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POLAND'S HISTORICAL COMMONWEALTH EXPANSION WITHOUT AGGRESSION



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NOT ONLY problems which arise out of the history of the former Republic of Poland, but also the difficulties with which the reborn State was confronted, call for statements and explanations in the spirit of absolute truth, for the sometimes incredibly dynamic development of the State, and at other times its tragic breakdown, render that history liable to false interpretation, and to the presentation of black as white and white as black.

Anyone glancing over the history of the former State of Poland must be struck above all by the tre-

mendous territorial development of that Republic, which led to the circumstance that for centuries it was the greatest Power in Central and Eastern Europe. Readers may remember that Poland, as set up in 1918-20 embraced only 35% of the Polish-Lithuanian State of the Jagiellons at the end of the middle ages (the 1492 frontiers), 38% of the seventeenth century Poland (the 1618 frontiers), and 53.1% of the Poland which fell a victim to the Partitions at the end of the eighteenth century.

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POLAND SPEAKS . . .

From A Recent Speech By Jan Ciechanowski, Polish Ambassador In Washington

THE treacherous attack of Japan on the United States on December 7th, the declaration of war against this country by Germany and Italy on the 11th, have forced this great Democracy to rise to its full height as an actively belligerent Power in this unprecedented conflict.

. . . The present Germanic onslaught threatens the very foundations of humanity everywhere.

. . . It is urgent bravely to face the truth. It is urgent dispassionately to analyze this appalling state of affairs.

. . . The tasks facing Democracy are twofold:

Firstly, — the immediate task of fully realizing that Democracy must be victorious in this conflict. The realization that this foremost necessity requires immediate united and active effort on the part of all democratic peoples in both hemispheres.

Secondly, — the task of fully realizing that there is likewise no time to lose in the preparation of the foundations for a just and total peace after this total war. We must be fully prepared and unanimously agreed upon the principles of peace when the time comes to apply them to a world not merely war weary and physically exhausted, but one which will be fundamentally destroyed politically, ethnographically, financially, economically, morally and socially. The release of tension caused by the sudden cessation of the inhuman pressures exercised in this war upon the countless millions of human beings literally crazed by suffering, may result in mass reactions, both incalculable and disastrous in their effects. There will be no time as in the past for lengthy and eloquent peace conferences. The risk would be too great.

. . . It is essential to realize that in reestablishing peace after this unprecedented catastrophe, we may no longer aim at recreating any past version of so-called "peace in our time" or risk the repetition of past blunders, or mistake appeasement for peace.

We shall be dealing with a chaos so complete, with a world in rags, a world so shattered and unhinged, that we will have to create and to build up from the very foundations. This should afford the opportunity for bold and vast planning on a total scale.

. . . Firstly,—there is the problem of winning the war. It does not appear possible to achieve a real and productive victory if still at this stage of the war we continue to differentiate between Hitlerism and Pan-Germanism. In some authoritative quarters in the democratic camp the fallacious hope still persists that this childish differentiation will in a miraculous way make the German people repudiate Hitler and his totalitarian Nazism. The Nazis have had no difficulty in convincing their German followers that this wishful thinking goes to prove that Democracies are conscious that they can never conquer Germany as long as she is led by Hitler.

. . . What is even more serious is the fact that, dis-

tinguishing between Hitlerism and Germany, merely encourages the Germans to gamble on Hitler's luck by inspiring them with the conviction that they may safely do so, because, should he ultimately fail, they have only to turn him out, as they did with the Kaiser, in order to be welcomed back on favorable terms into the family of civilized nations.

. . . The German people have disregarded all warnings and, through their acts, have made themselves fully responsible for Hitler.

. . . It is indispensable that Democracy should pursue this war to complete victory for several reasons of particular importance.

Firstly,—because by now it has become abundantly clear that there is not, and that there never can be, any basis for compromise between the diametrically opposed principles of Democracy and Totalitarianism. There is likewise no possible compromise between the modern version of Pan-Germanism, embellished by Nazi racial nationalism, and the indisputable right of free nations to independence.

Secondly, — because, by now, it must have become equally clear that in this present onslaught of Pan-Germanism we are not merely faced by an outburst of militaristic exuberance enforced upon a peace-loving, musical and gemuetlich German people, by a short-lived, aristocratic, Prussian war-minded clique. We are faced by a young, entirely pagan, entirely ruthless, sadistic and brutal generation of Germans, whose receptive minds Hitler has successfully inoculated with the fascinating cult of Germanic racial superiority over all other races, and with a mystical faith in their mission of world domination. He has reinforced their faith by an unbroken series of easily won victories and unlimited loot.

. . . The young generation of Germans has finally become emancipated from all reasonable influence. It has acquired a one-track mind solely guided by its burning faith in the Germanic totalitarian state and its super-god Hitler.

That is the reason which makes a complete Allied victory over Germany imperative at the end of this war. Only a German defeat which will make the young generation feel the consequences of total warfare can effectively discourage them from repeating their attempts at world domination.

Thirdly, — because a partly defeated Germany will not be easily coerced to disgorge all the territories she has annexed by force. To survive, Democracy must insist on the fullest reestablishment of legality and justice which requires the unconditional restitution of all such territories to States victims of German aggression.

Fourthly, — and this point is of the utmost importance, — complete victory is indispensable to the establishment of durable peace on the basis of effective security.

There are various ways of achieving security, but only one way is sound and lasting. We must avoid

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"UNION OF LUBLIN"

Painted by J. Matejko

King Sigismund Augustus holds the Cross aloft at the Union of Poland and Lithuania in 1569.



POLAND'S HISTORICAL COMMONWEALTH

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This percentage comparison of 20th century Poland with the Poland prior to 1772 gives some idea of the enormous extent of the former State.

Normally, such territorial expansion in the history of nations can easily be explained by periods of government by great conquerors depending on powerful regular armies, and expressing the spirit of domination by enfeebling their neighbors. Moreover, in many nations' history even the internal process of unification of the State, as for instance, in France, was the result of the internal subjection of the weakest by the strongest. This factor is not found in the history of Poland during the years when the State was built up, in the fourteenth century, for here the Western feudal system did not exist, and from the beginning there was a process of fusion of equals under the authority of a dynasty loved by all, whether natives or foreigners.

For the entire process of concentration of these vast areas of Eastern and Central Europe within the framework of a single State alliance, an alliance which was more and more consolidated with the passing of the centuries, was the result of a historical process quite peculiar to Poland, and completely different from the creation of great States by way of conquest. Poland's frontiers in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth embraced areas with the dimensions of an Empire, and, what was even more astonishing, Poland achieved this without ever conducting aggressive wars. The desire to concentrate around the Polish State was the mainspring of Polish territorial expansion, in distinction from that of others. This is the first peculiarity which needs to be made clear, especially as hostile propaganda often only ignores it, and sometimes attempts to exploit

the fact of the great dimensions of Polish territory to impute to Polish historical activities that very quality which was most foreign and opposed to it, namely, aggression and imperialistic domination.

Equal with Equals, Free with the Free

The basic motive of Polish history—the struggle of right against force and violence—runs like a thread from the very beginnings of the Polish State. Anyone who wishes to understand Polish history, especially certain errors as viewed from the angle of temporary State interests, must remember that Polish minds inherited from their Slavonic forefathers a sense of right developed to such a degree that it became a political factor. They also inherited the principle that that is right which enjoys the assent of the community.

We may not go into the details of the Piast epoch of Polish mediaeval history. But the principle accepted by the entire Polish population that each of the sons of the reigning monarch had a right of inheritance to a separate area, led to the mediaeval Polish State being divided and broken into parts again and again. Undoubtedly Polish political thought even in the twelfth century realized the negative effects of such an application of the right of inheritance to political life, and endeavored to avoid it by the conception of seniority expressed in the testament of Boleslav the Wry-mouthed in 1138. The principle of seniority, according to which the oldest son inherited not only his province, but also Cracow and a number of possessions, and had the obligation of representing and defending the State as a whole, was the first great historical proof of the unceasing Polish tendencies to reconcile the principle of right with the requirements of the State.

None the less, while in the course of the centuries States in Eastern Europe began to emerge which were based on the principle of violence and the

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exploitation of force for imperialistic ends, in the center of Europe, in Poland, arose a State organism which finally in practice achieved the same ends by the principle of observing the rights and obtaining the mutual alliance of entire nations in the name of defense of their common interests.

In consequence, the regeneration of the unity of the Polish State in the fourteenth century took place not by internal subjection as in other countries, but through unification by way of the right of inheritance, which found its expression first in the fact of the revival of the Polish kingdom under Przemyslaw in 1295, and then in the union of the Polish State on the basis of the law of inheritance by King Wladyslaw Lokietek in the years 1306-1333.

How alien, even in internal relations, to the Polish spirit was the foreign principle of imposing State coherence by way of subjection, is best revealed by the fact that separate Piast princes continued to govern Mazovia for a further two centuries, i.e., down to 1529, and though they truly fulfilled their obligations to the Polish State, they continued to govern their territories until the line became extinct. Although the relation of forces between the Polish-Lithuanian State of the Jagiellons in the sixteenth century, and the Mazurian princes was probably that of 100 to 1, the princes governed in freedom within the great Polish-Lithuanian State, only and exclusively because they were defended by one single thing: the right. When the line became extinct, Mazovia was incorporated with Poland as a separate province, the Mazurians welcoming the step enthusiastically.

For the territorial development of Poland was not padded out with aggressive wars, in the sense of imperialistic tendencies or interests, but was achieved by more and more agreements for a voluntary union, a factor which distinguishes Polish history from that of many other States which have played a great role in the history of Europe.

Poland's Commonwealth Since the Fourteenth Century — Poland, Lithuania, Ruthenia

Students of history know that the greatest advance in the territorial development of the Polish State occurred as the result of the union of Poland with Lithuania, which was begun with the agreement at Krowo in 1385, and consummated by the marriage of Jadwiga to Jagiello in 1386, with its related agreements. But it is not so well known that the preliminary agreement at Krowo provided for and introduced the incorporation of all the Lithuanian territory with the territory of the Polish State. This incorporation, as the agreement itself called

it, was never brought about, and the alliance of Poland with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and, to be more exact, with the Lithuanian-Ruthenian world, was in reality achieved as a voluntary union of equal with equals, free with the free.

The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was already to a large extent a Lithuanian-Ruthenian State, for the Lithuanian population was concentrated more in the area known as Zmudz, and only in part in historical Lithuania, which already possessed a very strong White-Ruthenian element, especially in the towns. The native and written language of the higher classes and the nobility was Ruthenian (the basic root of present-day Russian, Ukrainian and White Ruthenian), which afterwards, owing to cultural and ecclesiastical influences, but without any distinctive modification in any given year, was replaced by Polish.

For the Union of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was not only a Union between the Polish and Lithuanian States, but also a voluntary alliance between the Polish nation professing the Roman Catholic faith, and the Ruthenian population, belonging to the Greek Orthodox Church, which inhabited the vast expanse of territories reaching from the sources of the Volga to the Black Sea.

The strongest element in this Union was Poland, by reason of the fact that she had attained a far superior level of civilization due to her Latin culture of Western European origin, and also possessed far greater natural resources.

But as pagan Lithuania adopted Christianity according to the Catholic rite at the moment of Jadwiga's marriage with Jagiello, and accepted it from Polish hands, so at and from that moment the entire Lithuanian world came within the orbit of Polish influences, since the direct alliance with the Ruthenian element came somewhat later.

Primarily the alliance of Poland with this new Lithuanian-Ruthenian world was an alliance of a free nation with national groups, which both in Lithuania and in other Ruthenian duchies, did not possess individual freedom. Simultaneously with baptism, Jagiello gave the Lithuanian nobility, in accordance with Polish customs, freedom to dispose of their property and family, and liberation from a number of feudal obligations.

This fact is in a sense the symbol of all Poland's role in the East, since every increase of dependence upon or State alliance with Poland was continually followed by an enlargement of the liberties enjoyed by the Polish nobility and the entire population in these areas.

At first all this extension of Polish liberties and the Polish spirit of freedom and equality embraced

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OUR SUPPLEMENT

Land belongs to those who till and cultivate it, and love it enough not to leave it — not by those who exploit its treasures, exact all from its people by force, and finally degrade and leave it to look for better lands . . . The peaceful worker has more right to it than a temporary invader.

— WACLAW SOBIESKI

AS a supplement to this issue of "The Polish Review" we publish a map in color representing the western and northern parts of Poland from 1918-1939, with part of German Silesia and East Prussia. This map is an exact replica of one issued in Germany, based on an official census report of 1910 (prepared by the German government), at a time when statistical data was not falsified to serve propaganda purposes.

This map furnishes the best proofs that Poles constituted a decisive majority, not only in the lands rightfully granted to Poland under the Treaty of Versailles, but also in German Silesia and East Prussia. It disposes of present German claims that there is a German majority in these lands.

Independently we publish in this issue, another map showing the incidence of population in Silesia, from the German atlas by Andree, edited in 1923. It clearly shows that Poles constituted an indisputable majority in Opole Silesia (German). These lands are Polish, but were given to Germany by the Treaty of Versailles.

It is not without interest that a "revised" edition of this atlas, published the same year was devoid of this map.

POLAND SPEAKS

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establishing security on the permanent maintenance of huge military establishments, of vast war industries, on the erection of costly fortifications, inasmuch as it forces peacefully-minded nations permanently to overburden their national budgets with disproportionately heavy expenditures for national defense. It creates likewise a feeling of growing insecurity and prevents the return of international confidence indispensable to normal peaceful relations. Hence the necessity arises to demand that Germany, who is the sole aggressive Power in Europe, should be effectively disarmed and that her war industry be dismantled and destroyed. . . Security is absolutely essential to a future total peace. Abhorrent though it appears to many generously-minded people who have been spared the direct effects of the ruthless German total war methods, the establishment of security cannot be achieved otherwise than by making Germany accept certain conditions calculated to reduce her aggressive fighting capacity. This would probably be only a superficial and temporary hardship. In the long run it would certainly be in the direct interest of the German people, because only an effectively disarmed



Germany, controlled in regard to her supply of the raw materials necessary for war purposes may hope to regain the confidence of the community of civilized nations which she has at present so completely lost.

. . . After this war, tortured humanity will demand a "New Deal" in the establishment of security and total peace. Such a "New Deal" on a world basis will be no easy task. It will have to bring the solution not merely of security, but of the social, economic and financial problems as well.

Tragic experience has taught us that peace cannot be improvised by applying half measures, or temporary settlements based upon the bankrupt conception of a balance of power. We have gradually come to understand security as a system so conceived as effectively to insure the permanent preservation of the four fundamental freedoms to which civilized humanity has every right to aspire.

The principles of a "New Deal" for the future peace will have to come from the United States.

As regards victory in this war and future reconstruction of the world after victory, it is hardly too much to say that the American people hold the destinies of the world in their hands.

The hour of America's Destiny has struck.

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only the Catholics of the Polish Lithuanian Grand Duchy. Obviously, this was not a final stage, and it evoked dissatisfaction among the very numerous Ruthenian circles which did not at first participate in all these advantages of the alliance with Poland. But this state of things lasted only a brief while, for in 1432, the great Jagiello, under the name of Wladyslaw II, King of Poland, extended by the act of Grodno all these rights and liberties of the Catholics to the Greek Orthodox Ruthenians. Ruthenian nobility accepted the Lithuanian nobility to their orders, and thenceforth all differences between Poles, Lithuanians and Ruthenians were removed. Thus not only in the political sphere, but also in the internal structure, a union both of States and of nations was achieved on the basis that Poland extended her spirit of freedom and her privileges to the Eastern area.

It is impossible to obtain a clear idea of these processes without recalling the one characteristic element of struggle. For it might be considered that all these liberal methods of unifying nations together through freedom and privileges, so far in advance of the times, was the result of a lack of strength on the Polish side, that it was a policy imposed by necessity. In reality quite the opposite was the case. Poland, through her nobility and gentry, represented an incomparably greater military force than either the

Lithuanians or Ruthenians. And when elements in the Grand Duchy, which were hostile to the alliance with Poland, allied themselves, under the leadership of Duke Swidrygiello, with the Teutonic Knights of the Sword in Inflanty, in order to obstruct the creation of the State alliance, the Poles sent their knights to the aid of the adherents of the Polish alliance; and in the battle of Wilkomierz on the River Swieta in 1435, they utterly defeated all their opponents, together with the Grand Master of the Order.

However, this defeat of Poland's opponents did not bring any change in the political methods applied to the Lithuanian-Ruthenian lands. For it is not fortuitous that the spirit of Polish history is opposed to the absolute dominion of the Hapsburgs, who in the battle of Biala Gora (the White Mountain) in 1620 began to destroy the Czech nation, which they had previously courted. The Polish-Lithuanian co-existence not only does not come within the epoch of the application of force, but its most splendid period, the long reign of King Casimir Jagiellon (1447-1492) developed in peace and security. And this was the reign in which the direct Polish Government was united with the direct Government of Lithuania.

Jagiellon Idea Czechia and Hungary

In no period of the political life of Central and Eastern Europe did the existence of a great Polish Commonwealth prove to be such an indisputable benefit to the nation as during the many years of government of the last two Jagiellons, Sigismund 1st (1506-1548), and Sigismund August 2nd (1548-1572). The period has justly been called the Golden Age of Polish history. The basic motif of Polish history is the union of equal with equals, of free with free in a liberally governed Polish Commonwealth, and this is what constitutes the Jagiellon conception. But anyone who regarded the words Jagiellon Conception as a kind of historical reminiscence of the epoch lasting from the XIVth to the XVIth century would be in error, for it is the most

essential content of the Polish ideology and Polish policy which lived on uninterrupted for centuries after the Jagiellons, and was revived in the period of the Polish struggles for independence. Moreover, it not only had a very strong influence on the policy of the Polish State reborn in the XXth century, but it constitutes the content of the most widely accepted political beliefs of Poles at the present time. For all the present slogans of federation of the Central and part of Eastern Europe, all the pronouncements as to

the need for several nations to join together against German tyranny not only existed in those days of Polish history, but were at that time realized, a proof that they can be realized today.

The Jagiellon conception went far beyond the framework of the Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian Commonwealth. For the eldest son of Casimir Jagiellon was voluntarily called to the Czech throne in 1471, and to the Hungarian throne in 1490. The Jagiellon brothers came together again and again in order to discuss such matters as the Hungarian coasts of the Adriatic, or the defense of Belgrade, the problems of the Nowogrod Republic, or the expanse around the sources of the Volga. But always this Commonwealth had one and the same care, the struggle against the imperialism of the tyrannously governed Moscovite realm and the religious imperialism of the dictatorial State of the Osmands, or steps to counter the avidity of the absolute dominion of the Hapsburgs and the Prussian methods of spoliation employed by the Knights of the Cross. For, without exaggerating historical comparisons, one can say that the idea of solidarity of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe in resistance to the imperialism of Germany and Czarist Russia, and against the Turkish threat which then existed, but which today no longer exists, has already been realized once in history with the utmost success, by the

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"Nor can that endure which has not its foundation upon love. For love alone diminishes not, but shines with its own light, makes an end of discord, softens the fires of hate, restores peace to the world, brings together the sundered, redresses wrongs, aids all and injures none. And whoso invokes its aid shall find peace and safety and have no fear of future ill; through it laws are made, kingdoms are ruled, cities ordered and the state of the Commonwealth attains to the highest end."

Words taken from the Act of Horodlo in 1413.

GERMAN FIFTH COLUMN IN POLAND

Revelation Of The German Spy And Fifth Column System In Poland



THE German diversionist activities in all their multifarious forms and considerable dimensions constitute a unique feature in the history of war. They played a primary role in the success of the German

Army's offensive, and were meticulously prepared long before the war.

A document which fell into Polish hands the day after hostilities began, i.e. on September 2, 1939, provided definite proof that these activities were very carefully planned before the war, and of the leading role assigned to the German minority. Members of the minority serving in the Polish Army as well as civilian elements were utilized.

Examination of the diversionist agents taken prisoner provided the following details of the organization of their activities:

1. The agents were recruited mainly from the youth group known as the Hitler Jugend and from men and women, chiefly of German nationality, enrolled from Poland.

2. Special courses lasting from two weeks to three months were organized for these agents on the territory of the Reich.

3. A short time before the war the students at these courses underwent a supplementary training in special camps, where they were assigned to "districts of diversionist activity."

Besides the agents recruited from the youth and intended to collaborate with the German civilian population, there was a group of directors and instructors composed of officers who arrived in Poland, provided with passports, a little before the war, and of local agents transported by car or airplane to the rear of the Polish armies during the first days of the war.

One of the German diversionist agents, a lad aged 18, captured near Wlodzimierz in Wolhynia, Eastern Poland, made the following statement:

"In December, 1938, members of the Hitler Jugend were summoned to attend a three-months' course. They received training in the use of parachutes, as well as in liaison work with the Reich air force. The students were told that in the event of war they would be assigned to espionage activities. For this purpose they would be transported into the enemy country, where they would have to identify the positions of the enemy armies, etc., and to supply the German airmen with details by means of agreed signals.

"This activity was obligatory upon the members of the Hitler-Jugend who participated in the course; at the time of mobilization they were to receive notices similar to those of ordinary mobilization.

"The subversive agents were divided into two categories. The first was composed of persons possessing a thorough knowledge of Polish. They were supplied with Polish officers' and non-commissioned officers' uniforms, or those of Polish police or railroad officials. In these uniforms they were dropped by parachutes on Polish territory. The second category was composed of those who knew Polish only imperfectly. They were dropped in civilian clothes, and were allotted the task of mingling with the Polish refugees who streamed towards the center of the country."

Each agent received a list of Germans living in Poland, to whom he was to turn for aid and assistance. The author of this statement went to one named Zielke, a member of the German minority in

Hrubieszow. He succeeded in fulfilling his task, furnishing the German airmen with information as to the positions of the Polish commands, their depots, stores, etc.

Agreed signals were made in the following ways:

In the daytime, by means of tent canvas or by setting fire to stacks of hay or straw.

At night, by means of electric torches and by setting fire to various objects.

Those destined to carry out diversionist activities were even equipped to some extent, and wore brassards of an agreed color with a yellow circle on a red or blue ground on their arms under their coats, or on their shirts. Their activity everywhere conformed to the same military instructions, to the same regulations, and everywhere they used agreed passwords.

They terrorized even the peaceable elements of the German population, and in any case provoked disturbances and committed terroristic acts.

Diversionist activity was carried out with the aid of the local German colonists. This element provided the German air force with the following information:

- a. It indicated the position of Polish troops, and in particular the artillery command.
- b. It informed of Polish military objectives.
- c. It reported on the movements of Polish troops.

This activity was carried out principally in the rear of Polish troops. Its primary object was to provoke panic. Such panic was provoked in the rear of the 8th Infantry Division during the night of September 3rd-4th, in the district of Szulmierz.

The network of short-wave transmitter stations established by the German spies was so well arranged and the stations themselves so cleverly hidden that they were discovered only by chance. For instance, such stations were found in the tomb of a well-known industrialist at Poznan, in the house of a Protestant pastor at Luck, and in a hollow tree.



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Jagiellons. But the base of that system was the strength of the Polish State in those times.

In the South and West gaps were quickly made in that system, when, after the Jagiellons, in 1526, the dynastic absolutism of the Hapsburgs acquired the inheritance of the thrones of Hungary and Czechia. Even so,

this Polish Commonwealth continued to develop, with its seat at the Royal Castle in Cracow, simultaneously establishing the principles of Parliamentary Government throughout the entire State.

We must devote some special consideration to these principles.

Union of Lublin

Just as the Jagiellon conception did not disappear with the Jagiellon dynasty, so the principles of union which they acted upon for centuries did not vanish with the dynasty. On the contrary, they gave them the most precise and fixed form, in the great Act of Union of the last Jagiellon, Sigismund Augustus, in the Lublin Sejm of 1569. The proposal was not passed without difficulty. For Lithuanian separatism still existed even then, being represented by the Radziwills, who set their own interests of local authority and importance above the interests of the population of the Grand Duchy. But the Lithuanian separatists saw their cause completely defeated, for the population of the extensive Ruthenian areas of the Duchy was content to be under Polish influence. So at Lublin the deputies from Podlasie, Wolhynia, and Braclaw, the entire Kiev region (already in those days referred to as the Ukraine), and also Podolia, united against the separatist group in Lithuania, and voluntarily joined with Poland.

The inter-State agreements also recognized all confessions, especially the Greek Orthodox and Schismatics, as equal, and the deputies of all these areas themselves defined this first act of the Lublin Covenant in the words: "Free with the free and equal with the equal."

This step taken by the representatives of these extensive areas has a decisive influence on the attitude of the separatist Lithuanian magnates. They returned to Lublin, and concluded the Polish-Lithuanian Union in 1569. Thus Poland and all the Ruthenian lands were united with Lithuania. Poland's greatest territorial expansion was achieved peacefully and on a voluntary basis. If none the less Polish history is filled with continual wars, it is because for centuries to come Poland had to defend

her associated peoples against the aggression of absolutist imperialism.

Land Settlement in Eastern Poland

When discussing the question of the national Polish-Lithuanian-White-Ruthenian unity, we must spare a few lines for the problem of the Polish settlement of certain Eastern areas. To anyone not acquainted with the situation it might seem strange that in view of the Poles' continual respect for other people's State self-government they extended the area of their settlements, in the North, for instance, beyond Vilno, and in the South in the direction of Tarnopol. It need only be said that this advance of the Polish settlement areas is the very antithesis of the method of the Knights of the Cross and the Prussians, who simply uprooted and exterminated the local population, whether in Brandenburg or in Eastern Prussia. The Americans will best understand the Polish methods of extending their settlements, especially when they realize that this enormous area of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, including Ruthenia, was very thinly populated in the fourteenth and even in the sixteenth century. In certain southern parts, especially along the Dnieper, there was simply an ownerless wilderness, or *res nullius*. Certain historical atlases give these areas with demarcated frontiers and State allegiance, but in practice anyone who wished could settle there.

In this way the Polish population, especially the smaller gentry, shifted from over-populated Mazovia towards the Vilno and Novogrodek provinces, giving these areas, which had been ravished many centuries before by the Knights of the Cross, a Polish character. This settlement has left its mark down to the present time in the 60% and even 70% native Polish population in the province of Vilno. Similarly, in the Novogrodek province we find that Poles are 52.4% of the population, while in Tarnopol they are 49.5%. Even in the eighteenth century one could have lived for years in Vilno or its environs without hearing one word of Lithuanian, for nationally and culturally it was one of the most intensive of Polish centers, and, because of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth not one Lithuanian-speaking Lithuanian had any objection to this being so.

Nor must we imagine that this free system of colonization of the wilderness was some Polish speciality, for it has its corollary in the Cossack settlement in the South on the River Dnieper, from which the Ukrainian consciousness of their political distinctiveness is derived. All these areas along the Dnieper, which in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries belonged to Lithuania, and which afterwards, in the sixteenth century voluntarily linked their destinies with Poland, were colonized by settlers of the most varied nationalities, though there was a strong percentage of Poles among them. But with the passing of the years, just as in the Vilno area the Polish element rose to dominance, so here in the Cossack areas or Ukraine, under the Polish liberal régime, the Ruthenian and Greek-Orthodox element came to dominance, thus creating the bases for the later national Ukrainian tendencies. There is no one in

the world who could better understand this situation perhaps than the Americans, who are acquainted with the history of Canada, where the British liberal régime created a new center of the British language without disturbing the centers where French predominated. Yet it would be difficult to make the objection that only in recent times has Canada or Australia become British, although neither of these countries is to be found on XVth century maps.

We have made this digression concerning the settlement question in order to recall that the respect of the rights of others was not restricted to the interstate acts of union and exchange of armorial bearings among the nobility, but was part of the daily life of these areas and nations for centuries, and that in a manner which was in clearest opposition to the Prussian methods.

Cossacks and the Ukraine

This picture would not be complete if we did not mention steps which were very characteristic of the Polish principles of legal government, namely the granting of self-government to that part of the Ruthenian population, which through the Cossack struggle expressed their demands for this self-government. For when the long period of wars in the time of Hetman Chmielnicki's revolt showed both the detriment which these revolts brought to Poland, and the impossibility of the Ukraine maintaining itself as an independent State, the Cossacks themselves returned to the idea of union with Poland, by separating out autonomous territories which legally belonged to the Polish State. In 1658 this led to the agreement and union of Hadziacz, which withdrew the three great southern provinces of Kiev, Braclaw and Czernichov from direct union with Poland, so creating in the Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian Commonwealth a third State of the union in addition to Lithuania, with a separate hetman and separate officials. The free Cossacks were granted nobility privileges, and the freedom of both the Greek Orthodox and the Roman Catholic faiths was assured.

Unfortunately, the absolutist Russian State was too strong at that time, and worked with all its power to shatter this voluntary Polish-Ruthenian alliance. (Lithuania was unaffected by these changes). It is true that the Muscovite troops suffered defeat after defeat, but Moscow succeeded in wresting away part of the Cossacks, namely those living along the

Dnieper, and later Turkish imperialism intervened in the Ukrainian question. As the result of the numerous wars and changes which went on right down to the end of the XVIIth century, Poland retained a large part of the Ukraine in her hands, but the idea of a triple Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian State failed to endure. Of course the alliance between Poland and Lithuania remained unviolated, for this was not only a personal union through a single king, but a real union, for the most important legislative organ, the Parliament, was common to Poland and Lithuania.

Vitality of Poland's Commonwealth


In the sphere of State structure the *nihil novi* Constitution of 1505, which established parliamentary system in Poland, and in the sphere of joint Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian organization the Lublin Union of

1569, are the two historic facts which established the bases of the former Polish State. And in principle these foundations persisted down to the fall of that State, and penetrated deeply into the life and sentiment of all these three nations.

Supported on these bases, the Polish-Lithuanian State survived victoriously the most violent storms, and even such torrential invasions on all sides as that of the period known to history as the "Flood," in the year 1655, when Poland was invaded simultaneously by the Swedes, the Brandenburgians, the Muscovites, the Cossacks, and the Hungarians under Rakoczy. The State structure stood the test, despite the incessant menace of imperialistic neighbors, but best of all in the period when the principle of free election of the kings of the Wasa dynasty was realized, from 1587 to 1668.

Even the sombre period of Poland's Government by the Saxon kings of German origin failed to violate these bases of the Polish Commonwealth. They endured down to the time of the Partitions, and the last great political act of the Republic — the Four Year Sejm and the memorable Third of May Constitution of 1791 — only once more confirmed the inseparable State alliance of Poland and Lithuania and of both Poland and Lithuania with those areas in which the Ruthenian population was prominent. The principle of the Lublin Covenant, the alliance of free with free, of equal with equals, penetrated so deeply into the blood and ideology of the citizens of the Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian Commonwealth

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"Neminem Captivabimus" — A Document of 1430, awarding personal immunity. "We will not imprison anyone without a lawful verdict."

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that it survived even the fall of the State and the Partitions, to be revived during the 150 years of struggle for independence.

No Standing Army

Why was it that, despite the power and vitality of the Polish Commonwealth, a State with such an exceptional power of attraction was subjected to the Partitions in the XVIIIth century, and for a time even disappeared from the map of Europe? The answer to this apparent contradiction is provided by a study of the development of the army issue in Polish history, and more particularly the recognition of the principle of defense despite aversion from aggression.

We must return again to the bases of Polish thought, namely, to the times of the Piasts, to discover that as early as the XIVth century the Polish nobility, which enjoyed the irrefragable opinion of soldierly courage, recognized war as a means of defense, and not of aggression. Even more interesting, this attitude was manifested not only in the histories of the Polish wars in the middle ages, which were all of a defensive nature, but in the legislation. The oldest written statute of Poland dated from 1347, namely, the Wislica Statute, which was complemented by the Great Poland Statute of Piotrkow. This most ancient memorial of legislation makes a distinction between defensive war, which a knight undertakes at his own cost, and the war beyond the country's frontiers, in which the knight was to be recompensed for his participation by the prince or king. This distinction is found again in the Pact of Koszyce of 1374, and afterwards emerges again and again in numerous manifestos of the Polish nobility, which declare that they will willingly hasten with all help to defend their frontiers, but are against any war of invasion and aggression.

This aversion from aggressive war provides the key to an understanding of the military affairs of the former Republic, and is linked up with the other aversion of the contemporary Polish Nation, the king's possession of absolute power. In opposing expenditure on a standing army the Polish sejms were governed not only by repugnance for wars of invasions, but also by the fear that a standing army might become, as it did in other States of Europe, a basis for the king's absolute power and for the suspension of democratic liberties. So down to the XVIIth century the sejms preferred to resolve on a general mobilization of all the nobility for a war of defense and to organize the defense of the towns

by the citizens, rather than agree to taxation for the maintenance of a standing army. This thought of peace and avoidance of wars of invasion was at the basis of the attitude of the Jagiellons, as we find well expressed by the famous Dr. Erasmus in a letter from Rotterdam to King Sigismund I: "The peace of Thy Kingdom and Christian blood were always incomparably more precious to thine eyes than conquests and subjections of enemy territories, and this has the approbation of the crowds." These words dating from the beginning of the Middle Ages have lost none of their pertinence today.

Thus, although Poland experienced an unusually large number of wars, they were always defensive, and, still more surprising, she gained famous victories all over Europe, but did not wish to have an army.

Everyone acquainted with European history knows how tragically Poland paid for her faith that the very dislike of aggression and annexation would be a political defense against the aggression, and annexations of others. For meantime, since 1717, Russia had imposed by a trick a resolution to

limit the standing army of the Polish Commonwealth to 24,000 — 18,000 for Poland and 6,000 for Lithuania. In face of this disproportionately small size of the standing army Russia's influence in Polish areas grew continually with the years, and, through the struggle with the unorganized nobility in the Confederation of Bar, it led to the first Partition of 1772.

The first Partition was a tragic blow to the entire ideology of pacifism. It was realized that troops and a strong army were necessary precisely for the defense of freedom. At the beginning of 1788 the Four-Year Sejm resolved to raise the troops to 100,000, and all Poland lived under the watchword of the organization of a modern defense. Unfortunately, there was not time to repair the errors which had arisen from the former confidence that dislike of annexation would defend against annexations. The overwhelming German and Russian forces crushed the Polish resistance.

For Our Freedom and for Yours

All world histories mention the Polish insurrections to regain independence. But it would be a fundamental error to imagine that any single one of these struggles took place only in the ethnographical areas of Polish settlement. For all who had come under the rule of the aggressors in all these areas

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THE TRUE MEANING OF NATIONHOOD

By STANISLAW STRZETELSKI

This is the third and last of a series of articles on the meaning of Nationhood.

IN a previous article I discussed the problem of collective social energies operating within the confines of a single community or nation. But how about the international aspect? Is it possible for a nation to maintain a sound internal structure and its moral strength, while subjugating other nations, because of its alleged mission as a "master race"?

It is not. Each successive conquest, each exploitation automatically replaces creative power by further exploitation and thus dries up the source for creation of new social energies. A young German intoxicated by Nazi slogans is ready to make any sacrifice for his Führer. But after a few months in the administration of Polish occupied territories, he changes into a man who "has his price." When tested he will be found unready to sacrifice himself for an idea. The scale of values has shifted in his life: idealism has yielded to self-seeking and lust for enjoyment.

Like a family, but in a much broader and higher sense, the nation lifts a man to a higher plane of civilization. In its service, through voluntary assumption of responsibility and readiness to sacrifice, creative power is released and a sense of honor and justice developed.

This energy can, of course, be utilized by the State for non-creative purposes, for the conquest and oppression of other nations. But such a procedure is contrary to the nature of things and exacts a terrible revenge. The moral force of the aggressor is ruined, the sources of his creative energy run dry.

Man is neither entirely an angel nor entirely an animal, and nations are social composites of good and evil.

Certain forms of national egoism must and will exist. But they must stop short of the line where national selfishness harms others, or, sooner or later decay will set in.

Just where this line begins cannot be left to individual appraisal. A factor must be brought into international life to regulate the play of egoism, a factor equipped with executive power. The nature

of man and of nations leads one to the following moral and political conclusions:

1. The progress of life and history lies in the subjection of the ego of the individual to a cause greater than himself. This process begins with the voluntary sacrifice that is born of love for the family.

2. The idea of the nation, as the creative principle of civilization appears next. The State for the protection of the people by law follows.

3. The life of the nation, as well as that of the individual must be founded on moral law that discriminates clearly between good and evil. Evil and crime continue to be evil and crime, regardless of the purpose for which they were committed, whether committed by an individual or a State. There cannot exist two different codes of ethics — one for the individual, another for the nation.

4. Any system of law that aspires to regulate relations between individuals or nations cannot permit the exploitation of some by others. Not only because this is immoral, but because every organism supported by exploitation in any form destroys strength which should be used to raise nations to ever higher levels of life.

5. In the life of the separate State, each individual is entitled to his just and proportionate share in the national wealth. In the same way each nation in the world economic system is entitled to its individual "place in the sun," sufficient for its political and economic development.

Since it is impossible to achieve equality in all walks of life, there must be instituted in the economy alike of nations and individuals, some system that provides for a minimum of justice to all. In this way harmony, so essential to the development and continuance for human institutions, will be insured.

6. Social harmony within a State depends on the voluntary subordination of the individual ego to the welfare of the whole. The same principle holds true in world politics and economics. Scope must be allowed for the play and expansion of national individualisms. But in the interests of world order and harmony the particular claims and ambitions of each nation, must voluntarily yield to the interests of the world commonwealth.

POLAND'S HISTORICAL COMMONWEALTH

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
struggled to rebuild the Polish State and to recover their freedom. As the Prussians obtained areas exclusively populated by Poles, such a rising as that of the Poles against Prussia in 1848 was obviously only a rising of Poles. But all the other actions embraced citizens and lands of the former Poland, who struggled for their freedom and the restoration of that Poland. So we need not be surprised that the pages of the Polish struggles for independence are inscribed with other names besides those of Poles, for instance, Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Polonized Germans and Jews. For Poland had entered into the blood and mind of the inhabitants of these areas, beyond and despite the ethnographical differences which developed and intensified afterwards.

For the Polish risings went into the struggle against the brutal superior force of the absolutist partitioning powers not only under the watchword of the restoration of Poland, but also with the watchword of the freedom of all the citizens of the former Polish lands, with the inscription on their standards: "for our freedom and yours."

The Last War and This

And it can be added with the utmost satisfaction that during this last Polish war, of September, 1939, so long as a government existed and regular struggles were waged in Poland all the other nationalities dwelling within the frontiers of the Polish State fulfilled their duty to fight in defense of the State, whether they were White Ruthenians, or Jews, or Ukrainians. On the eve of the war, on August 26,

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Equality of Rights for Protestants in 1573 (Confederation of Warsaw). "... We promise each other on behalf of ourselves and our descendants that we who are DISSIDENTES DE RELIGIONE (non-conformists in religion) will keep the peace between ourselves and neither shed blood on account of differences of faith or kinds of churches, nor punish one another by confiscation of goods, deprivation of honour, imprisonment or exile . . ."

PICTURES OF POLAND'S WAR EFFORT



HEREWITH we print three pictures recently received from Africa, Canada and England. On the right, Miss Halina Eminowicz, an American born in Detroit, is the first woman volunteer to join the Polish Army in Canada. She will leave shortly for England.

On the left is the mascot of a Polish Bomber Squadron, an Irish terrier, sitting on an aerial bomb with an inscription in the Polish language: "Na Berlin," — "On Berlin!" The picture below shows a unit of Polish motorcyclists in action near Tobruk.



Ever since September 1939, Poland has

been carrying on the struggle. The Polish Army fought in France, in Norway, and is now fighting side by side with the British. A large Polish contingent is taking part in the Middle-East campaign, others are in Tobruk, where they have already distinguished themselves for their bravery, in the severe struggle going on there. The



glory of Polish aviation is perpetuated in the air by Poland's avenging eagles, and the fame of Poland's navy is carried to all the seven seas by Polish sailors and Merchant Seamen. Another great army is being organized in Russia. Poland is fighting on all the fronts of Freedom.

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1939, their official representatives voluntarily called their kinsmen to a sacrificial fulfilment of their duty to fight.

The basic phenomena had not changed, and all the peoples in the area of the Polish Commonwealth thoroughly understand that. Poland's neighbor on the West, Germany, is representative of the most rapacious imperialism that European history records. Poland always built up and can build up only on freedom.

The Experience of 1939

Yet, in face of the new invasion of Poland in September, 1939, and her military defeat, the charge may be made that Poland continued not only to renounce all thought of imperialism and conquest, but even failed to care sufficiently for her own defense. But it must be stated that the 150 years of struggle for independence developed in all the contemporary Polish nation a care for defense of the State. The Poles of the XIXth century not only fought, but knew that the condition of the maintenance of their freedom and of those who were linked with them was a strong army. So in the reborn Poland not only the Polish nation, but all the citizens of the Polish State, without regard to their nationality, agreed to taxation for the army at the cost of other activities, for the army estimates accounted on the

average for some 40 per cent. of the State expenditure, and in the financial year 1933/4 even 44% of the normal budget. In addition to taxation the entire nation made voluntary contributions and raised large internal loans directed almost entirely to army purposes.

And yet, in 1939 Poland lacked not people and heroism, but materials and all kinds of mechanical equipment. The explanation is very simple. Although world finance lent Poland barely one-fortieth of what it gave to Germany to finance her aggression, even those small sums which were lent to Poland were pumped out of the Polish State during the pre-war period by demands for repayment and the withdrawal of capital. We need only recall, and, for the sake of exaggerated impartiality we recall from German sources, that while the internal debt of the Polish State rose from 292 million zlotys in 1928 to 2,951 million zlotys in 1938, Poland's foreign indebtedness fell from 4,819 million zlotys in 1932 to barely 2,720 millions in 1938.

So the fault, therefore, was not so much that of any lack of provision on Poland's part, but rather the delusions under which Western Europe and the world existed, and their failure to appraise adequately the evil designs of Poland's neighbors, who diligently spread the legend of Poland's imperialism, while they were themselves preparing their aggressive campaigns.