed either in fact or by a specific commitment of the Western Powers, France excepted. Germany was free—and profited by her freedom—to build offensive fortifications on the Polish frontier. And Stresemann's explicit refusal at Locarno to recognize these frontiers as he had recognized the frontiers of France boded ill for the future.

None the less it was considered that the question of German rearmament, which did arise after Germany's withdrawal, could be settled by the Great Powers alone. On October 4, Great Britain issued invitations to Germany, France and Italy to come together at a Conference in London. On the 15th the French Government accepted the invitation on condition that the Conference take place in Geneva. By choosing Geneva, Herriot wanted in fact to place this Conference within the framework of the League and the Disarmament Conference. Germany refused to come to Geneva.

Finally, in private negotiations—the United States representation at the Disarmament Conference acting as an intermediary—the Great Powers arrived at an understanding. On December 11 an agreement was signed which recognized in principle the German claim to equality in armaments. This document said:

“The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Italy have declared that one of the principles that should guide the Conference on Disarmament should be to grant to Germany and to the other Powers disarmed by Treaty, equality of rights in a system which would provide security of all nations, and that the principle should itself be embodied in a Convention containing the conclusions of the Disarmament Conference.

“On the basis of this declaration Germany has signified her willingness to resume her place at the Disarmament Conference.

“The five Governments, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, have declared that they are resolved to co-operate in the Conference with other States there represented in seeking without delay to work out a Convention. . . .”

When this document was presented to the Disarmament Conference the Polish delegate rose to protest. He stated that the question of German armaments was of as much interest to Poland and to other countries as to the signatories of the agreement, and that these countries could not recognize as binding upon them a document which they had not signed and in the preparation of which they had not been consulted.

It is well known that the Declaration of December 11 had no practical value whatever. A few months later Germany withdrew again from the Disarmament Conference—this time finally. In the meanwhile the signatories of the agreement differed continually as to its meaning.

Before Germany's withdrawal, however, there was another still-born combination of Great Powers. This was the Four-Power Pact.

THE FOUR-POWER PACT

IN MARCH, 1933, Ramsay MacDonald suddenly left the Disarmament Conference in order to meet Mussolini in Rome. The Italian Dictator presented the British Prime Minister with a draft designed to place in the hands of a directorate of four Powers—Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy—the complete control of Europe which would have to be

reshaped, boundaries and all, at the will of this directorate. In fact, Article 1 of this draft said:

“Les quatre Puissances occidentales: l’Allemagne, la France, la Grande Bretagne, l’Italie s’engagent a réaliser entre elles une politique effective de collaboration en vue du maintien de la paix selon l’esprit du Pact Kellogg et du ‘no-force Pact’ et s’engagent d’agir dans le domaine des relations européennes pour que cette politique de paix soit adoptée en cas de nécessité par d’autres États.”

Article 2 dealt expressly with the revision of Peace Treaties. Article 3 promised Germany equality of armaments in the event of failure to obtain this equality at the Disarmament Conference. Finally, Article 4 said that the Contracting Powers bound themselves to adopt in all political and non-political questions *“autant que possible une ligne de conduite commune”* in Europe and outside Europe.

MacDonald, in principle, agreed to the idea of the Four-Power Directorate. But in his speech to the Commons on March 23, 1933, he objected to the idea that in the draft the emphasis was placed on the revision of peace treaties, and he said that the pact “must not exclude smaller States from playing their proper part in the consideration when it is undertaken.”

But he made it quite clear that in his opinion a slight re-draft would be sufficient to amend this pact and that the smaller States ought not to meddle in any major issues. He accorded to the smaller States only the right “to be consulted wherever their special interests were concerned.”

Thus in Ramsay MacDonald's opinion, even in questions which directly concerned the smaller nations, they were only to be consulted, while the decision was to rest with the four Great Powers.

The Mussolini plan did not and could not succeed. It was not only the smaller Powers which protested loudly against this attempt to establish an international dictatorship. In Great Britain and in France voices of protest were also raised. Brigadier-General Spears said in the Commons on March 23:

"The effect of this seems to me to make the League of Nations completely powerless save as an instrument for enforcing the will of the Great Powers on the small Powers. I cannot see how a suggestion of this kind can possibly make a nation feel safe. I agree that the Great Powers should have a voice in Geneva proportionate to their responsibility, but there is something very ominous in this Great Power business which is so constantly insisted upon in the documents we submit at Geneva. . . . I cannot imagine a number of Great Powers acting as a bloc, as one. They are bound to be divided by conflicts of interest sooner or later, and will form themselves in groups. Inevitably you will get a situation very much resembling the situation we had before the war."

And in the same debate Sir Stafford Cripps declared:

"It would indeed be the greatest possible tragedy if this Four-Power Pact were to turn out to be an idea and a system

under which it was hoped that the four Great Powers concerned in it were to obtain dictatorial powers over Europe or over the rest of the world. On that basis any resettlement of the treaties of Europe as something imposed as the decision of the four Great Powers would never get the consent of the people of Europe, who would not feel that they had been justly dealt with."

Daladier, then Prime Minister of France, tried to modify the impression by declaring in the Chamber of Deputies that the idea of a directorate of big Powers "would come into collision with the French—or rather Franco-Italian—idea of the equality of nations."

It became obvious that Mussolini's draft had to be completely changed. This redrafting took a considerable time. And the Four-Power Pact finally signed had very little in common with the European Directorate visualized by Mussolini and Hitler. It could no longer be used as a lever to disrupt the smaller States. Instead of binding themselves to consult on all matters, political and non-political, and to try to impose their decisions on the other powers, the new text obliged the High Contracting Parties only to act in concert on all questions which concerned them directly, "*sur toutes les questions qui leur sont propres.*" And the new text affirmed that everything should be done within the framework of the League of Nations. This amended wording allayed many if not all the fears the Four-Power Pact had raised.

THE STRESA FRONT

THE PACT, however, like the preceding agreement of July 19, 1932, never became a political reality. The only positive obligation which it contained, the obligation to consult on all questions directly concerning the signatories, was flouted by Germany a few months later.

On March 16, 1935, Hitler, without consulting the cosignatories of the Four-Power Pact, without any previous warning, tore up the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and introduced compulsory military service in Germany.

The military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles had been placed in the care of the League. It was the duty of the Council to react against their violation. And on March 20 the French Government did appeal to the League of Nations.

Before the meeting of the Council, however, another meeting took place which was to present the Council with a *fait accompli*. The Prime Ministers and the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France and Italy met at Stresa to decide on a common course of action.

The ambitions of the chief conveners of the Stresa Conference, Great Britain and Italy, went even further. They hoped that at a certain moment Germany too might be invited to come to Stresa and that the four Great Powers would then settle among themselves the question of German rearmament. Sir John Simon said so frankly in the House of Commons on March 21. This plan however did not materialize. In fact, before the Stresa Conference Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden went to Berlin, and their interview with Hit-

ler revealed what Sir John Simon called in the House of Commons "profound divergencies" amongst the parties.

Hitler, in fact, had declared to the British Ministers, as Gordon Lennox related in the *DAILY TELEGRAPH*, that "he does not accept the territorial settlements of the Peace Treaties. He asked for a) the suppression of the Polish Corridor, b) the readjustment of the German-Polish frontier in Upper Silesia, c) the return of the Sudeten Germans to the Reich, d) the economic Anschluss with Austria."

The Stresa Conference took place from April 11 to April 14. Though there was much talk afterwards of a Stresa Front nothing like a common front of the Three Western Powers against Hitler was achieved. Mussolini himself had ridiculed the whole Conference in advance in the *POPOLO D'ITALIA*, and the communiqué issued at the end of the Conference was absolutely noncommittal.

The resolution drafted at Stresa and submitted afterwards to the Council of the League of Nations did not even expressly condemn Germany's violation of the Versailles Treaty. It declared simply that "Germany had violated her obligations," and deprecated in general terms only "all unilateral repudiation of international obligations." No action was called for by the resolution.

Thus the only outcome of this attempt to substitute a Great Power Agreement for the League was a weakening of the latter. As soon as the Stresa Conference was announced the Polish Government sounded a note of warning. The semi-official *GAZETA POLSKA* wrote on March 23:

to "A problem in its most complicated form is to come back to Geneva and to be examined by the Council of the League of Nations. Those who in no way contributed to create this situation will be called upon to remedy it. In these conditions it may be feared that negotiations pursued outside the League of Nations at a critical moment may shake the basis of the League. If the League of Nations is to be an instrument of international collaboration it cannot be treated as a passive instrument destined only to register the unhappy consequences of mistaken efforts made outside it and without the participation of its members with full rights."

And in the Council of the League, Denmark, taking advantage of the uneasiness created by the procedure of using the Council as a rubber-stamp for decisions reached outside the League, abstained from voting. A forecast of Denmark's decision in 1940.

The Ethiopian war provided further instances of the disastrous confiscation of the League machinery by the Great Powers, of the attempt to exploit the League, devised as an instrument of collective security, for the game of power politics. First we had the Hoare-Laval plan. I am not concerned now with the plan itself—enough has been said about it—but with the legerdemain by which certain Powers tried to barter away the biggest issue of all, an issue on which all the peoples of the world had taken their stand against aggression, for a triangular deal between Italy, Great Britain and France.

The sanctions against Italy had been voted. Committees

of the League were working to implement them. They could have succeeded.

C. J. Hambro, the President of the Norwegian Storting and one of the most outstanding statesmen who worked at Geneva, wrote (C. J. Hambro: HOW TO WIN THE PEACE):

"The support given to the action was impressive and the work done at Geneva without any adequate machinery to give effect to the limited sanctions was admirable."

In fact, nobody watching the League at that moment could forget the sudden revelation that collective security was not the dream of an idealistic professor, but a reality for which people were prepared to fight, that the Covenant was a working instrument and that the obligations of the League members were binding.

Pierre Laval, however, did not renounce the hope of striking a bargain at the expense of Ethiopia. At the end of October, 1935, in a "free and frank interview," he succeeded in convincing Sir Samuel Hoare. Following this free and frank interview, both Laval and Sir Samuel declared, at a meeting of the Co-ordination Committee on November 2, that they would continue their efforts at conciliation. This was the cue for van Zeeland, who had come from Brussels for the occasion, to propose that the League should give a mandate to Great Britain and France to proceed with this mediation. The mandate was not given. One after another the delegates of Soviet-Russia, Poland, the Little Entente, and Spain explained politely but firmly that the settlement of the conflict was a task for the entire Council of the

League, and that no mandate of any sort could be given. Nevertheless the governments of Great Britain and France continued to negotiate, and the outcome of these negotiations was the Hoare-Laval plan.

This attempt failed. The Members of the League refused to accept the plan, and in Great Britain the popular indignation swept Sir Samuel from office. But the independent role of the Great Powers was not finished. For the lifting of sanctions in the Ethiopian affair, which sounded the death-knell of collective security, was due to a unilateral decision made by Great Britain. Formally the sanctions were lifted by the League Assembly. In fact they were disposed of on June 18, 1936, when Anthony Eden announced to the Commons that the British Government considered it necessary to put an end to the sanctions.

C. J. Hambro says: "But sanctions were called off. Without Great Britain and France the League could not act. And all the initiated knew that sanctions had been called off because they threatened to be successful, not because they had failed."

There is a little anecdote that perfectly epitomizes the attitude of the Great Powers in the inter-war period. At the Lausanne Conference in 1932, which was to settle finally the question of German Reparation payments, all negotiations were conducted between Germany, von Papen; Great Britain, Ramsay MacDonald; and France, Edouard Herriot. Meanwhile representatives of the smaller Allied and Associated Powers, for some of whom the Reparation payments formed more important Budget items than either for France

or for Great Britain, were kicking their heels in the lobby of the conference hotel together with the journalists, sometimes less well informed than the latter.

One day MacDonald walked out, beaming, from the conference room, and announced that a final agreement had been reached and that its signature was imminent. At the announcement the Yugoslav delegate stepped forward and said: "I hope we shall be able to see the agreement before its signature, and to make our observations."

"Of course not," replied MacDonald, indignantly.

It was this attitude, this disregard of the rights and interests of the smaller nations, culminating in Lord Runciman's mission and the Munich agreement, that was largely responsible for the tragic drift of the smaller nations into "neutrality," at such cost to themselves, and with such grievous detriment to the Allied effort in 1940.

One of the Swedish delegates put the position to me quite bluntly when the sanctions against Italy were lifted. "We have allowed ourselves to be fooled once. We enthusiastically voted the sanctions, for we believed that the Great Powers had at last been convinced of the necessity for collective security. Now we see that we have only been pawns in a game of power politics. We shall not be fooled a second time."

Collective security was dead. So was the ideal of collaboration between free nations "equal in status," to quote the Balfour report on the British Commonwealth. And soon afterwards we had the only impressive achievement of the collaboration of the "Big Four."

It was the Munich agreement.

The I.L.O. survived. Thanks largely to a succession of outstanding and courageous men at the helm—Albert Thomas, Harold Butler, John Winant—it succeeded in developing its admirable activity. This activity was not interrupted by the war, and the Conference of the I.L.O. at Atlantic City in January, 1941, was proof of the vitality of this institution. But the link connecting it with the League of Nations had become a purely formal one. The activities of the I.L.O. at Geneva had scarcely any connection with those in the League building only a few hundred yards away. The conviction that the rights of labour are intimately connected with the peace problem had vanished.

The Cassandras, those of us who issued repeated warnings that dictatorships are a permanent menace to peace, who understood the real meaning of the Japanese aggression, of Mussolini's robber expedition in Ethiopia, of the conquest of Spain, of the seizure of Austria, were contemptuously dismissed as "ideologists" and "war-mongers." Yet when Armageddon came the "ideological front" reappeared at once. The climate of the belligerent countries immediately became the climate not of 1914 but of 1918. There still are, of course, people who continue to think in simple imperialist terms, who hope that once victory is achieved everything will fall back into the old pre-war pattern, who are preparing to-day for the return of an "untrammelled" economic system, of the "competitive struggle for markets," of "unfet-

tered sovereignty," of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States. But they are very few.

God knows, Neville Chamberlain refused long enough to see not only that National Socialism and Fascism were articles of export, but that their very existence was incompatible with the maintenance of peace. Nevertheless, when the conflict came he realized that it was not a case of Poland or Great Britain versus Germany, but a battle for the maintenance of European civilization. On August 24, 1939, he said in the Commons:

"If, despite all our efforts to find the way of peace—and God knows I have tried my best—if, in spite of all that, we find ourselves forced to embark upon a struggle which is bound to be fraught with suffering and misery for all mankind, and the end of which no man can foresee, if that should happen, *we shall not be fighting for the political future of a far-away city in a foreign land; we shall be fighting for the preservation of those principles of which I have spoken,*¹ the destruction of which would involve the destruction of all possibility of peace and security for the peoples of the world."

On September 2 Mr. Winston Churchill put the same idea in more inspired words: "This is not a question of fighting for Danzig or fighting for Poland. We are fighting to save the whole world from the pestilence of Nazi tyranny, and in defence of all that is most sacred to man."

And Franklin Roosevelt in his "Four Freedoms" speech

¹ My italics.

in which he outlined the Charter of the new democracy said still more trenchantly:

“By an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations of our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers. *We know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other peoples' freedom.*”¹

The issues of peace and democracy are now linked together again. There is to-day a virtually unanimous conviction that peace cannot be guaranteed if totalitarian and anti-democratic regimes survive this war; there is virtual unanimity that it concerns all of us if a dictatorship is set up in any country. And there is growing unanimity that certain cardinal rights of man must be universally set up and guaranteed.

There is virtual unanimity that international collaboration for the maintenance of peace must be much closer than was the collaboration in the League of Nations, and that there must be an international force to restrain future aggressors. And a great majority realize the full implication of the statement that the conception of the absolute sovereignty of States is dead. It is realized that the rule of law between nations cannot be established unless there exists a supra-national authority, backed by sufficient force.

There is a growing unanimity of opinion that political

¹ My italics.

and social questions cannot be dissociated. President Roosevelt has put among the four necessary freedoms the freedom from want. There are still vested interests which oppose and will continue to oppose very strongly any profound modification of the pre-war "individualist" and "competitive" economic order. But it becomes more and more obvious that "freedom from want" cannot be assured unless there is a great measure of planned economy, even a great measure of Socialism.

Collective security, democracy, and social security are linked up again, just as they were in 1919. And the Atlantic Charter, though much less explicit than Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, is based on these three principles.

But what about the last cornerstone of the 1919 ideology, the self-determination of nations? We find it in the Atlantic Charter. But what about public opinion?

2

IT IS a strange spectacle indeed that we find when we turn to this question of self-determination and independence of nations. At the outset there seemed to be no doubt that the war was being fought for the restoration of the independence of the nations subjugated by Hitler. But somehow since the entry of Soviet Russia into the war this issue appears to have been obscured in many minds. In a peculiar partnership, certain New Dealers in America agree with isolationists. In Great Britain die-hard imperialists and left-wing Socialists have discovered that after all the independence of small nations is not a desirable war aim. On this question G. D. H. Cole and Victor Gollancz agree with THE TIMES¹; the NEW STATESMAN AND NATION is in agreement with the SUNDAY DISPATCH and the Marquess of Donegal, Professor Harold Laski, with Professor Carr.

The most fantastic of these blueprints of a brave new world, disregarding completely the claims of nations, is due to an American professor. George T. Renner, professor of geography at Teachers College, Columbia University, published on June 6, 1942, in COLLIER'S MAGAZINE, an article entitled MAPS FOR A NEW WORLD. According to Professor Ren-

¹ The Times of London.

ner his appointed mission is the "designing of a new world map to meet democratic specifications." And this is to be achieved by creating a "Europe consisting of nine strong nations," any one of which would be strong enough to discourage aggression.

To achieve this aim Professor Renner first of all suppresses from the map completely Belgium, Holland, Portugal and Switzerland. Belgium, in fact, is to be divided among Germany, France and Holland, while this enlarged Holland is to be absorbed by the British Empire. Switzerland is to be divided among Germany, France and Italy, while Portugal is presented to Spain. Then Professor Renner proceeds to distribute parts of territories of other States. He is completely impartial, he gives presents to some of the United Nations as well as to Axis Powers. As said above, Great Britain is to incorporate Holland and get Calais in France, the U.S.S.R. gets Eastern Poland and the Baltic States, France besides Belgium and part of Switzerland gets a slice of Spain. The Axis Powers, however, fare still better. Germany gets part of Poland, part of Switzerland, and the Sudetenland, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, some of Belgium, all of Austria, all of Hungary and a nice slice of Rumania. Italy is to get the whole coast of Dalmatia, which the Yugoslavs have to lose for having dared to oppose Hitler and fight with the United Nations, part of Switzerland, part of France, Corsica, most of Tunis, a greatly enlarged Libya and Malta, which has so heroically resisted the onslaught of the Italians and the Germans.

It is not only the suggestion, that the Axis Powers after

having lost the war should emerge infinitely more powerful than before the war which makes the Renner plan ridiculous, but it is the whole conception underlying his proposals; the conception that States are arbitrary creations which can be refashioned and remodelled to suit the whims of geographers or statesmen; the conception that for the people it makes no difference whatever whether they are living in one state or in another.

Walter Lippmann was a hundred per cent right when reviewing Professor Renner's map, he said:

“There is no evidence, as some have feared, that Professor Renner had been specially inoculated by barbarous aliens. But there is every reason to think that he would easily have resisted and thrown off the infection if his mind had not been weakened by extreme and prolonged intellectual dissipation. Professor Renner's vice was the habit of regarding other men as inanimate objects. For him the Swiss were not human persons formed into a nation by a tradition which binds them together from their ancient past through the living present into the future. For Professor Renner Switzerland was merely a small patch of color on a map, and some statistics which show that there are Swiss who speak German, others who speak French, others who speak Italian. He did not think of Switzerland in its full-blooded reality and its historic permanence. Professor Renner thought of the Swiss as so many paper dolls, without bodies or souls, which he could cut up and paste together, as he, a little Caesar become a god, found convenient so as to fit them into his scheme.

"This almost certainly explains why he was sublimely unconscious that he was playing with murder and robbery and the blackest brand of bad faith. Switzerland, Belgium, Portugal and all the others that he wanted the United States to destroy were, as his mind worked, not those nations themselves but paper dolls made to represent them. The destruction of a paper doll is not murder. Since the world of Professor Renner was composed entirely of paper dolls, he cut them up and pasted them together with no sense of reality, and therefore with no feeling of responsibility, and with no consciousness of guilt.

"He was not murdering Switzerland; he was merely sitting in his study redrawing the map of Switzerland. He was not telling the American people to commit a foul crime and to make themselves forever infamous. He was not proposing that American soldiers invade Switzerland and shoot down the protesting Swiss. He was only a Professor in his study painting new colors on a paper map."

Professor Renner's plan is a caricature. His idea, however, that the creation of big units may be most successfully achieved by the simple suppression of smaller States is shared also by more representative writers.

There is however a remarkable difference. While Professor Renner is busily redrawing the whole map of Europe, the Britishers confine their plans of suppression of States to the Eastern half of Europe. Would it be preposterous to suggest that the reason of this difference is that the Britishers have cognizance of the real position of the Western Euro-

pean nations and, therefore, realize that their cutting up and arbitrary regrouping is impossible, while they are just as blissfully ignorant of Eastern Europe, as Professor Renner is of the whole of the European Continent?

Let us quote three typical pronouncements.

Mr. G. D. H. Cole, president of the Fabian Society, representing the intellectual leadership of British socialism, writes in his extremely clever book, *EUROPE, RUSSIA, AND THE FUTURE*:

"The idea of nationality as a basis for independent statehood is obsolete" and a few lines further, "In that event is it not most likely that the problems of Poland, and of the Balkans, and of Hungary will be solved by their inclusion as Soviet Republics within a vastly enlarged State based on the U.S.S.R.? At this prospect some Social Democrats, I know, will hold up their hands in holy horror. But I, for one, should regard this as a far better solution than the return of these States to their past condition of precarious, poverty-stricken, quarrelsome independent sovereignty, or than any restoration of capitalism in them."

Victor Gollancz says in *RUSSIA AND OURSELVES*:

"In terms it is tentatively suggested, of three great Unions, an *enlarged*¹ U.S.S.R. (herein lies the greatest hope, for instance, in the Balkans), a Union of Western Democratic Socialist Republics, and Anglo-America. In some such conceptions lies the way forward. What we in the West must unequivocally regard as its evils may well be inseparable from the attempt to establish Socialism in that particular terri-

¹ My italics.

tory and in those particular circumstances, and may also be an inevitable feature of Socialism when it is established in various Eastern European countries."

The NEW STATESMAN AND NATION (December 27, 1941) states that "the vague points of the Atlantic Charter, with their contradiction between the promises of freedom from want and of the restoration of the *petty sovereignties of Europe*,¹ are no substitute."

In the United States, Walter Sulzbach, professor of social economics has written a book NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS to explain that the "religion" of a national State is in opposition to the conception of a rational organization of the world and that the sentiment of national community ought to be liquidated.

A second school of thought is more cautious. It does not advocate outright annexations of whole countries, more modestly it proposes that the world should be divided into spheres of influence of the four leading Powers, which are generally named (I will explain later why I use this cautious formula "generally named") as Great Britain, the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China.

As a European I am not entitled to discuss the question whether the Latin American countries would agree to be treated as less sovereign than the United States, whether they would accept to be treated as an exclusively American "sphere of influence." Though I must confess that I have rather serious doubts in this matter. To speak nothing of the vivid political consciousness of the Latin American re-

¹ My italics.

publics, I see that very serious American authors have doubts whether even economically one can speak of an integrated America. Eugene Staley published in the April issue of 1941 of FOREIGN AFFAIRS an illuminating article on this subject under the title "The Myth of the Continents."

Still less am I prepared to discuss whether Asia should be considered a Chinese sphere of influence. Though I doubt very strongly whether the Chinese themselves would voice such a claim.

In fact Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek unmistakably repudiated them when he said: "China has no desire to replace Western imperialism in Asia with an Oriental imperialism or isolationism of its own or of anybody else."

For us Europeans the question boils down to the partition of Europe between a British and a Russian "sphere of influence."

Let us here mention from the start that the advocates of the Russian "sphere of influence" admit that the acceptance of this principle implies the acceptance of Russia's claims to territorial aggrandizement. Thus, Poland, the first country to say "no" to Hitler, the country which has suffered the most from the German barbarity, the country which has produced no Quislings is to be rewarded by the loss of half of her territory, with 11 million inhabitants of whom there are more than 5 million Poles and not more than 100,000 Russians.

So Constantine Brown in the WASHINGTON STAR wrote coolly:

"It would not be surprising if the Moscow Government wished to straighten out its borders in Central and Southern Europe to include parts of Poland, Bessarabia and Moravia to the Carpathian Mountains and Dobruja on the Black Sea. Bulgaria herself will ask for the privilege of being incorporated into the U.S.S.R. should the Russians, after the collapse of the Nazi power, succeed in establishing a common boundary by the annexation of the former Turkish province of Dobruja, which has been in Rumanian hands less than fifty years.

"Nobody here would be surprised if Moscow insisted on extending its influence through Iran to the Persian Gulf in order to gain access to the Indian Ocean. Nor is it certain that the people of Yugoslavia will not be induced to ask for union with the great Slav Power, Russia, thus giving that empire an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea."

And Hiram Motherwell says in his book, *THE PEACE WE FIGHT FOR*:

"We may take it for granted that the United Nations will take over provisional control of all or nearly all Continental Europe this side of Russia. They will not need to assume direct control over Russia or for those portions of Europe over which Russia may exercise effective control. The U.S.S.R. will be quite capable of administering such territories with the help of materials supplied to it out of the general world pool."

I do not want, however, to discuss this particular aspect

of the question in this context. I want to analyse the general implications of the conception of "spheres of influence."

Let us start by quoting some typical pronouncements. THE TIMES¹ stated in an editorial of August 1, 1941:

"Leadership in Eastern Europe is essential if the disorganization of the past twenty years is to be avoided, and if the weaker countries are not to be exposed once more to economic disaster or to violent assault. This leadership can fall only to Germany or to Russia."

This statement energetically and successfully exploited by German propaganda was deeply resented not only in the Allied countries but also in Turkey. And it needed a lot of work to neutralize its effect in Ankara.

Two years later THE TIMES¹ reverted to this question and in an editorial of March 10, 1943, under the title SECURITY IN EUROPE WROTE:

"These considerations point to two essential tasks which must engage British diplomacy at the present time. The first is to develop a spirit of growing confidence in relations between Britain and Russia. Success in this task will no doubt depend as much on military achievement as on diplomatic skill. But it will in no circumstances be complete or lasting unless ungrudging and unqualified agreement is attained between the two countries on the future conditions on security in Europe. Four Great Powers, as Mr. Eden said in his speech last December, will have 'a virtual monopoly of armed strength when the war ends': and this armed strength

¹ The Times of London.

'must be used in the name of the United Nations to prevent "a repetition of aggression."' Of these four Powers only two are situated on the confines of Europe; and on these two rests a pre-eminent responsibility for European security. This is the sense and significance of the Eden-Molotov treaty of May last. If Britain's frontier is on the Rhine, it might just as pertinently be said, that Russia's frontier is on the Oder, and in the same sense. This does not mean that Russia any more than Britain desires to assail the independence of other countries or to control their domestic affairs. On the contrary it must stand to reason that Russian security will best be served by an understanding with peoples who have themselves good cause to look to Russia for security against any repetition of the grim experience of Nazi domination and whose relations with the Soviet Union are founded upon a solid basis of contentment and good will. The sole interest of Russia is to assure herself that her outer defences are in sure hands; and this interest will be best served if the lands between her frontiers and those of Germany are held by governments and peoples friendly to herself. That is the one condition on which Russia must and will insist. *Everything goes to show that she will be in a position after the war to shape the settlement on lines consistent with this conception of what her security demands.*¹ But it will make all the difference to the future of Anglo-Russian friendship whether these lines have been *freely approved and welcomed by Britain in advance, or whether they are grudgingly accepted as a fait accompli after the victory has been won.*"¹

¹ My italics.

And later on in the same article we read:

“The issue of security in Europe will not be settled by the enunciation of general principles; it will not be settled by the acceptance of hypothetical obligations or by the establishment of loose machinery of consultation or co-operation; it will not be settled by any organization based on a conception of national independence which entails the partition of Europe among twenty separate and jarring military and economic sovereignties. It will be settled only if those who possess military and economic power on the largest scale, and are prepared to exercise it within the confines of Europe, organize that power in common for the fulfilment of common purposes and for the benefit of all.”

Another advocate of this conception is Professor George Catlin who writes (FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, February, 1943):

“For practical purposes a regional division of powers may be necessary, which would *leave Russia as the determinative Power in Eastern Europe.*”¹

Professor E. H. Carr has written a whole book, *CONDITIONS OF PEACE*, advocating this division of Europe into spheres of influence. And it is in this book that we shall find the best definition of the meaning of this expression.

G. D. H. Cole or *THE TIMES* assume that the ruling Powers will rule for the benefit of all. Theirs is a policy of enlightened paternalism. They know, indeed they say it sometimes, that the people of Europe do not accept this theory of the

¹ My italics.

dictatorship of Great Britain and Russia, that they object strongly to being considered simply as objects of politics. But they want to make the peoples of Europe happy, even if they object to being made happy on these lines. They reason like Marshal Pétain, who also believes it to be his duty to impose on Frenchmen a policy, of which they disapprove in order to make them happy.

Professor Carr is more candid and more realistic. He does not hesitate to state that in his opinion "preponderant weight" should be given to the "views and interests" of Great Britain and Russia in their respective spheres of influence. He does not conceal that the interests of Belgians and Dutch, of Poles and Czechs, ought to be subordinated to the interests of Britishers and Russians.

Before we proceed further we must note a curious sidelight. I said above that the leading Powers are "generally named" as Great Britain, the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China.

In fact the advocates of "spheres of influence" are in agreement with Professor Renner. They do not exclude the possibility of rewarding Germany for her outstanding merits in bringing war to the world; they do not exclude the possibility that it might be Germany who will be called upon to organize Central Europe or even the whole of Europe.

THE TIMES in its editorial of August 1, 1941, said that leadership in Eastern Europe "can fall only *to Germany*¹ or to Russia."

Professor Carr expressly rejects the claim of France

¹ My italics.

to equality with Great Britain, but of Germany he says:

“The German dilemma can be resolved not by destroying Germany or diminishing her, but by making her a partner in a large unit in which Great Britain will also have her place. Germany’s belated nationalism can be overcome only by making internationalism *worth her while*.”¹

And G. D. H. Cole states in *EUROPE, RUSSIA, AND THE FUTURE* that “there does seem to be a possibility of these groupings with the Soviet Union, *Germany*¹ and the Western Parliamentary countries as their respective rallying points, and that this triple division offers positive advantages” and in “Fabian Socialism” he visualizes a possibility of a “second Soviet Union modelled upon the U.S.S.R., but working under *German leadership*¹ and with German industrial technique as the main forces behind them.”

I do not want to discuss these statements in detail. I have quoted them to show how the intoxication with the idea that hugeness is in itself a blessing, with the idea of *Grossraumwirtschaft*, is able to blind people to the profound immorality of a conception which would give to a defeated Germany, a Germany which has looted and murdered on a scale unprecedented in history, the leadership of the people against whom she has sinned. What a profound contempt these authors must have for human nature, for the peoples of Europe, not to see that a desperate bloody revolution would be the answer of Europe to any attempt to place it under German leadership.

¹ My italics.

The advocates of the suppression of smaller States or of the "sphere of influence" appear generally in a progressive garb. They explain that this "integration" is necessitated by new means of transport, by the fact that the present economic conditions do not allow the maintenance of smaller State units. We will deal with these arguments later on. But already now we must state, that far from being a progressive conception, a conception based on the economic and social transformation of the twentieth century, it is simply a rehash of the conceptions of the early nineteenth century.

In fact the most perfect embodiment of the idea that the Great Powers have the right and the obligation to exercise a dominating influence on the smaller ones; that an understanding among them means peace for the world was the Holy Alliance. The saint patron of all these schemes for a brave new world was Metternich.

The conception of spheres of influence and maintaining peace by a nice balance of these spheres of influence is not new either. It was the stock in trade conception of the imperialist policies.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries are full of quarrels about and adjustments of spheres of influence between Great Britain and France in North Africa, Great Britain and Russia in Persia and Afghanistan and so on. It is hardly a progressive idea to apply policies used toward colonial and backward peoples fifty or one hundred years ago to the peoples of Europe.

Finally one must note that the psychology underlying

these schemes is our old acquaintance, which has cost us so dear—the psychology of appeasement.

What was in fact the political philosophy, underlying the appeasement policy? It was the assumption that the only thing which mattered was to assure an understanding between the Great European Powers (at that moment Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy). This understanding was considered to be the necessary and sufficient basis of peace, the only guarantee of a harmonious development of Europe. Therefore this understanding had to be reached at any cost, even at the expense of smaller nations. Appeasement was the extreme form of power politics.

In fact the first draft of Mussolini's Four-Power Pact, quoted above, expressly provided for a revision of Peace Treaties, which could only have been carried out at the expense of smaller European nations.

And the climax of the appeasement policy came when at Munich, Neville Chamberlain was sincerely persuaded that he had bought "peace in our time" at the trifling expense of the Sudeten area, which did not belong to Great Britain, but to Czechoslovakia.

The fact that to-day the Big Four does not mean Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy but Great Britain, the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China does not change the essence of this policy.

The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace set up by the Carnegie Peace Foundation under the presidency of Professor Shotwell has produced a report signed by Pro-

fessor Quincy Wright which unhappily is open to many analogous objections.

The report is meant to deal only with the "Political conditions of the period of transition" and does not give a blueprint of the future European organization. On the other hand Professor Wright does not contemplate any decisive interference of China or Russia in the settlement of European affairs. For Russia he hopes simply that "presumably the Soviet government will undertake the task" of her reconstruction. In his opinion it will fall to Great Britain and the United States to reconstruct Europe completely and he endows them with dictatorial powers to this effect.

Let us quote the relevant passages:

"Care must be taken not to restore and recognize national governments prematurely. To do so might re-establish concepts of national sovereignty which could present serious obstacles to the creation of adequate European and world institutions. National governments should only be recognized subject to limitations of sovereignty necessary if the European and the world order are to function successfully. Thus it seems that recognition of European governments would have to await the decision of a Peace Conference on the nature of a new European order, but such a Conference could hardly assemble until the participating governments had been recognized. . . ."

Professor Wright proposes provisional recognition of governments, but he says: "These provisional recognitions

would not become definite until those affected had had an opportunity to discuss and modify their regimes and give their consent." And in the meantime the power would rest with "the directorate."

". . . While governments of many of the occupied states now in exile in London have been provisionally recognized it may be doubted whether the immediate re-establishment of these governments with the power of sovereign states which *formerly constituted*¹ their boundaries would either be possible or desirable.

"Before such government is definitely recognized, it should be able to demonstrate first that it enjoys the confidence and consent of the population, second that it is prepared to collaborate in whatever institutions of European and world government may be established with the general consent of the populations involved and third, that it regards its frontiers as provisional until they have been definitely recognized by the world order."

The importance of the institution which has published this report, the high standing of Professor Shotwell, claim a close analysis of the document, the implications of which cannot have been fully realized by its author and its sponsors.

In fact what is the picture visualized by Professor Quincy Wright? For the time being there are the United Nations—Americans and Poles, British and Dutch, Norwegian and Greeks—fighting together the common foe. The govern-

¹ My italics.

ments in exile, recognized by their fighting forces and by the underground movements in the occupied countries, represent these countries.

However, the day the "cease fire" has sounded, the picture changes abruptly. On one side we shall have two nations who do not surrender their sovereignty to anybody, two governments in the full possession of their constitutional rights: the nations and governments of the United States and of Great Britain. On the other hand on the Continent of Europe we have a *tabula rasa*. The governments cease to represent their people, no States exist, no boundaries are fixed and the United States and Great Britain proceed to a complete reshuffle of the Continent. Professor Quincy Wright himself sees a danger looming. He says:

"In the second place there is the danger that States which will assume the burden and successfully administer the task of the transitional period will not be willing to relinquish their position in favour of a world organization, that they will fail to establish the national regional and world institutions to which their authority should be transferred."

This objection is quite sensible, but it meets only a minor point.

The essential objection is that Europe is not *tabula rasa*. Professor Wright says lightly "former boundaries," forgetting that it is for these "former boundaries" that thousands of people are dying every day in battle or in the hell of concentration camps, and that they will not be more prone to forego their rights to national state after the com-

mon victory, than they have been during the terrible years of unrelenting struggle against Hitler.

There is a second point which Professor Wright does not see. The main argument of the Germans against the Versailles Treaty, an argument which has found a more than friendly echo in many American quarters was that it was a dictated peace. And Germany had been responsible for the First World War, and had lost it. Now Professor Wright proposes to impose a *Diktat* not on the beaten foe, but on the comrades in arms, on the Allied Nations. For he states clearly that no government will be recognized which will not sign a blank acceptance of any limitations to the sovereignty of its State, or any redrawing of its frontiers that may be to the advantage of Germany and Italy.

And he does not realize that this condition is in contradiction to his second condition that this recognized government should "demonstrate that it enjoys the confidence and the consent of the population."

There can be no doubt but that the *émigré* governments will be bound as soon as possible to call general elections and that the new governments which will emerge after these elections will not be identical with the actual governments in exile. If only for the reason that the leaders of the underground movements, the men who have fought the most terrible of all battles, will have to take a prominent place in the new governments. And there is no doubt that these new governments will have to enjoy "the confidence and the consent of the population." For that is the essence of democracy and we want a democratic Europe.

These governments, however, will have to draw their force precisely from this confidence and consent of the population and *not from an investiture by the Big Powers*. That is the promise given to the peoples of Europe by the Atlantic Charter.

A government which to obtain recognition would subscribe to the principle that the future of the country shall be dictated from outside by a "directoriate," which would accept that the boundaries of the motherland are to be settled by a dictation, would enjoy no more confidence than Quisling's government does in Norway, it would be considered not as the representative of the country but as a tool of foreign interests. And, therefore, the only solution would be a *permanent* Anglo-American protectorate over the whole Europe.

Thus even in the transition period the idea of absolute power given to the Great States appears absolutely unworkable.

The prolonged period of uncertainty which it necessarily implies would bring to the world not a new order, but chaos. Professor Condliffe states quite justly in his *AGENDA FOR A POST-WAR WORLD*:

"In the same way it would seem clear that political decisions should be rapid, clear cut and backed by authority. Effective government ought to be sustained or restored as quickly as possible. It would be fatal to allow prolonged wrangling and bickering over boundaries and other political questions. Compared with the danger of social disintegra-

tion such matters must be regarded in their true perspective. Important as they are, it is more important to preserve the structure of government and orderly co-operative social processes. At the close of the war the main principles of political settlement should be laid down. They ought to be worked out in advance."

There is finally a last variation of the Big Powers' policy to which we must pay attention. It is the suggestion that the Big Powers should have the monopoly of armed power in order to maintain the peace of the world.

In the United States this idea was expressed most clearly by Forrest Davis in an article, purported to express the conceptions of President Roosevelt.

Forrest Davis writes:

"A security commission made up of Russia, Britain and the United States might well police the peace of Europe during the transition period until the political reorganization of the Continent is completed. A similar commission including China, could do the same for Asia. Subsidiary bodies could be entrusted with political reorganization. A sort of master commission with each region represented might sit permanently as an executive council on problems of friction between nations that might lead to war.

". . . He opposes an International Air Force or United Nations military arm of any kind. . . .

". . . The President holds that genuine association of interest on the part of the Great Powers must precede the transformation of the United Nations' military alliance into

a political society of Nations. This war has demonstrated that the defensive powers of a Belgium or a Norway have little more than nuisance value for a powerful aggressor.

"Small nations may as well disarm, whether or not they can trust the good intentions of the Powers, and if the United Nations can be erected into a bulwark against the aggressors small nations may more readily be brought to disarmament as a preliminary to the general laying-down of offensive arms given as an ideal in the Atlantic Charter."

However Forrest affirms that even then the United States would use its force "in the interest of collective security for limited objectives and in specific instances, but would not accept blanket commitments" as in Article 10 of the Covenant.

An analogous opinion was expressed by Anthony Eden in his speech in the Commons on December 2, 1942, when he said:

"What will happen when the fighting is over is that these Great Powers and particularly ourselves, the United States and Russia will have a virtual monopoly of armed strength and that armed strength must be used in the name of the United Nations to prevent a repetition of aggression."

Certainly Mr. Eden does not advocate the suppression of smaller States nor even their capital diminution by their subordination to leading Powers.

In the same speech which I have quoted, he stated:

"The last thing I desire is that the impression should get

abroad that we want to arrive in Europe to impose our methods and our will on the countries which have suffered so long from Germany, so though my Hon. Friend may be assured that we think of these things, we have to approach them with some thought for the sensibilities of these countries which have suffered so much."

And immediately following the passage about "the virtual monopoly of armed strength," Mr. Eden added:

"But other Powers, be they great, be they small, provided they are willing to play their part, will, I trust, be secured in the enjoyment of that independence for which they have fought and suffered. Indeed it is essential that the independence of these countries should be restored, if we are to create a free international society in Europe."

And he assured that:

"I have spoken of the four Great Powers, ourselves, the United States of America, Russia and China, but I must make it plain that I do not visualize a world in which those four Powers try to clamp down some form of Big Power dictatorship over everybody else."

And nobody will suspect President Roosevelt of imperialistic designs.

However, even this apparently purely practical solution to ensure the defence of collective security in the transitional period, or even as Forrest Davis suggests forever, to the four Big Powers, is highly questionable.

If Forrest is right in his statement that the United States would accept no "blanket commitment," the security of Europe would have to be guaranteed exclusively by Great Britain and Russia.

The first question which arises is what is to happen to the forces of the other United Nations, who are waging war to-day. These forces are far from negligible. The Polish army, e.g., numbers to-day some 150,000 men and has written glorious pages in the French campaign, in the defence of Tobruk.

The Polish air force numbers some 12,000 men. In the Battle of Britain it accounted for 10% of the destroyed planes. On September 15 they scored 28 out of a total of 185. Their grand total of German planes destroyed over Great Britain alone up to August 1, 1943, was 536. Polish bombers provide regularly 10% of the British bomber squadrons. Are they all to be disarmed when peace comes *at the same time as the German armies and air force* and is the defence of Poland to be entrusted to the British and Soviet armies?

And here we come up against the second question. If we read carefully the Atlantic Charter and the pronouncements of Allied statements, we must realize that the disarmament to be imposed on the Axis Powers as a guarantee against future aggression is not only a preventive measure, but also a punitive one. What will be the repercussion in the United Nations if that same measure is to be applied to them, if they also are to forego the possession of any armed

forces? A British journalist, the Marquess of Donegal, has unwittingly given the only construction which can be put on such a measure. He proposes in the SUNDAY DISPATCH:

“. . . and as the only armed force an international air force, consisting of the members of the great nations *that we can trust*,¹ the British Empire, the United States, Russia and China.”

The operative words are, of course, “nations that we can trust.” Germany, Japan and Italy have to be disarmed because they cannot be trusted. And that’s why it is psychologically impossible to impose disarmament on members of the Allied Nations, who can and ought to be trusted.

The final argument, however, is the argument, that willy-nilly the monopoly of armed forces gives to the armed Powers a preponderance incompatible with an ordered and contented world. The veteran Belgian statesman de Brouckère was completely right, when discussing one of these plans to liberate the small States from any obligation to support collective security he wrote (FRANCE, January 7, 1942):

“[In this case] the small Nations would no longer be associates equal in dignity and in liberty. They would be protected, and consequently placed in fact under a protectorate. They have too profound a love of their independence to accept such a situation for long with resignation and patience. Their dissatisfaction would grow rapidly, and the experience of recent decades has proved that the dissatisfaction even of small nations may be the cause of dangerous troubles

¹ My italics.

for the international order. The whole world would lose in tranquillity what the small nations lost in dignity."

For this reason the solution advocated by Walter Lippmann in his brilliant book on United States Foreign Policy is also impossible. Lippmann quite rightly says that the Versailles settlement "which treated the border region as a military barrier, as the *cordon sanitaire*, between Russia and the rest of Europe" ought not to be repeated.

But he is wrong if he thinks "that the hope of a good settlement on Russia's western borderlands depends upon whether the border states will adopt a policy of neutralization and whether Russia will respect and support it." For placing the independence of these States on sufferance, basing their independence on the goodwill of Russia alone, would not be conducive to peace and would create in those states a sentiment of insecurity which might disturb the whole of Europe.

And to speak of "a neutralized role like that of Scandinavians and the Swiss" as a hopeful solution after the experience of April, 1940, is a grim irony indeed.

3

WE MUST examine now the reasons underlying this conviction of the obsolescence of smaller State units, of the principle of nationality as the basis of statehood in order to discover whether there is in fact some objective justification for this conviction. We must examine the arguments which are adduced by the advocates of what I would call neo-imperialism.

There is first of all, of course, what I should call the aesthetic argument. The simplicity of a scheme involving only a few large units instead of a medley of big and little States, is certainly attractive. Maps would be simplified, and so would be the teaching of geography. In fact Professor Renner is a teacher of geography. It is also easier to imagine planning for territories under one central authority, or territories in which, at all events, one partner has a preponderant voice, than for groups of States with equal rights. Essentially, however, I think the arguments of the adversaries of small Nation-States could be summarized under two headings:

1—The existence of “petty sovereignties,” the “balkanization” of Europe, is a permanent danger to peace, for the

multiplication of frontiers leads necessarily to permanent friction and the creation of "danger spots."

2—New inventions, and particularly the development of railways, motor-cars, and aeroplanes, have made big economic units a necessity. The frontiers of the "petty sovereignties" have hampered international trade, and have been among the main causes of the economic collapse which, in turn, was one of the main causes of the present war.

In this view the national sovereignty of small States is as obsolete as were the petty German principalities in the nineteenth century. Just as the nineteenth century was the century of the integration of the German States in the German Reich, and of the Italian States in a united Italy, on the basis of nationality, so to-day the time has come to transcend the Nation-State and the national frontiers, and to attempt the organization of bigger units on a wider basis.

Let us dispassionately examine these two premises. First of all let us consider the political danger of the existence of "petty sovereignties," the dangers to peace that arise out of the existence of small Nation-States.

If we cease to reason in terms of abstractions, and to rely on slogans like the marvellous German propaganda slogan of the "balkanization" of Europe, and turn to facts, we shall see that the danger to peace arising from the existence of "petty sovereignties" is simply non-existent. No drawing of frontiers can be perfect in areas of mixed nationalities, and between 1919 and 1939 there was a lot of revisionist agitation in certain of the smaller States of Europe. But no war arose out of it.

The Greco-Albanian and Yugoslav-Albanian frontier disputes never produced even a remote danger to peace. Even the long-standing and extremely bitter dispute over Macedonia between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria did not constitute a real menace to peace. The I.M.R.O., the Macedonian terrorist organization, did a lot of shooting and murdering in Yugoslavia. At certain moments, when the Fascists were in power in Bulgaria, after the assassination of the great Bulgarian peasant leader Stambuliski, who stood for Balkan collaboration, the I.M.R.O. movement was supported and financed by the Bulgarian Government. Nevertheless this Government did not dare to consider for one moment the possibility of an isolated Bulgaro-Yugoslav war; nor did the Yugoslav Government dream of waging war against Bulgaria in order to eliminate the real source of the internal danger which the Macedonian unrest represented. Eventually King Alexander and King Boris arrived at an understanding between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and for a time the Bulgarian Government withdrew its support from the I.M.R.O. Vantche Mihailov, the sinister leader of the Macedonian murder gangs, was obliged to leave Bulgaria and go into hiding abroad. He has reappeared to-day in Macedonia—a tool of Hitler and Mussolini.

Nor did the Hungarian grievances—so long as they were purely Hungarian—endanger the peace of Europe. There was, indeed, a moment after the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia, engineered by Ante Pavelitch, to-day the Poglavnik of Croatia, when Yugoslav feeling against Hungary ran so high that there seemed to be a danger of

war. In fact, by the standards of 1914 there was every reason for Yugoslavia to declare war on Hungary. For Pavelitch and his associates had been supported by the Hungarian Government and everything pointed to Budapest as the centre in which the murder had been organized. There existed unimpeachable evidence that at Yanka Pusta and elsewhere the Hungarian Government had organized training centres for Croatian terrorists, where the would-be murderers were thoroughly instructed in the manufacture and handling of bombs and other explosives, or taught to use their revolvers. The assassins of Alexander, like other assassins before them, had been trained in Hungary, had been furnished by Hungarian officials with first-class faked passports for their travels, and had been liberally financed by the Hungarian Government.

And there was a strong temptation for the Yugoslavs to seize this occasion for finally eliminating the dangers of Hungarian revisionism. For the odds were heavily in favour of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia alone was stronger than Hungary, and infinitely better armed. And at that moment she could have counted on the wholehearted support of the partners in the Little Entente, for Dr. Beneš still ruled in Czechoslovakia and Titulescu directed the foreign policy in Rumania. Moreover, European opinion was fully prepared to consider the assassination of Alexander as an act of aggression.

Yet there was no war. Both Yugoslavia and Hungary accepted the mediation of the League of Nations. And after long and weary debates the rapporteur of the League Coun-

cil—his name was Anthony Eden—was able to produce a report, accepted by all parties, which finally liquidated the “incident.” Thus even the League of Nations, that minimum of international organization and international collaboration, proved sufficient to deal with what in nineteenth-century circumstances would certainly have developed into a war—a Balkan war.

In two other cases in which disputes arose between smaller Powers, the existence of the League of Nations and its machinery proved equally serviceable in the maintenance of peace. In October, 1925, there was a “frontier incident” at Demir Kapu between Greek and Bulgarian troops. The arms had spoken. Immediately, on October 22, the Bulgarian Government appealed to the League. On October 23 the President of the League Council, Aristide Briand, sent a telegram to the Greek and Bulgarian Governments urging them to withdraw their troops behind their respective frontiers. On October 26 the Council met and repeated this injunction. British, French, and Italian officers were dispatched to the spot in order to report to the Council on the execution of the withdrawal. On October 28 the Bulgarian and Greek Governments informed the Council that they would conform to its request. And finally the whole question was settled by a resolution of the Council of December 25. There was no war.

Still more spectacular was the success of the League in the dispute between Colombia and Peru. In February, 1933, Peruvian troops invaded the territory of Leticia. This terri-

tory had been awarded to Colombia under the Solomon-Lozano Treaty of March 24, 1922, but the award had been contested by Peru. Colombia now appealed to the League. And not only was the intervention of the Council—backed by the menace of sanctions—sufficient to stop all military action immediately, but during the whole period of the examination of the merits of the dispute by the Council the territory of Leticia was placed under the administration of a commission set up by the League and placed under the flag of the League. The League commission administered the territory from June 23, 1933, to June 19, 1934. At that date the territory was handed back to Colombia, in conformity with an agreement reached between the parties under the auspices of the League. There was no war.

It is true that one dispute between two smaller Powers, the Chaco dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, could not be settled by the League and degenerated into a protracted and sanguinary war. This, however, is one of those exceptions that prove the rule. To begin with, in this dispute there was a marked reluctance on the part of the European Great Powers and the leading South American States to consider the possibility of applying sanctions.

At the conference held at the Onwentsia Club in Lake Forest, Illinois, in April, 1941, a conference which grouped most eminent personalities from all the Continents, a Bolivian diplomat, Señor Lozada, stated quite clearly that in the Chaco dispute "the Great Powers were not willing to create a precedent by establishing an embargo" and he

added that the continuation of the Chaco war "was due to the selfishness of the Great Powers that were not willing to tie up their freedom of action."

And there was also another reason for the reluctance to apply these same methods which had been so eminently successful in the Leticia dispute. The reason was that the Chaco dispute was only formally a conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay.

In fact both Governments were pawns in a much bigger game. Behind Bolivia and Paraguay oil interests loomed large; a whole intricate game of power politics was being played in South America, in which one at least of the leading South American States was deeply involved.

It was not the existence of "petty sovereignties" that endangered peace between 1919 and 1939. It was the existence of powerful imperialisms, the aggressiveness of certain big Powers. The Greco-Bulgarian frontier dispute was easily settled by the League. But when, in 1923, a Greek bandit murdered the Italian General Tellini, who was a member of the frontier commission, Mussolini did not appeal to the League. He shelled and conquered Corfu instead. The Great Powers decided that it was too delicate a matter to be left to the League, and transferred the dispute to the Conference of Ambassadors. This Conference bribed Mussolini by accepting extravagant claims for compensation against Greece for the murder of Tellini and meekly condoning the shelling of the civilian population of a peaceful island. Thus at the very beginning of his career Mussolini was presented with a handsome success for his first violation of interna-

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tional law. The Corfu award did endanger the peace of the world, for it assured impunity to any Great Power that flouted international law.

The assassination of King Alexander supplied a second proof of this impunity. I have related how the League succeeded in peacefully settling the dispute between Yugoslavia and Hungary arising out of this murder. But that was only half of the story. In fact Ante Pavelitch was supported as much by Italy and Germany as by Hungary. There were camps in Italy as well as Hungary for training of Croatian terrorists. And this murder had been planned in Rome as well as in Budapest. Even Berlin had a hand in the murder, because Hitler, though not greatly interested in King Alexander, was deeply interested in bringing down Louis Barthou, who had brought Soviet Russia into the League and was trying to form an alliance in order to stem German expansion. This side of the affair was not disclosed in the League proceedings. The Little Entente delegates were persuaded to refrain from the indictment of Italy or Germany. Great Powers were taboo. That did endanger peace, for it confirmed that the Great Powers were sacrosanct.

It was the Great Powers that broke the peace of the world. Japan, a Great Power, was the first to set out on the path of war by the conquest of Manchuria. Mussolini followed with his war against Ethiopia. It was not Yugoslavia or Greece, the neighbours of Albania, who waged war against that unhappy country: it was Mussolini who on Good Friday, 1939, sent his planes and warships to shell and bomb Albania into

submission. And Adolf Hitler is not the dictator of a petty State.

It may be argued, of course, that the Ethiopian war, the conquest of Albania, of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, and so on, prove that the existence of "petty sovereignties" did in fact endanger peace, for they constituted a temptation for the stronger neighbour. G. D. H. Cole uses this argument when he says that "*It is inevitable*¹ that great States should seek to engulf their neighbours." But the argument is unacceptable. Not only is it virtually the argument of La Fontaine's wolf, addressed to the lamb, but it simply does not conform to the reality.

The present World War started the day Japanese troops invaded Manchuria. And not only is it difficult to consider China as a "petty sovereignty," but we have the Tanaka plan to confirm that even the conquest of China was only a stepping stone to the contest with Great Britain and the United States. Mussolini's Ethiopian and Spanish campaigns were likewise only stepping stones to the final mastery of the Mediterranean, to the conflict with France and Great Britain. And Hitler in one of his latest speeches made it abundantly clear that he did not attack Poland for the sake of Danzig or Polish Pomerania. Danzig and the "Corridor" were pretexts. His goal was the conquest of the Continent and Russia, the elimination of Great Britain from Europe, and finally the domination of the world.

Thus the story of 1919-39 teaches us that the existence of small Nation-States and their independence were no danger

¹ My italics.

to peace; they menaced nothing and nobody. A minimum of international organization, even with the formal maintenance of full national sovereignty, would have been sufficient to eliminate any danger to peace from this quarter. Unrestricted sovereignty was in fact a danger for peace, but it was the unrestricted sovereignty of the Great Powers.

Will the redivision of the world into spheres of influence of the four leading Powers obviate this danger? Can we safely assume that this division will be final, that in future the "spheres of influence" will not clash, that there will be no misunderstanding about them?

One would be unduly optimistic in replying in the affirmative. In fact one of the American advocates of the redivision of the world in big blocs, James Burnham, warns at the same time that clashes and bloody wars between these units for the domination of the world are inevitable. (Incidentally Burnham sees as the future leading Powers not the "Big Four" but the United States, Germany and Japan.)

Louis de Brouckère is of the same opinion. In an article in *FRANCE* (March 17, 1943) he says: "If the world is divided in great blocs, necessary rival blocs, the danger of frontiers will not be diminished, it will be aggravated. There will be less frontiers, but they will be more frightful."

Walter Lippmann in his book *U.S. FOREIGN POLICY* says that fissures between the Allies "will tend to become wider and deeper the more any one of the Great Powers seeks to aggrandize itself either at the expense of one of the other Great Powers, or at the expense of their smaller allies. . . .

". . . By the same token again, a Russian policy of ag-

grandizement in Europe, one which threatened the national liberties of her neighbors, would inexorably be regarded as such a threat to Britain and America that they would begin to encourage the nations which resisted Russia."

And on another page of this book we find the following statement, whose correctness cannot be disputed "nor could the nuclear allies divide the globe into spheres of influence, which each was free to dominate and exploit separately. For no spheres of influence can be defined which do not overlap, which would not therefore bring the Great Powers into conflict. Where, in Europe, for example, could a sphere of influence be fixed which separated Britain and Russia into convenient imperialist compartments? On which side of the line would the Scandinavian countries lie? If on the Russian then the sea and air approaches to Britain are insecure; if on the British then the sea and air approaches to Russia are insecure."

And that is also the conclusion which the experts of Onwentsia Club have adopted: "It is one of the theories proclaimed by the Nazi propaganda that the division of the world into four big units, each of them ruled by a leading Power, is just the kind of organization that is needed. The German attack on the U.S.S.R. has destroyed any lingering belief in the sincerity of this doctrine. But even if it were taken at face value, it is evident that all sorts of causes of conflict would exist between the blocs in every field and that the precarious peace established between them would be little else than a temporary bloodless war. The struggle for markets and raw materials as well as for political domina-

tion would continue and would almost certainly be carried over in the spiritual domain as well and the present gigantic armament race would go on without so much as a pause."

THE WORLD'S FATE AND THE UNITED STATES

LITTLE did the experts of Onwentsia Club suspect that this same doctrine which they condemned as Nazi would after the entry of the U.S.S.R. in the war find "progressive" advocates in the United States and in Great Britain.

No, the formation of big blocs through the absorption of the smaller States or the assuring of a privileged position to the Great Powers would not ensure the peace of the world. It would only ensure that the next war would be a World War from the start.

The political history of the inter-war years teaches us the necessity for the establishment of a supranational authority. It teaches us that this authority must have armed forces at its disposal in order to oppose any aggression, armed forces to which all States must contribute. But it does not teach us that the existence of smaller States within this new and strong world organization is an anachronism.

It is not a discrimination between national sovereignties that is needed, the smaller States having to submit to more stringent restrictions of their sovereignty than the Great Powers.

What is necessary to ensure peace, to ensure collective security is to bring ALL national sovereignties under the rule of law.

NOW LET US examine the economic aspect of the question of small States in these same inter-war years. Here again the prevailing tendency is to make the existence of the small States, the "atomization" of Europe (to use G. D. H. Cole's picturesque expression), the villain of the drama. We have read many impressive accounts of how the Peace Treaties lengthened inter-state frontiers by thousands of miles, how existing economic units were disrupted, and how innumerable customs barriers hampered the flow of world trade. Oswald Dutch, in his *ECONOMIC PEACE AIMS*, affirms that "The defect of the national States lay in their unnatural structure. They had passed through no natural stages of development and were without logical origin." And G. D. H. Cole goes so far as to declare that "So dire are the fruits of Europe's economic atomism that it is quite possible to argue that, in a purely economic sense, unification under the Nazis might be better than no unification at all." It is true that

¹ I shall be quoting rather extensively from Professor J. B. Condliffe's book on the *RECONSTRUCTION OF WORLD TRADE*. This book is a work of a special character. It was intended primarily as a report for the international conference on reconstruction of world trade, which was to meet at Bergen on August 27, 1939. For this reason it was based on a series of special studies prepared by leading economists of all nations for this report, and for the same reason the author aimed at achieving a maximum of objectivity and impartiality.

Mr. Cole, probably remembering the hunger-stricken populations of Poland and Greece "unified" under the Nazi heel, qualifies his statement and deprecates the suggestion that the people of the occupied countries are better off to-day than they were before the German conquest. But the gist of his argument is that it is impossible to think of economic reconstruction without an amalgamation of the smaller States into big units.

The economic picture painted by these opponents of the independence of the smaller States is vivid and impressive. Only, like the picture of the dangers to peace created by the existence of small States, it happens to be untrue.

I do not suggest, of course, that the existence of the many customs barriers, some of them very high, between the smaller States did not contribute to the economic unsettlement of the Continent. I shall not attempt to vindicate all the economic measures taken by the smaller States, especially those which attempted to imitate the autarkic policies of Germany and Italy. And I am far from advocating simply a return to the *status quo ante*.

What I do affirm is that: a) the economic cataclysm which came in 1929 was the result of the policies of the Great Powers; b) the economic plight of the world was due as much, if not more, to political as to purely economic causes; c) the efforts of the smaller States to remedy the economic position by regional understandings, and by a reduction of these customs barriers which loom so large in the indictment of the smaller States, were thwarted by the Great Powers;

and, consequently, d) the continued existence of small Nation-States cannot prove an obstacle to the economic rehabilitation of the world.

One preliminary remark is well worth making. The countries which weathered the economic blizzard of the inter-war years were, in fact, small States. Sweden, with her Socialist Government and her intelligent economic policy, remained practically unscathed throughout the whole period. She succeeded in preserving a balanced economy and in maintaining the very high standard of life of her inhabitants. In a lesser degree the same may be said of Norway and Denmark. Little Switzerland also showed great power of resistance. Thus history has proved that small States as economic units are not intrinsically incapable of survival. Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland had been neutrals in the First World War. All these countries confidently hoped to remain outside the future war if it was to come. It is not a pure coincidence that precisely these countries, which firmly believed in the possibility of maintaining their neutrality in any conflagration and were thus more or less free from fear, were the countries which most successfully resisted the economic depression. The essential lesson of 1919-39 is, in fact, not only that there can be no divorce between politics and economics, but also that in troubled periods it is the political factor that is paramount.

Professor Condliffe writes:

“The primary responsibility for the breakdown, therefore, lies not with economic facts, but with economic policy.

The problem is a political one, even in the sphere of economic developments. Governments, fearful of their strategic and political security, have interposed barriers to the progressive interdependence which is inevitable if economic tendencies are allowed to work freely in the modern world."

And elsewhere:

"While at every stage of the breakdown there can be found reasons for further interference in the economic interest of important groups of producers threatened by heavy loss as a result of prior intervention, the ultimate causes of the breakdown are dominantly political and social in character. . . . Since 1918 there has been not only a great dislocation of economic specialization but a reluctance to face the cost and sacrifices involved in a gradual reduction of that dislocation. More important have been the continuation of war policies in peace-time and the gradual subordination of economic welfare to the totalitarian mobilization of economic activity in systems of economics."

This fundamental truth was realized throughout the whole inter-war period. If we re-read the findings of the innumerable economic committees and conferences of this period, if we return to the dusty files of the discussions in the Second Committee of the League Assemblies (the Second Committee dealt with economic and financial questions), we find a single leitmotiv continually recurring: "It is impossible to think of economic rehabilitation so long as political confidence is not restored."

In a world which at any moment might collapse—and the

Manchurian affair, the rise of Hitler to power, the Ethiopian war delineated only too clearly the shape of things to come—there could be no long-term economic policy, no possibility of readjustment. The plans for great international works, sponsored by the I.L.O. as one of the solutions of the unemployment problem, collapsed because nobody dared to invest in them. The migration conferences never produced any result, because the financing of the flow of migrants demanded long-term investments. The agrarian reform in Poland, the redistribution of land among the peasants, was hampered by the prohibitive interest rates demanded in the great financial centres for financing it; and the rates were prohibitive because they included an implicit insurance against war risks. For a short period, between the Locarno Treaties and 1931, there was a silver lining to the clouds on the horizon, a temporary economic recovery. People believed then that peace might be maintained. But as soon as the clouds lowered over the political horizon, the economic fabric was cracked beyond repair.

There were, of course, other contributory causes. But nothing can be farther from the truth than Oswald Dutch's statement that "The world economic crisis of 1931 began in Central Europe and spread from there." It was not in Vienna that the great economic crisis started, it was in New York. The origin of the collapse of the *Kreditanstalt* in Vienna, and later of the collapse of the whole German banking system, was the Wall Street crash which led to the withdrawal of American credits from Europe. Professor Condliffe writes:

"There is no doubt that the proximate cause, not only of the Austrian *Kreditanstalt* difficulties in May, 1931, but of the German banking failure in July and the fall of sterling in September, as well as of the disequilibria that led to exchange control measures in so many countries after the depreciation of sterling, was a liquidity panic marked in each case by sudden withdrawals of short term credits."

And that was the moment that the Hoover administration chose for raising the American tariff wall, for almost completely closing the American market to European goods. Let us quote Professor Condliffe again:

"The Hawley Smoot tariff of 1930 was a fatal blow to any remaining hope of international economic equilibrium. It was followed almost immediately by a crop of tariff increases in other countries. In some cases the reprisal motive was very strong. In others there was a strong defensive reaction against the loss of export markets and the fear of enhanced import competition."

The reversal of the British commercial policy which followed was hardly less disastrous. The new tariff policy and the Ottawa agreements closed a second market to the European countries. As Professor Condliffe states, the new British policy

"was a decisive factor in the widespread adoption of exchange control, the raising of tariffs, and the adoption of quantitative trade restrictions and regulated national economic systems. It threw the smaller manufacturing coun-

tries of Europe, as well as the agricultural exporting countries the world over, into something approaching consternation. The longer-run effects deriving from the collapse of the world trading system that had rested upon sterling for over a century cannot yet be assessed. The decisions of 1931-32, it is becoming clear, marked the end of an era not only for Great Britain itself, but for the rest of the world. Nineteenth-century concepts of monetary stability, of international specialization and co-operation, and of the relation between politics and economics, were revealed as no longer operative, or adequate. The end of the story cannot yet be foreseen, but the significance of these historic events does not diminish as the passing years reveal the amplitude of their repercussions."

President Roosevelt tried to reverse the process. Mr. Cordell Hull's trade agreement policy was directed toward a reconstruction of world trade, toward a reconstruction of the world economy. The opposing forces were, however, too strong, and only small results were achieved by this policy.

Finally, we must not omit from this picture the disrupting forces of the totalitarian regimes. The Mussolinian and Hitlerian slogan of autarky had no economic aims. The forces of Germany and, in a lesser degree, of Italy were marshalled for non-economic aims—for wars of conquest. In April, 1936, the chief of the department of "strategic economy" of the German War Ministry wrote:

"Strategic economy, *Wehrwirtschaft*, merges entirely with the economic system renewed and transformed by National

Socialism. Strategic economy covers all human life, and therefore transforms the social structure. It rests on the absolute will to military preparedness. It is the economic principle of the totalitarian State, and constitutes the economic preparation for future war, which will also be in the highest degree totalitarian."

Professor Condliffe sums up his study of the pre-war economic policies in these words:

"It is difficult, therefore, to resist the conclusion that the conflict of tariff policies in the world just before the present war mirrored the international political situation only too accurately. The British trading system, based on the unchallenged stability of sterling and a great free-trade market, had broken down and been replaced by an opportunist policy conservatory of vested interests. Totalitarian policies were making vigorous and determined attempts to create new centres of world trade designed to strengthen the economic bases of military power. The United States was moving in the direction necessary to restore world trade, but slowly and with reservations deriving essentially from a profound reluctance to accept the consequences of effective and responsible participation in an interdependent world."

Where do the small countries, whose innumerable frontiers and customs barriers are supposed to have been the main reason for the economic unrest of the inter-war years, come into this picture? They come in, but in a quite different way. For throughout this whole period the small nations struggled to remedy the troubles which could be related to

their particular position. They tried to neutralize their frontiers, to counteract the consequences of their "atomization." They repeatedly tried to form groupings that would permit a freer flow of goods. All these attempts failed—through the fault of the Great Powers.

Let us take first the story of the so-called Oslo group. The World Economic Conference at Geneva proposed a tariff truce. Eventually, under the leadership of Great Britain, a draft convention, embodying in part the findings of the Conference, was adopted on March 24, 1930. This convention never came into operation, for the necessary ratifications were not forthcoming. Representatives, however, of Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Sweden and Norway met in October, 1930, at The Hague, in November at Geneva, and finally in December at Oslo, where a convention was signed providing that none of the countries concerned would impose new duties or increase existing duties without consultation with the other signatories. In 1932 Finland added her signature to the convention.

This "tariff truce" was meant as a first step toward tariff reduction, toward the creation of a zone of free trade. In fact, in July, 1932, Belgium and Holland signed a convention at Ouchy providing for reciprocal and progressive tariff reductions, and negotiations were started to include the other signatories of the Oslo group in this scheme. It came to nothing, however, for the Imperial Conference at Ottawa insisted—on the basis of the most-favoured-nation clause, which at this same conference had been ruled out of inter-Imperial relations—that all concessions made within the

Oslo group must also be granted to the British Empire. This decision gave the death blow to the Ouchy initiative. The members of the Oslo group continued to meet to discuss possibilities and exchange information. In 1937 an agreement was even signed aiming, since tariff reductions were impossible, at expanding the trade between these countries by a relaxation of the quantitative restrictions on imports. But this agreement was terminated in May, 1938. And war in Finland and afterwards in the Scandinavian countries ended even the consultations.

The Baltic States (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia) endeavoured between 1928 and 1934 to secure the acceptance of a Baltic clause as an exception to the most-favoured-nation clause, and thus to forge a larger economic unit out of these three States. In vain. Similar efforts at the Balkan conferences at Istanbul, Bucharest, and Salonika after 1930 met with the same ill-success. The more ambitious scheme of preferential treatment for grain and other agricultural exports from Central and Eastern Europe, following the Warsaw Conference of August, 1930, attended by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Estonia and Latvia, was no more successful.

As Professor Condliffe states:

“The economic need of these small countries was desperate, but economic motives were not strong enough to move the great trading countries or to secure unanimity of action among the Eastern European countries themselves. The former were preoccupied with their own economic difficul-

ties and unwilling to penalize the great agricultural exporting countries outside Europe. The latter were divided by political differences *and under heavy pressure from the even more bitter struggle among the Great Powers for political hegemony.*"¹

This struggle between the Great Powers was most marked in the so-called Danubian area, in relation, that is, to the "Succession States" that had emerged from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Throughout the whole period repeated attempts were made to re-establish the former economic links between the Succession States. The Stresa Conference of 1932 for the valorization of cereals, the so-called Tardieu plan, and the attempts to achieve a closer economic union between Czechoslovakia and Austria initiated by the Czechoslovak Government, were all doomed to failure, because neither Italy nor Germany would allow a closer economic union between the Succession States. For this closer economic union between the Little Entente States on one side and Austria and Hungary on the other would have been sure to lead to a political understanding. And for Mussolini in particular such a political understanding would have meant a strengthening of the French security system and of French influence in Europe. This the Italian dictator would not allow. He encouraged the revisionist agitation in Hungary, and used all his influence on the Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Dollfuss, to prevent any understanding between the Succession States.

¹ My italics.

The sequel to these events is well known. On February 12, 1934, Dollfuss, on the orders of Mussolini, shelled and machine-gunned out of existence the workers' movement in Austria, which had been a force making for international goodwill. In the summer of the same year King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Barthou were assassinated, and Barthou was replaced by a man who could be bribed by Mussolini—Pierre Laval.

No Danubian economic understanding came into being, but Austria and Hungary were linked up by the so-called Rome protocols to the Italian economic system—without any profit to them, or, for that matter, to Italy. Later Hitler's Germany stepped in, and Austria disappeared.

We cannot better sum up the economic story of the inter-war years than by two fine quotations from Professor Condliffe's book. Speaking of the innumerable conferences between the smaller Powers, he says:

"The reality behind these conferences, however, is to be found in a relentless political struggle between the Great Powers for control over the smaller nations of Europe. In that struggle economic relations were steadily worsened and all attempts at regional understandings were thwarted."

And later:

"Political conflicts among the smaller Powers have been a cause of disunion; but the political conflict that has wrecked all the regional initiatives launched in recent years has been the bitter struggle of the Great Powers for hegemony on the Continent of Europe."

What are the lessons to be drawn from this history? The first is, of course, the rejection of the theory that it was the existence of small Nation-States that rendered impossible a rational organization of the European economic system. For all the attempts at building up effective collaboration between the smaller Powers were thwarted by the imperialism of the Great Powers, who wanted the "leadership" which G. D. H. Cole now advocates as the best solution. The second lesson is that while politics are conditioned largely by economic factors, economics are conditioned no less by political factors. And in the inter-war years the political factors were predominant, as they will be after this war.

I shall try later to give a broad outline of how the necessities of planning, the necessities of the organization of a new economic order, can be reconciled with the conception of Nation-States. But as the question is primarily a political one, as the people who are conquered to-day would be prepared even to accept economic hardships in order to maintain their existence, I will deal first with the political aspects of the question.

AT THE Peace Conference in Paris, Mr. Lloyd George assured Paderewski that he could understand the needs of Poland better than any other statesman, because he himself was a member of a small nation. He used the same argument in a discussion with General Botha concerning the national problems in South Africa. Mr. Lloyd George was, of course, in one sense right. He is a member of a small nation: he is a Welshman. But this fact had hardly any bearing on his political career. Mr. Lloyd George, M.P., Mr. Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd George, the great Prime Minister in the First World War, the member of the Big Four in Paris, did not act as a Welshman. He was a "British" statesman.

This complete divorce between nationality and state-membership is characteristic of Great Britain. In political life Englishmen, Scotsmen, and Welshmen forget their nationality and act simply as British subjects for the good of Great Britain as a unity. (It is strange to note that in this freest of all countries the term "citizen" has not yet displaced the old word "subject.")

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No Englishman regards it as strange when a Welshman like Mr. Lloyd George, or a Scotsman like Ramsay Mac-

Donald, occupies No. 10, Downing Street. In Parliament there is a Scottish group, but though the Cabinet includes a Minister for Scotland, this, so far as I can ascertain, is a manifestation rather of regionalism than of nationalism in the Continental sense of the word. Home Rule for Scotland, Home Rule for Wales, never have played, and I think never will play, a part comparable to that of the Home Rule for Ireland movement. Scottish and Welsh nationalism are politically of no more importance than the Breton autonomist movement in France. Broadly speaking, the conception of nationality in Great Britain is a non-political one. Parliament is divided on party lines, not on national lines. And I do not think that any Englishman would refer to a Scotsman as a "foreigner."

This conception of nationality as a matter of purely private concern, easily reconcilable with allegiance to a non-national State, is, however, peculiar to Great Britain. Everywhere else the term "nation" has a political connotation and a political meaning, though by no means a uniform one. In France we find the opposite of the British conception. As a result of the centralistic policy of Louis XI, Richelieu, Louis XIV, the Revolution, and Napoleon, the French concept of nationality has become identified with the concept of French citizenship. There is, in fact, only one word in French defining both these concepts, the word "*nationalité*."

I remember very well my first encounter with this French conception. It was in 1905. We students of Warsaw University walked out on the first day of the revolution and

decided upon a "students' strike." We vowed not to return so long as Russian remained the language officially used by the University. The Tsarist Government remained unbending, and so we were obliged to go abroad in order to conclude our studies, and I matriculated at the University of Paris. Asked for my nationality, I gave it, of course, as Polish, which the Registrar refused to admit. He explained to me that as there was no Polish State there could be no such thing as Polish nationality, and that as a Russian subject I was necessarily of Russian nationality. We quarrelled for a long time and finally agreed to a compromise. I was enrolled as Russian and—in brackets—Polish.

There are, perhaps, much bigger differences between a Provençal who at home as often as not speaks Provençal and not French, a Catalan-speaking inhabitant of Perpignan, a Breton who even to-day may not be able to speak a word of French, and a native of the Île de France or of Normandy, than there are between a Scotsman and an Englishman. But they all consider themselves members of one nation, the French nation. This identification of nationality with citizenship goes so far that the negro children of Senegal are taught that "our ancestors, the inhabitants of Gaul, had blue eyes and fair hair." During the French occupation of the Rhineland the story was widely circulated, and widely believed, of a black soldier who returned to his barracks exclaiming indignantly: "Why do the people stare at me? Have they never seen a Frenchman?" This story may be true or not. But there is no doubt at all that there are black and coloured Frenchmen. The deputies from Martinique,

Guadeloupe, and Senegal to the French Parliament, and the coloured Governor-General Eboué, who is continuing the fight against the Germans in Africa, regard themselves as members of the French nation.

France and the French nation are not the sole example of a nationality moulded by the State. In the course of centuries the Swiss State has welded together the Italian-speaking peoples of Ticino, the French-speaking peoples of Vaud and the Valais, and the German-speaking peoples of Berne and of Basle into a single nation—the Swiss nation. It is true that cantonal patriotism has remained strong, and that a Swiss will generally refer to himself as a Genevese, a Bernese, or a Vaudois, and not a Swiss. It is true that Gottfried Keller and Jakob Burckhardt belong to the history of German literature, just as Jean Jacques Rousseau and Henri Amiel belong to the history of French literature. It is true that the sympathies of the Swiss in the First World War were largely divided along the linguistic frontiers, the French-speaking Swiss being favourable to Allies and the German-speaking Swiss to the Central Powers. To-day the situation is different and the German Swiss are strongly anti-Hitler. But this is a war which transcends national sympathies—it is a war of democracy against Fascism. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that the Swiss national consciousness and the Swiss nation are living realities.

Walloons and Flemings, the former closely related to the French and the latter as closely related to the Dutch, are to-day one nation, the Belgian nation, and have a strong consciousness of their common nationhood. If Brussels and

the Walloon provinces had not formed a part of the dowry of the Burgundian wife of Maximilian of Austria, but had been reunited, together with the rest of Burgundy, to the French monarchy in the fifteenth century, and if the Flemish provinces of Belgium had been united with the Netherlands after the successful revolt of the Dutch provinces in the sixteenth century, there would have been no Belgian nation. As it is, this nation exists and neither the Germany of William II in the years of occupation during the First World War, nor the Germany of Hitler, succeeded in disrupting the unity of Belgium. There did exist in 1914-18 a Council of Flanders, there were in the inter-war years and there are to-day some Flemings who preach the gospel of Germanism, but they have no more importance than the Quislings and Musserts.

There can also be no doubt of the reality of the Argentinian, Peruvian, or Uruguayan nations. Here again it is the State that has created the nation. Actually, until the beginning of the nineteenth century all the Latin American States (Brazil excepted) were provinces of the Spanish Empire. The revolutionaries who revolted against Spanish rule, all of them descendants of Spaniards and Spanish-speaking, were conscious of a difference between themselves and the Spaniards in Spain, but it was by no means certain what States would finally emerge from the revolution, and the Bolivians and Colombians did not regard themselves as such. Bolivar himself favoured a lesser number of States than finally emerged. He tried hard to create a single unit out of the several "Bolivarian" States, as they are called to

this day. In the final settlement, however, Latin America broke up roughly on the lines of the ancient Spanish administrative divisions, for even these purely artificial divisions had already created a sense of community. And to-day in Latin America there are just as many separate nations, each of them deeply conscious of its own nationhood, as there are States—no more and no less.

This process of the emergence of nations as products of States is still going on. The Canadian and the Australian nations bear testimony to it. There can be hardly any doubt that the emergence of a united Canadian nation, of a Canadian national consciousness, is the direct result of Canadian self-government, of the gradual weakening of the links uniting Canada with Whitehall. And an Australian nation can hardly be said to have existed before the establishment of the Australian Commonwealth in 1900. To-day these nations do exist, and the word Canadian, for instance, does not mean simply an Englishman, a Scotsman, a Frenchman or a Ukrainian with Canadian citizenship, but means a member of the Canadian nation.

And the United States of America: what has made a nation of these descendants of all nations of Europe if not the existence of the American State?

However, this nation-building power of the State is not unlimited. Alongside the States in which citizenship and nationality are synonymous we find States in which these concepts are sharply distinguished. The classical example is South Africa. A very interesting book has recently appeared under the provocative title *THERE ARE NO SOUTH AFRICANS*.

In fact the long political ascendancy of General Hertzog and the large following of Dr. Malan prove that the majority of the Afrikanders continue to be a separate nation, co-existing with the British in the South African State, but absolutely refusing to lose their national individuality.

The two post-war attempts to build up single nationhoods on the basis of a single State in Europe also failed. Czechs, and Slovaks agreed in 1917 at the Pittsburgh convention to unite in the building up of a single State of Czecho-Slovakia. (The name was to be spelt with a hyphen.) And I have no doubt that after the war Czechs and Slovaks alike will desire to wipe out the partition imposed by Hitler in March, 1939, and that there will again be a Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, there has not emerged a Czechoslovak nation, unhyphenated. Czechs and Slovaks have retained their separate nationhoods, their separate national consciousness. Similarly Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had agreed during the First World War to unite in a single State—the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. It was to be an equal partnership. There is every probability that this partnership, too, will not be dissolved. Pavelitch and his gang, pretending to represent the new Kingdom of Croatia, have as little right to speak for the Croat nation as Tiso and Tuka to speak for the Slovaks. It is Matchek, the great peasant leader, to-day a German prisoner, who represents the Croats, and Matchek never accepted the idea of a disruption of the Yugoslav State. But here again no new nation has emerged. The name of the State was changed to Yugoslavia, but Yugoslavia has continued to be the country of three nations—the Serbs, the

Croats, and the Slovenes. All the attempts to ignore this essential fact, all the attempts to rule the country as the land of a single nation, the Yugoslavs, have failed and have been the cause of perpetual unrest.

This consciousness of separate nationhood, based on the bonds of common descent, common language, and common history, can thus prove stronger than the bonds of common statehood. And it can outlast centuries. The Catalans of Perpignan, the Basques of Bayonne are to-day Frenchmen. But the Catalans of Barcelona and the Basques of Irun are emphatically not Spaniards, but members of separate nations. The original Czech State collapsed in the sixteenth century: the Czech nation survived. The Serb State was wiped out in the fifteenth century: the Serb nation survived. Upper Silesia was separated from the Polish State in the fourteenth century. Six hundred years later the plebiscite showed that the people of Upper Silesia remained Polish. Latvia and Estonia have never been independent States in a modern sense; yet the Lett and Estonian nations were realities.¹

¹ The twentieth century has given us examples which seem to prove that in the conflict between the nation as a group determined by common origin, and the nation as the sum of citizens of one State, it is the first grouping that prevails. I refer to the question of immigrants. The policy of the United States and of the Latin American States has always been based on the assumption that as soon as an immigrant has become an American, Brazilian, or Argentinian citizen he becomes also a member of the American, Brazilian or Argentinian nation. The State was not interested in the language these citizens spoke at home; it permitted Italian, German or Polish schools and newspapers. For a long time the system proved completely workable, and the sentimental ties with the countries of origin and with the language of origin did not disrupt the national unity.

In 1914-18, however, the United States had trouble with the "hyphenated" German-Americans. The "Americanism" of many of these citizens proved unable to stand the strain of the conflict between their country of adoption and their country of origin. To-day the system has collapsed completely in the Latin

It is essential to realize that it was not the upper classes, not the intelligentsia, that maintained the existence of nations, as entities independent of the State. It was the common people. The concept of nationality is essentially a democratic concept. It is no accident that the symbol of the unity of the French nation, a unity transcending the differences between Armagnacs, Lorrainers, and the people of the Île de France, the first genuinely French patriot was a peasant girl, Jeanne la Lorraine—Joan of Arc. It is no mere coincidence that the slogan of France "one and indivisible" was forged only by the French Revolution: it is in accord-

American States, and is endangered even in the United States. In 1938 the Brazilian Government felt compelled to close down all German schools. These schools were, in fact, not endeavouring to turn out German-speaking Brazilians, but purely and simply Germans, whose allegiance was to the German Reich and to Adolf Hitler and not to Brazil. The investigations of the Dies Committee in the United States and of Tabora in Argentina, and the attempted putsches in Bolivia and Paraguay, have made it more than clear that the loyalty of a great majority of the citizens of German and Italian origin in the Latin American States, and of a number of these people in the United States was first to the people of their kin in Europe, and that the loyalty to the States and to their fellow-citizens was bound to be discarded in the conflict between them.

The nation was victorious in the conflict with the State. The most instructive example of this growing importance of national ties is given by the Volga Germans. They are descendants of colonists brought to Russia by Catherine II. This means that they have been Russian subjects for 200 years, that for 200 years their only ties with Germany were their German descent and German language. In the First World War these ties did not count. The Volga Germans, as well as the German Baltic barons, fought in the Tsarist army without any qualms. The Bolshevik revolution enlarged the national rights of the Volga Germans, and were recognized as a federated republic, the republic of the Volga Germans, and they obtained full self-government. For twenty years these workers and peasants have been educated in the Communist creed, for twenty years their schools and their newspapers inculcated in them hatred of Fascism. They appeared to be happy and loyal Soviet citizens. However, as soon as the German-Soviet war started these German Communists felt that their loyalty to the German people came first, even if the leader of these people was Adolf Hitler. The Volga Germans became such a hotbed of fifth columnist activities that as Hitler's armies approached the Volga the Soviet Government saw no other solution than the wholesale deportation of the 600,000 Volga Germans far from the front to Siberia. Bearing in mind the strain this deportation in the middle of a war must have put on the Russian communications system, it is easy to realize the magnitude of the danger the Volga Germans must have presented.

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ance with the normal historic process. French noblemen have served the German Emperor against France in bygone days; Germans have been Marshals in France. The Serbian nobles were converted to Islam and merged in the Turkish ruling class, and the Czech aristocracy became Germanized. The Polish aristocracy in Upper Silesia became German, and the Lithuanian nobles after the union of Lithuania and Poland accepted Polish culture and Polish nationality. The toiling masses resisted. The peasants and miners of Upper Silesia remained Polish, the Serb, the Czech, the Lithuanian peasants continued to cling to their language, to their way of life. And it was these peasant masses who, becoming articulate in the nineteenth century, revived the Czech, the Serb, the Lithuanian nations. It was this survival of national consciousness in the masses that invalidated the equation between State and nation.

6

There will be no Socialism before independence.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

WE HAVE seen that there can be no single definition of nationality. Nationality means something different to an Englishman and a Frenchman, to an Ulsterman and a Southern Irishman, to a French Catalan and a Spanish Catalan, to a Pole and an Argentinian. An all-embracing definition of a nation can be given only in tautological terms—"A nation is a group that considers itself to be a nation." For even the seemingly very comprehensive definition of Louis de Brouckère, "A nation is constituted by the community of those who have at the same time the will and the means of living together" does not cover all the possibilities. For instance, non-Zionist Jewish nationalists, and the majority of Jewish Socialists regard themselves as members of the Jewish nation, but have neither the will nor the means of living together in Palestine, and insist simply on their right of retaining their nationality while living in the diaspora among other nations.

That is why "self-determination" is the only principle on which a just solution of national problems can be based. In its usual connotation this principle implies, however, more than the simple and hardly disputed affirmation that a nation is a group that considers itself to be a nation. In

President Wilson's Fourteen Points it implied also the right of each nation to determine whether it wanted to live in its own Nation-State, or whether it was willing to be part of a larger State unit. The authors of the Versailles Treaty accepted this interpretation of self-determination when re-drawing the map of Europe. They cancelled, for instance, the London Treaty, which had given Dalmatia to the Italian State. After much bloodshed the British Government accepted the principle of self-determination for Ireland. Today the Atlantic Charter has reaffirmed this principle. Point 3 of the Charter says explicitly that the signatories "wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."

A substantial section of British and American opinion, however, including ex-appeasers as well as certain left-wing writers, is now fighting against this principle of the self-determination of nations, insisting that smaller States are "obsolescent" and denying that national rights imply the right to a separate Nation-State. Mr. G. D. H. Cole, in his book, *EUROPE, RUSSIA, AND THE FUTURE*, states this case with exceptional vigour and, therefore, we give him pride of place.

Mr. Cole does not deny that nations as such are entitled to certain rights. He says:

"For most of us—even of those who see the need—international government is not so much an inspiring ideal as an unwelcome necessity. That makes it indispensable to think out clearly in our minds the means of preserving cultural

nationalism, with its appropriate institutions near to the everyday lives of men, within the broader framework of the international State. The nations must have their parliaments—or soviets—to voice their common desires; they must have leaders who speak their language and think their thoughts; their institutions must be officered by men and women who speak their language and share the outlook of the people with whom they have to deal.”

But he absolutely rejects the idea that the rights of nations should extend to separate statehood. The small States are anathema to him. His argument is twofold, both political and economic. His political argument is summed up as follows:

“The idea of nationality as a basis for an independent statehood is obsolete. Economic development, including the development of the economic arts of war, has destroyed it finally. The independence of small States, and, indeed, of *all States save the largest and richest in developed resources*,¹ is impracticable now that a mechanized army and air force belonging to a great State can simply sweep aside all the resistance that they can offer. The utmost “independence” any small State can hope for in the future is a false independence, behind which lies the reality of complete domination of a greater neighbor. That or existence on mere sufferance, or as a buffer between greater neighbors, almost certain to become a battleground if those neighbors fall out. Assume the revival of the pre-war European State system,

¹ My italics.

even with federations of the smaller and weaker independent countries. What chance would a federated Danubia have of resisting either a united Germany or a united Russia, were either minded to enslave it—that is, except by enslaving itself to the other? For how much would the military might of federated Balkania count in any future conflict? For nothing, as an independent force.”

This argument is a peculiar example of Sahib mentality, a curious example of forgetfulness of very recent facts. For if this war, in which France did not defend herself any longer than Poland, and Singapore held out less long than the Polish Peninsula, has proved anything, it has proved that even the larger States and those richest in developed resources cannot defend themselves successfully single-handed. This war can be won only by a *coalition*, comprising four of the largest States—Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Mr. Cole’s argument leads necessarily to the conclusion that the idea of *any* absolutely independent State is obsolete. It is an argument for establishing a worldwide system of collective security. It is true that without an adequate organization of collective security the aggressor Powers that have prepared for war will always have the initial advantage; it is true that without collective security the “freedom from fear” cannot disappear. In this respect, however, Great Powers and small Powers are all in the same boat, and there is absolutely no reason for discrimination.

Mr. Cole’s second argument is economic. He continues:

“Nor, military considerations apart, have such groupings any sufficient basis of economic strength. Can Balkan or Danubian federations solve the problems of peasant poverty? Yet these are the basic problems of all Southern and Eastern Europe, and there will be no stable European order until a solution of them has been made possible.”

Here again the argument in itself is sound. But there is a *non sequitur* between it and the condemnation of small States and federations of small States. The argument proves the necessity of worldwide economic collaboration, of elements of worldwide organization transcending *all* national sovereignties. For without such collaboration, without such organization, not only the problems of Southern and Eastern Europe, but the problems of France, Great Britain, and the United States as well, are insoluble. No Power to-day is completely self-sufficient. Even the creation of huge units such as Mr. Cole contemplates would not eliminate the necessity for a certain amount of interstate planning, and if that is so, here again no reason can be found for discriminating between smaller and greater States.

I have quoted Mr. Cole because he has perhaps argued most forcibly and effectively the case of the adversaries of small States. Mr. Cole, however, is far from being isolated in his views.

So—to take an American example—Hiram Motherwell of the CHICAGO DAILY NEWS writes in his book, THE PEACE WE FIGHT FOR, that “the nationalist groups large and small may freely foster their national folk dances and plays; they may

teach the national language and literature in the schools, they may have all the costume parades and schools they like."

And to return to Great Britain, Kenneth Bell in the *NEW STATESMAN* reviewing Mr. Cecil's apology for Metternich wrote: "Metternich did not mind Italians appreciating Dante or Michelangelo provided they did not express their enthusiasm by stabbing Austrian policemen in Lombardy."

This statement—which condemns the fights of Mazzini, Cavour and Garibaldi for Italian unity as futile, if not criminal, which tries to justify Metternich who for over a hundred years has symbolized the most abominable reaction—confirms fully what I have written before that all these plans for the suppression or capital diminution of small States are not forward but backward looking; that they are not the expression of the new needs of the twentieth century, but the rehash of plans and ideas of the reactionaries who after the downfall of Napoleon wanted to turn the clock back to the times preceding 1789.

However it becomes necessary to examine the merits of this assumption, to examine whether in fact national needs are satisfied if a nation can foster its language, literature and "folk dances"; whether to put the question on a more serious plane fully *guaranteed local government* (in contradistinction to self-government) is not sufficient to meet national needs, whether the insistence on national independence is not simply a quibble over a word.

In a purely rational world Mr. Cole might be right. In a world of angels, where the majority nation inside the State

would not take an unfair advantage of its majority position, he would certainly be right. But humanity is not composed of angels. And it is not moved only by rational causes, just as it is not moved only by economic causes. There can be no doubt that the term "national independence" has a profound psychological and emotional basis, that the desire for national independence, and not simply for national rights in the framework of a larger State unit, has been and continues to be one of the most potent motives of heroism and sacrifice. There can be no doubt—we shall return to this aspect of the question—that the innumerable heroes and martyrs of Poland, Yugoslavia, Norway, and the other occupied countries are fighting precisely for national independence. To neglect this psychological factor is to close our eyes to one of the most important realities in the present situation.

Scores of examples could be adduced to prove the irresistible force of the desire for full national independence. I will limit myself to two. Sweden and Norway were two democratic countries, each with full self-government. The only link between these two countries was the person of the King. But even this loose union appeared to the Norwegian people to be an intolerable humiliation, for the ruling dynasty was a Swedish dynasty. And Sweden and Norway separated peacefully in 1905.

In the preceding chapter I exemplified the nation-building power of the State by the history of Canada and Australia. This history, however, points also in a different direction of the State-building power of a nation. It proves that

as soon as a nation achieves full consciousness of its separate nationhood it automatically strives to obtain the maximum of independence for its State. Neither Canada nor Australia has ever seriously contemplated secession from the British Empire, or rupture of the links with the British Crown. But both insistently claimed, and finally obtained in the Westminster Statute, the recognition of their full sovereignty and independence, the recognition that as members of the British Commonwealth they are "equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another."

Here again it is important to note that the idea of national independence, of the right of each nation to its own State,¹ is essentially a democratic ideal. Its implication is, as Nehru's dictum proves, that full democracy can only be realized within the framework of a national State.

This intimate connection between the fight for democracy and the fight for independence cannot be better exemplified than by the story of the 150 years of Poland's struggle. The Polish insurrection of 1794 was Kosciusko's insurrection. And Kosciusko, who had fought in the United States with Washington, was a partisan of the French Revolution, as were also his comrades in arms. One of his first acts had been the liberation of the peasants. After the third partition of Poland, Polish legions were organized in revolutionary France, and they fought in Italy under a banner on which these proud words were inscribed "*Gli uomini liberi sono fratelli*"—free men are brothers. The Polish insurrection

¹ Or to membership of a federal State on the basis of the absolute equality of the federated nations. This, however, is a question to be examined later.

of 1830 was started by freemasons and republicans, and the soldiers of 1830 fought the troops of the Tsar under the banner "for our freedom and for yours." The revolution of 1863 was started by the "Reds" against the advice of the conservative "Whites," who joined only later in the struggle. The first manifesto of January 22, 1863, began with the words:

"In the first moment of this sacred struggle, the National Central Committee declares all sons of Poland, without any difference of religion, origin, or status, equal and free citizens of the country. The land which the peasant population has hitherto tilled as tenants or serfs to-day becomes its property."

Neither Marx nor Herzen had any doubt that the Polish revolution of 1863 was a popular revolution, meriting the sympathy and the support of the European working class. In fact, the foundation of the First International was a direct outcome of the general agitation in favour of Poland. And after the collapse of the revolution two of its leaders, generals Dabrowski and Wróblewski became military leaders of the Paris Commune.

In the years between 1863 and 1914 the Conservative elements of Polish society reasoned precisely along the lines of Mr. Cole's argument. They insisted that nationality could be divorced from statehood, and that the Polish nation ought to accommodate itself to foreign rule and concentrate only on the cultural development of the Polish nationality, as the only thing that mattered. In Austria, where after 1867

the cultural rights of the Poles were respected and where the Poles had provincial self-government, the Polish Conservatives were the staunchest supporters of the Dual Monarchy. And even in Russian and Prussian Poland the Conservative class, the great landlords and industrialists, proclaimed the gospel of loyalty of the State, fondly hoping that as a reward for this loyalty they might obtain a reversal of the policy of forcible Russification and Germanization and devote themselves to the pursuit of the economic interests which linked them with the occupying Power.

The Socialist Party, however, inscribed in its programme the fight for the Independence of Poland. It was the reasoned and profound conviction of the founders of Polish Socialism that independent statehood was the necessary condition for the full freedom of the Polish people. And in the years immediately preceding the First World War the political counterpart of Piłsudski's military organization, which prepared the Polish independent intervention in the approaching war, was the Confederate Commission of the Polish Independence Parties, comprising the Socialist Party, the Peasant Party, and the party of the radical intelligentsia, then headed by Władysław Sikorski.

The independence of Poland was proclaimed on November 7, 1918, by a Government representing the Socialists, the peasants, and the radical intelligentsia. Its head was the great Socialist leader Ignacy Daszyński. And when in 1920 the Russian armies approached Warsaw the national Government was headed by the peasant leader Wincenty Witos as Premier, with the Socialist leader Daszyński as his deputy.

That supreme realist, Lenin, who had lived in Poland before the war, well understood this necessary connection between Socialism and national independence. There was at that time a "fraction" (political group) of Polish Socialists, headed by people who afterwards left the Polish movement—Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Radek, Dzierzynski—which opposed the fight for independence. They affirmed that economically the three parts of Poland were already indissolubly linked up with the partitioning States, that the severance of these links would spell misery for the Polish worker, that proletarians were interested only in a Socialist revolution and not in nationalist fads. Lenin fought them wholeheartedly and passionately. We read in the memoirs of his widow:

"But the war would inevitably—Ilyich had no doubt about that—develop into rebellion; the oppressed nationalities would fight for their independence. This was their right. The International Socialist Conference in London in 1896 had already confirmed this right. The underestimation of the right of nations to self-determination at such a time, the end of 1912 and the beginning of 1913, in the face of impending war, filled Vladimir Ilyich with indignation. . . . But the most serious controversy over the question of the right of nations to self-determination was carried on with the Poles. The latter, Rosa Luxemburg and Róžlamowcy, maintained that the right of nations to self-determination does not necessarily mean the establishment of separate States. Ilyich appreciated the reasons why the Poles

were disturbed about the question of right to self-determination."

And in 1915, in answer to an article by Radek in the *BERNER TAGWACHT*, Lenin wrote: "It is senseless to contrast the Socialist revolution and the revolutionary struggle against capitalism with *one* of the questions of democracy, in this case the national question."

Lenin had no doubt that national liberty meant the right to a separate national State. In his thesis on the socialist revolution and the right of nations of self-determination (*VERBOTE*, April, 1916) he wrote: "The right of nations to self-determination means only the right to *independence in a political sense*,¹ the right to free political secession from the oppressing nation."

In his article "Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism" we read:

"What is a national uprising? It is an uprising that has for its aim the political independence of the oppressed nation, i.e., the establishment of a separate national State."

In his speech at a conference on May 12, 1917, replying to Piatakov he emphasized:

"As regards the separatist movements we are indifferent neutral. If Finland, Poland, if the Ukraine break away from Russia there is nothing bad about it. What is there bad about it? Anyone who says there is, is a chauvinist. It would be madness to continue the policy of Tsar Nicholas. . . ."

¹ My italics.

Once upon a time Alexander I and Napoleon traded people, once upon a time tsars traded portions of Poland. Are we to continue these tactics of the tsars?

"We say that frontiers are determined by the will of the populations. Russia does not dare to fight over Courland. Germany withdraw your armies from Courland."

Another passage of his thesis has a quite modern ring.

"On the other hand we see the rather frank servants of the bourgeoisie, who defend annexations on the ground that imperialism and political concentration are progressive and who repudiate the right to self-determination on the ground that it is utopian, illusory, petty bourgeois, etc. Among these may be included Parvus and the extreme opportunists in Germany, a section of the Fabians and Trade Union leaders in England, and the opportunists Semkovsky, Yurkovits, etc., in Russia.

"Russian Socialists who fail to demand freedom of secession for Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, etc., are behaving like chauvinists, like lackeys of the blood and mudstained imperialist monarchies and imperialist bourgeoisies."

And in another article: "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Self-Determination," in answer to Radek, Lenin gave this definition of imperialism, which fits like a glove the new policy of "spheres of influence":

"Imperialism is the progressive oppression of the nations of the world by a handful of Great Powers."

One of the men who knew pre-war Europe best, one of

the shrewdest and most intelligent observers, the former Director of the I.L.O., Harold Butler, sums up the case admirably. He writes in *THE LOST PEACE*:

“It was easy enough to condemn the peace settlements, the ‘balkanization’ of Europe, from armchairs in London. It was all very well for the economists to demonstrate by industrial and banking statistics that the new grouping of States was unworkable—and to a large extent they were right. But national sentiment takes little account of statistics. To the traveller who witnessed the ecstasy with which all the liberated peoples were revelling in their newly won freedom, it was obvious that the peace settlement was in its broad lines not only right, but inevitable.”

And this opinion of Harold Butler is the opinion of all impartial American and British observers, who have first hand information of Europe. It is the opinion of Edgar A. Mowrer who fights against the conception of spheres of influence. It is the opinion of Vernon Bartlett who after a visit to the States wrote in the *NEWS CHRONICLE*:

“Some foresee the domination by the United States, the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth and China over the smaller States, so often condemned for a nationalism which is still praised when professed by the larger nations.

“There are many Americans in the second category. They are too remote from Europe to understand how suffering has strengthened the moral fibre of Europeans, even though it has weakened their physical resistance.

“It is true that the four Great Powers will have the heavi-

est responsibility and will, therefore, take the major share of the control. But there can be neither justice nor peace if these Great Powers forget that even the smallest national groups in Europe have made valuable contributions to civilization. The problem is not how to dominate these groups, but how to integrate them."

It is the opinion of Professor D. W. Brogan who in the July issue of 1942 of the ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE rightly insists on the supremacy of the political over the economic standpoint, writing:

"The first duty of the student of politics is to insist on its primacy. It is not superfluous to-day to do this, for in countries with a happy history, countries like the United States and to a lesser degree, England, it is natural to take politics in its widest sense for granted, and to ignore the fact that unless political problems, above all the basic problem of Power, are brought reasonably near a solution, triumphs in all other organized activities, the economic, cultural, religious scientific life, will avail little."

And Professor Brogan emphasizes:

"Liberty seems only to be a fighting word when it *means political autonomy*¹ for an actual or potential unit of the type we call nation. Roughly, people who will not fight for their own country will not fight for another or a cause."

The changes which the educational curricula and the propaganda in Soviet Russia have undergone exemplify

¹ My italics.

admirably the importance which the conception of the State as the home of a nation still possesses. It is not Soviet patriotism, it is Russian patriotism, even Russian nationalism, that has been fostered in the U.S.S.R. of recent years. The whole of Russian national history, not only the history of the Russian revolutionary struggle, has become sacrosanct. It would be possible to explain in terms of Socialism the glorification of Kutuzov, the victor of 1812. For Napoleon's army was an invading army, and resistance to foreign aggression is wholly consistent with the Socialist outlook. The apotheosis of Peter the Great could also be defended on the ground that at the time Peter I represented a progressive force in Russia, modernizing the backward Muscovite monarchy. The disgrace of the official poet of the Soviet regime, Demian Biedny, calls, however, for a different interpretation. For Biedny's crime was simply that he poked fun at St. Vladimir, the prince who Christianized Russia, and his comrades in arms. It is true that the official explanation was that the introduction of Christianity was at that moment a measure of progress; in fact, however, the protection of the memory of St. Vladimir was simply a proof that the whole of the Russian national tradition must be incorporated in the fabric of the Soviet State.

And the recent cult of Suvorov furnishes final proof that in the Soviet Union of to-day national sentiment and the national and State tradition overrule all other considerations. For Suvorov cannot be considered as a representative of progressive thought, even for his time; Suvorov cannot be considered as a man who defended Russian soil

against foreign aggression, and who for that reason has a right to the gratitude of the country. Suvorov's only title to the position of a national hero is that he waged successive aggressive wars against Turkey, against Poland fighting for its independence, and against the French Revolution.¹ It was not in a war against Napoleon that Suvorov retreated with his armies across the Alpine glaciers. His adversary was the young General Bonaparte, at that time a soldier of the French Revolution.

It is not, however, only a question of national psychology. There are very serious and positive reasons for basing the post-war order on a *co-ordination* of independent national States, and not on the amalgamating of smaller States and Great Powers into larger units. Louis de Brouckère, one of the most profound thinkers of to-day, a recognized leader of international Socialism, has stated the case perfectly in three articles written for FRANCE. In the issue of January 24, 1942, we read:

“Finally the economic side, the financial side, and the military side, important as they are, are far from constituting the totality of social activity. There remains the political aspect. There remains the juridical aspect. There remains the whole vast problem of education—and I do not forget that education in its broadest sense comprises scientific research and artistic production. There remains the hardly initiated work of social welfare. Does not the national

¹ These were wars characterized by appalling cruelty. The wholesale slaughter of the population in Bessarabia, and of the population of the Warsaw suburb of Praga, revolted the conscience of Suvorov's contemporaries.

community play an essential part in these fields? Is it not necessary for working successfully in them to have a profound mutual understanding? This freedom of action, which is rendered possible and easy by mutual understanding, can it not be developed better than anywhere precisely in these fields? And here the small nations are at an advantage. The Government is nearer to the people, democracy is more direct. For it must be well understood that the small States are not an abnormal survival of the past."

The independence of the smaller State is closely connected with the all-important issue of a democratic organization of the world. Democracy, in fact, does not mean simply and merely majority rule; it means as well equality of the citizens in the sense of equality before the law and of equal opportunity.

If we want to apply the principles of democracy to the international sphere we will see that the independence and full self-government of the national State are the necessary conditions of a democratic world order, as Cordell Hull has lucidly stated.

Only if a nation is considered as a unit within the world order, juridically equal to all other units, only if we accept the principle that nations as well as individuals have certain imprescriptible rights of which no majority vote can deprive them, is an organization transcending the Nation-State and calling for surrender of parts of the nation's sovereignty possible and desirable.

The pure majority rule is in principle the subordination

of all sectional interests to the general interest, based on the assumption that the importance of the share of the citizen in the general interest of the community overrides, or ought to override, his share in sectional interests. This assumption holds good as long as the community is fairly homogeneous and the divisions within it run on parallel lines. All citizens being equal, the decision acceptable to the majority must, *ex hypothesi*, be considered as just and fair. But whenever divisions are on several different lines pure majority rule becomes inadequate. That is why in the existing federal constitutions the balance between the representation of the population as a whole and the representation of the different State interests is assured by the system of representation of States in the Upper Chamber irrespective of the number of their inhabitants. Even so, in the United States conflicts between Federal and State governments, and complaints of encroachment by the Federal authorities, are far from unknown.

In Switzerland these conflicts sometimes become acute. They are most acute in the French-speaking cantons. For the French-speaking Swiss are a minority, and the people of Lausanne or Geneva are hypersensitive in regard to any majority decision which smacks of the imposition of German conceptions. The bitter struggle waged by the French-speaking cantons against a single federal penal code, based on the Germanic conception of right, bore eloquent testimony to difficulties which can arise even within the framework of a single nation. How much more strongly would decisions carried by a majority made up of members of the

majority nation be resented within the framework of a huge unit.

The most ardent advocates of Federal Union fully realize the existence of this problem. If Clarence Streit excludes from his proposed Federal Union, India, China, and the U.S.S.R., it is because he takes the representation by numbers as the basis, and he is keenly interested in a structure which provides that the United States cannot be outvoted.

Even from the economic viewpoint it is arguable that only an independent State can guarantee the full development of economic resources. Professor Condliffe writes, in the book from which I have already quoted so much:

“The Greeks thought a certain degree of economic self-sufficiency was one of the essential requirements of independent statehood. No community which did not contain within itself a minimum degree of economic self-sufficiency could develop the cultural and political life that was deemed an essential attribute of independent nation-life. This idea has survived, particularly in the small countries with vivid national traditions. To them, political independence and the preservation of their characteristic ways of living are more important than great wealth. They are prepared to justify measures which, even at some economic cost, check the tendency toward extreme specialization; but they are more than willing to participate in a world market which is complementary of their own resources. Their quarrel is not with internationalism, but with a cosmopolitanism that would estrange and destroy their individuality. Their at-

titude is that many moral values and cultural ideals are interwoven with political independence, which must be regarded as worth preserving for its own sake, even at some economic cost."

Professor Condliffe stresses the political implications of economic independence, though the "extreme specialization" of which he writes is even economically unsound. What, however, is very seldom mentioned is that independence may be, and often has been, a paying economic proposition.

The disruption of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, that huge economic unit, is often quoted as an example of disastrous economic results of the establishment of a series of economic sovereignties. And if we look at the picture through the windows of a Vienna banking house or a Hungarian aristocratic residence, these lamentations are justified. If we turn, however, to the dwelling of a Croatian or a Polish peasant the picture will be quite different. We shall see that the Pole and the Croat actually gained economically by the establishment of independent Poland and of Yugoslavia. They gained because their own governments were interested in the development of the country, in the well being of its inhabitants, while Vienna and Budapest always sacrificed the interests of these outlying provinces with their alien inhabitants to the interests of the ruling nation.

Vienna always hampered the industrial development of what was then called "the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria," for it wanted to conserve that territory as a market

for Austrian industry. Budapest similarly hampered the industrial development of Croatia. All the factories and repair shops of the State railways were established in Hungary proper. The tax system, the tariff system, everything was organized to promote the development of Hungary proper at the expense of Croatia. All the railway lines converged on Budapest. And the railway tariffs—the famous Baros tariffs—were so cunningly devised that a farmer of the Croatian wheat belt had to pay more for the transport of wheat from Osijek to the Adriatic—450 kilometres—than if he sent the wheat via Budapest, a distance of more than 700 kilometres.

As for Slovakia the former Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Milan Hodza, states in his book, *FEDERATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE*, that from 1920 to 1931 the profits of Slovak peasants increased by 170%.

The reason is quite obvious. A huge State has a certain order of priorities in the development of the country, a certain order of priorities in its attempts to raise the standard of living in different provinces. And quite naturally the welfare of the majority people, the ruling people, comes first in this order of priorities. Therefore the economic development of a State is only guaranteed by its political independence (or by a close union of States where none of the constituents will have an overwhelming influence, due to its preponderance in wealth or in population).

The economic development of Poland in the twenty years of Polish independence is perhaps the most striking illustration of this truth. As said before, the Polish

provinces under Austrian rule were condemned to poverty because the Vienna government hampered their development. The Polish provinces under Russian rule suffered as severely economically under the Tsarist government, which deliberately fostered the interests of the Central Russian provinces against the interests of the Poles.

Russian Poland was a land self-sufficient agriculturally. However since 1908 a cunning tariff policy succeeded in flooding the Polish markets with Russian wheat to the detriment of the Polish peasant and landowner. The interests of the Polish iron industry in the Dabrowa basin were always sacrificed to the interests of the industry in the Donetz basin, by the government as well as by the cartel organization "Pradometa."

In the beginning of the nineteenth century the so-called Kingdom of Poland or Congress Poland (in memory of the Vienna Congress, which created it), which at that time was united with Russia only by a personal union and had its own government and parliament started a policy of developing Polish waterways and building of canals. After the war of 1830-31 against Russia which brought about the end of the Polish government and placed Congress Poland under the Central government of St. Petersburg, this work was abruptly stopped. Not a single mile of canals had been built in Poland between 1831 and 1919, nay the existing canals and waterways were deliberately neglected.

And this ruin of the Polish waterways was not due to the development of railway traffic. In fact the railway network in Russian Poland was strictly limited to railways of strate-

gic interest, and it was deliberately kept insufficient in order to hamper any future invasion.

The existence in Congress Poland of important coal and iron deposits, which originated an industry before 1830, the fact that the cultural development of Poland in the nineteenth century was much higher than in Russia, the energy of the Polish entrepreneurs who fought successfully the Tsarist bureaucracy and could not be completely stifled resulted in a development of Polish industry, which became eventually important, if always partially lopsided.

In the Eastern provinces of Poland, however, which were not included in Congress Poland this policy of sacrificing the interests of Poles, Ukrainians and Byelorussians who inhabited these borderlands of the Russian Empire to the interests of the Russians, inhabiting the central provinces, succeeded in a complete arrest of their development.

In the whole 150 years of Russian rule not a single new town appeared in these provinces and the existent towns remained in the same position as they were in the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The peasant whose interests were sacrificed to the interests of Central Russian agriculture lived in abject poverty.

It is only after the reunion of these provinces with Poland in 1921 that the clock of economic development began to tick again.

Twenty years were not enough, of course, to undo the evil of 150 years; in 1939 these provinces were still the least industrialized and the poorest region of Poland. In absolute figures the development of their industries, the number of

industrial workers, the indexes of standards of life were still at dramatically low figures. But if we take comparative statistics, we will see that the independence of Poland, its separation from the Russian colossus, was a blessing for Eastern Poland.

I do not want to burden this book with statistics. But I will quote one set of figures which proves superabundantly how the progressive equalization of conditions in Eastern Poland and in the rest of the country which was the aim of the Polish governments has been able to counterbalance the influence of the great trade depression. The figures show the index of employment in Poland in 1937, taking the figures for the year 1928 as 100. In Poland as a whole the index was 88.9. Poland, as all the countries in the world, was still smarting under the evil of unemployment. But for the Eastern provinces the respective figures were for the province of Wilno—103.6; the province of Nowogródek—146.2; the province of Polesie—148.7; the province of Wołyń—207.9.

In the Polish provinces under Prussian rule we see an analogous situation. In Congress Poland the development of an industry was possible as long as Russia herself was not industrialized and the independence of Poland came soon enough to avert the impending crushing of this industry by the favoured Russian industry.

In Prussian Poland the agriculturist fared reasonably well, for the Polish provinces were considered as the necessary granary for the Reich. Even this statement, however, needs a qualification, for the Prussian policy deliberately

favoured the big landlord and the big peasant holding, thus keeping down the number of people who could live on the land and forcing the surplus population to emigrate. And in the last years before the war a policy of forcible expropriation of Poles and of settling Germans on the land had started.

On the other hand the development of any industry was hampered by all possible means. It is only the independence of Poland which permitted an industrialization of these provinces and made them able to support their population, even after the United States was closed to immigrants.

A still more striking example is given by Upper Silesia. German propaganda still bewails the "injustice" of the League of Nations award which had given the purely Polish part of Upper Silesia to Poland. And there are still in the United States candid people—like Mr. Hoover and Mr. Gibson—who let themselves be influenced by this propaganda. In fact since 1900 the Prussian government has systematically favoured the Ruhr industry to the detriment of the Upper Silesian industry. And the reason given was that the Ruhr is a German land, while Upper Silesia is inhabited by Poles, and, therefore, the Ruhr has first claim to the solicitude of a German government. Upper Silesia had no future as a German province.

Thus it is not an accident that the regions which economists call Europe B—the underindustrialized part of Europe with the lowest standard of living—are the regions where for centuries nations have lived under foreign rule. These countries were poor, *because* they have lived under

foreign rule, and they began to recover economically as soon as they recovered their political independence.

Thus even under the regime of private enterprise, of free competition, the power of the State was sufficient to create depressed areas, to hamper for political reasons the economic development of certain provinces.

How much more will this power become formidable in a system of planned economy, how much more dangerous in such an economy would be the preponderance of "views and interests" of the leading Powers.

The Polish economist Ferdynand Zweig in his book, *THE PLANNING OF FREE SOCIETIES*, rightly observes:

"National sovereignty may be regarded as mere superstition by powerful nations whose interests—owing to the weight of their power—are safe in international arrangements, but are looked on differently by small nations, whose interests in international arrangements are often overlooked."

And he insists that international planning can only be carried out successfully if it is a *co-ordination of national plans*.

And national plans suppose necessarily the existence of national States.

Thus even from the economic point of view the national State is not played out; nay it is only the national State which, whether in an economy of free competition or in a planned economy, can assure the freedom from want of its citizens.

The first point is that the world will still continue to be *organized* in a number of separate nations. The violence of the reaction against Nazism was due more to the attempt to stamp out national freedom and individuality than to anything else. To suppose that nations who have made unprecedented sacrifices in order to serve their national identity are going to surrender it once they have regained it is surely contrary to common sense. To remake their national lives will be the first and dearest wish of all of them, even the smallest, and their right to do so is implicit in the conception of democracy. The national ideal is still the source from which the vitality, the culture, and the rich diversity of our civilization will be drawn.

HAROLD BUTLER,
The Lost Peace

THUS national independence and the existence of separate Nation-States were firmly founded in the pre-war days not only on the national psychologies but on very real national interests. How does the question stand to-day? What are the desires and the tendencies of the people, countries incorporated in Hitler's New Order, the people of Poland and Czechoslovakia, of Holland and Belgium, of Norway and Greece?

If we take the pronouncements of the statesmen and writers who were happy enough to escape to the two lands of liberty, the United States and Great Britain, their impressive unanimity, amounts to a plebiscite. All of them affirm that the paramount object the peoples are fighting

for is the restoration of full national independence; all of them reject a world order which would divide the world in spheres of influence among the four Great Powers, or would restrict unduly the influence of the smaller nations in the future Commonwealth of Nations.

I will select some of the more important quotations to illustrate this unanimity, and I will give the first place to the letter of M. van Kleffens, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, to *THE TIMES*¹ (March 25, 1943), for this letter sums up most aptly all the arguments.

Mr. van Kleffens says:

“There is at present a strong (fortunately not general) tendency in Britain and in the United States to vindicate a dominant position in matters of more or less general concern for the Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth plus Russia, and, though less generally China: the largest political units in the world, with the exception, of course, of Germany, Italy and Japan in their present morbid and criminal mood and of France. The views of the lesser States are by no means ignored, but, according to speakers and writers of that school, would carry less weight, the decisive criterion appearing to be size and power.

“I venture to submit that in a world, dedicating itself anew to democracy, this is an antiquated conception.

“In national affairs we have advanced well beyond the stage when wealth gave political power. The poor worker has as good a voice and a vote as the rich man. It is difficult

¹ The Times of London.

to see how, in things international, democratically minded people can feel justified in attaching more weight to the voice of the greater powers than to that of the smaller ones—not necessarily small ones. Might and influence, in national and international affairs, are one thing, opinion and views are another. The great powers, according to the 'Big Four' theory, seem desirous of benignly ruling the community of nations; the lesser powers (whose very life depends on wise international collaboration) wish to serve the common good and, I venture to suggest, that this is a more valuable—because more unselfish—approach to claiming a voice at the council table.

“It is sometimes said that the great powers are entitled to the last word because they make the greater sacrifices and carry the heavier burden. I doubt whether that consideration should be decisive. The smaller powers suffer for the mistakes made by the big ones on the strength of their power, mistakes often made against the express advice of the lesser States, whose existence as a result of such errors is sometimes endangered to even a greater degree than that of their more powerful friends. Nor should the importance of the smaller powers be underrated. What, to give only one example, would have happened to Britain, and more indirectly to the United States, Russia and China, had Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Yugoslavia and Greece, meekly submitted to German aggression? The pace of German, Italian and Japanese advance would have quickened to a degree which might well have caused disastrous results to great and small countries alike, the tonnage of the Allies

would be many millions less, and vast resources would have fallen to the enemy which now are available to the Allies.

"The Netherlands has a population of 9,000,000 in Europe and of 70,000,000 in Asia, not to mention the Netherlands West Indies. With what right are two, three or four great powers to decide the fate of these multitudes? Add to them the population of the other Allied countries and this proposition becomes even more trenchant.

"I am fully aware that concessions must be made to practical necessities. But they should be viewed as concessions, and not as the exercise by others of well-founded rights. In times of war, moreover, such concessions must be greater, than in peacetime. Everybody will understand that. But it does not invalidate or alter the main argument.

"If we are to be true to the democratic idea, these ideas must prevail. We cannot proclaim democracy and practise the rule of the few. The peoples of the occupied countries, who are going through sufferings such as is still inadequately understood elsewhere, have a right to expect something very different.

"No rights without obligations. If, therefore, the smaller States claim their vote, they must also contribute to the common safety to the proportionate measure of their capacity."

Here is a second Dutch voice. Professor Dr. J. A. Veraart writes in the April issue of *WORLD REVIEW* as follows:

"I wish to make it clear that the advocated Commonwealth of Nations should interfere as little as possible with the independence of the peoples forming this unity. Inter-

nationally they will have to understand two things: their economic interdependence and the necessity of collaboration in arms. But in all other respects the people are longing for nothing better than a rich development of their national life. Generally I do not believe in nations which are 'too great' and nations which are 'too small.' Luxemburg and Russia both seem to me equally right."

C. J. Hambro, President of the Norwegian Storting, writes in his book, *HOW TO WIN THE PEACE*:

"To-day every small country, whether neutral or allied lives in the fear of being selected as the pawn sacrificed in the gambit by one of the Great Powers. . . .

"There is a growing feeling of uncertainty among men and women from occupied countries. Not only do they feel that their war efforts are minimized or not mentioned by the official information machine, but they are well aware that one new organization after another, leading over to the transition period, is established without any representation for the smaller powers. They do not demand much, but, on the other hand, they have no intense desire to remain, on the day of final reckoning, just a group of forgotten nations. They think that they have a right to a hand in the peace we have won. Maybe they are touchy, maybe they are unduly suspicious. But they have every reason to be so. They know that unless the small nations are given a voice and a vote in the council of the mighty, there will be faint hope of any international democracy and of any democratic control

of foreign policy, and without democratic rights in the international Commonwealth no peace can be won.

"To more than one representative of the small Allied Powers it may be a sad surprise that the very fact that they are Allied Powers, that their men are fighting and dying on every front, is non-existent for Anglo-American writers of authority. . . ."

Of Professor Julian Huxley, C. J. Hambro says:

"It does not seem to occur to him that Russia, China, Holland and every fighting ally has just the same right to hold an opinion and take its part of the decisions as has Great Britain or the United States of America. To 'sit in' is not a privilege bestowed as a grace by any Great Power, or by any two Great Powers. It is the right of primogeniture of all free nations. And until this is realized by those who speak for great nations there will be a poor prospect of winning the peace. . . ."

"It may be inconvenient, it may be cumbrous and bothersome to have to consult representatives of a number of countries. But that is the way of democracy; the road to progress is the resultant of the given composition of forces. . . ."

"But to any international work the small nations and their men and women are needed, they are brought up to be internationally minded. Ignorance is the privilege of great countries. It is a luxury small countries cannot afford if they want to survive."

And the Norwegian Review published in London, *THE NORSEMAN*, defends emphatically the same ideas.

From another Scandinavian country—Sweden—comes an analogous warning. The Minister of Education, Bagge, was reported by *THE TIMES*¹ on May 18, 1943, as saying:

“Some quarters have boldly proclaimed that the existence of small neutral States is no longer tolerable or even imaginable. What the German ‘New Order’ would mean we have been clearly told in detail. We know less about what the Allied International Organization for the Preservation of Peace entails. Although the Atlantic Charter was greeted with joy and hopefulness not least from the smaller peoples, we have also seen authoritative statements in the opposite sense in the British and American Press. A new Holy Alliance blandly basing inroads on the smaller States’ independence and integrity on the so-called security needs of the Great Powers and dividing Europe into spheres of interest would be a very unwholesome atmosphere for the smaller States which must take all precautions to maintain their freedom and independence.”

For Belgium I have extensively quoted the leader of Belgian socialism, de Brouckère. Here is a statement by the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul Henri Spaak (Speech at the Interallied Friendship dinner in London, on May 18, 1943, as reported by *FREE EUROPE*):

“I do not dispute what one might call the Great Nations’

¹ The Times of London.

role of leadership, but that role which gives them greater responsibilities, than rights, can be fulfilled by them—at any rate by those who have accepted the principles of the Atlantic Charter, only in conformity with the ideal for which they are fighting. A peace imposed on the small and medium-sized states against their will or without their full share in the discussion of all its terms would be a most absurd and fragile peace. Why indeed should that purely German method be contemplated, when the other method, the method of civilized and democratic countries, will give infinitely better results?

“It should be a mistake if we were to assume that there existed amongst the United Nations an opposition of interests among the Great Powers and the rest and that it would be easier to reach agreement among four states, than among fifteen or twenty. That would be not only false but definitely dangerous. The small- and medium-sized countries of Europe have, it is true, been beaten in this war. But was that solely their fault? Will the great forget, when they bring Germany to her knees, the sacrifices borne on the battlefields of 1940 and 1941 by those who fought without hope of winning, and the constant heroism and the terrible sufferings of those who never despaired under the most brutal of occupations?

“The fate of the great and small states is not very different. They all ultimately need security and prosperity, and their means of attaining them are the same. However great and strong some states may be to-day, they are not

great and strong enough to do without the others. It will doubtless be the world's problem, but also its glory to make that law of solidarity fully understood."

General Sikorski, whose tragic death was mourned by all the United Nations, at a dinner in London on March 2, 1943, as reported by FREE EUROPE said:

"We must at all costs avoid the pre-Munich mistake of believing that it is possible to keep the peace by sacrificing the interests of one country or another. We must also avoid any system directed not toward highly proclaimed principles but toward power politics.

"The nations who to-day found themselves under a foreign yoke, which each day suffered unbelievable sacrifices for the common cause—these nations must collaborate and have the right to collaborate on a footing of perfect equality in the organization of the peace."

President Beneš of Czechoslovakia said in a speech on April 28, 1942:

"We know that we must reorganize Europe and the world. What will happen to the smaller states?"

"There is still a sceptical attitude toward them. Disquieting books and articles have been published recently in this country regarding their future status or the need for dividing Europe into spheres of influence so that after all client states are to be dependent on their powerful neighbours. In some of the argumentation in favour of federation of federal union I detect a certain impatience with and con-

tempt for the smaller nations. From time to time I still hear the argument that the Germans after all are a great people and have the right to direct in some sense the life of their smaller neighbours, which—according to different voices—have not behaved always reasonably, etc.

“Politically this is, I think, a profound mistake. We must not forget that the smaller nations also have an important contribution to make to world’s culture.

“This historical truth has its value still in spite of the technical progress of the nineteenth century, and there exist to-day small nations and states from which such great nations as Germany and Italy could learn with the greatest profit for themselves.”

And in an article published by FOREIGN AFFAIRS in its January issue, 1942, President Beneš wrote:

“The weaknesses of the small states must not in the future tempt large states to fall upon them. Nor must certain large states countenance this procedure on the part of other large states as a proper thing to be paid in order to secure (for a little time) peace for themselves.”

And President Beneš’s chief political opponent, Stefan Osusky, former Czechoslovak Minister to Paris, is in that respect of one opinion with Beneš. He writes in FREE EUROPE (April 9, 1943):

“The Atlantic Charter has established in broad outline an equal status for all the nations which have joined the common cause, a status based on equality of obligations and

rights. The distinction now made in certain quarters between the prerogatives of Great Powers and the position of small nations and the attempts to classify the smaller states according to geographical and often merely opportunistic considerations have met with open criticism. Mr. Churchill's broadcast, Mr. Eden's disclaimers in Washington and the definite line followed by the American State Department have somewhat cleared the air. Yet apprehension exists in three directions: a) regarding attempts to establish in place of a European Four-Power Pact of fatal memory an intercontinental, in fact global, Four-Power Pact embracing Great Britain, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and, to a lesser extent, China; b) regarding the suspicion that an opportunist policy of appeasement, though in a different form, may re-enter the discussions of the Great Powers on post-war matters; c) that the use of attractive formulas such as 'interdependence must be tempered by interdependence' is an attempt to establish various degrees of sovereignty and security according to political, economic and military requirements of the Big Four.

"These apprehensions must be realized, since they are shared by a considerable section of public opinion of those nations whose full and unreserved collaboration in any future Council of Europe is an essential condition of success. Mr. Churchill has rightly said that it would be premature to discuss details of the future before the war is won. Yet when we hear it said that Britain's frontiers are on the Rhine, America's frontiers at Dover, and Russia's frontiers on the Oder, can the smaller nations really be suspected of

misdemeanour if they wonder where their borders will be?

“Experience has taught a lesson, particularly to the nations of East-Central and Central Europe, a lesson which the present war ought to have taught the whole world, namely, that appeasement at the expense of the weaker rebounds upon the appeaser.”

And I will conclude these quotations by a voice from the smallest of the United Nations. Victor Bodson, Minister of Luxemburg, writes in the May issue, 1943, of the *FORT-NIGHTLY REVIEW*:

“There has been much talk of the Europe of to-morrow. Some want the smaller states to disappear altogether in order to avoid dangerous appetites, as they call it. Others are eager to forge various states together into economic unions. Both ideas may be contested. The amalgamation of different small nations in one big State would threaten, if not actually destroy, the traditions and characteristics of the smaller nations and create ‘minorities’ where none have been before. We may likewise anticipate that a change of that kind would mean ‘carrying coals to Newcastle’ and add new difficulties to the existing ones. As to welding economic blocs by force under pressure of the Great Powers, this seems an equally shortsighted policy and would certainly affect adversely the prospect of a future peace by bringing those together who have no desire to be linked in an economic union.

“To my mind the best possible solution is to leave it to the small nations themselves to choose the partners with whom they wish to form a union.”

And later on Victor Bodson says:

"During twenty years at Geneva and more than three years in London, Washington and elsewhere the Great Powers have been sitting next to the smaller powers at conference tables, but the day has yet to come when the representative of a small nation will be found guilty of impeding the conference in its work. The leading idea should, therefore, be to secure a place for the small nations at every round table conference."

These quotations—and I could easily multiply them—establish beyond any doubt the complete unanimity of all the representatives of the occupied nations. But—we are told—the émigrés in London or in Washington have lost touch with the people at home. Their opinions do not represent the opinions of the underground fighters. We read fairly often that the émigré governments in London are not fully representative. It is this assumption which underlies all the more or less fantastic plans of withdrawing recognition from these governments as soon as their countries are liberated and for the administration of these countries by some or all of the Big Powers in the transition period.

In fact the people who amuse themselves in elaborating plans for the future of Europe are so sure of their attractiveness that they simply cannot imagine that the peoples in the occupied countries should reject them. And, therefore, instead of trying to ascertain—which is not so difficult—what the peoples of Europe really want they prefer to indulge in wishful thinking and to affirm bluntly that the

people who to-day are fighting the Germans in the occupied countries, the saboteurs and guerrillas of Poland, the Chetniks of Yugoslavia, do not care a fig for their national independence, that they would gladly see their country become a part of the Soviet Union, that the only thing that interests these fighters is social revolution. This school of thought is perfectly epitomized by the following quotation from the NEW STATESMAN AND NATION:

“It is, however, too early to treat these schemes as anything more than suggestions. If the Russians realize their hope of beating the Germans before the end of this year, their prestige and their leadership will be decisive in Eastern and Central Europe at least. The future of the Balkans will be decided not by exiled courts in London, but by the peasant armies still fighting with steadfast courage in the mountainous interior.

“It is the wish of the Russians to erect a big (which would not on that account be a strong) Poland, as a buffer between Germany and themselves. But we are sceptical about the old-world conceptions of a balance of power which inspire all these arrangements sketched by conservative exiles in conservative London. The Europe that emerges after it has shaken off the German yoke will not be the Europe whose divisions and corruptions invited the Nazi attack. It may achieve a revolutionary fraternity, and dismiss these timid variations of the old pattern of nationalism and sovereignty in order to advance toward a wider union of peoples.”

A second group, more alive to the realities of to-day, ad-

mits that the underground workers are fighting primarily for their national independence. Julius Braunthal, speaking of his country, Austria, writes in LEFT NEWS:

“If I judge rightly the psychological repercussions of the Nazi experience on the minds of the people in Austria, I believe that the Austrians, although they intensely dread the resurrection of the ‘independence’ of their country, because it has meant permanent and indeed hopeless mass unemployment and misery, will none the less restore her sovereignty in the initial stages of the revolution. I, for one, feel sure that on the very first day of the revolution in Austria the Austrian republic will certainly be proclaimed.”

And G. D. H. Cole writes:

“It is hardly to be expected that any of the exiled governments in London now domiciled in Great Britain will fail to demand the restoration of the State which it still purports to represent and, over and above this, there will be many citizens of these States who will readily identify the restoration of their own liberties with the restoration of the States by whose downfall they were lost. Revolutionary movements generated under the stress of foreign conquest will tend to take a strongly nationalistic form; and this nationalism will tend to express itself in a demand for a return to sovereign independence.”

But having admitted it, Mr. Cole and the others simply brush aside this recognition as purely irrelevant, and con-

tinue to vaticinate about the obsolescence of small States, to appeal to "supranational sentiments," to develop their own theories. Is such an attitude, which refuses to distinguish between right and wrong in international politics and preaches the naked doctrine of force, like Professor Carr, compatible with democracy and Socialism? I, for one, have serious doubts of it.

It would be quite a different proposition if the assumptions of the first group were true. And therefore it is important to examine whether in fact it is only the émigré governments (and, by the way, all the émigré Socialist leaders) who insist on the restoration of the national independence of the overrun States, whether in fact for the underground workers of Europe the question of national independence has lost its meaning, or at least its prime importance.

The simple answer is that the people who put forward this assertion have obviously never troubled to ascertain the real opinion in the countries overrun by Hitler, and have preferred to rely comfortably on their armchair intuition. For anyone who has read the underground press, or who has interviewed any of the workers who have escaped to Great Britain, is left in no doubt that it is precisely the fight for national independence, and not the fight for social revolution, that is in the foreground.

In fact, it is not even necessary to acquaint ourselves with the situation in the occupied countries in order to come to this conclusion. It is enough to follow the Soviet broadcast to the occupied countries. These broadcasts, designed to

appeal to the people, designed to give them what they want, appeal to their national sentiment, and to their national sentiment alone.

To prove my contention I shall first turn to the underground movement I know best, the underground movement of Poland. This movement to-day unites people of all classes and all social creeds. The underground press, with over one hundred papers, represents all shades of public opinion. A complete analysis of all these shades would lead us too far. It would, moreover, be unnecessary. For our purpose it will be sufficient if we show that even for the press which is controlled by the Polish revolutionary Socialists, by the men who are fighting not for a return to the pre-war pattern of the Polish State but for a Socialist Poland, the question of Poland's independence, of the reconstitution of the Polish State, continues to be essential, and that they share the view of their predecessors of 1905 and 1914, and the view of Jawaharlal Nehru to-day that Socialism is inseparable from national independence.

The title of the leading Polish Socialist underground paper is in itself a manifesto. It is called "*Wolnosc, Row-nosc, Niepodleglosc*"—"Liberty, Equality, Independence." And here are some illuminating quotations. The May Manifesto of the Polish Socialist Party in 1940 concluded with these words:

"For the struggle for an independent Poland!

"Long live Liberty!

“Long live the Government of the people in the People’s Poland!

“Long live Socialism!”

We see that the fight for the independence of Poland takes pride of place in this manifesto. In the leading article of an issue in 1941 we read:

“The question of the independence of Poland and the question of Socialism are inseparable.”

And in another issue:

“The defence of Warsaw was the fight for the independence of the nation; it was also the bloody contribution of the Polish worker to the great fight of the people against international Fascism, a fight which spread from Madrid to our city.”

In another issue, in an article commenting on the first Polish-Czechoslovak agreement, we find the following statement:

“Among the people who are fighting the totalitarian flood, thought about a new Europe follows different paths from the theory and practice of Fascism. The direction of this road is indicated by the Polish-Czechoslovak understanding. Its basis is the respect of national and *State* independence and the creation of a working community in certain defined political, economic, and cultural questions.”

In an article under the title THE FIGHT FOR THE THIRD RE-

PUBLIC (the first Republic was Poland before the partitions; the second, Poland from 1919 to 1939), which prophesies "the armed insurrection of the people of Europe," and gives an outline of the post-war world, we read:

"We have a double aim: the liberation of the Polish State and the founding of this State on the firm basis of a government of peasants and workers. This duality, however, is only apparent. There is no room for the creative work of the toiling masses without the liberation of the country—and without a complete change of its interior life. Poland cannot subsist as a State between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. . . . The problems of the separate nations create one big common problem, the problem of Europe. There does not exist a real force, equal to the might of Fascism, which could liberate the nations separately, as there was no force which could enable them to defend their independence separately. There will be no independent Poland if there is not at the same time a resurgence of France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Holland." The article was written before the Balkan campaigns.

I shall conclude with a quotation from the May, 1941, manifesto of the underground workers of the People's Poland:

"We declare that Poland will always remain faithful to the supreme principles of collaboration for international liberty, equality, and democracy, and will endeavour to create a Union of the free peoples of Europe, based on the principle: the free with the free, equals with equals. That is

the sense of the testament of 1918 Poland's first people's Government, and these are the perspectives of the struggle which the Polish workers, peasants, and intellectual workers are waging for an independent Poland—the true mother country of the Polish people among the free peoples of Europe.”

I think these few quotations, which could be supplemented by countless others, prove beyond any doubt that the independence of Poland is the major issue for all Polish revolutionaries who are fighting to-day. And there can be no doubt that the position in the other occupied countries is essentially similar. The fight of the Yugoslav Chetniks is primarily a fight for the independence of Yugoslavia; it is led by Yugoslav patriots who expressly adopted the name of “Chetniks,” the name of their ancestors who fought the Turks for the liberty of their country.

The NEWS CHRONICLE reported in 1942 that in a demonstration of Yugoslav Communists the portrait of King Peter was carried beside that of Stalin. Does this not show that in order to pursue their policy of resistance even the Communists in Yugoslavia had adopted the slogan of an independent Yugoslavia, of which King Peter is the symbol?

And that is also the explanation why the entire resistance in Holland is centred around fidelity to the House of Orange, in Norway around fidelity to King Haakon. Certainly both Queen Wilhelmina and King Haakon have by their attitude thoroughly deserved the love of their subjects. But this fidelity to the crowned rulers is due much less to an

explosion of monarchical sentiments in the occupied countries than to the consciousness that to-day Queen Wilhelmina and King Haakon, as the recognized heads of the Dutch and the Norwegian States, symbolize the existence of independent Holland and independent Norway.

In the June 1943 issue of the *FREE WORLD* we find the report of a Round Table Conference of people representatives of the occupied countries, mostly left-wingers. All of the participants in this conference were in close contact with the underground movements in their respective countries. What had they to say?

Josef Hanc, speaking for Czechoslovakia, stated clearly: "We have a certain amount of information from the underground movements in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and we see that there is one definite tendency which is a revival of nationalism. I might also add it is a kind of national freedom in all these countries if I interpret it correctly."

And he explained that: "It is a kind of self-protective, defensive nationalism which has nothing to do with the aggressive type or gangster nationalism."

For Poland, the socialist writer Feliks Gross affirmed that: "the underground movements are in very close touch with the governments and acknowledge them. In Poland a complete administration can be organized the moment hostilities cease."

And he warned that "it is essential not to underestimate national sentiment and aspirations in the future reconstruction of Europe."

This same warning was expressed still more bluntly by the former editor of ARBEIDER BLADE, the Norwegian Finn Koe, who said: "I very much fear the consequences if you merely substitute representatives of the United Nations for the Nazis."

And Finn Koe affirmed that "so far as I know the situation in Norway, it is mainly on a national basis that people are united and they are united to such an extent that former political differences play no role."

Norman Angell who attended this conference very aptly said:

"For forty years I have regarded nationalism as the curse of mankind. I am inclined to think in the next ten or twenty years we may be praying that nationalism will survive.

"If we are going to organize Europe at all—and this is my point—if we are to organize Europe for democracy against aggression or against the Nazis or for any purpose whatever it must express its will by groups; the natural groups are the nations."

"Nationalism and the concept of the sovereign state are closely related, and both are reinforced by patriotism, that is to say, love of one's country and loyalty to its government. In this inclusive sense nationalism is the strongest political force in the modern world. The history of the last two centuries demonstrates that all other loyalties—humanitarianism and religion, international pacifism, liberalism, socialism, communism—when brought into irreconcilable conflict with nationalism have been defeated by it . . .

"If there is any one thing more than another that has enabled so many nations to unite for this purpose, and given them the will to carry it through, it is precisely the sentiment of nationalism and loyalty to the sovereign state. Let us not then condemn as in itself evil the very thing that in this time of crisis is saving us from destruction or be deluded by the notion that after the war is over we can at once abate as a political force a sentiment which the war itself has raised to a level of a religious faith. After the war is over, nationalism will remain, so far as we can see ahead what it has been, the strongest political force in the world; and since we cannot immediately discard it, the only hope is that we may be able to direct it to somewhat better ends."

CARL BECKER,
HOW WILL THE BETTER WORLD BE.
Yale Review, March, 1943.

WE HAVE seen what the peoples of Europe are thinking and if anything is sure it is that no scheme worked out in quiet London or Washington studies for the greater felicity of the people of the occupied countries will be able to prevail against the unanimous determination of the Eu-

ropean nations to live in their own States as free people. And it would perhaps not even be worth while to discuss the matter were it not for a very real and actual danger which these paper schemes present. We all agree that the mobilization of Europe against the Hitler regime, and a European revolution, are necessary for our victory. We all agree that the underground workers in the occupied countries, the men and women who are daily risking their lives in order to obstruct Hitler's war machine, are important Allies. Mr. Cole and Mr. Gollancz, to name only two prominent representatives of the British Left, are staunch believers in this important factor of a European revolution. They hope it will extend even to Germany. And their fight against "Vansittartism" is largely based on the assumption that it is sheer folly to discourage the potential German revolutionaries; they declare that British propaganda should give the Germans the promise of a better future if they fight Hitler. Yet, by a strange paradox, they do all they can to discourage the people who are not potential, but actual fighters against Hitler, the saboteurs and guerrillas of Poland and the Chetniks of Yugoslavia. They do their best to persuade them that their fight is completely senseless, for the best thing they can hope for is to exchange one alien rule for another, the rule of the "bad" Germans for the rule of the "good" Germans or the rule of Russia.

This glib and irresponsible talk of "an enlarged Soviet Russia"—to quote Mr. Gollancz—is a veritable godsend for Dr. Goebbels, who uses it to support his contention that Mr. Eden has "sold out" Eastern Europe to Russia.

In general one has only to follow the German and Fascist propaganda broadcasts, the German and Fascist press, to realize the importance of this aspect of the question.

At the beginning of the war and until 1941, when German victory seemed assured, the Berlin and Rome propaganda were quite frank as to the meaning of their "New Order." Europe was to be ruled by the two master races—the German and the Italian (probably Goebbels had his tongue in his cheek when he admitted the Italian claim to equality); the other European countries, inhabited by lesser breeds, had no claims to independence and had to accept the lead. This same doctrine was affirmed in the tripartite pact which gave Germany and Italy the leadership of Europe, and accorded Japan the leadership of Asia.

As to Eastern Europe the plans were still blunter. Dr. Ley in a celebrated speech stated clearly that the "New Order" would be based on slavery in the textual sense of the words, the conquered nations becoming slaves of the Germans.

And the treatment of the Polish workers in Germany, the suppression of all secondary schools in Poland, of all higher schools in Czechoslovakia, proved that this affirmation was not an empty boast.

Since 1942, however, since the moment when the propaganda for the policy of the "Big Four," the policy of spheres of influence had started in the United States and in Great Britain the Axis propaganda underwent a complete change.

First Gayda in Italy, then the German press and wireless began to stress the notion of the equality of all European nations, of a European commonwealth of free and equal

partners. They groomed themselves as defenders of the independence of the smaller countries against Anglo-Saxons and Russian imperialism.

They organized meetings of the "European press," they published pamphlets and books to explain that only a German victory could assure the true independence of European countries. The world "*Lebensraum*" was explained away so as to sound quite innocuous.¹

This propaganda device failed, because it was obliged to fail. The stern reality of German occupation, the barbarity of German rule speak in too loud a voice for the people of occupied countries to be sensitive to the siren voices from Berlin. The wolf is too apparent under the new sheepskin.

The fact, however, that German propaganda was able to resort to this device, that Goebbels could don the armour of the knight defending the independence of the smaller nations against Anglo-Saxon imperialists, anxious to suppress them, remains significant.

Difficile est satiram non scribere.

¹ One country, and one country only was excluded from this beautiful new picture of European states collaborating in full harmony and equality: Poland. Hitler and Goebbels knew that no blandishments would induce the Polish nation to reconcile themselves to the invaders and to abandon the fight, and, therefore, they continued to affirm that Poland had ceased to exist and will never again reappear as a State. And at the conference of "European" journalists where French and Belgian, Norwegian and Croat, Greek and Dutch Quislings consorted with the nazified journalists from Spain, Portugal and other neutral countries no Polish journalist was present.

9

WE HAVE tried to establish the principle that the self-determination of nations is far from being obsolete, and that it necessarily includes the right of each nation to determine whether it wishes to live in a separate independent State. This principle does not exclude the possibility of the union of several nations in a single State, as was the case with the Czechs and Slovaks or the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It implies, however, that such unions must be entirely voluntary, based on the will of the nations concerned.

Nor does the principle of self-determination exclude the building up of vaster economic, political and military unions, transcending the frontiers of the several States. It implies simply that the basic unit within such vaster unions will be the independent State, and that all the component States will be on an equal footing, irrespective of the number of their inhabitants and their wealth. It implies that each of the member States of these vaster units will surrender exactly the same amount of sovereignty.

I am fully aware of the difficulties of the problem of reconciling this absolute necessity of maintaining the independence of States with the equally compelling necessity of evading the pre-war muddle, and of achieving a rational organ-

ization of the post-war world. It is not my ambition to produce a full blue-print of the future organization. In general I am rather suspicious of blue-prints in political and social matters. The more so while we are still in the middle of a war, whose unpredictable future course must have an influence on the shape of the future world, if only through changes in psychology. How many of the blue-prints made in the first year of the war have become obsolete, first through the entry of Italy into the war, then through the German attack on Russia, and finally through the Far Eastern war! In my "thinking aloud" I will confine myself to erecting certain signposts and tracing a very general outline, admitting of innumerable variations within its framework, but quite definitely leaving out of it certain possibilities which may seem to others attractive.

The essential basis of my argument will be that this war is really a World War. The war of 1914-18 was also called a World War. And if we look at the signatures on the peace treaties the name seems justified. We find, in fact, on these treaties the signatures of nearly all the European countries, of Great Britain and the Dominions, of the United States, of China, of Japan, and of a score of Latin American Republics.

These signatures are, however, misleading. The United States never ratified the Treaty of Versailles, and rejected all European obligations before the ink was dry on Wilson's signature. The British Dominions entered the war only out of loyalty to Great Britain, and never lost the conviction that for them it was a kind of colonial expedition. China and

Japan were formally the Allies of Great Britain and France. But when in the middle of the war one of these Allies, Japan, presented to the other Ally, China, the famous 21 demands, which were simply a Japanese bid for domination over China, nobody raised a finger. This incident was considered to be a purely local one. Except in regard to the distribution of the German colonies the peace settlement was a purely European settlement. And in many quarters even the League of Nations was considered simply as a guarantor of the European peace. The reluctance of Latin American countries to permit the League to take any effective action in an American dispute, the Chaco conflict, was paralleled by the indignation of many Frenchmen when it appeared that the League had to discuss the Japanese attack on Manchuria, and, still worse, that in the defence of Ethiopia it dared to impose sanctions on Mussolini, a potential Ally against Germany.

It was not, indeed, the League of Nations that compelled Japan to abandon her 21 demands. A special conference, the Washington Conference, forced Japan to sign a document linking up the independence and territorial integrity of China with the "open door" economic policy. And we all remember how the governments of Great Britain and France thwarted all action against the aggressor after the seizure of Manchuria by Japan. Neither London nor Paris was willing to acknowledge that British or French interests could possibly be influenced by happenings in so distant a country as Manchuria.

India was considered to be a purely domestic British prob-

lem. No country considered it of any interest to itself whether the people of India were granted self-government or not. Amritsar was a purely local story of scant news-value outside India and Great Britain.

This sectionalist attitude of all nations was perfectly illustrated by the attitude of the British Dominions in the inter-war period. In the Ethiopian affair Canada and Australia wholeheartedly supported the Baldwin administration when it decided to terminate the sanctions policy. They were completely in agreement with Sir John Simon that the independence of Ethiopia was not worth the sacrifice of a single British warship.

South Africa, however, refused to accept this reversal of British policy, and fought to the last for the maintenance of sanctions. The South African delegate, Mr. de Water, said in the League Assembly:

“My Government has again examined its own conduct in this matter scrupulously and conscientiously. It can find no new factor in the present situation which did not in fact, or potentially, exist when it announced its decision from this place to honour its obligations and to participate in collective action against the aggressor nation. On the contrary, the destruction of Ethiopian sovereignty by Italy, and the annexation of the territory of a country which at no time menaced the safety of Italy, creates now the exact state of affairs which this League was designed to avoid, and which we are still pledged to prevent by every agreed means in our power and to refuse to acknowledge. . . . And so I beg to

announce the decision of my Government that it is still prepared to maintain the collective action legitimately agreed upon by the resolution of this Assembly of the League of Nations on October 10, 1935. We offer this course, which in our deep conviction will alone maintain the League of Nations as an instrument of security for its members. We commend it to this Assembly, even at this eleventh hour, as the only way which will ensure salvation to the nations."

These proud and splendid words meant, however, only that Ethiopia was an African country, and that its annexation by Italy was a menace to South Africa. For when European countries were concerned South Africa, as well as Canada and Australia, supported Chamberlain's "appeasement" policy. It may even be said that their influence on the formation of this policy was far from negligible. The reason is apparent. These "European quarrels" seemed so remote to the Dominion statesmen that they did not see how they could have any influence on the situation in the Dominions. They did not dream that Hitler's bid for the hegemony of Europe could spell any danger for their own countries.¹

This time the situation is different. This war is a World War, and a total war not only in name but in fact. The war hammers to-day at the doors of Australia, it hammers at the

¹ One exception must be made. The Labour Government of New Zealand was always consistent in its support of the policy of collective security. Its representative on the Council of the League of Nations, Mr. Jordan, made memorable interventions both in the Ethiopian affair and later in the defence of the Spanish republic.

door of every American country. Canada has already had its black-out. Chinese troops fought in Burma alongside the British soldiers, for the defence of Burma was as much the defence of China as of an outpost of the British Empire. General Chiang Kai-shek went to India to mediate between the British Government and the Indian patriots. And Washington is as directly concerned over the future of British-Indian relations as London and Delhi.

And ineluctably the peace settlement after this war must be a total settlement, a world settlement. We must hope that the governments and the peoples have learnt the lesson that the destinies of Manchukuo, Ethiopia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, China, France, Great Britain, Brazil, and the United States are inextricably intertwined.

It follows that the system of collective security which will have to be established must be established on a worldwide basis. And, since this system will have to be based on compulsion, it follows that all States will have to surrender part of their sovereignty to a worldwide organization, whether it be called a reformed League of Nations or by any other name. Whether this worldwide organization will have its own army, drafted from the population of the Member States, or whether in peace time there will be only national armies under the orders of their national governments, which will be obliged in case of emergency to transfer contingents to an international authority, is more or less immaterial. It is also not essential, though perhaps highly desirable, that this worldwide authority should have the monopoly of the air forces, perhaps even of the whole of civil

aviation. What is essential is that this worldwide organization should have at its disposal a force capable of checking any aggression, and that it should have the authority to supervise all national armaments and to enforce on the aggressive Powers the disarmament which the Atlantic Charter demands.

The problem of collective security is not the only one that cannot be solved by the creation of several huge units, but only by a worldwide organization. There are purely technical problems which can be solved only on a worldwide basis. Some of these have been tackled already on that basis by the League of Nations. The work carried on by the Transport Section of the League, and the magnificent work of the Health Section, must be continued, and it can only be continued within the framework of a worldwide organization.

Nor is this enough. The fourth point of the Atlantic Charter states:

“They will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.”

This statement implies that the virtual monopoly of certain raw materials in the hands of certain Powers must be neutralized. But equality of access is not sufficient. There must be rational, organized distribution, not only of monopoly raw materials like rubber, nickel, tin or mercury,

but also of certain essential non-monopoly raw materials and products like wheat or steel.

Even in the pre-war world, international cartellization aimed in certain fields at a rationalization of production and distribution on a worldwide scale. But the trusts and cartels were interested in profits, and profits were easier to obtain by the restriction of production and the maintenance of high prices. The new world which we want to build will aim at the well-being of individuals and nations. There will be no place in it for the burning of wheat or of oranges, or for the feeding of locomotives with coffee-beans. This aim, however, can be attained only if there is a worldwide organization planning the distribution and the production of the essential raw materials. Thus rational economic planning as well as collective security postulates the existence of a worldwide organization.

And here we come to grips again with the problem of the independence and equality of nations. For a just plan, a plan promoting the general well-being of all nations, can be framed only by an organization in which all nations, great and small alike, collaborate on equal terms. Otherwise the danger that the more powerful States will take advantage of their preponderant position to further their own national economic interests, to the detriment of the interests of the smaller States, will always be present. This is the essential objection to a conception based only on numbers, and to the proposal that certain Great Powers should be granted spheres of "preponderating influence."

Hitler's "New Order" is a glaring example of such a mis-

use of "preponderating influence." But the same conception, though of course in an infinitely less brutal form, did underlay Naumann's conception of *Mitteleuropa* in the last war. I have shown in an earlier chapter how provinces of Russia, Germany, and Hungary were exploited by the dominating nations. And everyone knows how long the vested interests of Lancashire successfully opposed any development of Indian national industry, how even to-day India is industrially underdeveloped simply because any industrial development was inconsistent with certain interests of the British ruling nation.

The creation of several huge economic units, be they as vast as the continent of Asia or the union of the British Commonwealth with the United States, will never achieve the ideal of complete economic autarchy, of a completely rational economic planning. It will necessarily lead, on the contrary, to economic conflicts between these units, conflicts which may lead to new and yet more highly organized intercontinental wars. Thus the entrusting of a part of the task of economic planning to a worldwide organization, based on equal partnership of all nations, is the necessary corollary of collective security.

Between this worldwide organization, however, and the individual independent State there is still room for fairly close unions of several States in regional organizations. There may even be a series of concentric groups in such unions. There are classical juridical definitions of different kinds of unions between States—personal unions, real un-

ions, confederations, federations. I do not think it is of much avail to discuss the present day in these terms borrowed from the old text-books. The old international law is dead. One has only to look up what it had to say about neutrality, and compare the definitions with Mussolini's non-belligerency, with the policy of the United States before her entry into the war, or with the position of Switzerland, Sweden, or Vichy France to-day, to see how entirely inadequate the pre-war concepts are.

There may be completely new forms of union between States in the future, forms dictated by circumstances, by the necessities of adaptation, which it will be impossible to classify under any of the standard definitions. Thus the Polish-Czech understanding is already being called a confederation, but it has several distinctive traits of Federal Union. I shall confine myself, therefore, to a very broad outline.

The worldwide organization will necessarily provide only the general framework of collective security and the general framework of an economic plan. On the other hand, it will be necessary to harmonize the national economic plans in order to prevent overlapping; and it will be necessary to coordinate the defence provisions of neighbouring States. The solution of the problems of this adjustment of national economic systems and defence provisions will call for regional collaboration. Such an attempt at regional collaboration was Mr. Churchill's splendid scheme of Anglo-French union, rejected by those who betrayed France. Such attempts are also

the Polish-Czechoslovak and the Yugoslav-Greek agreements signed in London. President Beneš put the reasons for such agreements very aptly, when he said in the SUNDAY TIMES:

“Economic planning will be essential. A planned unit would comprise several nations. But, of course, the association must be well balanced. Apart altogether from political antipathies, Czechoslovakia cannot be confederated with a country of the magnitude of Germany. Even when planning the Customs union between Czechoslovakia and Poland we know that it will take some time for both national economies to adjust their commerce, industry, and agriculture to mutual requirements. It is the well-being of all the partners of such a planned unit which counts.”

The Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation declares as its purpose the promotion of a “common policy with regard to a) foreign affairs, b) defence, c) economic and financial matters, d) social questions, e) transport, posts, and telegraphs.” It will also “assure co-operation among its members in educational and cultural matters.” Even common organs of the Confederation may be established. But the maintenance of two separate State units is assured.

The text of the document establishing the Confederation leaves no doubt that both Poland and Czechoslovakia consider it only as a nucleus of a wider confederation. Article I says:

“The two governments desire that the Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation should embrace other States of the

European area with which the vital interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia are linked up."

And in the joint letter of congratulation sent to the Greek and Yugoslav governments after the conclusion of their agreement this area is defined as the "vast region stretching between the Baltic and the Aegean seas."

The collaboration of these four Allied countries has, indeed, already started. At the International Labour Conference in Washington the four delegations presented a common resolution. On January 7, 1942, at the invitation of Jan Stańczyk, the Polish Labor Minister, they founded a common "Central and Eastern European Planning Board." And this Board stated in its first declaration:

"We agree on the essential need for close collaboration among the peoples and governments of the small nations of Central and Eastern Europe, while the war is still being fought, and later, after peace comes back to the world. The East European region has its own problems, and these must be handled and solved by mutual consent and friendly collaboration of the respective nations. Doing so, they believe that the democratic world of to-day and to-morrow will be enriched by a new sincere effort and by a constructive experiment in the way of the building of a better order. The co-operation of all these nations constitutes a step toward the establishment of a future world based on mutual friendship. It is in that spirit that the idea of the Central and Eastern European Planning Board was conceived, and it is in that spirit that the founders want to see it work for the

benefit of their peoples, their part of the world, and all democratic peoples."

I know perfectly well that these schemes of regional confederation are very unpleasant for those who continue to think in terms of power politics, in terms of imperialism. It is only too clear that a voluntary union of the States between the Baltic and the Aegean seas could no longer be parcelled out into "spheres of influence" for the Great Powers; that such a union could not but be an equal partner in the world organization or any wider organization.

The necessity for such a wider organization for purposes of collective security was formulated by the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, M. Ninchich, in an interview reported in the *SUNDAY TIMES*. M. Ninchich said:

"These two wars have shown that in totalitarian war the fate of the British Empire and the fate of the Soviet Union is at stake. It is not necessary that an international organization aiming at security and collaboration should include from the start all the European nations. But it is essential that Great Britain and Russia should take their stand by the side of the lesser States—in the first place the actual Allies of these two Great Powers, those who have been the victims of aggression. It is only natural that these States should be the first to feel an urgent need for ensuring themselves a more peaceful future. Without Great Britain, without this small island of yours off the coasts of Europe, that is impossible."

Each of these organizations, the world organization, as well as the regional organizations, will call for a surrender of

part of the sovereignty of the component States. One may ask, therefore, will national independence have any meaning after so many attributes of sovereignty have been surrendered? I think the answer lies in two directions. First of all it would be a fundamental principle that the wider organizations would wield only so much power as was expressly surrendered to them for the mutual benefit of the component States. Thus the principle of independence would be maintained. Secondly, the principle of the equality of nations should be upheld. And that means not only that each nation or State should surrender an absolutely equal part of its sovereignty, but also that within the organizations this principle of equality should be maintained.

Of course, the principle of equality is like zero in mathematics, a goal to be approached as closely as possible, and not a reality to be completely achieved. The French Revolution proclaimed the equality of all men, but it retained financial qualifications for the electorate; complete political equality with votes for all did not exclude glaring economic inequalities; and even in Utopia the equality of men will mean only complete equality of opportunity. The juridical equality of States in the pre-war world did not exclude the bullying of small nations by the Great Powers. We must, therefore, define what we mean by this equality of nations, which we consider the necessary basis of the future world order.

First of all, equality of status. The formula of the Balfour Report holds good for the future world organization as well as for the British Commonwealth. It could read as follows:

“The States are autonomous communities within the League of Nations [or any other name], equal in status, and in no way subordinate one to another in respect of any of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common pursuit of the well-being of humanity, by a pledge of common defence against any aggression waged against any member of the League, and by full association as members of the League in the economic planning of the world.”

Here is the crux of the matter. Any future organization must be based on the *co-ordination* of States and nations and not on the *subordination* of one nation to another.

This principle implies that it will not be numbers alone that will count. Everyone will agree that a system under which the combined numbers of India and China could dominate the whole world organization, overriding the wishes and interests of the English-speaking peoples, would be unjust. In the same way the small nations have the right to demand an organization in which the might of numbers and the weight of economic force cannot be misused to the detriment of their interests. This means that in the executive organs, and in the legislative organs, if any, of the regional organizations and the world organization a balance must be struck between the representation of the whole population and the representation of States. Here again there exist various possibilities, already embodied in several federal constitutions; there may arise new formulas, probably even different ones for the regional organizations and the world

organization. But the principle of juridical equality of all States must be the basis.

And on this basis the real equality, the equality of opportunity, of all nations must be built up. No nation can be considered as a "market" for neighbouring States, no industrial development ought to be hampered in order to protect the vested interests of other industrial States. We must make an end, once and for all, of the imperialist conception of "spheres of influence," of "preponderating influences." Mr. H. G. Wells has forcibly expressed this truth:

"There is a particularly prevalent word among all these people who are avoiding the threefold Revolution which alone can bring peace and a resumption of civilization to Europe. That word is 'Hegemony.' The Japanese love it. It is a word I would make taboo everywhere. The world is to reconstruct itself under the benevolent 'Hegemony' of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, of Pan-America, Japan or a Pan-Slavia, and so forth and so on. Certain big Powers are to boss the show. The little peoples are to cuddle up and be protected. And exploited. We are to live in a world of five or six jealously competing Hegemonies, with faint squeaks from the nationalisms or races on which they will be seated. No more Imperialism! Wicked stuff that was! Just Hegemonies!"

10

Appendix

THE CASE OF CENTRAL EUROPE

I HAVE tried to outline the solution which seems to me to be the only just one: the independence of all nations that desire to exist as independent States, within the framework of a worldwide organization of collective security and economic planning; with the possibility of regional unions within this general framework.

And the first question which arises naturally is whether the best regional unit is not the Continent of Europe. This idea is widely canvassed in the United States and in Great Britain, is ardently propagated in Great Britain by Federal Union (which wants the inclusion of Great Britain in this European union) and by . . . the majority of the German refugees.

There can be doubt that the idea is *prima facie* seductive by its tidiness. The Continent of Europe is a geographical whole, why should it not as well become a political and economic unit?

However attractive this idea seems to be it is impracticable for many reasons. I do not want to enlarge on the difficulties which the inclusion of Great Britain in such a union might create in consideration of the ties Great Britain

has with the other nations of the Commonwealth or of the future closer British-American relations. It is not for a foreigner to intervene in the discussion of these questions. I will limit myself to consider whether from the continental point of view a complete union of Europe is possible and desirable.

Let us first of all quote the pronouncements of two responsible European statesmen. C. J. Hambro in his book writes:

"If we stop skating on the thin ice of polite speech, and soberly and realistically examine hard facts, we cannot help recognizing that continental interests are not of any solid substance or trustworthy structure.¹

"It is cheaper and it takes less time to send a cargo of paper from Norway to Philadelphia than to send it to Moscow.

"It may be well that future regional conventions will be defined on oceanic lines rather than on continental.

"It has become quite fashionable in America to talk of a European union or even a European constitution. It ought to be made perfectly clear in very outspoken words that such plans have no factual background that they are contrary to historical, geographical, demographic and political realities.

"Only through some kinds of international agency built

¹ This argument may apply also to the American continent. Eugene Staley has contributed to the *FOREIGN AFFAIRS* (April, 1941) a closely reasoned article under the striking title "The Myth of the Continents." And I remember very well how in the League of Nations committees prominent Mexicans and Argentinians regularly affirmed that economically their countries are tied up rather with Europe, than with the North American continent.

up on a worldwide basis can all nations, all peoples, all states great and small, all men, collaborate profitable and in full confidence.”

And President Beneš in his speech of April 28, 1942, from which I have quoted already, stated:

“But I am certain that there cannot now be a United States of Europe, similar to the U.S.A. While it is true that air transport, economic necessities and other technical issues have revolutionized our ideas of speed and space, while it is true that Europe must develop more along federal than along national lines, we must think in terms of the realistic possibilities and conditions of our time and in terms of organizations which promote, and do not retard, which conserve and do not destroy national culture.

“The smaller nations will again live and must live in their free states. They can and surely will combine in confederated blocs, and these blocs will perhaps be later united under a new European or world organization, as we had it in the League of Nations.

“It would be a mistake to try to combine the national states into purely mechanical units, to force those states who do not wish to live together to create larger inorganic units which would be again dismembered at the first occasion of an unexpected international conflict.”

And President Beneš outlined in this speech the Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation as a feasible aim and as a possible nucleus of a larger federation of the European Middle Zone.

Both these statesmen are right. Europe is not an economic unit. The economies of Western and Eastern Europe are far from being complementary, unless of course one wants to continue the traditional German policy of considering Eastern Europe simply as a market for German industry and a producer of foodstuffs and raw materials for Germany, thus helping to establish a German controlled autarchy.

This policy, however, would mean a permanent fixation of the poverty of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The only possibility of raising the standard of living in these countries is a change in their agriculture from the sowing of rye, wheat, maize or soya beans (where they cannot compete with Argentina, Canada or Manchuria) to the production of livestock and dairy products and their industrialization. It means that they must sell and buy not in a closed autarchic European continental market but in the world market.

And it is only if Germany herself will be dependent on the world market that the German danger can be eliminated.

For Europe, as an economic unit, will necessarily be dominated by Germany, who will be able, thanks to her geographical position and to her industrial predominance, to shape European economy according to her needs—as she has done in the last years before the war.

A Germany dependent on her imports of wheat from overseas markets, forced to export her industrial products overseas, will have a tremendous inducement to remain at peace. A Germany assured of her foodstuffs and necessary raw materials in the framework of a closed European econ-

omy would be tempted again to renew her bid for world power from the basis of "*Festung Europa*."

Economics, however, are less important in this context than politics. President Beneš was quite right when he emphasized as the necessary condition of any federation "the will to live together." There can be no common political organization, there can be no union unless this "will to live together" exists, unless there is a minimum not only of common interests, but of mutual sympathy as well.

Is it necessary to say that the peoples of the occupied countries who for long terrible years have been plundered and murdered by the Germans, who have learnt to hate them, will not have the wish to live after this war with these same Germans in a close union, such as the unification of the European Continent presupposes?

The future democratic Germany—if it emerges—must and will after the period of prolonged occupation which is necessary for many reasons find her place in the future world organization, in a world order where a counterpoise for her will be found in the United States, in the British Commonwealth, in Russia, and in a Federation of Central and Eastern Europe. In this world organization she will have her share and her voice beside the other regional organizations. But it is unthinkable that the people of Europe should be welded with Germany in one unit, that they should speak in the world organization with one voice, a voice with a strong German accent.

Dr. Goebbels knows very well that the unification of

Europe is to Germany's advantage. And the main object of his propaganda to-day is precisely the stressing of European unity.

The French Quislings, the Deats, Luchaires and company, have their mouths full of proclamations of European solidarity. They do not speak of a war of Germany against the United Nations. For them the war is a crusade to save Europe from the Bolshevist danger and from the equally appalling danger of Anglo-Saxon domination. They do not speak of German armies, they speak of European armies. Every day they are drumming into the ear of Frenchmen that French and German interests do coincide, that the integration of Europe is already completed, and that it should be a crime to disrupt this "natural" unity.

It is on this "Europeanity" that Mussert in Holland, Degrelle in Belgium, Quisling in Norway are insisting. It is the unity of the European Continent which was the favourite war horse of Virginio Gayda.

If a decisive proof were necessary that the unification of the whole Continent of Europe would mean that Germany has won the peace, the fact that it is Dr. Goebbels' war aim ought to be that proof.

If a complete European union is impossible at this time there is, however, a region in Europe, where the creation of a closer union is not only possible, but necessary. It is the region between the Baltic and the Aegean, the European Middle Zone.

The creation of this regional union is already foreshadowed by the Polish-Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav agree-

ments, by the creation of the Central and Eastern European Planning Board, which were mentioned in the preceding chapter.

For the time being the *official* discussions around this future union have been conducted only by the four governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece and Yugoslavia. The traitor governments who have forced their peoples into the Axis camp obviously cannot take part in any negotiations. (Had it not been for the last minute revolt of the Serb people and King Peter's own courageous decision Yugoslavia might to-day be in the same position as Rumania.)

The declarations of the four Allied governments leave no doubt, however, that this union will be open to all the peoples of the Middle Zone. And in unofficial discussions conducted in the Danubian Club in London anti-Fascists of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Albania have taken part and have contributed to the elaboration of schemes for the future union.

This regional union will be a union of people who have the will to live together, who have a kindred psychology, a kindred outlook. First of all, all these people have been—some of them for long centuries, some for a shorter time—under foreign domination. All these people have fought for their independence and cherish it above all. The importance of this community of destiny cannot be overrated, for having to fight for their own independence they have conserved the respect for the independence of others. They know that in their partnership there will be no attempt by one nation to dominate over the others, that this partner-

ship can survive only if it will be based on full equality. And they have learned the bitter lesson that they are all threatened by the same aggressor, who was able to destroy them precisely because they were not united, because he could tackle them "one by one."

There is another common feature of this region. All the inhabitants of the Middle Zone (Bohemia, Moravia and Western Poland excepted) are in the great, sometimes overwhelming majority, peasants.¹

And the peasantry has a common outlook, has common interests. Immediately after the war there was an attempt in these regions to create a peasant bloc, the "Green International." Stamboliski, the great leader of the Bulgarian peasants, was assassinated by the Bulgarian reactionaries precisely because he strove for a reconciliation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on the basis of the common interests of the peasantry of both lands.

For the people of all these countries there exists the same paramount problem of the relative overpopulation of the land, of the necessity to remedy it by the transformation of their agriculture, by an intensive industrialization.

These problems can be solved. The underdevelopment of these countries and the defective structure of their agriculture were not due to any lack of natural conditions, but to their lack of national independence, to the deliberate policy of their overlords. In the twenty years of their independence these countries have made large efforts to make

¹ Poland and Rumania have 70% of their population in agriculture, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria nearly 80%, Hungary 60%, Greece 50%, Czechoslovakia 40%.

good their backwardness. They have achieved some stupendous results, like the marvel of the Polish port of Gdynia, which twenty-five years ago had been a poor fishing village, and like the creation of the Polish Central industrial region. And immediately before the present war this Middle Zone produced already nearly 54 million tons of coal, over 30 million tons of lignite, 2.7 million tons of pig iron, over 4.5 million tons of steel, over 120,000 tons of iron pyrites, 32,000 tons of manganese ore. This region has the only seriously productive oil wells in Europe—in Rumania, Poland and Albania. It has an immense wealth of timber.

The achievements of these twenty years have been largely destroyed by the war and the deliberate policy of the German occupation.

What more natural for these countries, who will have to start again nearly from scratch, than to try to resolve amongst themselves their common problems, and to adjust their national economies to a larger plan covering the whole region for the benefit of all.

A further consideration will facilitate this adjustment. There will be practically no vested interests to overcome. In a Western European Union the adjustment of the French, Belgian, Luxemburg (to say nothing of the German) metallurgical interests would present a serious problem. In the union of Central Eastern Europe the adjustment of the existing industrial regions—Bohemia, Moravia and Western Poland—will be a much less formidable one. The main problem in fact will be the future industrialization, the location of the new industries. And this problem will be bet-

ter and more easily solved if the region is taken as a whole, if there is a common machinery, a common plan.

Thus a close grouping of over 100,000,000 people is already taking shape. In a total world settlement, however, a settlement which will embrace the 500,000,000 Chinese, the 400,000,000 Indians, and the United States (which has not many more inhabitants than Central Europe, but has infinitely more horse power), this union will not be self-sufficient either economically or militarily. It will have to be linked up closely with still another grouping. And here necessarily the question arises: what grouping?

There is in Great Britain a school of thought that sees these countries as complementary to Germany, as forming with Germany a rational economic unit. Mr. G. D. H. Cole, for instance, writes:

“Germany, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Balkan countries would form a second planning group quite as large as could be effectively unified, either politically or economically, at the present stage of human development in the arts of government and administration.”

And in another place:

“It is right for Germany to be closely associated with the less developed areas of Southern and Eastern Europe. Germany is the natural market for much of the produce of these areas; and German industry is in the best position, by way of exchange, to foster their economic development. Under the Nazis this process of exchange becomes one of exploita-

tion. But there is no reason why it should be so under a different German regime."

Thus Germany is to be the centre of this new grouping, a market for its produce and in turn an exporter of industrial goods. For this school of thought what is hateful in Hitler's "New Order" is only its brutality; the "unity" brought about by the German conquest is on the whole beneficial. It is affirmed that to break up this "unity" would mean renewed chaos; that it is impossible and wicked to attempt its disruption.

I have found in the *NEW STATESMAN* this summing up of the situation: "you cannot unscramble scrambled eggs." Metaphors are picturesque, but dangerous. Of course, nobody would dream of unscrambling scrambled eggs, for first of all there is no earthly reason for doing so. But when a bomb has wrecked a passenger train or destroyed a house and you face a bloody mess of twisted iron and broken limbs, it would be hardly helpful to leave it at that and say with a shrug of the shoulders "you cannot unscramble scrambled eggs." The thing to do is first of all to try to save the human lives, to try to remould the mangled bodies, and then to rebuild the railway track, to build a better house.

The economic "unity" created by Hitler in this war will have to go, lock, stock and barrel. These writers and politicians who are so fascinated by the word "unity" that they would like to maintain Hitler's "New Order," and only purge it of its brutality, disregard two essential considerations. The first is that this economic "unity," built up in

part, as in the Balkan countries, even before the war, is of such a nature that it is inseparable from the aim which it is intended to achieve—the domination of Germany over other peoples. It may be granted that this domination could be exercised in a less brutal form; the wholesale murder of the intelligentsia, the suppression of schools, the revival of slavery are not necessary ingredients of this “unity.” They do not follow necessarily from the assumption that Germany and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are complementary and ought to be welded in a single economic, or even political, unit.

It is clear, however, that such a grouping under German “leadership” would maintain the supremacy of the inflated German industry, and stifle, in the interests of that industry, the industrial development of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which is the only solution for their future. Doreen Warriner, who is a leading expert, writes in her pamphlet, *EASTERN EUROPE AFTER HITLER*:

“As a long-term policy the connection of these countries with the German war machine will be disastrous for three simple reasons: a) the German policy definitely discourages industrialization, the chief hope of relieving pressure on the land, b) it fosters the growth of industries, like cotton and soya, which are more suited to overseas production, while it checks the growth of demand for the high quality foodstuffs, c) finally it aims at enslaving the peasant population. Germany can only seek *Lebensraum* in the densely populated East by uprooting local populations.”

It may be granted, again, that the ruthless expulsion of Poles or Czechs would be impossible after the war. But the trend expressed in points a and b would remain, even with a change of regime in Germany. During the last war, indeed, this trend was implicit in the programme for *Mitteleuropa* drafted by Friedrich Naumann, who was a German Liberal. Any unity based on Berlin, with Berlin as the planning centre, would be highly detrimental to the economic development of Central and Eastern Europe.

The second objection to the plan of maintaining the "unity" achieved by Hitler's conquest is still more important. Even if the linking up of the countries between the Baltic and the Aegean with Germany were not harmful, even if it would be economically beneficent, it is still more impossible psychologically than the unification of the whole Continent of Europe.

In Great Britain and in the United States in discussions between "Vansittartites" and "Anti-Vansittartites," distinctions may be drawn between "Germans" and "Nazis," between "good" and "bad" Germans. In the countries which for years have been groaning under the Nazi heel this discussion is completely irrelevant. The peoples of Poland and Czechoslovakia, of Greece and Yugoslavia, as well as the peoples of Holland and Norway, of Belgium and France, will simply refuse to be linked up after the war in a *tête-à-tête* with any Germany, good or bad. They will absolutely and unconditionally reject any continuance of the "unity" achieved by Hitler's hordes. They will absolutely and unconditionally reject any organization of their part of Europe

under German "leadership," or in any form which allows Germany by her weight of numbers or the superiority of her industrial equipment, to-day largely achieved at their expense, to play a dominating role.¹

Just as impracticable is the second solution favoured by many writers in Great Britain, the linking up of these countries under Soviet leadership, or even as parts of an enlarged Soviet Union. Here again it is only complete ignorance of the countries concerned, or a complete disregard of their interests, a complete indifference to the opinions of "natives," that can explain this suggestion. Mr. Cole, for instance, writes:

"It is very doubtful whether the backward countries of Eastern and Southern Europe are suitable for parliamentary government. Some sort of Soviet system may suit their needs much better, as it has undoubtedly suited the Russians."²

It is rather curious to read that Poland or Czechoslovakia are backward countries unsuited for parliamentary govern-

¹ Some of the advocates of "unity" seem to recognize the validity of this argument. They try to blunt its edge by an escape into wishful thinking. They affirm, in fact, that the oppressed peoples themselves are in favour of the maintenance of this "unity."

Thus Mr. Cole writes: "From the purely economic point of view, it is quite arguable that it would be better to let Hitler conquer all Europe short of the Soviet Union, and thereafter exploit it ruthlessly in the Nazi interest, than to go back to the pre-war order of independent Nation-States with frontiers drawn so as to cut right across the natural units of production and exchange. *This is a part of the reason why there is in the Nation-States which Hitler has overrun no general repudiation of the Nazis' economic new order.*"

² To this last assertion there is a plain answer: It is untrue. The statement that there is no general repudiation of the new economic order is not only unsupported by any evidence but is flatly contradicted by an enormous amount of evidence with which Mr. Cole has evidently not bothered to acquaint himself. I challenge him to quote from the underground press of Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium, Holland, or Norway a single sentence which would support his contention. I defy him to quote a single sentence from the pronouncements of the Poles or Czechs who have escaped from the Nazi hell and are now in Great Britain.

ment. As a matter of fact Poland has had a parliament since 1422. The Polish counterpart of the liberty of the citizen section of Magna Charta and of Habeas Corpus, the declaration "*neminem captivabimus nisi jure victum*," is dated 1431. Poland is a Roman Catholic country in which the Inquisition was non-existent, in which religious freedom was respected during the centuries in which France and Germany were torn asunder by religious wars and it was not quite safe to be a Roman Catholic or a dissenter in the British Isles. The Poles' love of liberty is and always has been as strong as that of the English. Any totalitarian regime is as profoundly abhorrent to the Pole as to the Britisher.

If we turn now to the Eastern European attitude toward the Soviet regime, it is a fact that the Communist party in Poland was no stronger than its English counterpart. And throughout the whole of Central and Eastern Europe we might look in vain for a Communist movement comparable in strength to that of Germany or France. Communism could be brought to these countries only by Russian bayonets; it would mean foreign rule and a foreign spirit.

REYNOLDS NEWS reports that Sir Stafford Cripps said at Bristol:

"I am certain that we can make a contribution to the re-organization of post-war Europe, a contribution which no other country can make, for the people are not afraid of us. The common people of the occupied countries are relying on us to get the sort of world which they—and we—want after the war."

The wording is cautious and diplomatic, but its meaning is clear. The "common people" of the occupied countries do not look toward Soviet Russia, they do not see their salvation in a Soviet system. They look toward Great Britain and the United States and they long for the establishment of a true democracy.

And Franklin Roosevelt in his FOUR FREEDOMS speech in which he outlined the Charter of the new democracy said still more trenchantly:

"Third, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations of our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers. *We know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other peoples' freedom.*"¹

There is one central point which alone renders impracticable any Soviet solution of the problems of Central and Eastern Europe. These countries, as said before, are largely peasant countries. And the peasantry is individualistic and strongly attached to the individual ownership of the peasant's bit of land. Even in Soviet Russia the establishment of kolkhozes met with furious opposition in the Ukraine, where there was a peasant class based for centuries on individual ownership of the land (in contradistinction to Russia proper, where this individual ownership was introduced only by the Stolypin reform a few years before the First

¹ My italics.

World War). The peasant masses of Central and Eastern Europe are still more firmly attached to the principle of individual ownership of the land. They see their future in the development of the co-operative movement on the lines of the Danish movement, and they would firmly reject the collectivization that is inseparable from the Soviet system.

Economically they are entirely right. Let me quote Doreen Warriner again:

“Under the influence of the Russian Five-Year Plan many Socialists looked to collectivization as the right solution and affirmed that ‘the peasant is as dead as a doornail.’ This overlooked the fact that Russia both before and after collectivization had a lower productivity than Eastern Europe and a politically far more backward peasantry. Russian collectivization has not really achieved much increase in productivity through reforming the peasant system. Yields are still lower in Russia than in every part of Eastern Europe, cattle density is still much lower, and the conversion to new methods has not achieved anything like such good results as, for instance, the Bulgarian co-operatives or the Polish co-operatives in some districts. Collectivization of a certain kind ought to be carried through by the peasants themselves; but it is not, and cannot be for reasons we shall later investigate, a real remedy for rural poverty due to overpopulation. The Soviet Union’s successes in increasing food production have been in colonization, that is to say, in opening up new areas for cultivation, and not in reforming peasant life.”

The Central and Eastern European Federation will be

established on a basis of friendship with Soviet Russia. But it will not be linked up with the Soviet system either politically or even economically. It is even doubtful whether there will be a very great amount of trade between these countries and the Soviet Union. Doreen Warriner states that it is difficult to see what these countries could gain by close trade connections with the U.S.S.R.

The negative side is thus completely clear. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe could be linked up with Germany or Soviet Russia only as the result of a "*Diktat*" outraging all the principles of the Atlantic Charter, disregarding completely the will of the populations concerned, and sowing the seeds of discontent and of revolt of incalculable momentum.

There has been lately an opposition forthcoming to this plan of a Middle Zone Confederation. The Soviet government has made clear that it objects to it, and the Soviet weekly, *THE WAR AND THE WORKING CLASSES*, has on July 27, 1943, published an article with a savage attack on the scheme. In certain quarters in the United States and in Great Britain this opposition was considered as putting an end to any possibility of such a Confederation. Others who formerly supported this plan on its merits began to waver. President Beneš, who until then had considered the Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation as absolutely essential for the future peace of Europe, and who had forcibly expressed this opinion in speeches and articles, found it necessary to interrupt the negotiations with the Polish Government about the details of the Confederation.

If one examines the arguments against this Confederation, as they are presented in the highly official article of THE WAR AND THE WORKING CLASSES mentioned above one will realize that they are entirely imaginary.

The Soviet paper concludes its article by a clear threat saying that:

“Plans for the establishment of an Eastern European Federation hostile to the Soviet Union can be built up, but only if the renunciation of the necessity of friendship and collaboration between the U.S.S.R. and the Allies in the post-war period as the point of departure, only if the renunciation of the Anglo-Soviet treaty be considered. Honest supporters of the Anglo-Soviet treaty cannot uphold post-war plans hostile to the Soviet Union and Great Britain, or hostile to even one of these countries.”

It proceeds in fact by simple affirmations, without ad-
ducing any proofs.

We read that:

“Anti-democratic and semi-Fascist elements, however, are striving to prevent the participation of the U.S.S.R. in the organization of the post-war world setting up the most fantastic plans in this direction, plans obviously hostile to the Soviet Union.”

That:

“Reactionary groups of Polish émigrés from covert followers of Beck to *social-democrats*¹ and also representatives

¹ My italics.

of the Polish government in London are propagandizing with particular intensity the creation of an Eastern-European Federation. These gentlemen still cherish hopes of the realization of the imperialistic designs of their Polish masters, trying to find in the East European Federation a new lever for the realization of their designs, and attempting to adapt to this end their plans for the organization of post-war Europe."

Thus the plan of an Eastern Confederation is not condemned on its merits, only it is condemned because, as a plan favoured by the reactionary elements of Polish opinion, it must be obviously designed against Soviet Russia.

The premises of this reasoning are as devoid of any relation to reality as the conclusions. The plan is not and was not a plan of "Polish reactionaries." It is endorsed by the common consent of the whole Polish opinion (precisely with the exception of some extreme reactionaries). In fact, *THE WAR AND THE WORKING CLASSES* includes among the reactionaries the Polish Socialists in London.

The plan is endorsed by the underground movement in Poland. In documents issued by Polish underground labour, we read:

ORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE

"IN ORDER to safeguard the security of Poland and the other countries of Central-Eastern Europe against the imperialism of the great Powers, to assure to all nations in that part of Europe free cultural and economic development, and to

create adequate conditions for the introduction of a new system based on social justice, Poland will support the organization of a Federation of Central-Eastern Europe.

“The agreement concluded in January, 1942, between the Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia in London, is regarded as the first step toward such a Federation.”

DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES IN EVERY COUNTRY

“THE Federation will be a Union of Free States, linked by common economic and political interests. It must be based on the application of identical democratic principles in every country concerned. Its policy will outlaw all acts of violence and imperialism and will aim to maintain close contact with the Western Democracies, as well as to build up and broaden peaceful international collaboration in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter.

“The Federation will evolve a common economic plan that will aim, within the framework of a world-wide economic plan, at the most rapid and thorough reconstruction of its member countries ruined by war, and at the rational reorganization of the economic structures of the federated States.”

FRIENDLY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

“THE frontier between Poland and the U.S.S.R. should remain as defined by the Treaty of Riga, which was the result of a free agreement between Poland and the U.S.S.R.

“Poland, like the other Member-States of the Federation, will base its relations with the U.S.S.R. on a pact of friend-

ship and non-aggression, and on a pact of mutual assistance in case of attack from without. All members of the Federation will aim at close economic collaboration with the U.S.S.R.

“The Ukrainian and White Ruthenian people inhabiting Polish territory will have complete freedom of national, social, economic, and cultural development along the principles of full freedom and equality.

“The idea of Federation has become the goal and slogan of all who love peace rather than war, who love life and creative work, not death and destruction, who long for liberty instead of slavery.

“The compulsory herding of nations into one Empire which is governed by the strongest national group must, therefore, not be confused with a genuine Federation, for the latter is a voluntary organization of free nations, a union based on political, social and economic equality.”

The underground Czech Labour movement in its press expressed also its highest approval of the idea of Confederation.

And it is precisely the representatives of the democracy in the occupied countries who are trying to-day together in London and elsewhere to elaborate precise plans for the union of their peoples. A union on basis of full equality, as the underground document quoted above emphasizes, for of course, the bogey of “Polish Imperialism” is a pure phantasy.

In fact, one would be at a loss to understand why the

Soviet government could have conceived the idea that the plan of a Confederation of Central Eastern Europe should be directed against its interests if one was not aware that just as Bismarck had the "*cauchemar des coalitions*," so the leaders of the Soviet Union have still the "*cauchemar*" of an anti-Soviet intervention and, therefore, are suspicious of any combination of Powers on their frontiers, and prefer single States, necessarily weak, to a strong Confederation.

These suspicions are, of course, completely unfounded. Nobody dreams of turning the Confederation of Central Eastern Europe into a *cordon sanitaire* against Russia. The future of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe—menaced as it will be by a possible restoration of German strength—will necessarily involve friendly relations with Soviet Russia. The quotation of the Polish underground press, the declarations of General Sikorski and all the Polish successive Ministers of Foreign Affairs leave no doubt that such is the unanimous wish of the Poles.

It is, therefore, to be earnestly hoped that the opposition of the Soviet Union will vanish; that the rulers of the U.S.S.R. will persuade themselves that the Confederation of Central Eastern Europe is not directed against them; that on the contrary it will be advantageous to Russia as well as to the countries directly concerned.

This Soviet opposition, however, apart from the flimsiness of the reasons adduced against the Confederation, raises again the central issue; the decisive issue of principle: the question of international democracy.

This opposition raises the question: Whose will is to pre-

vail? Is it the will of the peoples who want to unite, who want to live together in a close union, which they consider as advantageous to all of them; or is it the will of a powerful neighbour, basing his claim to decide the issue on his status as a great Power?

Quia nominor leo.

The democratic answer is obvious.

The unwillingness of the Soviet Union to accept the necessity of a Central Eastern Federation is a supplementary argument against the linking up of this Federation with the Soviet Union.

Therefore the only possibility for this Federation is a linking up with the Western democracies.

It seems pretty clear nowadays that there will be close collaboration between the United States and the British Commonwealth, a continuation of their brotherhood in arms. The speech of the British Prime Minister at Harvard University, the reception this speech has met with in the United States have placed this collaboration on the map as a definite peace aim. On the other hand Great Britain is indissolubly linked up with Europe. Winston Churchill's great proposal of an Anglo-French union made on the eve of the French collapse, and rejected then by the same men, who afterward accepted "collaboration" with Germany, was more than a desperate attempt to keep France in the war. It was the expression of a constructive policy.

To-day it is not only France which is closely connected with Great Britain. In this war Great Britain has been the leader of *all* European peoples in their fight for freedom.

The Air Force which defended the British shores, the Navy which kept open the British sea lanes are composed of members of all European nations. This alliance should not and cannot be disrupted.

The economic rehabilitation of the European Continent, also dependent on close collaboration with the Anglo-Saxon democracies, is unthinkable without it. Even in pre-war days the tendency of the Central and Eastern European countries to increase their trade with Great Britain was very noticeable. This trend was reversed only because it seemed then necessary to "appease" Hitler, by not interfering with his plans of economic domination of Europe. In post-war Europe this quite natural and rational trend will again become apparent.

Sir Stafford Cripps speaking of the peoples of Europe, said: "They are not afraid of us."

And Wendell Willkie summed up his experiences in writing:

"People like our works I found not only because they help to make life easier and richer, but also because we have shown that American business enterprise does not necessarily lead to attempts at political control.

*"I found this dread of foreign control everywhere."*¹

That is the focal issue. The peoples of Europe have confidence in the Anglo-Saxon democracies, because they believe that such a partnership will not degenerate into a tyranny of the stronger over the weaker. And they are right

¹ My italics.

in their belief. In this book I have exposed and fought many plans, originated in the United States and in Great Britain, which seem to belie this confidence. But really representative men, the men who to-day have the right to speak for the United States and for Great Britain have remained true to the ideals of international collaboration on a democratic basis. Cordell Hull on September 13, 1943, stated principles which the whole of Europe will accept as the basis of the future world order, when he said:

“All peoples who, ‘with a decent respect to the opinions of mankind’ have qualified themselves to assume and to discharge the responsibilities of liberty are entitled to its enjoyment.


“Each sovereign nation, large and small, is in law and under law the equal of every other nation.

“All nations, large or small, which respect the right of others are entitled to freedom from outside interference in their internal affairs.”

And Winston Churchill has repeatedly emphasized the same points, has even in one of his speeches supported the principle of regional organizations in Europe.

Therefore, the peoples of occupied Europe continue to believe in the possibility and to fight for the establishment of a great democratic partnership established on the same basis as that on which the Union of Poland and Lithuania was established in 1569, a union of

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
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