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**The Problem
of
Upper
Silesia**

Robert Machray



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They have chosen texts from a wide variety of sources, including periodicals, speeches, official statements and underground papers. These embrace a period beginning with the Middle Ages, and include the various opinions expressed by the Poles in their present exile and by the underground press in Poland. The book not only introduces the reader to the development of Polish democratic thought, but describes the struggle of Polish writers and political organizers against reaction and ignorance, and, in some periods, against Fascist tendencies.

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The
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The Problem

of

Upper Silesia

Robert Machray

Robert Machray provides a concise summary of facts and cogent argument on the question of Upper Silesia, about which very little is known by the average British or American reader. Silesia, with its enormous coal, zinc and iron industries, forms, together with other Polish provinces, one economic unity. Its past (dealt with in some detail in the first chapter) is closely connected with Polish history. Upper Silesia particularly (where there is the heaviest concentration of industries) has little or no chance of normal development within the frontier of the German Reich, and furthermore has been and always would be for Germany the centre of armament production and thus an incentive to further aggression. The author contends that justice demands the return of this region to its mother country. The problem should be solved in a statesmanlike manner from the point of view of security and the necessity to assure in future a free and unhindered economic and cultural development to all nations living in that part of Europe.

Robert Machray provides in one handy volume a compendium of historical, economic and political information. Ethnographic and economic data are provided in appendices, and useful maps help further to elucidate a problem of very considerable complexity.

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REVOLUTION

by CHARLES BEARD



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
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
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
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THE PROBLEM
OF
UPPER
SILESIA

by Robert Machray

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DANUBE
AND THE LITTLE ENTENTE
1929-1938

THE LITTLE ENTENTE
1920-1929

POLAND
1914-1931

THE POLAND OF PILSUDSKI
1914-1936

THE EASTERN QUESTION REVIVED
1940

THE POLISH-GERMAN PROBLEM
1941

EAST PRUSSIA
1943





THE PROBLEM
OF
UPPER
SILESIA

by
ROBERT
MACHRAY

London

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INTRODUCTION

THE name Silesia does not convey much to the average British or American reader, though it is once again a feature of the high politics of the time. It is generally known that a plebiscite was held there after the First World War, and was the subject of serious disputes over the nationality of the population. But in Europe and in America people versed in economic policy knew and know that Silesia was and is one of the few centres in Europe whose extensive coal and zinc deposits interest the world of Big Business and hence the whole world.

Where is it situated? Known long ago as *Staropolska*, which means Old Poland, it lies on the Upper and Middle Oder. From the south and west Silesia is shielded by the massive Carpathians, known also there as the Beskids, and the Sudeten. In the north and east the Trzebnica Mountains and the Cracow Jura form a natural transition region to the central parts of Poland with which the area of Silesia shares the same geographical and climatic characteristics, common speech, culture and nationality. To the south Silesia finds an outlet by the Moravian Gate, the cross-roads of old communications between the Adriatic and the Baltic, as well as between the North Sea and the Black Sea. Katowice, the main industrial centre of all Silesia, lies half-way between the Danube and the Rhine estuaries.

Silesia, particularly its south-eastern part in which the enormous coal, zinc and iron industries are concentrated, forms together with other Polish provinces one economic unity. And only with Poland, its natural hinterland, can that province rise to the fullest use of all the mineral resources with which nature has provided it so abundantly.

Silesia's past, which is dealt with in more detail in the first chapter of this book, is closely connected with Polish history. It belonged to Poland from the dawn of her history and, together with *Wielkopolska*, was the birth-place of the rising Polish State in the tenth century. In the middle of the fourteenth century, and not without

outside interference from the German Empire and from the Brandenburg State, the union with Poland was lost and Silesia came for a time under Czech, then Hungarian and later Habsburg sovereignty.

In the middle of the eighteenth century, Frederick the Great, taking advantage of the confusion prevailing in the Habsburg Empire when the young Empress Maria Theresa ascended the throne, seized and occupied Silesia. On the conclusion of the Silesian Wars, Austria was forced to cede almost the whole of Silesia to Prussia save the two small districts of Opava (Troppau) and Cieszyn (Teschen). Conquered by Frederick II Silesia was made into a separate Prussian province, with the seat of its Government at Breslau (Wroclaw). The province was divided into three regencies: Lignica (Liegnitz), Wroclaw and Opole (Oppeln). The first two, embracing the western and central areas, are called *Lower Silesia*, as distinct from *Upper Silesia* which includes the south-eastern part of the province situated on the Upper Oder and consisting of the Opole regency.

From the moment Silesia was taken over by Prussia, a period of more intense Germanization of the Poles began, combined with a planned campaign for German colonization, proceeding from the west to the east. After the lapse of a hundred years, that is in the middle of the last century, Lower Silesia was Germanized to a large extent. Further Germanization easterly had slowed down at the end of the last and the beginning of this century. Grants of land to the peasants, the speedy industrialization of Upper Silesia and, above all, a growing national consciousness among the local population helped to stiffen the Polish resistance to German influences. Thanks to that stubbornness of the Poles the whole of Upper Silesia remained and still remains Polish. Despite the six hundred years of foreign rule and in defiance of Prussian efforts it preserved not only the Polish language, culture and tradition, but also had developed full national consciousness. The Poles proved their feelings when after the First World War they rose against the Prussian oppressor in three sanguinary revolts.

After the First World War Poland demanded the incorporation of that territory within her frontiers, basing her claim on the fact

that almost all Upper Silesia was inhabited by an indisputably Polish majority. Unfortunately the Versailles Peace Conference did not maintain its original proposal for the incorporation in Poland of Upper Silesia in the same manner as it did with Poznania and Pomerania, but made its decision dependent on the result of a plebiscite—held in March 1921. The plebiscite confirmed the claim that the larger part of Silesia was, as it is, undeniably Polish, notwithstanding that a part only of that territory was allocated to Poland. Over two-thirds of Upper Silesian territory remained to Germany despite the fact that according to biased German statistics the Polish population amounted then to 600,000—in reality it numbered over 800,000. That part of Upper Silesia, called in Polish since the new division *Opole Silesia*, became during the inter-World Wars period the object of even more ruthless anti-Polish measures which reached their climax under the Nazi régime.

After the occupation of Poland in the autumn of 1939, the Germans incorporated in the Reich the Polish Silesian province* along with other western territories of Poland and together with western districts of the Cracow and Kielce provinces. Out of the annexed territories the Germans created a separate Upper Silesian province, *Gau Oberschlesien*, in which they included, apart from the Polish territories, also the whole of *Opole Silesia*. Thus they clearly testified to the economic entity of that territory as well as to its homogeneous character in regard to the nationality of its inhabitants.

Opole Silesia is Polish not solely for ethnographic reasons. It constitutes an inseparable part of the Upper Silesia coal basin for which central Polish provinces represent a natural hinterland where Silesian economic expansion may be directed without hindrance. Both *Opole Silesia* and the remainder of Upper Silesia constitute in junction with other Polish territories one economic

* At the outbreak of the war in 1939 the Polish Silesian Province embraced that part of Upper Silesia which after the plebiscite had been allocated to Poland, as well as the greater part of Teschen Silesia. This latter district had been divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia after the First World War. In 1938 a further portion of Teschen Silesia beyond the river Olza (the so-called Zaolzie), with its coal-mining and iron industry centres (Karwina, Frysztat, Trzyniec) was incorporated in Poland.

unity. Upper Silesia is a key to the economic domination of Poland.

"If Germany—wrote Wilhelm von Kries in his study entitled "Oberschlesien"*—was left in possession of Upper Silesia and its coal fields Poland would have been forced to accept an understanding with Germany. Yet the same would be true with regard to Germany because . . . Upper Silesia could not exist without export facilities to Poland." If Poland is to be made permanently independent of Germany she must be given Opole Silesia. Upper Silesia's importance to Europe, if not to the world, lies in her great deposits of coal, with a depth of 1,200 metres estimated at 76.5 milliard tons. They are the richest deposits in continental Europe. Upper Silesia's excellent geographical position and good communications with Poland and the whole of South-Eastern Europe, demand the incorporation of Opole Silesia in Poland. This is in the interests of the population of the whole of Central and South-Eastern Europe, whose standard of living may be raised by means only of the development of industry all over her area.

Upper Silesia industry has little or no chance of normal development within the frontier of the German Reich, because, as formerly it was cut off by the frontiers of Tsarist Russia and Austria, it was later separated by those of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Thus that industry had to direct its expansion towards Central Germany. But as near as Berlin it met the unbeatable competition of the stronger and better placed Westphalian and Rhineland industries. Upper Silesia industry has, on the other hand, a great importance for Germany—and in this war an incalculable one—as a "smithy of armaments" (*Waffenschmiede*). Having that smithy of theirs the Germans are able to maintain their enormous war production and so to prolong their resistance despite the aerial bombardment and the destruction it causes in Western and Central Germany. The Upper Silesia industrial base has been and always would be for Germany the centre of armament production and an incentive to a new aggression.

* Cf. Friedrich Heiss u.A. Hillen Ziegfeld, "Deutschland und der Korridor," Berlin, 1933, p. 175.

Justice demands that Opole Silesia, as a territory ethnographically Polish, should return to its mother country. But while the problem of nationality has mostly a local character in a Polish-German frontier dispute, the economic aspect of one of the most important coal centres in Europe goes far beyond the local range and represents in reality one of the most acute problems of Europe, particularly Central Europe. This problem should be solved from the point of view of security and the necessity to assure in future a free and unhindered economic and cultural development to all nations living in that part of Europe.

* * * *

This book is a companion volume to "The Polish-German Problem" published in 1942, and to "East Prussia," published in 1943. To simplify the Polish spelling in the text the Polish accents have been omitted and the crossed Polish l is replaced by the ordinary letter. As regards proper nouns, such as the names of cities, rivers, and so on, I have followed Polish or German usage or both, and also employed some standardized English forms, as seemed most appropriate in each instance. In the Appendices short expository and bibliographical notes are given on a number of words and books. And in this connection the maps, it may be added, are helpful; but they are valuable in themselves as they have been drawn with great care.

I beg to acknowledge most gratefully the assistance in the making of this book as of other books, I received from Polish and other friends. My thanks are particularly due to Dr. St. Kudlicki for his suggestions and aid in collecting the materials.

ROBERT MACHRAY

July 1944

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Chapter One

SILESIA'S HISTORY

I. EARLY ASSOCIATION WITH POLAND

Silesia, inhabited by Poles and constituting a racial and cultural unity with other Polish lands, was an integral part of Poland at the time when an independent Polish Kingdom began to exist at the end of the tenth century. From the second half of that century the tribes of Silesia were closely associated with other Polish tribes united in 965 under the sceptre of Poland's first ruler, Mieszko I of the Piast dynasty. Situated in the western marches of Poland, Silesia at first effectively opposed German as well as Bohemian expansion. When in 1050 the Polish Prince Casimir, known as the "Restorer," entered Silesia after its temporary occupation by Bratislav, Prince of Bohemia, the German Emperor Henry III issued a deed recognizing Silesia as belonging to Poland. This imperial instrument was the first indication in history of Poland's title to Silesia.

How strong the ties were between Silesia and Poland at that period is shown by the words of the contemporary chronicler Gall, who extolls the Silesians' heroic resistance to the imperial troops in 1109, and says of them that they fought *pro libertate Poloniae*. The contemporary view was that Poland and Silesia formed a single entity.

A tragic deed in the history of Silesia, and Poland as well, was the testament of the Polish Prince Boleslas the Wrymouthed, who divided his State among his sons, assigning a separate area to each. But despite the assertions of certain German historians he did not create a separate State of Silesia, but only a separate principality within the Polish State, on the same footing as the so-called Great Poland (*Wielkopolska*) or Mazovia. All the various Polish principalities were welded together by the constitutional bond of the overlord (*princeps*), who was always the senior individual member of the Piast dynasty. Consequently, together with the other Polish principalities, Silesia still remained an integral part of the Polish State.

When the institution of overlordship died out in the twelfth century, the Piast princes ruling in the various principalities of Poland did not abandon the dynastic tie which linked them together. For the settlement of affairs concerning Poland as a whole all the princes, members of the Piast dynasty, met in conference, this body of men replacing the single princely overlord of former days.

As the members of the Piast dynasty increased, the principality of Silesia was broken up into smaller and smaller dukedoms the rulers of which often quarrelled among themselves. Still the Silesian princes always regarded themselves as bound by ties of blood and family solidarity with the Piast princes in other principalities. They made claim to the position of overlord, inherited the succession to other principalities, favoured a unification of all Poland, and the coronation of a King of Poland. These facts show that the political horizon of the Silesian princes extended far beyond the narrow bounds of their principalities and that they regarded themselves as Polish princes, and Silesia as an integral part of the Polish State. This found expression in their princely title, which time after time linked up *Polonia* with *Silesia*.

Silesia's close association with Poland was strengthened by ecclesiastical unity. The bishopric of Breslau, which was founded in the year A.D. 1000, was subordinated to the simultaneously created Polish archbishopric of Gniezno (province of Poznan).

On the other hand, the ever-growing disunion and disputes between the principalities weakened Silesia's resistance to external enemies, and created favourable conditions for alien penetration with all the serious dangers involved to Silesia's link with Poland.

German expansion in the direction of Silesia is found in the most varied forms from the earliest times of the existence of the Polish State. Petty wars among the various princes of Poland afforded the German Emperor frequent opportunities to intervene in the country's internal affairs. The purpose of all these interventions was to subordinate the Polish principalities to the German Empire. For the same reason the German Emperor tolerated the Bohemian expansion towards Silesia, for Bohemia at that time was a fief of the Emperor.

2. SILESIA UNDER THE LUXEMBURGS AND HABSBURGS

The final severance of the state bonds between Silesia and the rest of Poland occurred in the fourteenth century. The Polish prince, Ladislas the Short, fought then to unify the various Polish principalities in one Kingdom. But he was unsuccessful with regard to Silesia, because of the united resistance put up by John of Luxemburg, King of Bohemia and his powerful allies, the Margrave of Brandenburg and the German Emperor. John of Luxemburg organized a military expedition against Cracow, which at that time was the capital of Poland, and invaded Silesia with a large army in 1327. Under this military pressure the majority of the princes of Silesia were forced to pay homage to John. But in order to obtain Poland's formal renunciation of the claim to Silesia John put forward his own claims to the crown of Poland, made on the ground that his predecessor, Venceslas II, had for some years been King of Poland. Finally, at Trencin a treaty was signed (1335) by which John and his son Charles renounced all claims to the crown of Poland, while the representatives of the Polish King, Casimir the Great, renounced all Polish rights to the principalities of Silesia, which were thereafter attached to Bohemia as vassal States.

The treaty of Trencin was of profound importance to Poland, for it settled the long protracted struggle between the Luxemburgs and the Piasts, and freed Poland from the serious danger threatening her if the Luxemburgs were to join forces with the country's most dangerous enemy, the Teutonic Knights. But the price Poland had to pay for the benefits of this treaty was too high, for it included the renunciation of all Silesia. Consequently, Casimir the Great realized this and delayed the ratification of the treaty. But, faced with the danger of a new alliance of the Luxemburgs, the German Emperor and the Teutonic Knights, he was finally forced to ratify the Trencin treaty on February 9, 1339. Casimir regarded this as of deplorable but only temporary necessity. To the very end of his life he attempted by diplomatic means, through intervention with the Pope, and even by an unsuccessful military expedition to recover Silesia. But he failed in all his efforts.

Though the Silesian princes were now vassals of Bohemia, they

did not lose their feeling of Polish nationality. While they loyally fulfilled their obligations to their new rulers, they always stressed their ethnical and political difference; nor did they cease to maintain close relations with Poland. They put their signatures as witnesses to many Polish documents. When, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Polish King Ladislas Jagiello was thinking of recovering Silesia again, the Silesian princes gave him every encouragement. They also gave him armed assistance in the wars against the Teutonic Knights. After the Peace of Torun, which brought the Polish war against the Order to a victorious end in 1466,* the city of Breslau organized a great demonstration in favour of Poland.

When George of Podebrad came to the throne of Bohemia a revolt broke out against him in Silesia, and although he quelled it, he was unable to suppress the principalities' separatist tendencies. In 1467 a delegation of representatives from Breslau and the Silesian princes arrived at the court of King Casimir Jagiello of Poland, proposing that he should take over Silesia, or even the throne of Bohemia. The situation was very favourable to Poland, and the Roman Curia supported the movement, but Casimir Jagiello refused to take any action because he tried to secure the Czech throne for his son Ladislas, who actually ascended it in 1471 and that of Hungary in 1490. As Silesia later came under Hungarian sovereignty, its principalities found themselves under the Jagiellon dynasty. This reign of the Polish dynasty was interrupted owing to the tragic death of Louis II, a son of Ladislas, in the battle of Mohacs in 1526. Owing to the relationship between the Jagiellons and the Habsburgs Silesia came under Habsburg rule. Poland succeeded in regaining only some small principalities in the south-east of Silesia.

All through the many years that Silesia belonged politically to Bohemia, and later to Hungary and the Habsburgs, it still maintained very active relations, both commercially and culturally, with Poland.† A number of eminent Polish scholars of that time

* Cf. Robert Machray, "East Prussia." London, 1943.

† Dr. St. Komar, E. Rybarz, Dr. A. Szczepański, "Górny Śląsk." A collective publication of the Silesian Branch of the Association for the Defence of the Western Borders, pp. 26-27.

were of Silesian origin. Silesia provided the University of Cracow, which was then one of the most famous in Europe, with a number of professors. The youth of Silesia did not go to Prague or Vienna to study, but to Cracow. From 1434 to 1509, 2,480 Silesians graduated from the University of Cracow, a figure which for the times was extraordinarily large.

The period of Habsburg domination, which continued for over two centuries, was not beneficial to this province. It was treated as one of those of the Habsburg Empire, and continually had to resist the centralistic tendencies of the Vienna court, and to defend its age-old rights and liberties. After the majority of the Silesian princes had accepted the Protestant faith, Silesia had to suffer harsh oppression and persecution. It was devastated and depopulated by long wars, especially the Thirty Years War, much of which was fought on its territory. By 1648 Silesia had lost 200,000 of its inhabitants, a figure large even by present-day standards.

Even then Poland did not abandon her efforts to recover Silesia. The Polish electoral capitulations presented to candidates for the Polish throne always included the postulate that Silesia, a land "Polish to the core and torn from the Commonwealth," would again be attached to Poland. This demand also appeared in the provincial diets' instructions to deputies sent to the national diet. In the view of the nobility, who at this period were the governing class in Poland, the recovery of Silesia was a fundamental principle of Polish policy. The kings of Poland took the same view. The Vasa King Sigismund III, for instance, had a clear comprehension of the Silesian problem. In a letter to the voievod (provincial governor), Opalinski, he wrote: "It is necessary to keep a sharp eye on Silesia, so that by our oversight we do not neglect long overdue matters."* During the Thirty Years War Sigismund III suggested to the Court of Vienna that Silesia should be ceded to Poland. Possibly the suggestion would have been acted upon, if the Polish wars in the east had not compelled the King to concentrate his attention in that direction.

* A. Szelągowski, "Śląsk i Polska wobec powstania czeskiego." Kraków, 1904, p. 93.

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His son, Ladislas IV, put forward similar claims, and John Sobieski also interested himself in the return of Silesia. To obtain the restoration of Silesia to Poland, Sobieski would have utilized the aid he had afforded the German Emperor in the struggle against the Turks if further difficulties with the latter had not compelled him to direct his efforts chiefly to overcome this threat to Poland.

At this period, too, Silesia was still characteristically Polish. Generally speaking, the Habsburgs did not Germanize the areas. Their Government was regarded as oppressive by its inhabitants rather because of its centralizing tendencies, heavy taxation and religious persecutions. During their rule only members of the German aristocracy settled in Silesia.

One proof of the Polish character of Silesia is found in the frequent demonstrations by the local population in honour of Polish kings. A particularly important demonstration took place in honour of Queen Marysienka, wife of King John Sobieski, during her journey through Silesia. Silesian princes, descendants of the Piast dynasty, also put themselves forward as candidates for the Polish throne, thus manifesting their Polish connections.

3. SILESIA UNDER PRUSSIAN RULE

Prussian attempts to conquer Silesia date back to the earliest times; they are among the first practical expressions of the German *Drang nach Osten*. As early as the thirteenth century the Mark Brandenburg, out of which the Prussian State developed at the expense of Slavonic lands, threatened the *Lubusz land*, which, according to the testament of Boleslas the Wrymouthed, belonged to Silesia. This district was situated at the junction of the rivers Warta and Oder, on the latter's left bank, at the spot where Frankfurt-on-Oder now stands. Consequently it occupied a strategic key position essential to Poland's domination of the Middle and Upper Oder. It also constituted a powerful bastion of Polish life, reaching deeply into the Slavonic territories which the Germans had recently conquered. For these reasons the Margraves of Brandenburg brought the utmost pressure to bear on this district and tried at all costs to seize it. They succeeded in getting it in 1249, and thus

obtained a dangerous jumping-off ground for attacking other Polish lands in Silesia, Poznania and Pomerania.

After the lapse of two centuries, the Margraves of Brandenburg renewed their attempts at further conquest in Silesia. In 1428 the Elector of Brandenburg obtained other parts of Silesia: Krosno (Krossen) and Cylichow (Züllichau) as the result of a dispute over the succession. These two areas never returned to Silesia, though the princes of Silesia revolted against the cession of part of Silesia's territory to Brandenburg.

They now constitute two counties in the most eastern part of the present Brandenburg province. Expansion was achieved not only by war, but also by purchase, which entailed an entire duchy, or by a political marriage. At the beginning of the sixteenth century George of Brandenburg, a member of the Hohenzollern-Ansbach line, acquired Bogumin with the title of duke of Ratibor, and also Mysliwice (Karniow-Jägerndorf), Glupczyce (Leobschütz), Bytom (Beuthen) and other lands. The Prussians thus gained a favourable base for their expansion into Silesia.

In due course the Hohenzollerns put forward claims to further Silesian lands. These claims were advanced by all the rulers of Brandenburg in succession. Elector Frederick was particularly persistent in his activities, especially after he assumed the title of *King in Prussia* in 1701. But it was Frederick the Great who finally brought to fruition Prussia's expansionist tendencies in this direction. Renewing the claims of his predecessors, he demanded that Maria Theresa, Empress of Austria, should cede him the whole of Silesia. To enforce his claim, Frederick led an army into Silesia and occupied the entire province. The three successive Silesian wars which he waged against Maria Theresa ended in his victory. By the peace treaties concluded at Breslau in 1742, at Dresden in 1745 and Hubertusburg in 1763, he gained the whole of Lower and Upper Silesia, with the exception of the principalities of Teschen, Opava (Troppau) and Mysliwice (Karniow-Jägerndorf) which remained Austrian.

How doubtful the Prussian titles to Silesia were in the eyes of leading figures in the Kingdom of Prussia is evident from the

discussion which took place between Wilhelm I, King of Prussia, and Bismarck at a meeting of the State Council (*Staatsrat*) in 1864, on the eve of the Prussian-Danish war for Schleswig-Holstein. This conversation is given in the biography of Bismarck written by the German author, Emil Ludwig.*

Wilhelm I was not in favour of the Prussian-Danish war and the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein. During a session of the *Staatsrat*, at which Bismarck attempted to win his king over to the war and the annexation of these duchies, Wilhelm I uttered the frank remark:

"But after all I have no right whatever to these duchies."

To which Bismarck answered:

"Did the Great Elector or Frederick have more right to Prussia and Silesia? All the Hohenzollerns have been enlargers of the State."

In his private conversation Bismarck qualified the annexation of Silesia by Prussia simply as a theft.†

The real reason for Frederick II's annexation of Silesia was the province's wealth, and his desire to exploit that wealth to strengthen the power of the Kingdom of Prussia, already based on plunder. Silesia possessed valuable minerals, and its mining and smelting industries were among the most important in Europe. Silesia also possessed a well-developed spinning and weaving industry, which even in those days exported its manufactures *via* Holland to America. At this period the province's commercial relations extended to Kiev and Odessa, Holland and the Mediterranean countries. In his political testament (1752) Frederick the Great wrote that Silesian linens brought him as much income as Peru did to the King of Spain.‡

The Silesian iron foundries were to play an outstanding part in

* E. Ludwig, "Bismarck—Geschichte eines Kämpfers." Berlin, 1927, p. 276.

† Prince Bernhard von Bülow, Chancellor of the German Reich, writes in his memoirs, "Denkwürdigkeiten," published by Ullstein, Berlin, vol. iv, p. 10, that on the occasion of a talk about the annexation of the principality of Holstein Bismarck said to his father: "Frederick the Great has stolen Silesia and, nevertheless, he has been one of the greatest men of all times."

‡ As quoted in the introduction to the book "Schlesien in der Zeitwende—Ein Weckruf." Breslau, 1942, p. 12.

equipping the Prussian army. The desire to exploit all this wealth in order to strengthen the power of Prussia was one of the chief reasons for the Prussian invasion of the province. Edward Rybarz writes in his study, "The Polish Character of Silesia in its Historical Development": "In German historical circles the conviction is general that Frederick II conquered and treated Silesia as a province in the ancient Roman sense, i.e. as a colony."* Upper Silesia's economic position deteriorated not only as a result of the new ruler's exploitation, but also owing to the continual trade wars which Frederick II waged with Poland and Austria, i.e. with countries situated to the east and south of Silesia, which constituted her natural areas of economic expansion.

Silesia was the prey in the struggle between the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns, and in consequence it fell to Frederick the Great as a spoil of war. But despite all the vicissitudes of state and political dependence, the people of Silesia remained faithful to their Polish tradition. In order to eliminate the danger arising from the Polish character of Silesia and the Polish outlook of its inhabitants, the Prussians immediately began to pursue a policy of ruthless Germanization.

One of the instruments of this policy was colonization. German expansion in this form had, indeed, begun as early as the latter part of the twelfth century. But at that time the expansion was devoid of any political character. The German people who settled in the Silesian districts fled from Germany, driven there either by their poverty, or by the oppression of their German landlords. At the beginning of the thirteenth century the colonization movement developed on a larger scale and extended to rural, as well as urban areas. But this thin stratum of German colonists succumbed after a short time to partial Polonization. Only on the western fringes of Silesia, along the Sudeten Mountains, did the German population succeed in retaining its German character.

In the towns, however, the German immigrants retained their native characteristics, because it was there they formed compact and self-contained units. But even in the towns during this early

* Dr. St. Komar, E. Rybarz, Dr. A. Szczepański, op. cit., pp. 34 and 41.

period there was a certain Polonization of the Germans, owing to the towns depending for existence on the neighbouring Polish or Polonized villages. Thus Silesia, like other parts of Poland, adapted the model methods of West Europe's economic life by the aid of the colonization under *Magdeburg law*, maintaining, however, its essentially Polish ethnographic character.

Only the new wave of colonization inaugurated by Frederick the Great after his conquest of Silesia caused any serious modification in the Polish outlook and national characteristics of the inhabitants. Down to 1763, i.e. down to the end of the Third Silesian War, which confirmed Silesia's permanent cession to Prussia, there were only 61,152 Germans in the area.* In order to increase the number and to encourage Germans from other parts of Prussia to settle in Silesia, Frederick and his successor issued a number of charters making the conditions of colonization as attractive as possible for the new settlers. Only at this stage did the colonization acquire the shape of a definite Germanization policy.

Special recruitment offices were opened in a number of the large German cities, such as Frankfurt-on-the-Main and Hamburg, and in addition special recruitment officers were appointed all over the country. In his work "Betrachtungen zur Siedlungstätigkeit Friedrichs des Grossen, dargestellt an den Dörfern Horst und Finckenstein Kreis Oppeln," George Stumpe gives details of the conditions on which the colonists were settled.† The land was granted to them free of charge. Their houses and farm buildings were erected at the cost of the Prussian Government. The cattle, agricultural implements and even seed grain were given free. In addition, to cover their travel expenses, they were allowed two groschen per mile per member of the family. Under Frederick the Great's decrees the colonists were treated as free men, though at that time the feudal system still prevailed all over Prussia. Furthermore, they were freed from all taxation for a period of from four to six years. Their privileges were so great that they, their sons—

* Dr. St. Komar, E. Rybarz, Dr. A. Szczepański, op. cit., p. 38; quoted from Beheim-Schwarzbach's "Hohenzollernische Kolonisationen."

† G. Stumpe, op. cit., Breslau-Oppeln, 1941, pp. 10, 13-16.

during the early period even their grandsons—were exempted from military service. It is not surprising that the number of colonists increased year by year. In passing, it may be remarked that this colonization was the prototype of that pursued with the conferment of similar privileges by the National Socialist Reich of our time. Stumpe says that altogether Frederick the Great settled between three and four hundred persons in towns and villages all over Silesia. In the nineteenth century the influx of colonists of this type ceased, but another category of Germans, namely, State and private officials and the lower middle class, began to flow into Silesia in large numbers, especially when industry developed.

The colonization of Silesian lands by Germans was accompanied by the persecution of Polish peasants, and later of Polish industrial workers. In Silesia feudalism existed in its worst form. At the turn of the eighteenth century the tenure system was disappearing all over Europe and in 1816 the Prussian Government passed a decree abolishing it in Prussia. But the decree was not put into force in Silesia, for Prussian policy aimed first and foremost at the oppression of the Polish population. It was to the Prussian interest to compel the Polish peasants to migrate to western Germany by depriving them of their land and liberty, and so to make room for German colonists. For that reason the Prussian edict abolishing feudal tenure was suspended in regard to Silesia and enfranchisement was carried through as late as 1859, almost half a century after the other Polish provinces of Prussia.

This treatment of the Polish peasantry, the poor soil, the unfavourable climate, and the spoliation of the country by the exportation of its riches, all contributed to the impoverishment and indigence of the inhabitants, and caused great discontent among the Polish population. These feelings found vent in numerous Polish risings, which were forcibly suppressed by Prussian cavalry. In 1847-48, owing to the very widespread poverty, there was an outbreak of hunger typhus. Official estimates state that out of 80,000 cases 16,000 were fatal. There were very sanguinary peasant risings in the years 1765, 1785, 1799, and 1811,* and in the years 1846-48

* Komar, Rybarz, etc., op. cit., pp. 51 and 45.

there was an attempt at open Polish insurrection. During the second part of the nineteenth century wages in Silesia were lower than in the western provinces of Germany; social insurance and other provisions as well as living conditions, hygienic arrangements and so on were of a much lower standard than, for instance, in Westphalia.

The outstanding anti-social attitude of the successive Prussian Governments and German agricultural and industrial magnates towards the Polish peasants and industrial workers has been admitted even by the present National Socialist Government, which blames this anti-social policy for the increase of Polish influence in Upper Silesia at the beginning of the present century. The study by the German writer Gerhard Boberski, contains the following passage: "If things Polish had so many adherents in Upper Silesia before the Great War, we have to consider that it was by no means last or least a protest of the industrial workers against the contemporary social order, which in Upper Silesia particularly did not keep pace with the needs of the time."* Also the present Gauleiter of Upper Silesia, Fritz Bracht, has openly admitted that former Prussian Governments treated the country as a colony.†

The successive Prussian Governments not only resorted to German colonization and the oppression of the Polish peasants and workers, but also used other means of Germanizing the population and giving the entire country a German aspect. One of these means was the introduction of German as the official language. This step compelled the population to learn German. During the nineteenth century the Polish language vanished completely from use in the State offices, and in the latter half of the century it was eliminated from the local Government organizations as well. Yet another method of Germanizing the population was the systematic elimination of Polish schools. In the second half of the nineteenth century Polish State schools no longer existed in Silesia, and the few Polish

* G. Boberski, "Der Gau Oberschlesien," in the periodical "Deutsche Monatshefte," April-June, 1942, p. 390.

† "Völkischer Beobachter," June 25, 1942, article entitled "Oberschlesien—20 Jahre nachher."

private schools were subjected to considerable persecution and in the end completely eliminated.

Just before the middle of last century a wave of national liberalism swept over Europe, meeting with a lively response from among the Polish people. The Polish emigrants working in France for the recovery of political independence developed activities all over Poland which were warmly supported in Upper Silesia as elsewhere. In Silesia the Polish Democratic Society was particularly active. In the military plans drawn up by Mieroslawski, the organizer of the Polish insurrection in western Poland in 1846-48, an important strategic role was allotted to Upper Silesia. Toszek (Tost), between the fortress towns of Kozle and Gliwice, was assigned as the assembly point for the Silesian insurgents. After linking up with the insurgent forces from other parts of Poland they were to strike at Czestochowa. The suppression of the revolt in Poznan, however, cancelled the plans for the rising in Silesia. But they testify to the national sympathies of the Silesian people and to their movement to link up with Poland. During this period the national sentiments of the Upper Silesians developed and deepened greatly. A number of active Polish patriots carried on educational and national activities among the people, winning their complete confidence. Polish periodicals sprang up, cultural and educational organizations were started, and numerous other centres of Polish nationalism were active. The national resurrection began.

In 1848 Silesia elected two Poles, Father Joseph Szafranek and the farmer Gorzalka to the Prussian Diet at Berlin. In the Diet they joined the Polish group, which included all the Polish deputies from every Polish area annexed by Prussia. Father Szafranek's courageous and bold attitude in the Diet led to the Prussian Government lodging a complaint against him with the episcopal Curia at Breslau. In consequence the Curia forbade the father to sit with the left deputies. "Owing to the complaint lodged with the bishop," Bismarck writes in his memoirs, "Szafranek was forbidden to sit on the left in case of his re-election. So this sturdy priest stood in front of the left wing benches for five or six hours on end and, when extraordinary sessions were held, for as long as ten hours as stiff as a

sentry, and so did not need to rise up when he wanted to make an anti-German speech."*

In his notorious anti-Polish address of January 28, 1886, Bismarck again referred to Father Szafranek, saying of him: "His was the first Polish voice heard here for Upper Silesia."†

Father Szafranek's activities were directed primarily towards fighting for equality of rights in regard to the use of Polish in schools and churches, as well as in the administration and the judiciary. His efforts were not altogether in vain. Influenced by the general situation in Europe, the Prussian Government had, for some time at least, to make certain concessions with regard to the use of the Polish language in Upper Silesia.

After the Prussian victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 there began in Germany a bitter struggle against the Catholic Church, known as *Kulturkampf*. In the Polish areas this struggle took a definitely anti-Polish turn, and the language concessions granted only twenty years before were cancelled. Despite harsh persecution the Polish people, who were deeply attached to the Catholic faith, took active measures to defend the rights of the Catholic Church. The clergy, even those who were German, and the German Catholic Centre Party, which was started just about that time, supported the efforts of the Polish population to gain the right to use the Polish language freely.

One of the leaders of the Polish people in Silesia was the teacher, Karol Miarka, a prominent worker in the national cause. Almost all the deputies elected by Silesia to the first Parliament of the second German Reich in 1871 were representatives of the German Catholic Centre Party, which had spread rapidly in Silesia. This was due to the support which Miarka and the Polish population had given the party, because it had loyally defended Polish interests during the *Kulturkampf* struggle.

Bismarck's agreement with the Catholic Church which terminated the *Kulturkampf* did not put an end to Germany's anti-Polish

* Otto Fürst von Bismarck, "Gedanken und Erinnerungen." Stuttgart, 1898, vol. 2, p. 127.

† "Die politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarck." Stuttgart, 1894, vol. xi, p. 438.

policy in Silesia. On the contrary, it was more and more intensely applied, taking the extreme form of extermination of everything Polish. No longer having any fears for the interests of the Church, the Catholic Centre Party proved faithless to the Polish people, whose support it had enjoyed, and to whom alone it owed its growth into a powerful party. The German Catholic clergy and the Episcopal Curia at Breslau supported the Prussian Government's policy of Germanization, while the Polish priests who defended the rights of the Polish people were exposed to ruthless persecution. Church services were held in German, and children had to prepare for the sacraments by instruction in German. The Polish language was no longer used in the schools. The German attempts to Germanize the people now had the support of a new powerful factor, the Catholic Church, with all the influence it had among its adherents.

The Evangelical Church (Protestant) also played its part in the work of Germanization. For there were quite large numbers of Polish Protestants in both Upper and Lower Silesia. In a work by the well-known Polish historian, Dr. Stanislaw Karwowski, there occurs the statement: "In 1841, 38 Evangelical pastors and 130 teachers knowing Polish were required for the superintendencies of Pszczyna, Opole and Kluczborek parishes. Also in the superintendency of Nisa, and in the districts of Namyslow, Sycow, Olesnica and Olawa (in Lower Silesia), there were entirely Polish evangelical communities. "Altogether," wrote Pastor Fiedler of Miedzyborz in 1850, "there are about 120,000 Polish evangelicals in Prussian Silesia. They are fervent adherents of the Evangelical Church, they love their clergy and their mother tongue. . . . All their wealth of books consists of a few religious and devotional books, also the Bible and the Polish Hymnal, and Dabrowski's sermons. All these books are printed in Gothic letters, the majority being printed in Brzeg (Brieg)."* This quotation gives some idea of the large number of Protestant Poles. Because of their fidelity to their Polish descent these people were persecuted as bitterly by the German

* Dr. Stanislaw Karwowski. "Polacy i język polski na Śląsku pod panowaniem pruskim." Poznań, 1910, pp. 8-9.

Protestant Church as the Polish Catholics were by the German Catholic Church.

Yet this thorough and comprehensive attempt at Germanization did not bring the people of Silesia any closer to Germany. The more far-reaching the German activities, the stronger grew the national sentiments of the Silesian people, and the closer their relationship and contact with Poles in other parts of Poland.

Because the Catholic Centre Party had completely gone over to an anti-Polish policy, the embryo of a new Polish political group developed about 1890 under the leadership of a young Upper Silesian doctor named Rostek, in Raciborz. The new group was definitely Polish in its make-up and national-radical in views, and by its advocacy of "independent Polish political thought" it marked a turning-point in Silesian public life. In a few years this nucleus developed into a central political organization of the Polish inhabitants of Upper Silesia. The Polish periodicals founded and directed by Dr. Rostek, especially the "Nowiny Raciborskie," together with the "Katolik" and the "Gazeta Opolska," and later the "Gornoslazak" came to be the expression of Polish Silesian political thought.

By the beginning of the present century the Polish Silesian national movement had increased rapidly. For the first time a group of Poles, those gathered around the "Gornoslazak," openly opposed the Centre Party in the elections to the German Reichstag. The Polish candidates were headed by Wojciech Korfanty, a young Polish patriot, who later became the chief leader of the Polish Silesians and was the Polish Government commissar during the plebiscite in 1921. At the elections held in 1902 Korfanty was elected deputy for Katowice-Zabrze. These elections were annulled, but in supplementary elections a year later Korfanty was re-elected. A second Polish candidate was elected for the Bytom-Tarnowskie Gory district. At elections held in 1908 and 1912 Poles gained four and five seats respectively in Upper Silesia.

This first definite political success of the national Polish group evoked an extraordinary outburst of nationalistic energy among the people of Silesia. As a result there was a further increase of

German anti-Polish activities. All the powers of the State and the police, the large landowners and heavy industrialists, the urban middle class, the Church and the educational system were concentrated in an attempt to crush the Polish population. Nevertheless, Polish cultural and educational societies, organizations of young industrial workers and agricultural groups, increased at an extraordinary rate, drawing in larger and larger circles of the Polish population. At the same time the Poles were strengthening their economic power, creating a close network of prosperous credit and agricultural co-operatives, associated with the Union of Co-operative Societies in Poznan.

This last period of Upper Silesian history prior to the First World War shows not only that at least that part of historic Silesia retained entirely its Polish character and that there was a considerable growth in the feeling for the Polish nation as a whole.

At the beginning of the present century Polish national life in Upper Silesia developed on an unexpected scale, and in no way lagged behind the national movement in Pomerania or Poznan, the most Polish province of the former Prussian State. The renaissance in Upper Silesia, however, came only during the last twenty-five years before the First World War. While Silesia had always been linguistically Polish, the national element had not previously been so pronounced as in other parts of Poland.

German propagandists tried again and again to explain this great development in the Silesian national movement as due to the influence of what they were pleased to call *Grosspolnische Propaganda*, i.e. artificially bolstered nationalism from centres in Poznan. That explanation is quite false, and is given the lie by the facts of history, especially by the circumstance that native Upper Silesians such as Lompa, Miarka, Dr. Rostek, and Korfanty were foremost in encouraging and developing the Polish national spirit. The reasons for the belated nature of the national regeneration in the area were quite different. To avoid any charge of partiality the opinion of the German, Dr. Paul Weber, author of a standard German work on Poles in Upper Silesia, may be quoted. In his book "Die Polen in Oberschlesien," he explains the true reasons

why the national renaissance in Upper Silesia occurred only towards the end of last century.*

As already said, the Polish inhabitants of Upper Silesia were extremely poor. Weber writes: "Descriptions of the poverty of the Polish rural population, fighting for their existence, vividly recall the times of medieval serfdom." The soil of Upper Silesia is not very fertile, the climate is harsh and all this intensified the hardships among the Poles, especially as "in fact the Polish inhabitants live in the infertile part of the country, while the Germans live in the fertile part."

An interesting light is thrown on this concentration of the Polish people in the least fertile parts of Upper Silesia by statistics comparing the average receipts from land tax per hectare of arable land (the rate of which depended on the nature of the soil) with the percentage of Polish population in the various districts. For instance, the most thoroughly Polish counties yielded the lowest receipts from land tax; in other words, they had the poorest land. Lubliniec county, for instance, had a Polish population of 79·3 per cent.† The average receipts from land tax per hectare in this county were 3·76 German marks; 80·7 per cent of the population of Olesno county was Polish, and the average receipts per hectare from land tax were 5·60 German marks. On the other hand, counties with a low percentage of Polish population provided large receipts from land tax. In Prudnik county only 47·1 per cent of the population was Polish, but land tax receipts averaged 19·99 German marks per hectare. In Glupczyce county only 6·3 per cent of the population was Polish, and the land tax receipts averaged 31·03 marks per hectare.

The conditions in which the Poles suffered from extreme poverty and were dependent on the Germans, who owned all the large landed estates, rendered it difficult for the Polish inhabitants to grow rich and gain that degree of economic independence requisite for the development of national cultural activities. In Poznania, for

* Dr. Paul Weber, "Die Polen in Oberschlesien—Eine statistische Untersuchung." Berlin, 1914, p. 15.

† The percentage of Polish population (ignoring the so-called bilinguals) is taken from the population census of 1910, as quoted by Weber.

example, the social structure was not so one-sidedly in favour of the Germans as in Upper Silesia, and there the process of material consolidation of the Polish population began much earlier (the enfranchisement of the peasantry occurred some fifty years earlier). Therefore Polish political consciousness and the civil development of the great mass of the people began much earlier in Poznania. Only after 1871 was there in Upper Silesia a decisive change in the standard of material well-being, i.e. during the development of Silesia's industries. Only then was there an awakening of the Polish national instinct. Paul Weber ends his observations on this subject with the following statement: "In all that I have hitherto said, attention has been directed first and foremost to the economic backwardness of the Upper Silesian Poles, which resulted in the circumstance that they were drawn into the economic and political struggle a whole generation later than the Poles of Poznania and Pomerania. After which I sought to demonstrate that the essential factors in the economic backwardness of Upper Silesia's Poles were the unfavourable climatic conditions of the area, and the property relationships existing in the sphere of land-ownership."*

This explanation is the best testimony to Silesia's national instinct, which was aroused as soon as its people's most essential material needs were satisfied.

The people of Silesia have retained not only their Polish tongue, habits and customs, but also the feeling of complete national unity with everything Polish. This was manifested with particular clearness during the last twenty-five years before the First World War. Whenever conditions allowed they fought bitterly for their Polish heritage, doing all in their power to resist German domination.

* Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

Chapter Two

UPPER SILESIA'S ECONOMIC FUNCTION

I. A SOURCE OF EUROPEAN COAL SUPPLY

Upper Silesia is an area of great importance, both economically and politically. Economically, because of its geographical position as the main centre of coal production in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Politically, because of the national factors facing each other within it; and, also because of the war potential it offers owing to its geographical position and economic wealth.


The industries of Upper Silesia are based primarily on its enormous deposits of coal. In addition to coal, it possesses other natural wealth, including zinc ore. Formerly, it also produced iron ore, but the reserves of this mineral were almost entirely exhausted by the beginning of the present century. However, the areas neighbouring Poland still have enormous reserves of iron ore. Based on this natural wealth an iron and zinc industry developed side by side with the coal industry. An economic study of the area must, therefore, necessarily be devoted primarily to these three branches of heavy industry, which have fundamentally moulded the economy of Upper Silesia.

The present study is concerned above all with the economic problem of Upper Silesia, and in particular of Opole Silesia, i.e. that part of the area which in 1921 was retained by Germany. As certain branches of industry in this district are connected with the neighbouring Polish industrial fields, which with Opole Silesia make up the Great Upper Silesian Field, a general economic study must embrace the whole Great Upper Silesian area.

The Upper Silesian coal-field forms geographically one single field with the adjacent coal deposits in the districts of Dabrowa Gornicza, Cracow, and Teschen Silesia. This great tract as a whole constitutes one of the four main coal-fields of Europe. The largest of all these fields is situated in Great Britain; the second in North-Western Europe (the Ruhr and the coal-fields of Northern France,


**MAIN CENTRES
OF
COAL PRODUCTION
IN EUROPE**

1. GREAT BRITAIN.
WEST EUROPEAN AREA
2. WESTERN GERMANY, FRANCE,
BELGIUM AND HOLLAND.
3. GREATER UPPER SILESIAN
AREA.
4. DONIETZ BASIN.



M.P.K.

Map No. 2



Map No. 3

Belgium, and Holland); the third, in South-Eastern Europe, the Donetz coal-field (Donbas) belonging to Soviet Russia; between the two fields situated on the two verges of continental Europe (Western Europe and Russia), in the very centre where many of Europe's most important lines of communication cross, there lies the fourth, the Great Upper Silesian Field, with its chief deposits in Upper Silesia proper.

The special importance of the Great Silesian coal-field is shown by the figures relating to the coal reserves and the annual production of the area. According to the latest published German figures* the Great Silesian coal reserves, down to a depth of 1,200 metres (approx. 4,000 feet), amount to 76,500 million tons. The reserves in the Ruhr Valley are estimated by the same German source at 40,000 million tons, the reserves in England, or, more precisely, of the central English field, amount to 60,000 million tons, and the Donetz field to 56,000 million tons. Great Silesia has the largest coal reserves in continental Europe, and correspondingly great possibilities of development.

In 1937 the aggregate coal output of the Great Silesian Field amounted to 68 million tons† (Appendix No. 2). During the same year the Western European field (France, Belgium, Holland and the Ruhr Valley with the Saar) had an output of 235 million tons,‡ and Great Britain 245 million tons. The output of European Russia was 105 million tons. In 1937 all Europe had an aggregate output of some 688 million tons (Appendix No. 3). Thus the Great Silesian Field has an output of above 10 per cent of the total European production, and close on 30 per cent of Western European production, exclusive of Great Britain (i.e. that of France, Belgium, Holland, the Ruhr and Saar valleys put together). Consequently the Great Silesian Field occupied the fourth place among the European

* Walter Greiff, "Raumordnung und Wirtschaftsplanung in Oberschlesien," in "Deutsche Monatshefte," April-June 1942, p. 429.

† Greiff gives the output for 1938 as 76 million tons. These economic statistics are based mainly on the tables appended to this work. These tables give the various sources from which the figures have been taken. References for any figures not taken from the statistical tables are given in footnotes.

‡ Greiff gives the output of the Ruhr Valley alone as 130 million tons in 1938, and that of the Donetz field as 78 million.

coal producers, i.e. after Great Britain, Germany and Russia. The Germans stated that during the present war the output of the field would approach 100 million tons.*

A glance at the map reveals the natural economic hinterland of each of these four main European coal-fields (see map facing p. 32). Coal produced in Great Britain will always seek its overseas markets in Europe, primarily in Scandinavia and France. The fields of North-Western Europe, especially those of the Ruhr and the Saar, tend to dispose their output towards Central Europe, more or less up to a line drawn between the Elbe and the Oder. The Donetz field has its natural hinterland in Russia. Because of its situation in Central Europe, the Silesian field is destined to supply coal to the area east of the Oder and to the south-east of Europe. Consequently, the Silesian field's natural economic hinterland is Poland and the countries between the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Adriatic.

2. UPPER SILESIA'S ECONOMIC POTENTIAL

In discussing the economic structure and industrial potential of Upper Silesia, in particular of Opole Silesia, the population statistics must be considered. According to the census of 1933, the German part of Upper Silesia (see map at end), or, to be more precise, the Opole Regency,† had a population of 1,480,925. Since then the number of inhabitants has grown by natural increase,‡ which from 1933 to the outbreak of the present war averaged some seven per thousand inhabitants per annum.§ The Regency covered an area of 9,714·19 square kilometres. Consequently, the average density of population was 152·6 per square kilometre. The population live to the extent of 56·7 per cent in urban areas, 43·3 in

* Cf. "Oberschlesische Wirtschaft," in "Der Deutsche Volkswirt," No. 39, June 27, 1941, pp. 1378-9.

† Figures for Opole Silesia are taken from Hans Otto von Borcke's "Die Entwicklung der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Verhältnisse in Westoberschlesien nach der Teilung." Berlin, 1937.

‡ A considerable proportion of the natural increase, however, emigrated every year into the heart of Germany. According to Borcke (op. cit.) this emigration amounted to 39,779 persons during the years 1925 to 1933. The flow of emigrants continued after 1933.

§ According to the last census of 1939 the Opole Regency had a population of 1,529,258, and covered an area of 9,715·35 sq. km.

rural; 37.4 per cent are employed in industry and crafts, 13 in trade and communication, 23.9 in other economic activities, and only 25.7 per cent in agriculture and forestry. According to the 1931 census, the Polish part of Upper Silesia, i.e. the Upper Silesian part of the Polish Silesian province (Voievodship of Katowice), had a population of 1,131,543 scattered over an area of 3,221 square kilometres, this working out at 351.3 per square kilometre. During the years from 1931 to 1939 the natural increase in the whole of Poland amounted to 11-12 per thousand inhabitants per annum.

After the occupation of Poland in 1939, Germany made a number of fundamental administrative changes in Silesia, as elsewhere. On February 1, 1941, a separate Upper Silesian province (*Gau Oberschlesien*) was formed, to embrace not only Opole Silesia, but also all the Polish province of Silesia (Voievodship of Katowice, i.e. Polish Upper Silesia, as well as Teschen Silesia) and the adjacent parts of the Cracow and Kielce provinces (see map at end). This new province covers* 20,635.9 square kilometres, and has 4,341,084 people or 210.4 to the square kilometre. It is divided into two Regencies: Opole, chiefly agricultural, with 1,374,232 inhabitants, or 117.3 to the square kilometre; and Katowice, chiefly industrial, with 2,966,825 inhabitants, or 332.5 to the square kilometre. According to the map published by Walter Greiff in his article quoted above, 47.1 per cent of the population of the new province work in industry and crafts (14.6 in mining, 8.4 in metallurgical industry, 3.8 in the textile industry), 12.6 in trade and communications, and only 21.7 per cent in agriculture.

The foregoing figures clearly show the industrial nature of the areas. Coal, iron and zinc are the main bases of present-day industry in Upper Silesia. In this connection it may be of interest to outline briefly the historical development of Upper Silesia's iron and coal industry. The history of Upper Silesia mining stretches into the distant past. The oldest document relating to it dates from the twelfth century. The birthplaces of the industry were the towns of

* The population statistics for the province of Upper Silesia are taken from Gerhard Boberski's "Der Gau Oberschlesien," in "Deutsche Monatshefte," April-June, 1942, p. 428.

Bytom (Beuthen) and Tarnowskie Gory. In 1528 the latter town was declared a free mining city. In those days the industry exploited the local deposits of iron ore, silver and lead, while the extensive forests in the district supplied wood to smelt the ore.

Mining and smelting in a more modern form began only in the second half of the eighteenth century and developed rapidly in the nineteenth century. It was during this period that the coal deposits began to be exploited on a large scale, and the modern development of the iron and steel industry is closely associated with this epoch-making innovation. The first large furnace was installed in Upper Silesia in 1721. By 1780 Silesia had thirty-six large furnaces. In 1796 a great coking oven was installed in Gliwice (Gleiwitz), the first in Germany at that time. In 1805, a few years later, the largest coking oven in continental Europe was built in Silesia.

Opole Silesia

After the partition in 1921 of the area of the 68 coal-mines existing in Upper Silesia, 14 remained to Germany inside the Opole Regency, or Opole Silesia.* The coal output from these latter mines in 1913, was 11,090,908 tons rising to 25,983,299 tons in 1938. An extensive development of industrial coal and by-products and chemical industry has taken place, and this process is being further intensified during the present war. In addition to the coal industry, there exists a considerable iron and steel industry in Opole Silesia, consisting of over a dozen great foundries, steel-works, and newly built or modernized metallurgical works. In 1913 the output of iron ore was 381,318 tons, in 1937 it amounted to 236,000 tons. The output of raw steel was 354,865 tons in 1913, and rose to 482,000 tons in 1937. Finally the rolled steel output† was 234,818 tons in 1913 and reached 371,000 tons in 1937.

The production of the third branch of Upper Silesian heavy industry, i.e. zinc and lead, developed under particularly favourable conditions, because the coal and zinc deposits lie in close proximity

* For comparative figures of Upper Silesian industrial production in the Polish and the German sections in 1922 see Appendix No. 11.

† "Stahl und Eisen," No. 9, 1938.

to each other. Some eight tons of coal are required to smelt one ton of zinc. In 1913 about 107,800 tons of calamine and 400,000 tons of zinc-blende were extracted from the whole of Upper Silesia. Of these 2,736 tons of calamine and 99,463 tons of zinc-blende were obtained from Opole-Silesia. In 1913 the total zinc production in Upper Silesia was 169,439 tons, all concentrated in that part of the country which afterwards went to Poland. Similarly the lead production, which was 41,561 tons, came from the later Polish Upper Silesia.

The result of the partitioning of Upper Silesia brought all the zinc foundries within the Polish area, while part of the zinc deposits as well as rolling mills remained to Germany, thus causing a vital change in the output of the zinc industry in Opole Silesia. The upper deposits of zinc ore, in which calamine was found, were exhausted by the time of the partitioning. Later production was restricted to the output of zinc-blende, which in 1935 was 122,000 tons. In the same year 24,000 tons of lead were extracted and 10,900 tons of sheet zinc produced. In 1934 the enterprise which was the chief producer of zinc ore in Opole Silesia, the *Bergwerksgesellschaft Georg von Giesches's Erben*, built a zinc foundry for smelting its ore. This foundry, however, was not built in Silesia but in Magdeburg.

Though the chief features of the economic structure of Opole Silesia necessarily result from the development of heavy industry, only a comparatively small part of the area is highly industrialized, this applying especially to the south-eastern corner bordering on Poland. The rest of the area is agricultural, and only in the towns is there a concentration of medium sized industry.

According to the 1933 census,* 62.6 per cent of the land were arable and meadow, and 27.4 forest, one-third of this being the property of the German State. Of the cultivated land 44.8 were held in farms of over 100 hectares, 11.1 in farms from 20 to 100 hectares, 32.1 in farms from five to twenty hectares, and 8.7 in farms from two to five. The remaining 3.3 were held in still smaller farms or in the form of industrial workers' allotments, ranging from 0.51 to 2 hectares.

* von Borcke, op. cit., p. 50.

Thus, Opole Silesia, i.e. the part of Upper Silesia belonging to Germany, represents an important economic potential in industrial as well as agricultural and forestry production. This economic potential gained great importance for Germany at the moment of the incorporation of all the adjacent Polish industrial area in Germany and its union with Opole Silesia into a separate province of Upper Silesia (*Gau Oberschlesien*)—i.e. after the outbreak of the Second World War.

The Province of Upper Silesia

As already said, the subject of this study is Opole Silesia. But owing to the economic bonds linking Opole Silesia with the Polish areas which have been attached to Germany during the present war it is advisable to consider the economic problems of the entire area. Below is summarized the economic and primarily the industrial potential of the entire province of Upper Silesia (*Gau Oberschlesien*), created by the Germans in 1941—in particular with the Great Silesian coal-field, which includes not only the mines, foundries and factories of Bytom, Gliwice and Zabrze, Katowice, Chorzow, Tarnowskie Gory and Rybnik, but also the mining and foundry establishments of Sosnowiec, Bedzin, and Dabrowa Gornicza, Jaworzno, Trzebinia and Chrzanow, and finally, Karwina, Frysztat and Trzyniec.

The economic structure of this enlarged province is similar to that of Opole Silesia both in industry and agriculture. But its potential is incomparably greater because it constitutes such an important proportion of the entire European economic potential.

Coal reserves down to a depth of 1,200 metres (approx. 4,000 feet) are 76,500 million tons,* and down to a depth of 2,000 metres (6,600 feet) 200,000 million tons. These may be compared with the estimated coal reserves, down to a depth of 2,000 metres, for other areas†: 190,000 million tons for Great Britain, 182,000 million tons for Germany (within the 1938 frontiers), 17,000 million tons for France, and 64,000 million tons for European Russia.

* Greiff, *op. cit.*, p. 429.

† "Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland." London, 1942.

Coal production amounted to 68 million tons in 1937.

Coal production* in 1937 totalled 245 million tons in Great Britain, 185 million tons in Germany, 44 million tons in France. The world production of coal in 1937 amounted to 1,310 million tons.

In 1937 the output of pig-iron in this area was about 1.4 million tons, of steel about 2.4 million tons, and of rolled steel products 1.8 million tons. The relative figures for certain other countries in the same year, 1937:

(Million tons)

	Pig-iron	Steel	Rolled Steel
Germany (1937 frontiers) ..	15	19.8	14.4
Great Britain	8.6	13.2	9.9
France	7.9	7.9	5.2
World production	104.0	135.5	—

In 1937 zinc production was 107,000 tons. In the same year zinc production in Germany (within the 1937 frontiers) totalled 163,000 tons. The corresponding figure for England was 63,000 tons, for Belgium 220,000 tons, for the United States 505,000 tons, and for the whole world 1,620,000 tons.

Besides these figures illustrating the potential of heavy industry in the Great Silesian Field it must be stated that in addition to numerous smaller power stations attached to various industrial works, there are in this area three large electrical power stations. In November 1941 the Germans organized a new company at Gliwice, by the name of *Bergbau Elektrizitäts A.G. Oberschlesien*, the shares being held by various industrial firms.

In addition to the heavy industry already discussed, there exists a considerable medium and small-sized industry within the new province. Particularly worthy of note is the iron manufacturing industry, foremost being machinery works, steel cable works and the locomotive works at Chrzanow. The chemical industry is also

* "Mały Rocznik Statystyczny." Warsaw, 1939.

of high importance. It has been extremely developed by the Germans during the present war, and embraces primarily such products as synthetic benzine, benzol, pitch, various kinds of oil, greases, etc.

In the neighbourhood of Opole, in Szczakowa, near Cracow, and Golezow, near Teschen, a lime and cement industry, based on local deposits of lime and clay, has developed. The great expanse of pine forests has led to the development of the paper and cellulose industry, especially in the districts of Katowice, Gliwice, Raciborz, and Kozle. In the western part of Opole Silesia are textile works. However, neither in size, nor in the quality of their products, do these mills equal those existing in the Polish part of Silesia at Bielsko and Andrychow which exported their manufactures to the whole of Europe and even overseas. Finally, all over the area there are works devoted to the timber industry, such as sawmills, and a well-developed electro-technical, furniture, and leather industry. The extensive agricultural hinterland has provided favourable conditions for the development of an agricultural processing industry in the form of numerous sugar refineries, mills, distilleries, breweries, dairies, starch works, canning factories, etc.

3. UPPER SILESIA'S DIFFICULTIES WITHIN THE GERMAN BORDERS

Although Upper Silesia possessed an extraordinary natural wealth and had been developing its mining and foundry industries since the early Middle Ages, it occupied no important economic position within the frontiers of pre-Versailles Germany, especially after the German mining and heavy industry of Westphalia and the Rhineland had begun to develop. Although one of the oldest mining and foundry areas of Europe, Silesia's industrial development did not keep pace with that of the Ruhr Valley. The coal and other production of Silesian industry was faced with difficulties of marketing which not even the most thorough-going tariff protection policy adopted by the German Governments could completely overcome. Yet neither before nor after the First World War was the Reich Government niggardly in aiding Silesia by tariff and other legislation aimed at encouraging local production.

This failure of Silesian production to keep pace with German, especially in regard to the iron and steel industry, is shown in Appendix No. 6. In 1871, for instance, the production of pig-iron in Upper Silesia was 14·8 per cent of the total German production, but by 1901 it had dropped to 8·1 and by 1913 totalled only 5·1. A similar though less obvious process occurred regarding steel production. In 1904 Upper Silesia accounted for 10 per cent of the total German production of steel, but in 1912 only for 8·6. What were the reasons for this decline? Originally this branch of industry was developed on the enormous local deposits of iron ore and the plentiful supply of timber and, later, coal. But by the beginning of the present century the reserves of iron ore were exhausted. In 1889, 800,000 tons of ore were mined in Upper Silesia,* this quantity providing 85 per cent of the Upper Silesian iron industry's requirements. By 1900 production had fallen to 147,000 tons, which covered only 34 per cent of the requirements; in 1913 the production had dropped to 138,000 tons, covering only 10 per cent of the local needs.†

Therefore, ore had to be imported from distant Lorraine, Sweden, or even Morocco. The transport expenses were very high and caused a great increase in the production cost. Large deposits of iron ore, however, still existed in close proximity to Upper Silesia—in the area of the Congress Kingdom of Poland (i.e. Central Poland which before 1914 was under Russian domination) and especially in the counties of Bedzin and Olkusz, adjacent to Upper Silesia, but, in spite of very low rates for transport, it was more expensive to import ore from this area than from the much more distant Swedish or Lorraine mines, because enormous customs duties were imposed by Russia.

A similar state of affairs existed in Opole Silesia. For instance, during the first decade after the First World War Swedish ore was three marks per ton cheaper in the Westphalian area than in Opole Silesia, and ore from Morocco was two marks cheaper in West-

* Gauleiter Bracht, "Oberschlesien als Standort einer Eisen-schaffenden Industrie," in "Der Vierjahresplan," April 20, 1941.

† If the lower iron content of Silesian ore is taken into account the figure was only 7 per cent.

phalia than in Silesia. Westphalian industry paid eleven marks per ton for Lorraine ore, whereas Opole Silesia had to pay twenty marks for Polish.

Therefore, as time went on, the processing of pig-iron was almost completely abandoned in Opole Silesia* in favour of the production of steel from scrap-iron. In 1932 only one foundry smelted pig-iron. Later, under the Hitler régime, the production of pig-iron again was developed for the purpose of re-armament. Because of the exhaustion locally of iron ore, the iron and steel industry of Upper Silesia, cut off from the neighbouring Polish areas, was hampered in its development. In iron industry the production process was cheaper in Westphalia, although labour was cheaper in Silesia than in Western Germany. For, besides the higher cost of ore, Silesian production was burdened with a more expensive smelting process, caused by the lack of adequate quantities of coking coal,† while steel production was burdened by the lack of scrap-iron on the spot, which necessitated its being imported from distant industrialized areas of Germany. For all these reasons iron manufactures produced in Upper Silesia were more expensive to market in Central Germany than those of the Westphalian and Rhineland industries. This rendered it difficult for Silesia to compete with Westphalia.

A further obstacle to the development of Silesian industry was the problem of communications. The iron industry in Silesia was able to grow as long as it had marketing possibilities in the neighbouring areas of Poland and Russia. In 1886, 20 per cent of the total of Upper Silesia's production of pig-iron were exported. Of this 20 per cent, 98·2 were exported to Russia or to the part of Poland then under Russian rule.‡ But the possibility of completely unrestricted export to Poland, which had always been the natural economic hinterland for Upper Silesia's industrial area, suddenly came to an end. Russia developed her own iron industry in the Dabrowa field adjacent to Upper Silesia, in order to exploit the

* Cf. Dr. Gerhard Wende, "Die Auswirkung der Grenzziehung auf die Oberschlesische Montanindustrie," Stuttgart, 1932, p. 8.

† The coking coal of Upper Silesia is of inferior quality to that of Westphalia.

‡ Wende, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

deposits of iron ore found in the immediate neighbourhood. In order to protect this newly developing industry, Russia introduced a system of high protective tariffs, high import duties on Silesian iron manufactures, and, as already mentioned, export duties on iron ore. In consequence, Silesian exports to Russia came completely to an end, and the Silesian industry was forced to seek its markets in Germany. Here, however, it faced the powerful competition of Western German industry, with its cheaper production and shorter transport distances, thus the Silesian iron industry found its production impeded and reduced to the level of an auxiliary supply in Germany itself.

According to statistics based on the official figures of the International Coal Commission* in Moravska Ostrava and published by Jerzy Kramsztyk, the Polish Government Delegate to the Commission, coal production in Upper Silesia was 43,801,056 tons in 1913. After deducting 573,579 tons for the production of the *Petershofen* coal-mine in the south of Upper Silesia, which went to Czechoslovakia under the Treaty of Versailles, the coal production of the entire plebiscite area totalled 43,227,477 tons and was distributed as follows:

1. Requirements of the Upper Silesian coal-mines and coal consumption in Upper Silesia itself, plus that in the Polish areas which went to Poland after the war†	Approximately 25 million tons or 58 per cent of total production
2. Exports	Approximately 5.8 million tons or approximately 13 per cent of total
3. To Germany (excluding areas transferred to Poland, and excluding Upper Silesia)	12.5 million tons or approximately 29 per cent

Even in Berlin, which is nearer to Silesia than to Westphalia, coal from Upper Silesia had to wage a continual fight against the competition of Westphalian coal. In 1899, Greater Berlin consumed 63.11 per cent of Upper Silesia's coal, in 1910 only

* This commission controlled the production and marketing of coal produced in Upper Silesia during the period of the plebiscite.

† Andrzej Wierzbicki, "Prawda o Górnym Śląsku." Warsaw, 1921.

46.02,* and in 1913 the turnover fell to 43.7.† Also after the First World War there was a steady decline in the consumption of Upper Silesia's coal; for instance, in 1930 Berlin's consumption of Silesian coal decreased by 35.7 per cent compared with that of 1929, while the decline in consumption of Westphalian coal during the same period was only 9.4.

Upper Silesia's industry could not compete with the Westphalian and Rhineland industry in Germany, because Western German industry was far more favourably situated in regard to Central Germany. The Upper Silesian industrial area lies in the south-eastern corner of Germany and before 1914 touched the Russian frontier. Owing to the Russian system of protective tariffs, the existence of this frontier made it impossible to find a market for Upper Silesian goods in the natural, easterly direction. Silesia had only one or at most two railway lines connecting it with Central Germany (see map facing p. 33). Moreover it had practically no water transport facilities. On the other hand, Westphalia possessed far better railway communications with Central, Eastern, Southern and South-Western Germany, and, above all, it disposed of numerous waterways in the river system formed by the Rhine, Elbe, Oder and Danube.

Only small quantities of Silesian coal could take advantage of transport by the Klodnicki canal (see map at end). This canal linked the Silesian industrial region with the Upper Oder, but even after its extension and development in the post-war years it was inadequate to meet the needs of Silesia. Nor did it conduce towards a comparative cheapening of Silesian coal in Central Germany, for meantime the *Mittelkanal* had been constructed from the river Ems through Hanover to Berlin, and this led to a still greater reduction in the cost of Westphalian coal in Berlin. After this canal had been made there was a fall of 6 marks per ton in the transport costs of coal from Westphalia to Berlin and a reduction of 20 marks per ton of iron.

* "Zeitschrift des Oberschlesischen Berg und Hüttenmännischen Vereins," November, 1911, p. 509.

† S. Włodarkiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

Faced with such unfavourable communications and to some extent of raw materials, the Silesian industry was saved from extinction by one factor only: down to the outbreak of the First World War the sole important purchasers for its coal and iron were the Polish areas of Germany which after 1918 were partly incorporated in Poland. In addition, the German Government attempted to keep the Silesian industry in being by means of a special tariff policy. In 1911 the German railways introduced considerably reduced charges for Silesian products. The reconstruction of Poland caused that part of Silesia still remaining to Germany to lose an important customer in those areas with Polish inhabitants which went to the new State. Thus the economic situation in the German part of Upper Silesia deteriorated catastrophically in spite of the fact that the industrial potential of the Silesian industrial area which remained to Germany, had declined considerably. For instance, pig-iron production, which in 1913 amounted to 381,000 tons, or 2·3 per cent of the total German production, fell to 31,000 tons in 1932, i.e. barely 0·8 per cent of the total German production. In 1913 steel production in Opole Silesia amounted to 355,000 tons, and in 1932 to only 176,000 tons.

The author quoted above, von Borcke,* states that the industrial area of Upper Silesia is separated from its normal, immediate hinterland. If a circle were drawn around Gliwice (the centre of the industrial area of Upper Silesia) with a diameter of 300 km.—this represents the normal market outlet of every industrial area—then barely 9·4 per cent of this area would go to Germany, 90 per cent however lying inside Poland or Czechoslovakia (see map facing p. 49).

Yet the German Government desired at all costs to maintain the industrial vitality of Opole Silesia. It was animated by political motives, for industry could contribute greatly to the success of attempts at Germanizing the Polish population of the area. A further reason was the desire to keep Silesia in being as an important industrial base in the event of war; it was possible to maintain production at a certain level by granting far-reaching material

* von Borcke, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

privileges to Silesian industry on conditions in which normal amortization was impossible.

In addition to extensive assistance through *Osthilfe* and the *Sofortprogramm*, other aid was granted, such as specially reduced rates for Silesian coal on the German railways. There were in force special rates, from 38 to 40 per cent lower than normal, for the transport of this coal to East Prussia and to the sea ports. In addition the German Government granted aid to East Prussia from the *Osthilfe* funds for the purchase of Upper Silesia's coal, in the form of bonuses of 2.5 marks on every ton. Only by such subsidies did German industry in Opole Silesia survive the first decade after the partitioning of Silesia.

Though production in Upper Silesia increased considerably during the last few years before the present war, there were special reasons for this, not connected with the natural economic development of the area within the frontiers of Germany. In the Opole area coal production rose from 11.1 million tons in 1913 to 26.0 million in 1938. Steel production, which amounted to 355,000 tons in 1913, rose to 482,000 tons in 1937. The cause of this increase in production was Germany's re-armament, which was begun on a great scale when Hitler came to power. Only as a base for armaments production has Upper Silesia ever had any reason for existence within the German Reich. In times of peace it can expand naturally and organically only in connection with Poland and South-Eastern Europe.

In his introduction to a work published at Breslau in 1942, Dr. Kurt von Eichborn* discusses the reasons why the Silesian industry failed to keep pace with the development of Western German industry in the nineteenth century. He says: "Since the days of the Congress of Vienna, which transformed the map of Europe, the development of the iron industry in Silesia failed to keep pace with the development of western industry. . . . It was after this period that Silesian transit trade received its final and mortal blow. By the inclusion in Austria of the city of Cracow, which

* Dr. Kurt von Eichborn. Introduction to the book "Schlesien in der Zeitwende—Ein Weckruf," published by "Universitätsbund." Breslau, p. 13.

down to 1846 had been a free city, Silesia was deprived of its last hinterland."

This statement implies that Silesia is economically bound up with the Polish hinterland, and further that Silesia suffered a serious blow to its economic development by being deprived of all possibilities of expansion in that direction. Even earlier than this, leading representatives of Silesian economic life had realized the close economic bonds existing between industrial Upper Silesia and Poland, as well as the necessity for the area's economic expansion in an easterly direction. During the First World War the German Chamber of Commerce at Opole and the German Mining and Foundry Association in Katowice, which was headed by the Privy Councillor Williger, the greatest authority on Upper Silesia's industry during that period, drew up several confidential memoranda pointing out that the development of Upper Silesia's industry depended upon such a solution of the "Polish Question" as would correspond to the interests of Germany, especially of Upper Silesia. These memoranda were intended for the Reich Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, and the German Supreme Command. Despite their confidential nature, copies were left behind in Czesochowa by the German occupying authorities during the revolution of 1918 and were found there by the Polish authorities.

One of these memoranda, namely that addressed by the Chamber of Commerce to the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, in July 1917, contains the following passage*: "In view of the unfavourable situation of Upper Silesia's industrial district, Poland will remain an exceedingly important factor, one might almost say an irreplaceable one, in its economic development. If Upper Silesia did not make full use of Poland for any length of time, its industry would be forced to a standstill (*stocken*) and its value for the recovery and development of the German Reich would steadily decrease."

* The memorandum is quoted in "Upper Silesia," edited by the Polish Research Centre, London, p. 27. A reproduction of its title-page is facing p. 48.

4. A BASIS FOR GERMAN ARMAMENTS

The industry of Upper Silesia does not naturally gravitate toward Germany, nor possesses normal conditions of development within Germany's frontiers; it was unable to meet the competition of the Ruhr Valley. Nevertheless, the industry of Upper Silesia has always had the support of German Governments, because of its importance in terms of armaments. Even in the eighteenth century it was the armaments base for contemporary Prussia. In his article "Der Gau Oberschlesien," Gerhard Boberski writes: "Frederick the Great first and foremost paid particular attention to the iron industry. The requirements of the Silesian fortresses and the Prussian army were the deciding factors in the construction of some royal foundries in this area. The newly-built establishments soon gained considerable fame as the Prussian armourers' workshops (*Waffenschmiede*)."* Silesian industry played a similar part during the Wars of Liberation (1812-13) and also helped to equip the Prussian army during the conflicts with Denmark, Austria and France in 1864, 1866, and 1870-71.

Silesian industry acquired a particular importance in the sphere of the armaments industry in the years preceding and during the First World War. One of the above-mentioned memoranda presented by the Opole Chamber of Commerce to Bethmann-Hollweg during the last war stressed the importance of the area for war industry. It contains the following passage†: "The importance of Upper Silesia's industry not only in peace-time economy, but above all in war-time economy—which it will possess in even greater measure in the future—cannot be in the least doubted after three years of war. It will not be too much to point out that it would be impossible for Germany to carry on the war with its considerable demands for industrial products in the most varied spheres of military technique if the industry of Upper Silesia was unable to aid the German nation in meeting the needs of the war to the full."

More light is thrown on this statement by comparing the production-figures for coal in Upper Silesia during the various years of

* Boberski, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

† Wierzbicki, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-101.

Lud. V. S. 4. 10.



Streng vertraulich

Das Interesse Oberschlesiens an der Zukunft Polens.

Überreicht durch

die Handelskammer für den Regierungsbezirk Oppeln
in Oppeln.

Der Vorsitzende:


Vergrat Dt. Ing. h. c. Billiger-Katowia.

Der Syndikus

Laubrichter a. D. G. Stoephasius.

Oppeln.

Julii 1912



MPK.

Map No. 4

the War 1914-18. Before the war the figure was about 22 per cent* of the total German production; in 1910 the total coal production of Germany amounted to 152,828,000 tons, of which Upper Silesia accounted for 34,461,000 tons. During the war the proportion rose to about 26 per cent (in 1915-25.95; in 1916-26.21). This increasing importance was revealed even more clearly by an analysis of production over the years between the First and Second World Wars, and during the present war.

In 1913 Opole Silesia had a production of 11.1 million tons of coal. Germany attempted to compensate herself for her loss of the Polish part of Upper Silesia by increasing production in Opole Silesia. In 1929 it reached the figure of 22 million tons. During the world economic crisis production fell to 15.3 million tons in 1932, but from Hitler's coming to power and the beginning of German re-armament on a large scale it showed a continual rise. In 1934, for instance, 17.4 million tons of coal were hewn; in 1935, 19 million; in 1936, 21.1 million; in 1937, 24.5 million; in 1938, 26 millions. A similar development may be observed with regard to steel. In 1913 Opole Silesia had an output of 355,000 tons of steel; in 1929, 534,000; in 1932, only 176,000; but in 1937, 482,000.

It must be noted that only in situations favourable to armaments production does there occur a considerable increase in Silesian production. This confirms the part played by the area as a basis for war industry, and completely justifies the phrase which is used more and more frequently by Germans, when they speak of Upper Silesia as "one of the largest armourers' workshops of the Great German Reich" (*Eine der grössten Waffenschmieden des Grossdeutschen Reiches*).†

For obvious reasons the Germans are not publishing the figures of Silesian production during the present war. But in recent German Press and propaganda the part played by Silesia is continually being stressed. Its part is all the greater, since the former potential of

* The figures are taken from the "Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften." Jena, 1923, vol. 5, p. 762.

† "Die Gebote des Raumes," article in the "Kattowitzer Zeitung," March 9, 1941.

German Upper Silesia has been greatly increased by the German occupation of the neighbouring industrial areas of Poland, and by the unification of the entire field in a single administrative and economic unit for the purpose, of course, of still greater exploitation of that industry for German military necessities. The production figures for the years of the present war are not known. But from various publications it can be deduced that they have risen, and that the productive capacity of the various industrial establishments is being exploited to the utmost. The German Press has indicated more than once that coal production in the area, which amounted to some 73 million tons in 1938, reached close to a hundred million in 1941, i.e. a growth of close on 37 per cent.*

Such a greatly increased coal output, and also the frequent notes in the German Press on the war-time development of the coal by-product and chemical industries in Upper Silesia, seem to suggest that here too has begun the production of that highly important war-time fuel, synthetic petrol. All this testifies to the enormous war potential of the great Silesian field, now being fully exploited by Germany. By the end of 1940 Erwin Koch, the economic expert of the "Kattowitzer Zeitung," wrote the following passage in that newspaper expounding the importance of the Polish part of Silesia for war industry†: "Eastern Upper Silesia is already playing an outstanding part in supplying the Reich with coal, zinc, iron and lead. Although this area still calls for the solution of a number of problems, it already makes an extremely important contribution to the German war economy." Fritz Bracht, *Gauleiter* of Upper Silesia, made this comment in the German periodical "Der Vierjahresplan": "Coming to the military-economic aspect of the problem, it must be definitely stated that in the future also the army will never renounce an iron-working industry in the East as

* "Breslauer Neuste Nachrichten," May 18, 1941: "... The united mining areas of the East will reach a production of 100 million tons this year." "Der Deutsche Volkswirt," No. 39, June 27, 1941: article by E. Koch entitled "Oberschlesische Wirtschaft": "To-day . . . production is not too far from the limit of 100 million tons," pp. 1378-9.

† "Bewährung der kriegsverpflichteten Wirtschaft," in the "Kattowitzer Zeitung," No. 360, December 31, 1940.

a balancing factor to the West."* Recently also "The Times" has stressed that Upper Silesia plays an important part in German armament-production during the war.†

The importance of Silesia for war industry must be measured not only by its enormous productive possibilities, but also by the fact that its geographical position is very favourable if war breaks out between Germany and Great Britain or other States of Western Europe.

From yet another consideration the entire area of Silesia, particularly Upper Silesia, is of considerable importance to Prussia and Germany. Silesia constitutes a wedge driven deeply into the Slavonic lands, for, on the south it borders Bohemia and on the north ethnographically Polish land. This tract of land has always been used by the Prussians as a starting point and strategic base in the wars waged against Prussia's southern or eastern neighbours, e.g. against Austria and Russia. Frederick the Great used Silesia as such a base during his Silesian wars against Maria Theresa. The decisive battles preceding Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig in 1813 were fought on Silesian soil.

During the First World War Silesia played an important part in the Central Powers campaign against Russia. For a long period Kaiser Wilhelm's headquarters were at Pszczyna (Pless) in Polish Upper Silesia, and for some time the Austrian High Command had its headquarters at Teschen. At the beginning of the Second World War, Silesia occupied an important position as a starting point for the German armies in their attack on Poland. In the first few days of the war the outflanking of Poland from the south played a large part in deciding the final course of the German campaign. If left in German hands Silesia will always constitute a dangerous wedge between Poland and Czechoslovakia, militarily threatening both States.

* "Oberschlesien als Standort einer Eisen schaffenden Industrie," article in "Der Vierjahresplan," April 20, 1941.

† "New German Arsenal—Factories in Upper Silesia," article in "The Times" of October 1, 1943.

5. THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF SILESIA AS INDICATED IN GERMAN STATEMENTS AND ACTUAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

After the Germans had occupied the whole of the Great Upper Silesian Field in 1939, they set to work first and foremost to restart all the industrial establishments and to increase production to the utmost possible extent. The immediate object of this policy was to bring the entire Silesian industry within the orbit of German war economy, and to transform the area into a powerful armaments centre for the Third Reich. In addition to these emergency needs dictated by the requirements of the war, certain tendencies began to reveal themselves from the very first days of the German occupation. The measures applied show the existence of far-reaching plans for the development of Silesian industry and disclose the economic role which Germany has assigned to the industrial centre of Upper Silesia in her New European Order. Political motives also contributed much to the great attention which the Germans paid to the future economic development of that area. For political reasons they desired to exploit its industry, as an effective means of completely Germanizing the Polish population.

After the German annexation of the Polish industrial areas shortly after the outbreak of the present war, Upper Silesia's industrial potential was increased several times when compared with that of 1914. Not only were the mines, foundries and factories of the Dabrowa, the Cracow and the Teschen Silesia fields linked up with Silesia, but in addition the productive capacity of the various establishments had been greatly increased since 1918, as the result of extensive investments and technical developments on both sides of the German-Polish frontier. Therefore, if Silesian industry, with its pre-1914 smaller territorial range and economic scope, had difficulty in disposing of its products, the difficulties confronting it in the future should be far greater. For now much more coal and iron had to be disposed of on the German market, already saturated with the products of Western German industry. Yet, the German propagandists and Upper Silesia's *Gauleiter* Bracht declare in unison that the industrial establishments of Upper Silesia will be

greatly extended, and that after the present war the Great Upper Silesian Field can expect a brilliant future.

The answer to the fundamental question which occurs to every student of Silesia's economic relations, is to be found in a number of recent German publications and announcements. All express one single idea: hitherto, they agree, Upper Silesia has been cut off from its natural hinterland in the East, and so it has not had any possibilities of development. Now the "victorious German army" has opened up an enormous hinterland in the East, and Upper Silesia can expand in that direction as well as obtain the raw materials necessary for its industry.

That is the guiding thought expressed in various ways by German propagandists, economists, and Nazi officials. For instance, Walter Greiff, in an article entitled "Raumordnung und Wirtschaftsplanung in Oberschlesien" ("Space Ordering and Economic Planning in Upper Silesia"), published in the "Deutsche Monatshefte," writes as follows: "For the first time in all its history, so full of suffering, the Upper Silesian district may be granted the place which is its due. Its development, hitherto turned perforce in a westerly direction, involving a struggle with the economically stronger Ruhr Valley, will now be able to proceed in an easterly and south-easterly direction."*

In the winter of 1940-41 a series of lectures was organized by the University and the Chamber of Commerce of Breslau. The lectures were devoted to the new role of Upper Silesia. Later they were published as a book.† One of the lecturers, Dr. Erich Obst, delivered an address on December 16, 1940, in which he discussed the present expansion possibilities of Silesia. In the course of his remarks he said: "Here and here alone in Silesia is there a possibility of linking up communications between the Baltic Sea, the Danubian basin, and the Balkans. Hence is also the possibility of a far-reaching radiation towards the north-east, the east and the south-east." Later he said: "Now Silesia has again obtained access to all the roads running easterly, and as a result a mighty development awaits it."

* "Deutsche Monatshefte," April-June 1942, p. 428.

† "Schlesien in der Zeitwende—Ein Weckruf," op. cit., pp. 24, 32.

In the book two maps are given illustrating the lecture. The first map shows how Silesia is cut off from the east, and what limited possibilities of communication she has with Central Germany. Of course this map refers only to the German part of Upper Silesia, but it is well known that all Upper Silesia as it existed in 1914 was just as much cut off from its eastern hinterland by a frontier barrier and that, as already shown, the possibilities of expansion in the direction of Germany were greatly restricted and difficult. On the other hand, the second map shows Silesia "freed" from her frontier bonds. In it her lines of communication reach far to the east and south-east of Europe.

Finally, Fritz Bracht, *Gauleiter*, has discussed the disposal of Upper Silesia's coal in an article entitled "Industriegau Oberschlesien," published in a German periodical. He writes: "Exports may be directed . . . to Italy, Hungary and the Balkan States, *those natural export markets.*"* At the end of the article he expressly declares that "the new continental situation of the Upper Silesian industrial area, therefore, creates conditions undoubtedly rendering possible a great development of the area."

All these statements express the one fundamental idea which governs all the German measures in this economic sphere. Only he who has not only Upper Silesia, but also Eastern Europe at his command can guarantee Upper Silesia's economic development. At present the Germans are masters of the entire European continent, and so present-day Germany, in contradistinction to the Germany of 1914, can guarantee Upper Silesia the prosperity which previously was unobtainable. But by these very assertions, the Germans of to-day, like those of the last war, admit that the only natural hinterland for the area is Poland and South-Eastern Europe, and that in association only with Poland and close economic co-operation with other countries of South-Eastern Europe can Silesian economic life develop normally.

The gravitation of the Silesian coal-field towards Poland and South-Eastern Europe, and the necessity in future to bind Silesia closely with that part of the European continent are also emphasized

* "Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft," No. 28, October 1, 1941, pp. 1123-24.

in a recent book by a prominent British geographer, Robert Dickinson.* He writes: "The coal-field as a whole was developed mainly by Germany before 1919, but Silesia, too isolated effectively to compete with the products of the Ruhr, finds its chief markets in the Vistula and Danube lands. Before 1919, German authorities used this argument to justify claims for the incorporation of Congress Poland in Germany. Since 1919, Silesian coal and industries have become vital to the economic existence of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Silesia is the only important source of coal and coke in the whole of East-Central Europe, and it has great reserves. Its iron and steel industries depend on supplies of iron-ore from Scandinavia, Czechoslovakia and Austria. Thus, the New Order of the United Nations must provide both for the unity of the 'Black Country' of Upper Silesia itself, and for the free flow of goods to and from the States of East Central Europe."

That there is a special economic link between Silesia and the central Polish areas, and that it is necessary to render primarily those Polish areas accessible as part of the natural hinterland for the Upper Silesia field, is confirmed by the practical steps taken by the German authorities in the second year of Germany's occupation of Poland. Immediately after the close of operations in Poland the Germans incorporated the Polish western provinces, including Polish Silesia and the neighbouring industrial areas of the Dabrowa district and the Cracow province, in the Reich, setting up a new frontier between "Germany" and the "General Government." This frontier was not only a political, but also a customs and currency barrier. After twelve months' experience the Germans came to the conclusion that the forced customs and currency regulations had to be relaxed, for economic life in Silesia was failing to function normally because of the difficulties and hindrances arising through its separation from its natural hinterland. Consequently, on February 11, 1941, a German decree permitted the transport of various kinds of commodities to the General Government without the previous permission of the currency and foreign bills department,†

* Robert E. Dickinson, "The German Lebensraum." London, 1943, p. 212.

† "Berliner Börsen Zeitung," No. 82, February 19, 1941.

among the commodities affected being coal and coke from Silesia.

In the summer of 1941 economic conferences between representatives from Upper Silesia and the General Government were held in Katowice. The conference discussed the need for a further relaxation of the customs regulations and the development of transport and communications. A note reporting one of these conferences, published in the "Krakauer Zeitung," No. 163, of July 5, 1941, stated that it had been agreed that "in the sphere of passport regulations and economic communications there must be an improvement in the situation existing hitherto, if the close mutual interlocking of the two areas is not to be exposed to disturbances." Finally, the "Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland" for December 2, 1941,* reported that from that same date the customs frontier between the General Government and the Reich, including Upper Silesia, was abolished completely. All these steps express the Germans' realization that Upper Silesia is closely bound up economically with the rest of Poland.

Most recently there appeared in the "Krakauer Zeitung"† an article stressing the close economic links between Upper Silesia and the General Government. There we read: ". . . But not only is Upper Silesia a whole for the first time in its history, it is also the first time that it has a natural hinterland open to it, so that it is able to extend its energies unchecked in all directions. . . . The General Government is a natural market for the heavy industry of Upper Silesia."

In yet another sphere Germany has recognized Upper Silesia's economic dependence on Poland and her southern neighbours. In order to exploit fully all the by-products of coal and to supply "the entire German East" (*den gesamten deutschen Ostraum*) with electricity, a new limited company‡ was formed in 1941, under the title of *Bergbau-Elektrizitäts-A.G. Oberschlesien*. This new company aims at an increased output of electrical current for the central

* "Dziennik Polski," No. 784, January 29, 1943.

† "Krakauer Zeitung," September 30, 1943 (quoted from "News Digest," October 21, 1943).

‡ The size and capacity of this company is mentioned on p. 39.

areas of Poland. In an article on the formation of the company one German periodical writes: "The areas of the new provinces of Wartheland, West-Prussia, and also East-Prussia, the whole General Government in the east, the Sudetenland, the Czech-Moravian Protectorate, and finally the so-called Ostmark in the south and south-east, together with Vienna, which is highly industrialized and is only 250 kilometres from the Silesian field, are now wholly or to a large extent the undoubted economic marketing area for Upper Silesia's coal,"* revealing that the Germans fully realize the direction in which Upper Silesia can obtain a natural expansion, and the economic area to which it belongs.

6. UPPER SILESIA'S LINES OF COMMUNICATION

The Germans recognize that the economic future of the Upper Silesia field is closely linked up with its hinterland in the east and south-east of Europe. At the moment this hinterland is accessible to Silesia. If, unlike the situation prior to 1914, the Germans were to retain their present conquests, they could in future count on the exploitation of the natural wealth of the area, since they have at their disposal both Silesia and all Central-Eastern Europe. But *ipso facto* German experts also admit that Upper Silesia is neither necessary to the normal economic development of the Third Reich, nor belongs to the German economic *Lebensraum*, but forms an economic unit with Poland and the other countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and, because of its extensive coal deposits, constitutes an important and irreplaceable industrial basis for that unit.

The practical steps taken by the German occupying authorities in Silesia encourage the province's trend towards an easterly expansion. Their plans for the development of communications in this and the neighbouring areas, particularly the development of waterways, call for special attention.

The Upper Silesia field lies in the upper reaches of the Oder and the Vistula. The Danube flows not a great distance away. These three rivers—the Oder and Vistula, flowing into the Baltic, and the

* "Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung," No. 266, November 12, 1941, article entitled "Oberschlesischer Strom für den deutschen Ostraum."

Danube, flowing into, the Black Sea—constitute natural lines of communication for all this area. The relatively great attention, under war-time conditions, which the Germans have given to the problem of regulating the Vistula and its tributaries, is explained by their anxiety for the future economic development of Upper Silesia: the regulating of the Vistula is to be a means of facilitating the accomplishment of Silesia's task of economically radiating into Eastern Europe. The German plans, discussed by German economists, are not new plans at all. They follow Polish plans, which were partially carried out during Poland's twenty years of independence. The Germans are simply continuing unfinished Polish constructional works, or modifying Polish plans in order to adapt them to the inland navigation system of the pre-war German Reich.

The plan for the development of waterways which the Germans proclaim and have to some extent already realized consists of three parts:

1. The completion and enlargement of the dams built by Poland at Roznow on the Dunajec and at Porabka on the Sola (Southern Poland). These dams were planned as local constructional works for the regulation of the Vistula and its tributaries, and also to form reservoirs with the object of utilizing water power for the generation of electricity.
2. The regulation of the Vistula and its tributaries;
3. The construction of a number of canals to link up the Silesian Field with the Oder-Vistula-Danube river system.

Of the various canals planned, the Germans towards the end of 1939 completed one called the Adolf Hitler Kanal, which links the Oder near Kozle with the coal-field of Opole Silesia at Gliwice. This canal had been under construction for some years, and was based on the enlargement and extension of the old Klodnicki canal, which had been built as early as 1792. In order to ship coal as well as iron and steel manufactures a great port was developed at Gliwice, utilizing water transport for the distribution of a large part of the local production.

Previously the Upper Silesia Field, unlike that of the Ruhr, had

been unable to make use of water transport, which, as is well known, greatly reduces transport costs. In 1913 only 5 per cent of the goods turnover of the Upper Silesia Field were transported by inland waterways.* The new Hitler Canal is intended to eliminate this disadvantage. However its usefulness as a waterway leading to the Baltic as well as Central and Western Germany will remain rather slight, for the river Oder is not sufficiently navigable to enable its use. In his introduction to Wende's book, Kurt Widenfeld writes: "It will be a difficult matter to develop the Oder into such a serviceable waterway as by its aid to greatly reduce freight charges and to extend considerably the marketing of Silesian industry."†

This canal, however, will be useful for the transport of Upper Silesia commodities down the middle and lower Oder towards Central Germany and the Baltic, but even more for South-Eastern Europe. The Hitler Canal is only a small part of the great plan for developing waterways in this area, and its value largely depends on another canal from the Oder to the Danube, on which preliminary work is said to have been started. This canal, which binds up the Oder with the Danube, will be about 300 kilometres long‡ and opens a road for the transport of coal and other Silesian industrial products to the Danubian states and the Black Sea.

Simultaneously with the Oder-Danube canal the Germans are considering not only the regulation of the Vistula and its tributaries, but also the possibility of realizing old Polish plans to link up the river San with the Dniester and the Dniester with the Pruth by means of canals. The object is to create a second waterway to the Black Sea, so that one runs *via* the Danube, and the other *via* the Vistula-San-Dniester-Pruth. To complete these basic plans, which in the more distant future were to be complemented by canals linking the Oder with the Warta and by the development of

* von Borcke, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

† Dr. Gerhard Wende, "Die Auswirkungen der Grenzziehung auf die Oberschlesische Montanindustrie." Introduction by Kurt Widenfeld, "Zu Oberschlesiens Not." Stuttgart, 1932, p. 8.

‡ Dr. Hans F. Zeck, "Die deutsche Wirtschaft und Südost Europa." Leipzig-Berlin, 1939, p. 78.

the Warta canal through the river Goplo with the Vistula, it is proposed to cut a canal between the Oder and the Vistula.*

From Kozle (see map facing p. 64) the new canal would run parallel with the Adolf Hitler Kanal to Gliwice, then it would turn northward from Mikolow, south of Murcki, cutting the rivers Przemsza and Vistula and following the southern bank of the latter river to Cracow. From this canal a branch would run from Imielin to Myslowice near Katowice, where the plan is to build a second large coal port, similar to Gliwice, to serve the eastern part of the Upper Silesia coal-field. Thus, the Silesian field would be served by two waterways, one on the west to the Oder, one on the east to the Vistula, opening the routes from Silesia to central Poland, the Baltic and the Black Sea, the Danubian countries and the Balkans. Writing on these plans Fritz Bracht says: "By building the Oder-Danube canal, which might be completed in 1946; and by carrying out other plans for canals, which are to link up Upper Silesia with the Elbe and the Vistula, the position of the iron industry in Upper Silesia will be made much easier, both in regard to bringing in raw materials, especially iron ore and scrap-iron, and to marketing of its commodities. In consequence production will be cheapened."†

By waterways Upper Silesia's economic expansion will be facilitated in the direction of Poland and South-Eastern Europe, because Silesia has there opportunities of exploiting its natural wealth and industrial potential. These German views on the question of waterways provide a further argument for attaching Upper Silesia to the Polish economic area, and confirm the fact that there are no close economic bonds between Silesia and the German ethnographical areas.

What has been said of waterways can also be said of roads and railways. Several of the most important roads in Europe cross Silesia, especially two ancient highroads known even to the Romans.‡ One ran from the south through the Moravian Gate to

* "Berliner Börsen Zeitung," No. 372, August 12, 1941; article by Arthur Zmarzly, "Im Netz der Strassen, Oberschlesische Verkehrspolitik."

† "Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft," No. 128, October 1, 1941; article entitled "Industriegau Oberschlesien," p. 1123.

‡ Wiktor Nechay, "Śląsk jako region geograficzny." Katowice, 1935, p. 14.

the Baltic Sea, the other ran from the north-west to the south-east along the Sudeten mountains to Cracow and Lwow. Both roads linked up Silesia with Poland. In later centuries the construction of metalled roads followed the lines of these two highroads, always linking Silesia with its natural Polish hinterland. At Bogumin, one of the most highly important railway junctions in Europe, railway lines from Western Europe and Berlin, to Cracow, Lwow, Bucharest, Kiev and Odessa intersect with lines running from Trieste, Belgrade, Budapest, and Vienna in the direction of Moscow and Leningrad. Silesia's railways clearly testify to its communications with Poland, and South-Eastern Europe, and provide further evidence for the argument that its economic connections are primarily with Poland.

7. UPPER SILESIA, THE NATURAL COAL AND INDUSTRIAL BASE FOR POLAND AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

From the foregoing, certain deductions must be made going beyond the limited sphere of any particular branch of industrial production, and concerning the economic relations of Silesia, Poland, and all South-Eastern Europe.

In post-war Europe the idea receiving ever greater emphasis is that there must be lasting economic co-operation among the States situated in any single area, and linked together by a mutual community of interests. Detailed proposals are being made for the formation of great economic blocs in Europe, each having adequate economic strength, and, therefore being able to fulfil the political role which the future security of Europe will demand from it. In particular the proposal for permanent economic and political co-operation among the States of East-Central Europe, united in a single or several interlocking, co-operating federations, is coming more and more to the forefront. The countries in question all possess a similar economic structure. In all of them agriculture predominates, and industry, except in the case of Czechoslovakia, is poorly developed. Certain countries are rich in valuable and important raw materials; Poland possesses great reserves of coal, Poland and Yugoslavia possess zinc and lead, Rumania and Poland oil,

while the other countries have such raw materials as iron, copper, manganese, magnesite, etc.

All these countries are linked with one another by convenient communications, and though some are not yet properly opened up, they will certainly afford great facilities after a constructional work has been carried out, chiefly in regard to waterways and roads. Almost all the countries concerned have so far offered their inhabitants only a low standard of living, despite their abounding natural wealth. These low standards have been caused by a one-sided agriculture, and the absence of industry, especially manufacturing. Most of their raw materials were sent abroad. The misfortune common to all these States has been their one-sided exploitation by Germany, who sought to turn Eastern and South-Eastern Europe into a kind of colony, extracting raw materials and cheap agricultural produce, paying low prices for goods bought and then mainly not in cash, but by supplying her own expensive machinery and ready-made industrial commodities.

The German export trade to the south-eastern countries of Europe is of long standing. The old idea of a railway line from Berlin through Turkey to Baghdad, which achieved such notoriety in the days of Wilhelm II, was one of the classic examples of German expansionist policy, with an ultimate threat to the British Empire. After the First World War Germany exploited the *impasse* in which the States of Western Europe found themselves, and renewed her economic pressure in the same direction, once more threatening British domination in the Mediterranean. In 1935 German exports in terms of value to the States of South-Eastern Europe—were 471·4 million German marks, thus constituting 10 per cent of the total value of German exports.* By 1937 the figure had risen to 940·5 million marks, and was 16 per cent of Germany's total exports. The sum was made up of 134·4 million marks in exports to Yugoslavia, 129·5 million marks in exports to Rumania, and about 110 million marks in exports to each of the three States: Turkey, Greece and Hungary. In 1937 40 per cent of all Turkey's imports came from Germany, whereas Great Britain accounted for

* Dr. Hans F. Zeck, op. cit., pp. 102 and 66.

only 6 per cent. Thus these countries, so largely dependent upon Germany, became an easy prey to Hitler.

The future of these countries is linked by three factors:

1. The task of emancipating themselves from Germany's economic hegemony.
2. The need to reconstruct their social and economic system by industrializing their countries and so increasing the wealth of their inhabitants;
3. The consciousness of their common danger from German aggression, making it necessary for them to co-operate with one another to avoid the mistakes and sacrifices of the past.

In the light of this common past and the common aims for the future Upper Silesia, the only great coal-field of the entire area, acquires particular importance for this part of Europe, especially when steps are taken to realize the indispensable postulate that this part of the European continent must be industrialized.

Germany is an over-industrialized country. She produces more industrial articles than are required by her own people, and more than are needed for a healthy export trade. This hyper-industrialized structure of Germany was one of the main causes for her economic conquest of the neighbouring countries, and the basis of German political expansion. It was a source of the further German aggression—the second in twenty-five years—against a Europe as helpless as in 1914. The existence of a constant economic expansion of Germany at the expense of less powerful States is admitted by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in its pamphlet "The Problem of Germany," which reads: "As Germany is the most powerful economic unit in Europe, and has developed highly the art of subordinating the economy of others to her own, the reintegration of most of Europe into her system is in that event to be expected, unless Britain, America and Russia take steps to relieve the weaker States of their dependence on Germany as 'sole buyer.'"^{*}

If Europe is to have peace Germany must be deprived of the possibility of provoking another war; her industrial potential must

^{*} "The Problem of Germany—An Interim Report by a Chatham House Study Group." London, 1943, p. 44.


be restricted and her war industry destroyed, while modifying the structure of the rest of her industry so that it cannot be made to serve war purposes.

The industry of Opole Silesia constitutes an important addition to Germany's industrial balance. Silesian industry is not necessary to peace-time Germany, and in regard to communications and economics it gravitates exclusively towards Poland and South-Eastern Europe. The coal and industrial products of Silesia failed to stand up to the competition of western German industry in the central areas of Germany, or even in Berlin, which is not very far from Silesia. The existence and the doubtful profitability of Silesian industry were secured only by means of reduced railway rates, low interest-bearing credits, export bonuses, and taxation reliefs, granted liberally by successive German Governments.

Within the borders of Germany Silesian industry has fulfilled only one single role: to benefit Germany. It was a powerful centre of armaments industry and a sally-port for the economic domination of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.


It will be in the interest of European security and peace, as well as Silesian industry and the Silesian people, if the area is attached to Poland, to which it is linked naturally by economic and traffic connections, and with which it has been bound ethnically from time immemorial by a common language, culture, and national instinct. The attachment of Silesia to Poland will make it accessible as a coal supplies base to the countries situated between the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Adriatic without these States becoming economically dependent on Poland. On the contrary it would enable them to develop their own industry swiftly, thus approximating at least to some degree their living standards to those of Western European States.

Such a solution of the problem would, furthermore, give security to British interests in the eastern part of the Mediterranean basin, for that security depends largely on the area's being permanently free of German influences in South-Eastern Europe.



MPK.

Map No. 5



Map No. 6

Language Frontiers in Upper and Middle Silesia according to the German scholar, Dr. Joseph Partsch (Reproduction)

Chapter Three

UPPER SILESIA POLISH BY NATIONALITY STATISTICS

I. POPULATION CENSUSES DURING THE NINETEENTH AND THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

When two hundred years ago Frederick the Great occupied all Silesia, both Upper and Lower, it was Polish. But intense colonization and other measures caused a swift process of Germanization, especially in Lower Silesia. After his conquests the boundaries of the Polish linguistic area began to shift rapidly east. In the nineteenth century it still extended considerably beyond the frontiers of Upper Silesia, reaching as far as Breslau and embracing almost the whole of Silesia lying along the right bank of the Oder north of that city. In one of his books Dr. Karl Weinhold, professor of Breslau, discussed in detail the range of the Polish language towards the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. He mentions a letter written by Goethe's friend Charlotte von Stein to Charlotte von Scholler on May 9, 1803.* At the time Frau von Stein was staying on her son's estate in the county of Breslau. She wrote enthusiastically of the Polish songs sung by the village youngsters, thus confirming the Polish character of the environs of that city.

Dr. Joseph Partsch, professor of geography at Breslau, in his book on Silesia published in 1896, wrote: "In Upper Silesia the linguistic frontier has not shifted to any large extent, but in Central Silesia (around Breslau) an extensive area which Frederick had left half-Polish, has been Germanized in this century. Certain zones which at that time were still entirely Polish have been won to Germanism."†

Not so long ago, even in this century, the Polish language was commonly heard in Breslau, especially on market days, when the

* Dr. Karl Weinhold, "Die Verbreitung und Herkunft der Deutschen in Schlesien." Stuttgart, 1887, p. 189.

† Dr. Joseph Partsch, "Schlesien, eine Landeskunde für das deutsche Volk auf wissenschaftlicher Grundlage." Breslau, 1896, vol. 1, p. 364.

local farmers drove to town. This is confirmed by Dr. Robert Dickinson, who writes: "In 1790 Breslau was still largely Polish in speech, and the Oder still forms the approximate border between German and Polish speech."*

Partsch published a map illustrating how far the border of the Polish language had shifted east by 1890 in comparison with 1790. According to this map the eighteenth century territory with a Polish majority included the south-eastern areas of Breslau, the Olawa (Ohlau) district, almost all the Brzeg (Brieg) county, Namyslow (Namslau), Sycow (Gr. Wartenberg), Trzebnica (Treb-nitz) and other counties. Numerous other German maps dealing with nationalities at the end of the last and the beginning of the present century indicate a similar area for the Polish language. The extent to which the Germans themselves recognized that Upper Silesia was Polish in character is indicated by Johannes Ziekursch, who reproduces a map illustrating his division of Upper Silesia into four economic zones: Northern Silesia, Central Silesia, Polish Silesia and the "Frontier Zone Silesia" (*Grenzstreifen*).† According to him "Polish Silesia" comprises the whole of Upper Silesia, except the counties of Glupczyce (Leobschütz), Prudnik (Neustadt), Grotkow (Grottkau) and Niemodlin (Falkenberg). On the other hand, he includes in "Polish Silesia" the counties of Sycow and Namyslow lying on the border of Poznania (see map facing p. 65).

The official population censuses made by the Prussian authorities give some idea of the numerical relations of the nationalities in Upper Silesia, though the figures by no means reflect the true state of affairs, because of the way in which the polls were organized; but they do give an idea of the ratio between the German and Polish populations. The earliest census of the population of Upper Silesia was taken in 1828. Censuses taken during the last century were antiquated by present standards. Those dating from the beginning of the present century were more modern. Their interest lies in determining the nationality of the inhabitants. In earlier times the

* Dr. Robert Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

† Johanne Ziekursch, "Hundert Jahre schlesischer Agrargeschichte vom Hubertusburger Frieden bis zum Abschluss der Bauernbefreiung." Breslau, 1915.

family was the criterion of decision; the nationality of the head of the family, as given by the census official, decided the nationality of the members of the family and of the occupants of the house. In later censuses the nationality of every person of full age was established separately, on the basis of his or her personal statement—such at least was the stipulation. Formerly the nationality of individuals was registered in accordance with such statements as whether the person in question understood the German church service* or attended a Polish or German church. In recent decades the nationality column was replaced by a column headed mother-tongue (*Muttersprache*).

A work by the German, Richard Böckh, published in 1869, discussed the results of earlier censuses from the view of nationality.†

Year	Germans	Poles	Percentage of Poles
1828	255,383	418,437	62·1
1831	257,852	456,348‡	63·9
1840	330,099	525,395	62·9
1849	350,892	559,848	61·5
1861	409,218	665,865	61·9
1867	457,545	742,153	61·8

These figures show a rapid increase in the population of Upper Silesia—from some 670,000 in 1828 to close on 1,200,000 in 1867. But the proportion of Polish inhabitants remained approximately at the same level—over 60 per cent.

Later official population censuses made by the Prussian authorities

* Dr. Paul Weber, "Die Polen in Oberschlesien, eine statistische Untersuchung." Berlin, 1914, p. 10.

† Richard Böckh, "Der Deutschen Volkszahl und Sprachgebiet in den europäischen Staaten." Berlin, 1869, p. 240.

‡ In this table the figures for Poles in 1831 also include the Czech population living in Upper Silesia. R. Böckh does not give the total number of inhabitants in any given year. Using his figures as a basis for working out the percentage of Poles, the sum of the Polish and German population may be taken as equivalent to the total of inhabitants; this is not strictly accurate, for a large number of Czechs lived in Upper Silesia, in addition to the Poles.

showed but little difference regarding the proportion of Poles and Germans*:

Year	Germans	Poles	Percentage of Poles
1890	566,523	918,728	58.2
1900	684,397	1,048,230	56.1
1905	757,200	1,158,805	56.9

2. THE 1910 POPULATION CENSUS

The earlier censuses revealed the Polish character of Upper Silesia. The population census taken in 1910 confirmed it even more definitely, though the Prussian authorities did their utmost to achieve the most favourable results possible for Germany; this also applies to the earlier polls; in other words, they did their best to reduce the official figure of the Polish inhabitants. Thus, the results of this census, though useful, do not give a true objective picture. Polish influence was really much greater in Upper Silesia than the official figure suggested. The Germans themselves admit that the census was biased.

The most important difference, for the first time appreciably, in the 1910 census, was the appearance of the category of bi-lingual inhabitants. This class was introduced to diminish the absolute figure of Polish inhabitants. The German census authorities considered that any person who knew both Polish and German, and used the latter only in certain circumstances, was *ipso facto* thoroughly acquainted with both. By this date no Polish schools were left in Upper Silesia, and German was the official language, so that every person in the area was obliged to know German. Taking advantage of this, the officials when conducting the census suggested that both languages should be declared as the "mother-tongue." The implication was that if anyone gave German as one of his mother-tongues he could not be regarded as non-German;

* Weber, op. cit., p. 64. (The proportion of Poles as given by Weber is in relation to the total number of inhabitants.)

thus the German officials counted bilinguals as belonging to Germany. Dr. Paul Weber, however, did not hesitate to admit that "the colloquial language of the majority of bilinguals in Upper Silesia is Polish. If it was desired to split them up and to assign part of the bilinguals to each nationality, undoubtedly by far the greater majority would go to Poles."* This statement by a German, not distinguished for great sympathy towards Poles, fully justifies assigning all the bilinguals to the category of Poles.

An even more important factor in making census figures unfavourable to the Poles was the Prussian method of taking the census. Every inhabitant was bound to define his mother-tongue clearly on the census form. Remembering that the Polish inhabitants consisted mostly of poor working people, and that in most instances, they were dependent on their German employers, and considering the abnormal part played in the census propaganda by the German schools (in most cases the German teacher was the census official) it must be concluded that only the most strongly nationalistic and politically courageous individuals declared Polish their mother-tongue. Naturally as the pressure increased and the rigorous measures applied against those who were not "right-minded" grew more effective, the number of such individuals declined.

The tendentiousness of the German pre-1914 censuses is fully admitted by the eminent German economist and expert on Polish affairs, Dr. Ludwig Bernhard, from whom are taken several remarkable excerpts.† In principle the census form had to be filled up independently by the individual citizen. Bernhard admitted that the instructions of the authorities "leave no doubt that the population, especially in the rural districts, took little part in the census. This applies especially to districts with a Polish or Danish population who do not always understand the census forms, which are printed in German. It would be practically impossible for the people to

* Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

† All quotations from Bernhard are from his study "Die Fehlerquellen in der Statistik der Nationalitäten," by Dr. Ludwig Bernhard, professor of Political Science at Berlin University. This was published as an introduction to Weber's book, already quoted.

carry out the formalities of the census alone. Some authority would always have to intervene to check or complete the figures" (pp. xvi-xvii). In the first instance the census official (*Zähler*) was this checking and completing authority. The instructions to the official clearly laid down that:

"It was his duty to insist on the correction of false or incomplete entries or to do this himself on the spot. If the information given is obviously incorrect the census officer is to correct it forthwith. In cases of doubt about the information given as regards the mother-tongue he is to make special inquiries, if necessary, calling in the local police" (p. xviii).

The result of resorting to the local Prussian police authorities was obviously unfavourable to Poles, since . . . "in the heat of conflict concerning nationality, it is not easy to preserve cool impartiality, and, when the *Landrat* (local prefect) or the *Regierungspräsident* (head of district administration) regarded the census as a political weapon, the impartiality of the census officer was indeed sorely tried" (p. xviii).

Of particular importance was the fact that the task of census officer was usually performed by the local elementary teacher, who in every locality was a special factor in the Germanization programme. The teacher considered it not only his duty, but, above all, his interest to achieve the maximum results favourable to Germany, for: "an increase in the Germans or bilinguals at the expense of the Poles showed the success of German school training while the teacher could be charged with a decrease in the number of the bilinguals" (p. xviii).

From the following statement made by Dr. Bernhard it may be deduced that the political authorities undoubtedly exercised influence in favour of Germany: "Zeal in countering any Polish propaganda was intensified by the fact that the *Landrat* examined the census forms and the *Regierungspräsident* supervised the count. Thus it happened, that, as a *Landrat* expressed it, the census officers sometimes overshot the mark (*übers Ziel hinausgeschossen wird*). As soon as political factors begin to play a part, the political interests of such officials are involved. How greatly this has affected

the compilation of statistics on the mother-tongue cannot be doubted after the examples cited above" (p. xviii).

All the German population censuses, especially that of 1910 could therefore reflect only partially the true strength of the Polish element in Silesia, as elsewhere. During the 1910 census the Prussian authorities counted 2,207,981 inhabitants in the Opole Regency, i.e. Upper Silesia.* Of these 884,045 declared German their mother-tongue, 1,169,340 declared Polish theirs, and 88,798 gave both German and Polish as their mother-tongues (the bilinguals). These figures show the Polish inhabitants accounted for 53 per cent of the total population of Upper Silesia. If the bilinguals are added to the Polish list, there were 1,258,138 Poles as compared with 2,207,981 inhabitants of all nationalities in Upper Silesia, i.e. 57.0 per cent. Besides Poles and Germans, 65,798 persons of other nationalities lived in Upper Silesia, the majority being Czechs in the county of Glupczyce (Leobschütz) and the south-western part of the county of Raciborz (Ratibor).

If, despite all the methods used to achieve a different result, the census reveals so large a proportion of Poles, it may be imagined that the true figures for Poles in Upper Silesia were actually much higher. According to the 1910 census the Opole Regency had a population of 57.0 per cent Polish. At the date of the census there were 3,500,621 Poles in all Prussia. Weber writes: "A third of the total Polish population of the State of Prussia is living in the Opole Regency: both absolutely, and to an even higher degree relatively to the density of population, the Regency possesses the largest number of Poles of all the Regencies in the Prussian State."† This statement is all the more remarkable because it was always considered that the greatest concentration of Poles was in the province of Poznan, one of the oldest and most thoroughly Polish provinces, its Polish character never being questioned by contemporary Prussian authorities, nor by any important German investigator.

The Opole Regency, however, is not homogeneous in regard to the density of its Polish population. According to Weber, the

* All figures relating to the 1910 census are taken from Weber.

† Weber, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

number of Poles (exclusive of bilinguals) living on the right bank of the Oder, the chief centres of Polish population, was 1,020,000, or 61·5 per cent of the total inhabitants.* As already noted, the chief centres of German influence in Upper Silesia were the towns, colonized in the distant past, but specially subjected to a process of Germanization in the last century during the period of industrial development. Weber made a distinction between the urban and the rural population. According to the 1910 census there were 126,471 Poles (exclusive of bilinguals) in the towns as compared with 395,736 Germans, Poles thus constituted 22·5 per cent of the total urban inhabitants. But the chief concentration of Polish population was in the rural areas, surrounding the German urban areas; there were 1,042,869 Poles, or 63·1 per cent of the total population of Upper Silesia, as compared with 488,309 Germans.

The Polish character of Upper Silesia and the range and density of the Polish population as far as the left bank of the Oder are clearly revealed in two maps Weber included in his work disclosing results of the 1910 population census in the towns and rural areas of Upper Silesia, county by county.† These maps reflect the state of affairs only as shown by the official, tendentious German statistics. The prejudicial tendency of the 1910 census is especially obvious the moment it is compared with the German school statistics of 1911. According to "Preussische Statistik"‡ nearly three-quarters of the children attending the elementary schools in the Regency of Opole in 1911 were Polish, whereas the census of 1910 indicated 53 per cent and together with bilinguals only 57·0 Poles.

3. LANGUAGE AS A TEST OF NATIONALITY

The results of the polls taken in Upper Silesia before the First World War were so obviously favourable to the Poles that it was difficult for the Germans to deny the Polish character. In their

* Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 13 and 55, table II.

† A photographic reproduction of one of these maps is facing p. 72.

‡ "Preussische Statistik, 231: Das niedere Schulwesen in Preussen," Berlin, 1912.

Stärke der polnischen Bevölkerung in den Kreisen des Reg.-Bez. Oppeln.

I. Gesamtbevölkerung der Kreise.

Nach der Volkszählung vom 1. XII 1910



Map No. 7

Percentage of Poles in Upper Silesia according to Professor Paul Weber
(Reproduction)



Map No. 8

Regional Economic Divisions of the Silesia Province according to the German author, Dr. Johannes Ziekursch, 1915 (Reproduction)

desire to maintain that Upper Silesia was German, the authorities attempted to decry the figures on the nationality issue, declaring that the mother-tongue as established in the census did not settle the question of any particular citizen's nationality. They argued that the language used in Upper Silesia is not literary Polish, but is only a regional *patois*, which they called *Wasserpölnisch* (Water-Polish). On the other hand, they declared that the national sentiment of the people was not Polish but German, and had a common culture not with Poland, but with Germany. No justification exists for this false assertion.

The language spoken by the Polish inhabitants of Upper Silesia is Polish in the full sense of the word. Of course it contains many words and phrases introduced from German, a fact which applies also to the Polish used in other Prussian provinces where Polish people live. This mixture is merely the result of decades of attempts to Germanize the people. Despite these foreign elements, the language spoken in Upper Silesia is pure Polish and has preserved many ancient Polish expressions some of which have fallen into disuse and are forgotten in Central Poland. In any case the language spoken by the Silesians is understood by the inhabitants of all other parts of Poland, and Upper Silesians have no difficulty in reading and understanding their native literary language.

The German argument that the mother-tongue does not indicate any consciousness of nationality in the citizen is completely false. Among the various elements composing a sense of nationality, the language spoken is undoubtedly the most important and most essential. This view corresponds to the general opinion, but even contemporary German scholars hold a similar view. This is precisely the argument Germans use to justify the necessity to organize the German minorities living outside the German State, and to count people using the German language as their mother-tongue in the German national community. All the German propaganda concerned with the problem of Germans abroad was based on the language argument. Space forbids to develop this point further, or to quote numerous, authoritative German sources in justification. One book is enough; Georg Schmidt-Rohr, published at Jena in

1931 by the German Academy,* a work, entitled "Muttersprache—vom Amt der Sprache bei der Volkswendung," which is one long hymn of praise to the mother-tongue, as the most essential component in the concept of the nation. In this book the following phrases occur: "The struggle for Germanism regarded as the struggle for the language" (p. 333). "To-day the boundaries of national ethics lie primarily along the boundaries of the language" (p. 336). "Anyone who brings up his child in another mother-tongue is giving it to another nation" (p. 342).

4. THE POPULATION CENSUSES OF 1925 AND 1933

Between the two World Wars population censuses in German Upper Silesia were taken in 1925, 1933 and 1939. Of these polls only that of 1925 can give a certain, though restricted, idea of the extent to which that part of Upper Silesia which remained to Germany is populated by Poles. This census was taken in conditions of far greater pressure on the population than those of pre-war days, but it does give the lie to German assertions that Upper Silesia is German in population. According to this census† the population of German Upper Silesia numbered 1,230,053, of which 154,743 persons gave Polish as their mother-tongue, and 373,503 gave both Polish and German as their mother-tongues. Therefore, the Poles in German Upper Silesia numbered 528,246. In reality, there were far more; there are still some 800,000 Poles in the area even to-day. But the very fact that the Germans themselves, despite their pressure and the intense Germanization policy pursued after 1918, counted over half a million Poles, is the finest testimony to the ardent national sentiment of the Polish population.

In examining the results of the 1925 census we have to consider the very characteristic feature of a great increase in the bilinguals." In 1910 the bilinguals numbered only some 7 per cent of the population which gave Polish as their mother-tongue, but by 1925

* Georg Schmidt-Rohr, "Muttersprache—Vom Amt der Sprache bei der Volkswendung"—"Schriften der Deutschen Akademie," No. 12. Jena, 1933.

† W. Winkler, "Statistisches Handbuch für das gesamte Deutschland." Berlin, 1927, p. 61.

the percentage of this category was close to 250. This indicates how far the Germans had carried the process of Germanization within less than a generation. People entered in the Polish category in the earlier census had become bilinguals in the census, to be transferred to the German category in subsequent censuses.

According to the 1910 census there were 623,000 Poles living in that part of Upper Silesia which was left to Germany after the plebiscite of 1921. The census of 1925 gave 528,000 Poles. The number of Poles who migrated to Poland after the division of Upper Silesia was not large. What had happened to the 100,000 Poles who had disappeared between the two censuses? The answer to this question is provided by an article in the "Vossische Zeitung," devoted to a discussion of the 1925 census in Opole Silesia.* The article says: "The figures recently published on the decline in the Polish-speaking population of Upper Silesia should not create any delusions that there has been any essential change in the actual situation of the Polish population. On such official occasions as the statistical census of the population, data are only too often given not corresponding to fact. To avoid unpleasant consequences the inhabitants give the German language as their mother-tongue, even though at home, both formerly and now, they talk Polish."

This quotation from a German newspaper leaves no doubt as to the atmosphere in which this population census was taken. Four years had passed since the plebiscite, and barely three since the division of Upper Silesia. Too short a period for all the passions developed during the severe struggle of nationalities—particularly violent from 1918 to 1921—to cool down completely. For that matter during this very period a wave of reaction swept over Germany, and that was bound to have even a retarding effect on the pacification of relations in Upper Silesia. Therefore the 1925 census, which quoted only 528,000 Poles, cannot be accepted as reliable in estimating the numerical strength of the Polish element in the area. The chief organization of Poles in Germany, the "Union of the Poles in Germany," itself estimated the figure approximately at 800,000. This same figure is given by an important

* "Vossische Zeitung," No. 104, May 1, 1926.

historical and political publication in Poland, namely, the "Sprawy Narodowosciowe" (Nationality Affairs), Nos. 4-5, 1938.

The 1925 census was held in conditions far worse even than those of 1910, which, as shown, a leading German economist declared were taken one-sidedly in favour of the Germans. Yet the 1925 census was made with some semblance of decency, which cannot be said of that taken in 1933. This was held under the Nazi régime, amid conditions of extraordinary terrorism. According to the 1933 census 356,568 Poles were living in Opole Silesia. Only 90,193 gave Polish as their mother-tongue, while 266,375 were in the bilingual category.*

This census, like the last pre-war one of 1939, the nationality statistics of which were not published before the outbreak of the war, was taken by the National Socialist authorities under conditions of brutal terrorism and vulgar falsification. They took no account of any humanitarian or legal considerations that might hinder the desired result. So the census cannot be regarded as providing any basis whatever for estimating the number of Poles in Opole Silesia. At most the data can only confirm the effectiveness of German terrorization of the Poles in Germany.

* "Statistisches Handbuch für das Deutsche Reich," 1937.

Chapter Four

THE 1921 PLEBISCITE AND THE DIVISION OF UPPER SILESIA

I. BEFORE THE PLEBISCITE

During the years immediately preceding the First World War, Upper Silesia pulsed with such vigorous Polish national life that in 1918 it seemed natural that the entire area should go to Poland, like Poznania and Pomerania, since the New Europe which was to emerge from the war was to be built on the principle of the self-determination of nations. The first draft of the peace treaty, dated May 7, 1919, justly granted Poland not only Poznania and Pomerania, but also Upper Silesia. Unfortunately German attempts to have this decision reversed gained some success. The original decision of the Peace Conference with regard to Upper Silesia was modified; its fate was to be decided by a plebiscite.

This change in the attitude of the Great Powers acted as a stimulant to all German elements in Upper Silesia, as well as elsewhere in Germany. There was an extraordinary increase in anti-Polish terrorism and the persecution of the Polish population. The authority acting in Silesia on behalf of the German Republican Government was the leading German Social-Democrat, Hoersing, who proclaimed a state of war, and developed such unprecedented anti-Polish activities that he has gone down in the history of the martyrdom of the Polish population as the "Executioner of Upper Silesia." On the other hand, the Versailles decision had a depressing effect on the Polish inhabitants, and the indignation caused by the German provocations and violence led to the outbreak of the first Silesian rising against the Prussian authorities in August 1919. The tense political situation thereby caused accelerated the decision to send Allied forces of occupation to Upper Silesia, and to appoint an Inter-Allied Commission, under whose auspices the plebiscite was to be taken for the attachment of Upper Silesia either to

Poland or Germany. But the Allied troops did not arrive before February 1920, and then in too small a strength to guarantee adequately complete order and an atmosphere free of all compulsion, rendering a free vote possible.

Although the sovereign authority in the plebiscite area had now passed into the hands of the Inter-Allied Commission, and despite the presence of British, French and Italian garrison troops, German armed bands, actively supported by the German authorities, continued to rove throughout Upper Silesia, persecuting the Polish population and rendering it difficult, and, at times, impossible, for any Polish national activities to be carried on. The tension reached its height in August 1920, while Poland was at war with Russia and when the Soviet armies were threatening Warsaw. It seemed to the Germans that the fate of Poland, and therefore of Upper Silesia, was already decided. They prematurely proclaimed the alleged occupation of Warsaw by Soviet troops, and the German armed bands intensified their terrorization of the population, murdering some of the most active and prominent workers for the Polish cause, among them a well-known physician, Dr. Mielecki of Katowice, one of the most important leaders of the Polish movement. This wave of terrorism led to the outbreak of the second Silesian rising, on August 15, 1920. It was ended after some days by the decision to replace the German police which had hitherto been in office by a mixed Polish-German police force. A period of comparative quiet ensued in Upper Silesia, but the date fixed for the plebiscite was continually postponed, and this too was a cause of continual irritation. The voting finally took place on March 20, 1921.

2. THE RESULTS OF THE PLEBISCITE

The results of the plebiscite are briefly summarized in the table on page 79.*

* Plebiscite statistics are taken from Dr. Adam Benisz's "Górny Śląsk w walce o polskość." Katowice, 1930 (plebiscite table on p. 299). Also "La Silésie Polonaise.—Conférences à la Bibliothèque Polonaise de Paris," 1932. For a table giving the results in detail see Appendix No. 14.

	Votes for Germany	Votes for Poland	Percentage of Polish Votes
Total votes	706,820	479,414	40·4
Votes of migrants	182,288	10,120	5·3
Votes of permanent inhabitants..	524,450	469,376	47·3
Votes of rural areas (excluding all towns) approximately ..	244,000	410,000	63·0

It will be seen that altogether 1,186,234 votes were cast, 479,414 for Poland, and 706,820 for Germany.

The regulations governing the plebiscite allowed not only the permanent inhabitants of the area, but also people born in Upper Silesia to take part in the voting, no matter how long or short a period they had remained there. Quite a large number of these so-called "migrants" voted for Germany and this fact testifies unquestionably to the nature of this category of voters. For out of the 1,186,234 voters 192,408 were migrants. Only 10,120 of these voted for Poland, and 182,288, or 94·7 per cent of the total, voted for Germany. Most of these migrants had their permanent homes in other parts of Germany. They were largely children of Prussian officials formerly working in Upper Silesia, and had spent part of their childhood there. Also, it was ascertained that quite a large number of these migrant voters consisted of people who had been born in the maternity hospital at Opole, which happened to be popular among German women living in Central Germany.* German fraudulent exploitation of migrants' voting rights was also proved. There were many cases of votes being cast in the name of people born in Upper Silesia who had already died elsewhere in Germany. As their deaths were registered in comparatively inaccessible German registration departments in Central Germany, it was not always possible to check the claim of the bogus voter in time.

It cannot be denied that this category of migrants had no moral

* The long journey was undertaken mostly by those unmarried who wished to avoid the undue curiosity of their own district.

right whatever to decide the future of an area with which they had long since severed all connections. Yet their participation distorted the plebiscite, and gave the Germans a plausible excuse for claiming that during it a large majority of German votes had been cast. An objective view of the results is obtained by first separating the migrants' vote from the total, thus getting the votes of the permanent inhabitants. This category showed a total vote of 993,826, of which 524,450 were cast for Germany, and 469,376, or 47·3 per cent for Poland. Thus, after deducting the migrant votes, the result was much more favourable to Poland.

Further, it should not be forgotten that the process of Germanization had gone particularly far in the towns of Upper Silesia. Deducting the votes of urban inhabitants (and therefore a mainly migrant element) from the total plebiscite vote, as also the results in the counties of Glupczyce and Prudnik,* only some 244,000 votes were cast in the rural areas for Germany, and 410,000, or 62·9 per cent for Poland.

Not only were the principles governing the plebiscite unfavourable to Poland because they allowed the inclusion of migrant votes and embraced the western, Germanized counties of Glupczyce and Prudnik, but also the general conditions in which the plebiscite was held by no means created an atmosphere for a free and independent vote. All the official departments were staffed by Germans, who considered it their first duty to act as Germanizing agents. No Polish schools existed and Polish life could develop only in private cultural and educational organizations. The Polish population consisted almost exclusively of workers and small farmers. They constituted the working classes who owned little or no real property and were absolutely dependent on the German authorities and community which was rich, and owned all the large landed estates, mines and foundries, and finally almost all the industries. This social and professional classification of the Polish inhabitants had a very serious effect on the voting, for the German authorities and

* In the county of Glupczyce only 251 votes were cast for Poland, while 41,766 were cast for Germany. In the county of Prudnik 4,405 votes were cast for Poland and 21,902 for Germany.

possessing classes, especially the landed proprietors and big industrialists and also to a large extent the Roman Church, worked together to exert pressure on the population by compelling them to cast their votes for Germany. In doing so they frequently exceeded their lawful powers and supported many forms of anti-Polish activity.

The fact that a year before the plebiscite was taken sovereignty over the plebiscite area had been transferred to an Inter-Allied Commission did not greatly modify this state of affairs. The commission entrusted with the government of Upper Silesia had only small British, French and Italian forces on which to base its authority. The central authority was in its hands, but the executive remained in the hands of the German officials and police, who were still operative. It is true that the Inter-Allied Commission appointed county controllers to act with the *Landrats*, but these controllers could have no great influence in Silesia's everyday life, because the entire staff of officials whom the inhabitants met in their daily affairs not only remained German, but were dominated by a violently anti-Polish spirit and aimed at obtaining votes for Germany for the sake of their own interests.

At first the German police had full authority, and did not conceal their pro-German sympathies, very often taking grossly unfair advantage of their position. During the plebiscite period German industry, which had always been an important factor in crushing all manifestations of Polish life, was reinforced by many demobilized German officers who, under the pretext of holding administrative industrial positions, organized German armed bands to terrorize the Poles. Despite all the efforts of the Inter-Allied Commission, Upper Silesia was the scene of incessant confusion, sanguinary struggles with armed German attacks on Polish meetings and on the terrorized and defenceless Polish population, especially in the rural areas.

To give a good idea of the extent and character of the German pressure on the Polish population and especially of the terrorism of the German armed bands, which were not only favoured but indeed financed and armed by official German circles, various

German publications appearing some years after the plebiscite may be cited. The majority were published at the time of the trial of the leaders of a German reactionary secret military organization, known as the *Schwarze Reichswehr*. H. J. Gumbel, professor at Heidelberg University, has stated in his book*: "The Reichswehr Ministry did not officially take part in the Upper Silesia fights, but arms and funds were put at the disposal of the German organizations by that Ministry. Under the direction of the former commander of a volunteer corps, later under the direction of the Reichswehr-officer Major Buchdrucker and his A.D.C., the retired First Lieutenant Paul Schultz, a supply inspectorate or commissariate was formed in Kottbus, which organized the reserves for the detachments fighting in Upper Silesia."

In a book by Buchdrucker himself,† there is a chapter entitled "The Struggles in Upper Silesia," containing the following passage: "By the Versailles Treaty the contested territory had been closed to the Reichswehr. Therefore the Reich allowed volunteers to carry out the fight. It gave money, arms and equipment, without which the fight would not have been possible at all. The Reich authorities for all that, denied they had anything to do with the matter, and represented it as if it were done by the people alone." The extent of the terrorization of the innocent Polish population is conveyed in the emphatic words of the memorandum presented to the German Reichstag on March 17, 1926, by Severing, then Minister for Home Affairs, on the subject of the *Black Reichswehr*. Severing himself confirms in this document "that the simple suspicion of Polish sympathies was sufficient to have the respective person given over to the *Selbstschutz* (Volunteer Defence)".‡ Gumbel remarks: "a denunciation, a suspicion without foundation under the given circumstances, was sufficient. The man concerned is fetched from his lodgings and instantly shot . . . all this only because the man was a Pole or was considered a Pole and worked for union with Poland."§

* H. J. Gumbel, "Verräter verfallen der Feme." Berlin, 1929, p. 156; quoted by J. Weinstein in "Upper Silesia a country of contrasts." Paris, 1931, p. 53.

† Buchdrucker, "Im Schatten Seeckts—Die Geschichte der Schwarzen Reichswehr." Berlin, 1928, p. 54.

‡ J. Weinstein, op. cit., p. 56.

§ H. J. Gumbel, op. cit., p. 175.

Under such circumstances, aggravated by the constant threat of further reprisals against the Polish population after the withdrawal of the Allied troops, not every Pole had the courage to cast his vote in favour of Poland. Therefore, despite the plebiscite showing a Polish majority in the Polish counties of Upper Silesia, the results were far from being an objective reflection of the true desires of the oppressed people. An idea of the injustice of the plebiscite result when compared with the proportion of Polish population revealed by the German population census, can be obtained by collating the results of the plebiscite in certain counties of Upper Silesia with those of the population census of 1910, which, as already pointed out, was organized so as to be disadvantageous to Poland:

County	Proportion of Poles in 1910 population census	Proportion of Polish votes in plebiscite	Proportion of Poles in 1925 population census
Kozle	75.0	29.9	63.7
Wielkie Strzelce ..	79.2	58.6	73.8
Opole (rural district)	75.8	38.8	74.1
Olesno	80.7	42.0	70.7
Toszek-Gliwice ..	76.4	63.3	65.0
Kluczborek	47.2	6.5	24.6

As this table shows, there was a particularly glaring discrepancy between the plebiscite votes and the 1910 census in the counties of Kozle, Opole rural district, Olesno and above all in Kluczborek. It is noteworthy that even the 1925 census, which was taken in a worse atmosphere than that of 1910, but in an incomparably better atmosphere than that of the plebiscite period, showed a percentage of Poles which in a number of counties approximated to the figures given by the 1910 census.*

This analysis of the plebiscite figures as compared with those of

* I.e. the combined percentage of persons giving Polish, and those giving Polish and German, as their mother-tongues.

the censuses throughly confirms the charge that the plebiscite voting was biased against Poland. Consequently the Upper Silesia plebiscite cannot be regarded as a completely reliable criterion for determining the nationality-relationships in the area, nor will it ever be; chiefly, because of the social structure of the Polish population, which is entirely different from that of the rich, economically strong and independent German population.

Bearing all these circumstances in mind, the declaration is justified that despite all German efforts to present the Upper Silesia plebiscite as a victory for Germany, it actually established that the area is fundamentally Polish. That applies especially to the rural areas, in which the towns represent isolated islands, inhabited by a German bourgeoisie and Prussian officials, who have no special ties with the area. The Polish nature of Upper Silesia, and especially of the counties lying on the east bank of the Oder, was confirmed by the plebiscite.

As Appendix No. 14 at the end of this book shows, the Polish votes in the plebiscite were in many counties considerably over 50 per cent of the total cast, despite the fact that the summarized county totals include the votes of the urban inhabitants, who of course, voted mainly in favour of Germany. For instance, in the county of Pszczyzna the percentage of Polish votes was 80·8, in the county of Rybnik it was 73·1, in Tarnowskie Gory 67·2, in Katowice (rural district) 60·3. This applies also to certain counties which after the division went wholly or largely to Germany. For instance, in the county of Toszek-Gliwice the percentage of Polish votes was 63·3, Bytom (rural district) 62·9 and Wielkie Strzelce 58·6.

In Upper Silesia the plebiscite was taken by districts. The line of demarcation between the Polish and the German part of Upper Silesia was to be drawn in accordance with the results of the voting in the individual districts. In practice such a demarcation became difficult, for it was impossible to draw any definite line separating Polish and German districts in Upper Silesia. Nevertheless, almost the whole of Upper Silesia on the right bank of the Oder had a decided majority for Poland. Only the towns and a few rural areas

were German. Immediately after the results of the voting were published, the Polish Government proposed that all that part which had a majority of Polish votes and a majority of Polish districts should be assigned to Poland. This area was limited by the so-called *Korfanty line* which ran from the Czech frontier approximately along the river Oder to Opole, then in a north-westerly direction towards the Polish frontier (see map facing p. 88).

In this area* covering 6,450 square kilometres, out of a total plebiscite area of 11,008 square kilometres, 673 districts out of 903 had a majority of votes for Poland, and 230 for Germany. Altogether 435,260 votes, including those of migrants, were cast for Poland in this area, and 409,618 for Germany. The area delimited by the Korfanty line was a solidly Polish region, in which those districts with a German majority—chiefly towns—were surrounded by Polish areas.

The Polish claim was justified not only by the unquestionably Polish character of the area, but also by the result of the voting. Yet it did not meet with recognition by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers which was responsible for the plebiscite and was to decide the future of Upper Silesia. Among the representatives of the Allied Governments in Upper Silesia there was no unanimous opinion as to the future frontier line.

3. THE THIRD SILESIAN RISING AND THE DIVISION OF UPPER SILESIA

Towards the end of April 1921, news reached Upper Silesia of a plan to grant Poland only the counties of Rybnik, Pszczyna, and the south-eastern strip of Katowice county, excluding the town of Katowice. This news came like a bolt from the blue, and it determined further events. Deceived in the confidence they had hitherto placed in the Allied Powers, the local Silesians gave expression to their bitter indignation. During the night preceding Poland's traditional national holiday of the 3rd of May, the greatest and most

* "La Silésie Polonaise.—Conferences à la Bibliothèque Polonaise de Paris," 1932.

sanguinary Silesian rising broke out. This revolt, organized by the local population, spread like wildfire; it soon embraced an army of over 40,000 insurgents, chiefly Silesian miners, workers, and peasants. Within a few days the insurgents had taken up a position approximately corresponding to the Korfanty line. Only the towns were left unoccupied, in accordance with an agreement with the Allied Plebiscite Commission. After some weeks the insurgents were forced to withdraw from the positions they had taken up, as regular *Reichswehr* forces superior in numbers and equipment came into action on the German side. The Allied Powers intervened and, finally, the rising was brought to an end.

The sacrifice of the common people of Silesia was not without influence on the further development of events. The Supreme Council transferred the decision on Upper Silesia to the Council of the League of Nations. The League Council made its decision on October 12, 1921, under the chairmanship of the Japanese, H. Ishii, and, on October 20, of the same year, the decision was confirmed by the Ambassadors Conference under the chairmanship of Aristide Briand.

The decision did not correspond to Poland's desires, but it granted her more than had been proposed in the previous April. Poland was given the counties of Rybnik, Pszczyna, Katowice with the town of Katowice, Tarnowskie Gory and part of the counties of Raciborz, Gliwice, Zabrze, Lubliniec and Olesno. The frontier line ran from the Czech frontier along the Oder to a point situated to the north of Raciborz. Thence it ran in a north-easterly direction, leaving the railway line from Raciborz to Bytom on the Polish side. Of the Silesian industrial area Poland received Katowice, Krolewska Huta, Chorzow, and Tarnowskie Gory. On the other hand, the towns of Gliwice, Zabrze and Bytom were left to Germany. In the north Poland received almost the whole county of Lubliniec and the southern part of the county of Olesno (see map at end). The results are summarized in the following table.*

* "Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich," 1927. For the results of the partition from an economic point of view, see Appendix No. 11 at the end of the book.

	Poland	Germany
Area	321,342·2 hectares	752,216·1 hectares
Population	892,537	1,046,039
<i>National Minorities:</i>		
Germans to Poland	263,701	
Poles to Germany		623,596

The decision of the League Council and the Ambassadors Conference was unjust to Poland because close on 625,000 Poles, all members of the native population whose families had been settled in Silesia for centuries, were left within the Reich frontiers. Counties were left with Germany which had shown a markedly Polish majority in the plebiscite, this being more than confirmed in the subsequent German population census of 1925. Viewed against the background of the last twenty years, and considering the experiences with regard to Germany during this war, it was a blunder to leave such a large and important industrial centre within the bounds of the German Reich.

Chapter Five

UPPER SILESIA AFTER THE DIVISION

I. THE GENEVA CONVENTION

When the plebiscite area of Upper Silesia was divided between Poland and Germany fears were expressed that the decision would entail not only complications of an economic but also of an international nature. The industrial area was partitioned along the very line where the density of the population was greatest and industrial works were most concentrated. This frontier line split up the property of various industrial concerns, cut off foundries from mines, manufacturing plants from their raw-materials bases, and the people from their places of work. It cut across railway lines, tramways, water supply pipes, and so on.

According to German statistics over 260,000 Germans were left in the area granted to Poland, while some 625,000 Poles were left to Germany. Such large "national minorities" could be only the source of new disturbances and struggles. After such a long period of wars—an atmosphere of uncertainty prevailed in Silesia from 1914 to the beginning of 1922—the area required a spell of peace and stability, in order to restore economic life and also for the sake of the people themselves. In the hope of eliminating national antagonisms, and removing probable economic difficulties, the Conference of Ambassadors proposed that, under the League of Nations, Poland and Germany should open negotiations for an agreement on all the social and economic questions caused by the division, and determining the sphere of the free cultural and national development of the minorities left on both sides of the frontier. After several months of discussion an agreement, known as the Geneva Convention, was signed on May 15, 1922, to be binding for fifteen years.


This Convention laid the main emphasis on social and economic questions, to which no fewer than 412 of its articles were devoted. Only 94 articles dealt with the protection of the Polish or German

THE PLEBISCITE AREA OF UPPER SILESIA



Map No. 9

- (1) Boundary of Upper Silesia.
- (2) Plebiscite Area, March 21, 1921.
- (3) Part of the County of Namyslow added to the Plebiscite Area.
- (4) Part of the County of Glupczyce added to the Plebiscite Area. It was to go to Czechoslovakia in case the northern part should go to Poland.
- (5) Part of the County of Raciborz (so-called Hulcin-Land) which went to Czechoslovakia without a plebiscite.
- (6) "Korfanty-Line," limiting the area of definite majority of pro-Polish votes.
- (7) Polish-German border of 1939.
- (8) Boundary of counties (Kreise) as existing in 1920.



minority. The minority rights included equality in all legal respects, the right of association and assembly, of creating foundations, especially in the field of language, culture and religion, and for the maintenance of national characteristics. The Convention granted the minorities extensive rights respecting their own public and private education.

Two articles of the Convention were fundamental for the application of the minority regulations. They were:

"Article 74. The question whether a person does or does not belong to a racial, linguistic or religious minority, may not be verified or disputed by the authorities."

"Article 131. In order to determine the language of a pupil or child, account shall be taken only of the verbal or written statement of the person legally responsible for the education of the pupil or child. This statement may not be verified or disputed by the school authorities."

These articles, especially the second, clearly establish objective criteria for determining a minority, whether of race, language or religion. Because of the ban on investigating the accuracy of the declaration made by the citizen, this fundamental regulation was reduced in practice to a situation in which every citizen, even if not belonging to a minority, could make such a statement. Owing to the social dependence of the Polish people in Opole Silesia and of part of the Polish majority in Polish Upper Silesia, this decision led to numerous excesses and tragedies, contrary to the elementary principles of the "protection of the minority."

The Convention provided for the simultaneous working in Upper Silesia of a number of international organs, to watch over the rights guaranteed by it and to settle disputes arising in its application. The Council of the League of Nations and the Permanent High Court of Justice at The Hague were granted far-reaching powers of intervention.

Among the international bodies set up locally in accordance with the Convention there must be mentioned the Upper Silesia Mixed Commission, which had its headquarters at Katowice, and consisted of two Polish and two German members, under the presi-

dency of Felix Calonder, a former President of the Swiss Confederation. Under his chairmanship the negotiations for the conclusion of the Convention were carried on. Besides, there was the Upper Silesia Arbitration Tribunal with its headquarters at Bytom, and consisting of two judges, one a Pole and the other a German, and a president, the Belgian scholar, Georges Kaeckenbeeck.* Both these international bodies had very wide competence. In practice the Mixed Commission dealt primarily with political and minority problems, while the Arbitration Tribunal was more concerned with questions of citizenship and economic matters, which, however, were rarely without their political aspect.

The Mixed Commission could intervene in matters regulated by the Convention both on its own initiative and also at the request of either of the two interested Governments, the Polish and the German, and, finally, of individual Polish or German citizens belonging to a national minority. A Polish or a German citizen, who as a "minority" citizen, felt injured by some regulation of his Government or its executive organs could make a complaint directly to the Council of the League of Nations, or could appeal to it, if his affair was not settled by the Mixed Commission. He could do this without having first to pass his complaint or question through his own national organs or even through the Mixed Commission.

The function of the Arbitration Tribunal was primarily the interpretation of particular regulations of the Convention and the supervision of individual citizens' "acquired rights," whose inviolability was guaranteed by it. This tribunal also decided disputes over the citizenship of inhabitants of the plebiscite area.

A number of articles devoted to particular problems reveal that the Convention was conceived primarily as an economic agreement.

Certain of the economic decisions to which great importance was attached at the time of drafting the Convention did not come into force, or else ceased to have actuality. Thus the provision that

* In 1942 Georges Kaeckenbeeck, D.C.L., published a study on Upper Silesia, entitled "The International Experiment of Upper Silesia."

for a period immediately after the attachment of Polish Upper Silesia to Poland German currency should remain in circulation, was not put into force at all. The rapid fall of the German mark caused new citizens of the Polish State to prefer Polish currency. Other regulations lost their practical value for other reasons. Certain articles of the Convention provided that the Polish railways should use the large goods station at Gliwice, the central junction for the great and complex railway system of Upper Silesia's industry. If the area had been deprived of the use of this station serious complications would have resulted, with a highly detrimental effect on the transport of coal and other Silesian products from the mines or works to the market, and consequent damage to production itself. This provision, very important at the time, lost its significance a few years later when Poland constructed at Tarnowskie Gory a new central goods station which held the same position for the Polish industrial area as Gliwice once had for the entire Upper Silesia Field. A similar development occurred with regard to the regulations concerning water supply, light, electrical power, etc. Long before the Convention expired the majority of its economic clauses lost their importance.

On the other hand, the articles dealing with the protection of minority rights remained in full force throughout the duration of the Convention. These regulations were conceived as assuring each nationality full cultural and national development, in order to create an atmosphere of peaceful co-existence between Germans and Poles. From the very beginning, unfortunately, one of the parties to the agreement—namely the German—had no intention of loyally observing either the letter or the spirit of the Convention.

In German hands the Convention became a convenient instrument for realizing aims contrary not only to its spirit and the intentions of its authors, but clearly directed against the territorial integrity of the other partner, the Polish State, and against the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. The Germans were not concerned with rendering it possible and easy for the Polish population left within Germany to retain its national characteristics; on the contrary, they were concerned to achieve a swift and complete

elimination of the Poles in Upper Silesia. From the first moment, German policy was animated entirely by revenge. The direct object of all German measures, both in home and foreign policy, was to secure a revision of the frontiers, especially the eastern frontiers of the Reich.

The German national minorities living outside the frontiers of Germany were, as the past twenty years showed, effective instruments of German revisionist policy. In Upper Silesia the Convention became a means of facilitating the employment of these instruments, despite its formal provisions, and above all, despite the spirit which animated those who had arranged the division of Upper Silesia and the subsequent Convention.

That Germany was exploiting the minority provisions of the peace treaties, and, in Upper Silesia, the terms of the Convention, for her own revisionist policy and her measures against the security of the Polish State, compelled Poland to take a number of moves to render it impossible for Germany to utilize the German minority for anti-Polish activities.

2. THE POLES IN OPOLE SILESIA

According to the 1910 population census, there were 625,000 Polish inhabitants in that part of Upper Silesia which remained to Germany. The census of 1925 recorded 528,000 Poles, including 373,000 bilinguals. This Polish minority in Opole Silesia had developed its own national life in numerous cultural, educational and economic organizations. The most important of these were the School Association, which was concerned with cultural and educational work and the organization of Polish private schools, the Youth Association, the Trade Unions, and the Union of Economic Co-operatives comprising credit and agricultural co-operative societies. The chief Polish organization, which to some extent acted in a supervisory capacity, and represented the interests of the Polish population to the German authorities, the League of Nations and the international organs set up under the Convention, was the *Union of the Poles in Germany, Silesian District*.

The most important method of maintaining the cultural and

national characteristics of any minority is education. The German population census of 1925 showed that out of the 528,000 Poles in Opole Silesia 83,000 were children of school age, who, under the terms of the Convention, had the right of attending Polish schools. How many did in fact take advantage of this right? The following figures give the number of State elementary schools and their pupils in Opole Silesia in various years*:

	<i>Schools</i>	<i>Pupils</i>
1923-24	16	1,227
1924-25	25	1,030
1925-26	53	1,288
1926-27	35	865
1927-28	30	659
1928-29	29	497
1929-30	28	410
1930-31	27	347
1931-32	26	306
1932-33	24	254
1933-34	12	151
1934-35	9	115
1935-36	8	96

In the year 1925 there were the largest number of Polish elementary schools, and the largest number of pupils attending, i.e. 53 schools and 1,288 pupils. Even these figures are very small compared with the existence of 83,000 Polish children. By 1935-36 the number of schools had fallen to eight, and there were only 96 children attending them.

The Polish schools were of a very low standard. The German authorities deliberately allowed and even encouraged this to deter Poles from sending their children to Polish schools. The chief reason for the low standard was the fact that the teachers were exclusively of German nationality, who knew Polish only superficially, and in many cases very imperfectly. The great majority had learnt Polish in special courses organized in 1919 by the German authorities. A further factor reducing the standard of Polish schools

* The figures concerning Polish schools in Opole Silesia are taken from "The International Experiment of Upper Silesia," by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, D.C.L., Oxford, 1942, pp. 332 and following.

was the lack of Polish primers and text-books. The German authorities deliberately delayed the publication of such books to prevent the parents sending their children to schools where instruction was given under the most primitive and inadequate conditions. The deliberate object of German policy was to create the absurd situation in which there would be a few Polish elementary schools with hardly any pupils, because, irrespective of their political views, the parents assuredly would not want to send their children to schools which had no educational value.

In addition to providing Polish elementary schools, the German authorities were by the Convention obliged to organize courses in Polish and religious instruction in Polish in the German schools, to meet the needs of those Polish children who did not attend the Polish schools. The number of children who attended these courses was also very small, and fell rapidly as time went on. In 1923, 10,833 children attended the classes for religious instruction in Polish; in 1925 the number had fallen to 5,677.* In 1923, 3,373 children attended courses of the Polish language, in 1925, 1,671, and in 1933, only 48.

Desiring to remedy such a serious deficiency as the absence of proper Polish schools, Polish organizations, and in particular the Polish School Association, attempted to make arrangements for Polish private schools. The German authorities impeded the starting of such schools and the first schools came into existence as late as 1930-31; in all they numbered six, and accommodated 92 pupils.† Parents who registered their children for attendance at private schools experienced all kinds of difficulties; they were pestered by the police and plagued by their German employers. Thus schools dependent on private Polish funds could not develop on any large scale. In 1934-35 there were ten Polish private schools, with 123 pupils.

The years of effort to organize at least one private Polish secondary school in Opole Silesia were crowned with success only in 1932-33. In Bytom 97 pupils registered for the Polish high school, while in 1936-37 the school had some 300 pupils.

* Kaeckenbeeck, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 338, 301.

The total number of pupils receiving instruction wholly or partly in Polish in Opole Silesia was 8,636 in 1925, and dropped to 400 in 1933-34. And this out of a population of 528,000 Poles, 83,000 of whom were children of school age!

Despite the Weimar Constitution, which guaranteed national cultural liberty to every citizen of Germany, and despite the definite obligations of the Reich Government under the Convention, that Government deliberately worked to eliminate all Polish features from Opole Silesia. The successive republican Governments attempted to cloak this policy under a pretext of legality, but the Nazi authorities pursued it quite openly and brutally.

In 1935 Wagner, the *Oberpräsident* of the Silesian province, addressed the teachers who were members of the German anti-Polish organization, *Bund deutscher Osten*, at Bochum, mentioned the unlimited powers conferred on him by Chancellor Hitler, and presented a detailed programme for the complete Germanization of the Poles in Silesia. In this programme Wagner paid special attention to the Church, foreshadowing the total abolition of Polish religious services and sermons. Polish breviaries were to disappear entirely. The complete Germanization of the children was to be assured not only by the German educational system in Silesia, but above all by the transference of children for varying periods into Germany proper, so that when they returned to Silesia they would never speak Polish again. Everything that pointed to the existence of Polish characteristics, and even all Polish names, were to disappear; within ten years Silesia was to become a district German to the core, while after thirty years no one would know even anything about Poles.

This programme has in fact already been initiated and was being carried out not only in the attitude and conduct of the German administration, but particularly in Nazi legislation. The laws dealing with hereditary farms, sterilization, forced labour, incorporation of Polish youth in the *Hitlerjugend*, the *Arbeitsfront*, and so forth,*

* "Tens of thousands of Poles firmly resisted these measures, and in consequence found themselves attacked and defrauded in every way. . . . Their struggle not only for national rights but even for tolerable conditions of existence was hard enough even in peace-time. . . . It calls for no great imagination to realize their fate since the out-

have had a crushing effect on the Polish elements in Opole Silesia, and gave a superficially German character to the region. The same end was furthered by the German regulation of January 30, 1935, giving the Governor of the area the right to change place names, a right fully exploited by the German authorities.*

In the years 1935-38 more than 600 places of Opole Silesia were given German names.† By order of the *Oberpräsident* of the province, on February 12, 1936, 64 of the Polish names still existing in the county of Toszek Gliwice were changed to German. Such a wholesale and rapid Germanization of place names made necessary an index for the public administrative bodies.‡

3. THE GERMAN MINORITY IN POLISH UPPER SILESIA

According to the 1910 census 263,000 persons of German nationality were living in the eastern part of Upper Silesia which went to Poland in 1921. They consisted mainly of state and local government officials, plus a small percentage of urban bourgeoisie and persons employed in industry. When Polish Upper Silesia was assigned to Poland these Germans themselves recognized that it was impossible to remain in a country whose language was unknown to them, and for which they felt no attachment. Thus, even before the Polish civil and military authorities took over, there was a voluntary migration of this category of Germans to Germany, despite the German Government's appeals to remain in Poland as an advance-guard of Germanism. The population census taken by the Polish Government in 1931 showed that at that date there were in Polish Upper Silesia only 75,000 Germans, i.e. 6.6 per cent of the total population of the area.

The organized life of this small German minority consisted of a

break of war, when military operations isolated Germany from the outer world." J. M. Winiewicz, "Aims and Failures of the German New Order." London, 1943, p. 70.

* "Reichsgesetzblatt," Part I, 1935, p. 49.

† Marek St. Korowicz, "Górnośląska Ochrona Mniejszości 1922-27 na tle stosunków narodowościowych." Katowice, 1938, pp. 200-1.

‡ "Verzeichnis der im Reichspostdirektionsbezirk Oppeln umbenannten Ortschaften. Teil I. Neue-alte Ortsnamen. Teil II. Alte-neue Ortsnamen." Stand vom 10. 12. 1936. Herausgegeben von der Reichspostdirektion Oppeln.

large number of cultural and economic organizations, covering all spheres of public life. The economic organizations and the German schools were particularly well developed, being provided with abundant material resources.

The following were the numbers of pupils attending German public elementary schools in Polish Upper Silesia, according to the reports of the *Deutscher Volksbund*.* In 1922-23, 29,329; in 1925-26, 20,645; in 1932-33, 13,213; in 1935-36, 8,239. In Polish Upper Silesia there was a fall in the pupils attending German schools. But the drop was much less than that of Polish pupils in the similar category of schools in Opole Silesia. It was caused first by the return of Germans to the Reich, and later by the policy pursued by the German minority organizations, which worked to extend the system of private schools. This fact is confirmed by figures taken from the same report of the *Deutscher Volksbund*, and from the book of M. St. Korowicz.† Thus, in 1922-23 there were four German private elementary schools with 396 pupils; in 1925-26 nine with 936 pupils; in 1932-33 sixteen with 1,693 pupils; and in 1935-36 eighteen with 2,686 pupils.

The favourable position of the Germans in Polish Upper Silesia, especially in the sphere of national cultural life, is shown still more clearly by the figures for secondary and high schools. The following figures are quoted from the sources already mentioned concerning elementary schools.

At first there were six German private secondary schools in Polish Upper Silesia, but later the figure fell to four. In 1922-23 they had 627 pupils; in 1925-26, 1,495 pupils; in 1932-33, 1,694; in 1935-36, 1,079. Therefore the 75,000 Germans in Polish Upper Silesia had an extensive system of public and private elementary and secondary schools with over 16,500 pupils attending them in 1932-33.

Other spheres of German cultural and economic life were developed on a scale parallel to that of education, and the Germans had an influence and position, especially in industry, trade and

* Kaeckenbeeck, op. cit., pp. 338 and 301.

† Korowicz, op. cit., pp. 184-5.

crafts, far beyond that corresponding to the proportion of Germans in the province.

The chief political organization of the German minority was the *Deutscher Volksbund*, which was a parallel organization to the *Union of the Poles in Germany, Silesian District*. Its head office, together with that of the *Deutscher Schulverein* and other German central organizations, employed hundreds of salaried officials, as though it constituted a ministry of provincial Government. The membership of the German organizations was so large that it is doubtful whether there was a German in Silesia who did not belong to one or several such organizations.

It was German official policy to exploit its minorities abroad as instruments for realizing revisionist plans, and as a means of effecting German political expansion. In accordance with that policy, the Germans in Upper Silesia acted on plans drawn up by Berlin. How far they had become the advanced guard of the German army was revealed by their activities as a *Fifth Column* on the eve of the withdrawal of the Polish troops in September 1939.

Of course, the official German organizations tried to conceal this ultimate aim of German policy in Poland. But all their activities and pronouncements were made to fit in with it. Beside the official organizations of the German minority there were rebellious bodies subordinated to the same headquarters at Berlin as were the official *Reichsbund* and *Deutscher Schulverein*. Among such bodies were the *Nazionalsozialistische Arbeiter Bewegung-Kampfbund*, members of which were brought to trial in Poland in 1936, after the revelation of their illegal activities. The details of their trial are to be found in a book by J. Winiewicz.* He reports that in justification of the sentences passed on the thirteen accused the court pointed out that although every minority enjoyed every possibility of liberty, hostile propaganda . . . had created a psychological condition in which the N.S.A.B.K. could be formed. The members . . . were bound to conditions of strict secrecy, took an oath of allegiance to Chancellor Hitler, and bound themselves to silence and obedience under threat of summary trial. Before a candidate took the oath he was told the

* Józef Winiewicz, "Mobilizacja sił niemieckich w Polsce." Warsaw, 1939, p. 132-

object of the organization was to restore Polish Upper Silesia to Germany.

The part played by these German citizens of Poland as a body fighting deliberately to attach Silesia to Germany was confirmed by Hitler's deputy, Rudolf Hess. Speaking at Katowice on February 9, 1941, three months before his adventurous flight to Scotland, he said: "When the situation ripened in September 1939, and called for a decision on the question of the future fate of this area, it was the Upper Silesians, especially the Upper Silesians from Eastern Upper Silesia for years cheated by the Polish State, who voluntarily joined Germany ready for the last defence and the last sacrifice for the German Reich."* This reliable statement and unusual recognition of services, coming from the man who was then Hitler's deputy, unmasks the true character of the Germans in Polish Upper Silesia.

4. THE UNSUCCESSFUL EXPERIMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE MINORITIES

The Poles in Opole Silesia, officially numbered 625,000 but in reality 800,000 strong, had great difficulty in maintaining their national existence, despite the Geneva Convention. Out of four-fifths of a million Poles only four hundred children were able to take advantage of their own minority schools in 1929. On the other hand, the 75,000 Germans in Polish Silesia enjoyed every right, and in this area 16,500 German children attended the minority schools in 1932.

Why this extraordinary disparity?

To explain this position, which goes to the heart of the antagonism between Poland and Germany, two questions must be answered.

Despite the ostensible equality of minority rights, there were two diametrically opposite starting points for the two nationalities. The German population in Polish Silesia was wealthy, had extensive establishments and a large proportion of well-educated and politically intelligent individuals. All the large landed estates, almost the

* "Kattowitzer Zeitung," Nr. 40, February 10, 1941.

entire industry, all the larger establishments in the towns, the merchants and craftsmen were German. The German population and organizations took every advantage of far-reaching material aid, especially political, from the German Government. In the hands of that Government they were willing instruments for the furtherance of German expansion.

The Polish population in Opole Silesia, however, consisted of workers and peasants, the latter owning only small holdings, if any. They were uneducated and, thus, not fully equal to carry on a complicated struggle for political rights, especially under the National Socialist system. The Poles were almost completely without members of the intellectual class. By the very force of events the leading workers in the area were drawn into Polish activities during the period of the risings and plebiscite, and had to flee to Poland when Opole went to Germany. Thus the Poles in the area were left without their recognized leaders, and only after intense effort, during the last few years before the war, a new but small class of young intellectuals began to be formed. The Polish population was dependent on its German employers, because all establishments were in German hands. The Poles did not receive any direct political or material aid from the Polish Government, which loyally observed the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of citizens of a foreign State.

The rights which the Geneva Convention granted to minorities, equal in principle but absolutely unequal in practice, provided the Germans in Poland with an additional powerful and effective instrument in the struggle to achieve their aims. On the other hand, those principles could not guarantee even minimum rights to the Polish population in Opole Silesia, not even such as would enable them to maintain their previous position. Because of the terms in which the Convention was formulated, and in face of the disparity in the social structure of the two nationalities, it became a rather oppressive factor and the cause of profound bitterness.

Georges Kaeckenbeeck, who was president of the Arbitration Tribunal for Upper Silesia throughout the enforcement of the Geneva Convention, refers in his book to the disproportion in the

economic and social structure of the population of Upper Silesia, writing, *inter alia*: "A circumstance which still further added to the difficulty was that the two minorities were in no way equal, the Polish minority in Germany consisting mostly of peasants and miners—the more intellectual members having gone to Poland; while the German minority in Poland almost entirely consisted of more instructed, socially better situated elements, comprising the leaders of industry, members of the free professions, technical experts and many qualified workers. A consequence was that the same provisions often wrought very different results on each side, results which, as seen in school matters, and to some extent in language matters, must have been galling to the Poles."*

Professor W. J. Rose gives a similar view of the way in which the Poles in Opole Silesia were neglected in regard to availing themselves of the rights of national minority protection. He writes: "The two minorities are socially and culturally a complete contrast. The Poles in Germany are either a farming element—and in many cases quite small farmers—or manual workers in mine and foundry. The Germans on the Polish side, on the other hand, are what they always were: the big owners, the industrial magnates, their higher and lower officials and engineers, their managers and white-collar workers, as well as a strong contingent of middle class professional and business people—including Jewish tradesmen. Just because these people constitute an educated social group, their natural self-consciousness has been of quite another kind from that of the Polish minority in German Silesia; and, by the same token, the advocacy of their claims and rights by the *Volksbund* has been much easier. In a word, they are articulate to a degree, while the Polish peasant-farmer or workman is not—which serves again to explain the activities of German interests in Geneva."†

As already said, the right to avail themselves of the regulations of the Geneva Convention was enjoyed by citizens who declared they belonged to the national minority. By the terms of the Convention

* Kaeckenbeeck, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

† William John Rose, "The Drama of Upper Silesia, A Regional Study." Oxford, 1936, p. 194.

this declaration could not be questioned by the State authorities, even though circumstances seemed to indicate inaccuracy. It must be added that during the past twenty years the economic life of Upper Silesia, like that of all Europe, and Poland in particular, suffered from a severe crisis. This fact made it possible for the Germans to bring economic pressure to bear on the Polish population for political issues.

One of the most fundamental rights of minorities was a minority school system. To take advantage of it the applicant had to declare at the beginning of the school year that the given citizen regarded himself as belonging to a "national minority" and, therefore, applied for the attendance of his child at a minority school. For any Pole in Opole Silesia this was equivalent to an open reminder to the educational authorities, the police and the German employers, that the applicant was a Pole. Such a declaration entailed unofficial pressure on the applicant to withdraw his declaration, accompanied by a threat of dismissal from employment. In the conditions of economic crisis and increasing unemployment such a dismissal brought disaster on the entire family.

The German in Poland, however, was economically independent, he was employed by a German firm and therefore need fear nothing. Even if there was a threat of reduction of staff owing to the general crisis and subsequent unemployment he knew he would find work in German Upper Silesia, or would receive maintenance grants from the abundant funds of the rich German minority organizations. Thus the Germans of Polish Silesia, in contrast with the Poles of Opole Silesia, were able to take full advantage of their rights. Nor was that all. In accordance with the fundamental principles of German policy, which aimed at keeping national relations in Silesia as strained as possible because it was a disputed territory, they exploited the regulations of the Convention and the economic stagnation to exert their influence likewise on the Poles in Polish Silesia.

As the Polish workers were usually employed in mines, foundries or factories owned by German capital and managed by Germans, they had to consider the pressure brought to bear on them to send

their children to the German schools. They were forced, under the threat of dismissal, to sign a declaration that they regarded themselves as Germans and wanted their children registered for attendance at a German school.

In this connection a very interesting case was raised again and again in the League of Nations and at The Hague Court. During a period of considerable unemployment in 1926 the number of registrations for German schools in Polish Silesia rose extraordinarily, and instead of 3,000, as in previous years, 8,000 children were registered. When the young pupils of the lowest class appeared at the German schools it came out that they did not know German, and it was a sheer impossibility for them to be given any instruction. Consequently, the Polish authorities made a close inquiry into every application, and, coming to the impartial conclusion that many of those declaring themselves Germans were really Poles, cancelled their registrations, and sent the children to Polish schools. The German *Volksbund* took action against the alleged violation of the Convention, and the question was taken up by the League of Nations, which sent a neutral expert, a Swiss educational inspector named Maurer, to conduct a language examination. In the overwhelming majority of cases this examination confirmed the justice of the Polish decision. But the Germans refused to regard their cause as lost. The Council of the League of Nations finally had to occupy itself with these children, who went down into Silesian educational history as "Maurer's children." The question was referred to The Hague Court to decide whether the Polish Government's attitude was contrary to the Convention or not. After a long time the Court decided against Poland. For the Polish Government's annulment of the registrations was contrary to the literal text of the Convention, as the respective Governments were not allowed to inquire whether the declaration of membership of a national minority was in accordance with the actual position or not. Consequently the children had to attend the German schools again. But the investigation of the affair had taken several years. The children who were six years old and beginning school life in 1926 now had to go back to the German schools after receiving

several years' education in Polish schools. Then common sense prevailed. A large number of the families withdrew their declarations of membership to the German minority, and their children were able to finish their Polish education in peace.

This glaring case exposes the tragedy of the Silesian people arising from the strained national relations. The literal text of the Geneva Convention triumphed, even though it was often contrary to its spirit, which of course aimed at ending the struggle between nationalities and safeguarding the foreign nationalities against any excesses by State authorities.

The practice of forcing Polish children into German schools continued to be pursued by the Germans, though not on such a large scale. Learning from their experience of "Maurer's children," the Germans resorted to collecting Polish children for private instruction in German, several months before the school enrolment, in order to prepare them for German schools.

This tragic condition of affairs still continues. After German troops occupied Polish Silesia in 1939 all Polish schools both in Polish and German Silesia were closed. Whether they know German or not, the children are now forced from the earliest years to receive instruction in German schools, and exclusively in the German language. After the Germans had been in occupation of Poland for two years, a certain Walter Gotthilf wrote on Upper Silesia's education in the Nazi weekly "Das Reich": "For here it continues to be more difficult than elsewhere to unite the school and the non-school life of the children into a single whole. The actual state of affairs in which the school and the home largely continue to be two separate worlds in linguistic respects, is very widely spread. . . . It is obvious that, in this connection, events must occur, especially among children beginning their school life, which are to a certain extent tragic."*

This example of minority education is taken to show that the rights guaranteed by the Geneva Convention could not result in equality of treatment for the Polish and the German minorities.

* "Das Reich," No. 43, October 26, 1941, article entitled "Nach den Schulstunden-Kinder in Ostoberschlesien."

Similar examples could be drawn from other spheres of minority life in Upper Silesia. In the actual conditions existing, no protection of minority rights could ensure the cultural development of the Polish national group, nor could it restrain the German minority, inspired by Berlin, from developing activities aimed at bringing Silesia back into the German Reich. For the future there is only one way of settling the question of minority rights as between Poland and Germany: namely, the transference of population, a method which brought such favourable results in the settlement of the Greco-Turkish dispute.

5. UPPER SILESIA AS A PROVINCE OF THE "GREATER GERMAN REICH"

Immediately after the German troops entered Poland the German Government incorporated the western Polish provinces in the Reich. At first the Polish province of Silesia, together with adjacent parts of the Kielce and Cracow provinces, were incorporated in the German province of *Schlesien*. On February 1, 1941, the Germans carved out of their great province of Silesia an area which they called Greater Upper Silesia, to include all Opole Silesia (the Opole Regency), the Polish province of Silesia and the adjacent areas of the Cracow and Kielce provinces. This administrative area they formed into a new German province, giving it the name of *Gau Oberschlesien*.

What were the objects of this strange decision? In the chapter on Silesian economy it has been shown that one of the reasons for this step was the desire to include all Upper Silesia industry within the bounds of a single administrative unit. If that was the only reason, it would have been sufficient to restrict the *Gau Oberschlesien* to definitely industrial areas. Yet a large part of Opole Silesia which is predominately agricultural, has been included.

The answer to the question is found in the nationality structure of the new *Gau*. According to German sources there are 4.4 million inhabitants of the new province. In 1931-33 that part of Silesia which was included in Poland had 2.6 million inhabitants, and Opole Silesia 1.2 million, a total of 3.8 millions. In the same period there were some 2.4 million Poles in Polish Silesia, the rest

consisting of Germans and Jews; according to German statistics in 1925 there were over 500,000 Poles in Opole Silesia. As already stated, there were in fact some 800,000. Thus out of the 3·8 million inhabitants there were over 2·9 million Poles, or some 76 per cent of the total population of both parts of Silesia.

These figures provide the answer to the question: what induced the Germans to create a separate *Gau Oberschlesien*?

In ethnographical respects, this new province is a curiosity not previously found in the history of the Second or Third Reich. A province with such a decisive Polish majority does not lend itself to central administration from Berlin, by methods applied to areas nationally homogeneous. It requires a special policy and regulations, the erasing at least of superficially Polish features.* Therefore, in creating the *Gau Oberschlesien* the Nazis have themselves admitted that all Upper Silesia, even the western bank of the Oder, does not belong to the German national area. The range of the German language ends somewhere in the neighbourhood of Silesian Nisa. The land to the east of that river is part of the Polish national area, and, as already noted, economically gravitates exclusively towards Poland.

This conclusion is reached by way of an analysis of the nationality relationships and the study of statistics. This situation, in which Poles dominate Opole Silesia, has been somewhat thoughtlessly admitted by the editor of the "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten." On the occasion of the creation of the *Gau Oberschlesien* he wrote of Opole Silesia in the following terms: "It is necessary to draw attention to the fact that it is a matter of meeting an obligation (he is referring to the Germanization of Silesia) which must be met not only in the eastern part of the province, but is just as burning an issue in the counties of Opole, Kluczborek, Olesno, Raciborz and Gliwice. In future it must never again be possible for those socially and politically deformed (*verwachsene*) relations to exist which, for instance, make it possible for the Poles to talk of their unliberated brothers in Opole Silesia."†

* J. M. Winiewicz, op. cit.

† "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten," No. 53, February 22, 1941. Article entitled "Die Sprache allein hilft nicht."

Conclusion

THE FUTURE OF UPPER SILESIA

The historical, national and economic aspects of Upper Silesia's problem have been briefly outlined making a special analysis of Opole Silesia, an area which, despite its Polish character, was not assigned to Poland in 1921. It would seem just to draw the following conclusions:

1. At the dawn of Polish history the whole of Silesia was Polish. Poland's loss of this area in the first half of the fourteenth century was the result of her internal difficulties and the menace from without (Boleslas Wrymouthed's testament, and the continual threat of a coalition between the Bohemians and the Teutonic Knights).

2. Despite her formal renunciation of Silesia, Poland did not throughout her later history resign her rights to this territory but made a number of attempts to establish her claims to it.

3. Poland's efforts to recover Silesia always met with the utmost support from the people of Silesia, who, although they had been separated from the Polish State for centuries, not only fully preserved their Polish character, but felt their complete unity with the entire Polish nation. During all the centuries of foreign domination Silesia always maintained close cultural and economic relations with the rest of Poland and remained Polish.

4. The wave of national aspiration which swept over the peoples of Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century, being particularly strong in the case of the Polish nation, also included the Silesian people in its scope. This applied with even more force to the inhabitants of Upper Silesia, where the feeling of Polish nationality had survived in its purest form. Though the national political renaissance occurred in Silesia only at the turn of the nineteenth century, the reasons for this have to be sought exclusively in the social and economic exploitation by the Germans, and the fact that in this area the peasants were emancipated half a century later than those in Poznan.

5. The Polish character of all Upper Silesia has been confirmed by numerous German statistical reports of the last as well as the present century. Despite their bias, these have always revealed a Polish majority in the area, exceeding 80 per cent in certain counties. The population census of 1910 gave the Polish percentage of the Upper Silesian population as 57, even though these statistics were compiled in a tendentious manner. German educational statistics of 1911 showed that 74 per cent of the Silesian children were Polish.

6. The decision of the Versailles Peace Conference to make the future of Upper Silesia dependent on a plebiscite was unjust to the Silesian population. The plebiscite was held in circumstances which were particularly unfavourable to Poland, and in an atmosphere of German political pressure and brutal terror.

7. Likewise unjust was the decision to divide Upper Silesia, whereby as much as 70 per cent of the plebiscite area and 51 per cent of the Polish population of all Upper Silesia (according to the 1910 census) including the counties of Opole Silesia, with its solid mass of Polish inhabitants (528,000 even according to the 1925 census) were left to Germany.

8. The Polish inhabitants of Opole Silesia were exposed to a policy of extermination by the German Government, which attempted to enforce the Bismarck slogan *ausrotten* (extermination) as quickly as possible with methods much more ruthless than those employed by previous Prussian Governments. This policy has had and is having especial success since Hitler's seizure of power, and above all since the outbreak of war.

9. No regulations for national minority protection—in such a form as the Geneva Convention—were able, nor will be able to safeguard the national cultural rights of the Polish population, because regulations alone cannot counter the effects of the Poles' material dependence on the German possessing classes.

10. The attitude adopted during the present war by the Polish population calls for all the more appreciation and respect, as they are not only maintaining an inflexible attitude as Poles, but are taking an active part in the underground activities against the

German conquerors. This attitude is the result of the profoundly Polish national feeling in the hearts of the Silesian people, and of their faith that this time their sufferings for, and fidelity to, Poland will be rewarded by the incorporation of all Opole Silesia in an independent Poland.

For all these reasons it is right and just to demand that after this war, in the name of historical justice and the principle of the freedom of nations Opole Silesia should return to Poland. This is all the more desirable and necessary considering the problem of Upper Silesia from a broader angle than that of general economics, namely, bearing in mind the new European and world society which is planned for the better future. That system is to ensure for Europe and the world a lasting peace, to guarantee freedom to the nations, and to the free peoples of Central and South-Eastern Europe a higher standard of cultural and economic existence and the possibility of enjoying the benefit of economic and social progress.

Considering the problem of Upper Silesia from the broad economic aspect, the question of Opole Silesia is not merely a frontier dispute between Poland and Germany, and the kernel of the matter does not consist in the additional incorporation in Poland of a number of districts which were left to Germany after the 1921 plebiscite.

Upper Silesia is economically unnecessary to Germany, by belonging to Germany it suffered stagnation in its industrial development. Upper Silesia has always been and will always be a dangerous armaments centre and a valuable strategic base for Germany. This statement also applies to the present war. As long as Silesia belongs to Germany it will always act as an incitement to the Germans' aggressive instinct, which drives them to seek the military domination of more and more areas, the subjugation of more and more peoples, in the sense of the high-flown but revealing words of the German national anthem, "Deutschland, Deutschland über alles, über alles in der Welt."

Upper Silesia is part of the Polish economic area: its economic expansion must inevitably and exclusively be eastward, towards

Poland and South-Eastern Europe. Only with this economic area open to it can Upper Silesia fully exploit its economic wealth for the good and benefit of humanity, and not for its own destruction, aggressive wars and the continual menace of a German world empire.

The present war is being fought for aims which go far beyond the immediate interests or tendencies of the various belligerents. This struggle is to decide the future face of the world. It is to ensure peace and the freedom of nations and individuals, the reign of right and justice, economic co-operation assuring economic and social progress to all the peoples of Europe, and especially to those whose conditions of existence are not on the level of the great democracies of Western Europe.

When the time comes at the future Peace Conference to establish the new system of Europe, it must be remembered that the question of Opole Silesia is not just a Polish-German frontier dispute, but that:

1. Upper Silesia is the great coal-field of Central and South-Eastern Europe, with reserves of coal greater than those of the Ruhr or the Donetz basin;

2. Upper Silesia is the junction at which many of the most important railway lines of Europe running north and south, east and west intersect.

3. Upper Silesia is an industrial area through which, when the Oder-Danube canal is finished, the Baltic and the Black Sea will be linked up by a canal system as important for Europe as the Suez Canal is for the East.

Upper Silesia is one of the few truly important centres of Europe, it is undoubtedly the most important economic centre of East-Central Europe. The future peace of Europe, and the development, happiness and wellbeing of the peoples inhabiting this part of the European continent, will depend on the correct disposition of this key area.

Since 1922 the eastern part of Upper Silesia has belonged to Poland. The rest of the area, i.e. Opole Silesia, should also be restored to Poland, since historical justice and the properly con-

ceived interests of all Europe require it, because this land is Polish and it is inhabited by Polish people. Only in association with Poland will it be able to exploit fully its economic wealth for the good of the Silesian people, for the benefit of Poland and the profit of all Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Only then will the countries of this part of the continent be able to fulfil successfully the role of guardian of the peace in Europe.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

THE AREA AND POPULATION OF THE GERMAN PROVINCE OF LOWER SILESIA,
THE OPOLE REGENCY, POLISH UPPER SILESIA, AND THE GERMAN PROVINCE
OF UPPER SILESIA (GAU OBERSCHLESIEIN)

THE PROVINCE OF LOWER SILESIA

<i>Area</i>	<i>Inhabitants</i>	<i>Inhabitants per sq. km.</i>
26,600·21 sq. km.	3,204,004	120·5

Occupations of Population

<i>Industry and Crafts</i>	<i>Trade and Commerce</i>	<i>Other Professions</i>	<i>Agriculture and Forestry</i>
<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
35·5	15·2	24·4	24·9

OPOLE REGENCY

<i>Area</i>	<i>Inhabitants</i>	<i>Inhabitants per sq. km.</i>
9,714·18 sq. km.	1,480,925 (1933 census)	152·6

Occupations

<i>Industry and Crafts</i>	<i>Trade and Commerce</i>	<i>Other Professions</i>	<i>Agriculture and Forestry</i>
<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
37·4	13	23·9	25·7

POLISH UPPER SILESIA

<i>Area</i>	<i>Inhabitants</i>	<i>Inhabitants per sq. km.</i>
3,221 sq. km.	1,131,543	351·3

THE GERMAN PROVINCE OF UPPER SILESIA (GAU OBERSCHLESIEIN)

<i>Area</i>	<i>Inhabitants</i>	<i>Inhabitants per sq. km.</i>
20,635·9 sq. km.	4,341,084	210·4

Occupations

<i>Industry and Crafts</i>	<i>Trade and Commerce</i>	<i>Other Professions</i>	<i>Agriculture and Forestry</i>
<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
47·1	12·6	18·6	21·7

APPENDIX 2

COAL PRODUCTION IN THE GREAT SILESIAN FIELD IN 1937*

(in million tons)

Opole Silesia	24.5
Polish Upper Silesia	27.4
Dąbrowa Field	6.4
Cracow Field	2.3
Karwina district	7.4
					<hr/>
Total	68.0

Production in the same year:

Germany (including Opole Silesia)	..	184.5
Poland (excluding Karwina district)	..	36.2
Czechoslovakia (including Karwina district)		17.0

* Figures of the economic Appendices are based on the following sources:

- (1) Hans Otto von Borcke. "Die Entwicklung der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Verhältnisse in Westoberschlesien nach der Teilung." Berlin, 1937.
- (2) "Handbuch des oberschlesischen Industriebezirks." Kattowitz, 1913.—Quoted by Andrzej Wierzbicki, "Prawda o Górnym Śląsku." Warsaw, 1921, p. 70.
- (3) "Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften" by Dr. L. Elsner, Dr. A. Weber, Dr. F. Wieser. Jena, 1923, vol. 3 and 5.
- (4) "Oberschlesien und der Genfer Schiedsspruch." A collective publication by the "Osteuropa Institut," Breslau, 1925.
- (5) Feliks Olszak. "Sprawy Gospodarcze Śląska Zaolziańskiego." An article published in "Ekonomista Polski," No. 3, 1942.
- (6) Dr. Gerhard Wende. "Die Auswirkungen der Grenzziehung auf die Oberschlesische Montanindustrie." Stuttgart, 1932.
- (7) "Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich: 1926, 1929, 1936, 1938."
- (8) "Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Eisen- und Stahlindustrie." Düsseldorf, 1937.
- (9) "Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches." 1937, No. 3, 4; 1938, No. 3, 4.
- (10) "Mały Rocznik Statystyczny." 1938, 1939.
- (11) "Rocznik Statystyki Polskiej." Warsaw, 1930.
- (12) "Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland." 1931, 1933, 1936.
- (13) Günther Saath und Gustav Reitter. "Die Industrie der eingegliederten oberschlesischen Ostgebiete." Berlin, 1942.

APPENDIX 3

EUROPEAN COAL OUTPUT IN 1937

(in million tons)

Great Britain	245
Germany	185
U.S.S.R. (in Europe)	c. 105
France	44
Poland	36
Belgium	30
Holland	14
Czechoslovakia	17
Spain	7*
Other European† Countries	5
Total	688

In 1937 the aggregate output of the chief European coal producers (Great Britain, Germany, U.S.S.R., France, Poland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Holland) was about 676 million tons.

* Output in 1935. (Figures for 1936 and 1937 are not known.)

† I.e. Bulgaria, 2.2 millions; Italy, one million; Sweden, Norway, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Austria, Portugal, the remaining amount.

APPENDIX 4

COAL PRODUCTION IN GERMANY AND IN UPPER SILESIA PRIOR TO 1914

(in million tons, round figures)

Year	Germany	Upper Silesia
1892	71.4	16.4
1901	108.5	25.3
1909	148.8	34.7
1913	190.1	43.8

APPENDIX 5

COAL PRODUCTION IN GERMANY, POLAND, OPOLE SILESIA
AND POLISH UPPER SILESIA, 1924-38*(in million tons, round figures)*

Year	Germany	Opole Silesia	Poland	Polish Upper Silesia
1913	140·8	11·1	41·0	32·0
1924	118·7	10·9	32·3	23·6
1925	132·6	14·3	29·1	21·4
1926	145·3	17·5	35·7	25·9
1928	150·9	19·7	40·6	30·2
1929	163·4	22·0	46·2	34·1
1930	142·7	18·0	37·5	28·2
1931	118·6	16·8	38·3	28·4
1932	104·7	15·5	28·8	21·5
1933	109·7	15·6	27·4	19·9
1935	143·0*	19·0	28·5	21·1
1936	158·3	21·1	29·7	22·1
1937	184·5	24·5	36·2	27·4
1938	—	26·0	38·1	28·8

* From 1935 onward, including Saar Valley.

APPENDIX 6

PIG-IRON PRODUCTION IN GERMANY AND UPPER SILESIA PRIOR TO 1914

(in 1,000 tons, round figures)

Year	Germany including Luxembourg	Upper Silesia	Upper Silesia production in per cent of German production
1871	1,564	232	14·8
1881	2,914	328	11·2
1891	4,641	480	10·3
1901	7,880	642	8·1
1910	14,793	901	6·1
1912	17,830	1,048	5·9
1913	19,309	994	5·1

APPENDIX 7

PIG-IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION IN GERMANY AND OPOLE SILESIA, 1924-37

(in 1,000 tons, round figures)

Year	Pig-Iron		Steel	
	Germany	Opole Silesia	Germany	Opole Silesia
1913	10,916	381	—	355
1924	7,833	262	9,705	—
1925	10,089	289	12,051	359
1926	9,636	232	12,226	434
1928	11,804	248	14,476	523
1929	13,239	180	16,023	534
1930	9,698	87	11,371	352
1931	6,061	59	8,176	308
1932	3,932	31	5,624	176
1933	5,247	53	7,454	204
1935	12,846*	175	16,144*	380
1936	15,302	236	18,756	450
1937	15,960	—	19,356	482

* From 1935 onward, including Saar Valley.

APPENDIX 8

PIG-IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION IN POLAND AND POLISH UPPER SILESIA, 1924-38

(in 1,000 tons, round figures)

Year	Pig-Iron		Steel	
	Poland	Polish Upper Silesia	Poland	Polish Upper Silesia
1913	1,055	613	1,677	1,050
1924	336	263	681	525
1925	315	228	782	542
1926	327	268	788	505
1928	684	464	1,438	937
1929	704	476	1,377	899
1930	478	324	1,238	903
1931	347	266	1,037	767
1932	199	148	564	365
1933	306	239	833	586
1935	394	300	946	606
1936	584	412	1,145	755
1937	724	—	1,451	—
1938	879	—	1,441	—

APPENDIX 9

ZINC AND LEAD-ORE OUTPUT AS WELL AS ZINC INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
IN POLISH UPPER SILESIA, 1924-31

(in 1,000 tons, round figures)

Year	Output			Production		
	Calamine	Blende	Lead ore	Zinc	Sheet zinc	Pig-lead
1913	105.0	307.9	37.3	169.4	42.5	41.6
1924	48.0	188.5	11.8	77.7	25.4	20.5
1925	72.1	247.1	19.3	98.2	27.5	28.4
1926	83.3	242.4	16.3	106.2	8.4	27.8
1928	35.9	210.3	13.0	140.8	14.2	37.0
1929	116.8	185.0	12.6	147.3	16.3	36.4
1930	214.0	165.1	12.6	158.6	15.7	40.9
1931	84.0	121.3	9.1	123.9	13.0	31.8

APPENDIX 10

ZINC AND LEAD ORE OUTPUT AS WELL AS ZINC INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
IN OPOLE SILESIA, 1925-37

(in 1,000 tons, round figures)

Year	Output		Production	
	Calamine	Blende	Lead ore	Sheet zinc
1913	2.7	92.5	15.3	4.0
1925	—	49.8	6.6	4.5
1926	—	109.4	12.0	6.9
1928	15.4	178.2	17.7	8.3
1929	14.3	186.9	22.0	6.8
1930	21.4	197.8	26.2	7.3
1931	10.7	168.2	22.5	7.9
1932	—	112.4	18.0	7.9
1933	—	124.3	19.2	7.8
1935	—	121.5	24.4	10.9
1936	—	113.5	21.3	—
1937	—	103.3	19.7	—

APPENDIX II

THE ECONOMIC ASPECT OF THE DIVISION OF UPPER SILESIA

The effect of the division of Upper Silesia in 1921 was to divide the area's industry between Poland and Germany as follows (figures based on the situation in 1913):

	Poland	Germany
<i>Mineral Reserves:</i>		
Coal (down to 1,000 metres)	Area: 2,200 sq. km.	600 sq. km.
Zinc and lead ores	Reserves of 9,000,000 tons	Reserves of 11,000,000 tons
<i>Production Plants:</i>		
Coal mines	53	14
Zinc and lead mines	10	5
Zinc smelting works	12	—
Zinc rolling mills	5	2
Silver and lead smelting	2	—
Foundry establishments	5	3
Large furnaces	22	15
Steel works	9	3
Rolling mills	9	3
<i>Production:</i>	tons	tons
Coal	31,907,906	11,090,908
Pig-iron	613,283	381,318
Raw steel	1,049,545	354,865
Roll mill production	829,454	234,818
Calamine	105,051	2,736
Zinc blende	307,924	92,463
Zinc	169,439	—
Sheet zinc	42,493	3,935
Lead ore	57,272	15,300
Pig-lead	31,561	—

SOURCES: *Mineral reserves and production plants:* figures taken from von Borcke, op. cit., p. 13.

Production: Figures taken from Dr. Gerhard Wende, op. cit., pp. 94-97.

NOTE 1: One coal mine in Upper Silesia (Petershofen) with an output of 573,579 tons per annum went to Czechoslovakia immediately after the war, and before the plebiscite was held (Wierzbicki, op. cit., p. 41).

NOTE 2: For population statistics of Upper Silesia after the division, see p. 87.

APPENDIX 12

RESULTS OF THE 1910 CENSUS*

District	Declared as Mother-tongue			
	Inhabitants	Polish†	German	Polish Per cent
1. Kluczbarek (Kreuzburg) ..	51,906	24,487	24,365	47·2
2. Olesno (Rosenberg) ..	52,341	42,234	8,586	80·7
3. Opole—urban (Oppeln) ..	33,907	5,371	27,128	15·8
4. Opole — rural district (Oppeln)	117,906	89,323	23,740	75·8
5. Wielkie Strzelce — (Gross Strehlitz)	73,383	58,102	12,616	79·2
6. Lubliniec (Lublinitz) ..	50,388	39,969	7,384	79·3
7. Gliwice—town (Gleiwitz) ..	66,981	9,843	49,543	14·7
8. Toszek-Gliwice (Tost-Gleiwitz)	80,515	61,509	16,408	76·4
9. Tarnowskie Gory (Tarnowitz)	77,583	51,858	20,969	66·8
10. Bytom—urban (Beuthen) ..	67,718	22,401	41,071	33·1
11. Krolewska Huta (Königshütte)	72,641	24,687	39,276	34·0
12. Bytom—rural district (Beuthen)	195,844	123,016	59,308	62·8
13. Zabrze (Hindenburg) ..	159,810	81,567	63,875	51·0
14. Katowice—urban (Kattowitz)	43,173	5,766	36,891	13·3
15. Katowice — rural district (Kattowitz)	216,807	140,592	65,763	64·8
16. Pszczyna (Pless)	122,897	105,744	16,464	86·0
17. Rybnik	131,630	102,430	24,872	77·8
18. Raciborz—urban (Ratibor)	38,424	11,525	22,914	30·0
19. Raciborz — rural district (Ratibor)	118,923	56,765	13,316	47·7
20. Kozle (Kosel)	75,673	56,794	16,433	75·0
21. Glupczyce (Leobschütz) ..	83,635	5,178	69,901	6·3
22. Prudnik (Neustadt) ..	97,537	43,787	51,489	44·9
23. Niemodlin (Falkenberg) ..	37,526	3,815	33,286	10·2
24. Nisa—urban (Neisse) ..	25,938	955	24,735	3·7
25. Nisa—rural district (Neisse)	75,285	797	74,125	1·1
26. Grotkow (Grottkau) ..	40,610	825	39,589	2·0
	2,207,981	1,169,340	884,045	53·0

[See foot of page 123 for footnotes]

APPENDIX 13

RESULTS OF THE CENSUS IN POLISH UPPER SILESIA, DECEMBER 9, 1931*

District	Inhabitants	Number declaring Polish as mother-tongue	Giving other language as mother-tongue	Percentage of people with mother-tongue other than Polish
1. Katowice—urban .	127,044	107,996	19,048	15.0
2. Katowice—country	230,490	216,572	13,918	6.0
3. Krolewska Huta— urban	80,734	68,321	12,415	15.4
4. Lubliniec	43,877	42,904	973	2.2
5. Pszczyna	161,987	156,759	5,228	3.2
6. Rybnik	213,271	208,564	4,707	2.2
7. Swietochlowice ..	207,978	195,017	12,961	6.2
8. Tarnowskie Gory	66,162	60,784	5,378	8.1
Total Upper Silesia	1,131,543	1,056,917	74,626	6.6

* According to "The Polish and Non-Polish Populations of Poland—Results of the Population Census of 1931." Warsaw.

Footnotes for page 122]

* The data of the 1910 census according to Dr. Paul Weber's "Die Polen in Oberschlesien—eine statistische Untersuchung," Berlin, 1914, and Dr. Adam Benisz's "Górny Śląsk w walce o polskość," Katowice, 1930.

† Apart from the 1,169,340 persons declaring Polish as their mother-tongue, 88,798 were counted as bilingual (Polish and German). Thus the actual number of Poles was 1,258,138.

APPENDIX 14

RESULTS OF THE 1921 PLEBISCITE*

District	Permanent Residents		
	Number of Votes	Voted for Poland	Voted for Germany
1. Kluczborek† (Kreuzburg)	26,847†	1,750	25,097
2. Olesno (Orosenberg)	25,841	10,849	14,992
3. Opole—urban (Oppeln)	16,425	1,089	15,336
4. Opole—rural district (Oppeln)	62,954	24,431	38,523
5. Wielkie Strzelce (Gr. Strehlitz)	38,013	22,283	15,750
6. Lubliniec (Lublinitz)	24,567	13,214	11,353
7. Gliwice—urban (Gleiwitz)	34,461	7,947	26,514
8. Toszek—Gliwice (Tost Gleiwitz)	42,150	26,690	15,480
9. Tarnowskie Gory (Tarnowitz)	40,318	27,107	13,211
10. Bytom—urban (Beuthen)	34,479	9,551	24,928
11. Krolewska Huta (Königshütte)	37,874	10,290	27,584
12. Bytom—rural district (Beuthen)	98,789	62,183	36,606
13. Zabrze (Hindenburg)	80,593	42,518	38,075
14. Katowice—urban (Kattowitz)	23,091	3,541	19,550
15. Katowice—rural district (Kattowitz)	103,125	65,147	42,978
16. Pszczyna (Pless)	65,346	52,802	12,544
17. Rybnik	70,198	51,326	18,872
18. Raciborz—urban (Ratibor)	18,650	2,175	16,475
19. Raciborz—rural district (Ratibor)	37,134	17,967	19,167
20. Kozle (Kosel)	39,647	11,860	27,737
21. Głupczyce (Leobschutz)	42,017	251	41,766
22. Prudnik‡ (Neistadt)	26,307‡	4,405	21,902
23. Niemodlin (Falkenberg)	} No plebiscite held		
24. Nisa—urban (Neisse)			
25. Nisa—rural (Neisse)			
26. Grotkow (Grotkau)			
	993,826	469,376	524,450

* Plebiscite figures according to "La Silésie Polonaise, Conférences faites à la Bibliothèque Polonaise de Paris," 1932; and Dr. Adam Benisz's "Górny Śląsk w walce o polskość," Katowice, 1930.

† The plebiscite for the Kluczborek district included also the figures for a few parishes in the Namysłów district.

‡ The plebiscite was held only in the eastern part of the Prudnik (Neustadt) district.

APPENDIX 14 (continued)

Emigrants Voted for			Results of Plebiscite			
Per cent of Polish Votes	Poland	Germany	Number of Votes	Polish Votes	German Votes	Per cent of Polish Votes
6.5	36	18,235	45,118	1,786	43,332	4.0
42.0	298	8,869	35,008	11,147	23,861	31.8
6.6	22	5,464	21,911	1,111	20,800	5.2
38.8	286	17,703	80,943	24,717	56,226	30.5
58.6	740	6,659	45,412	23,033	22,389	50.7
53.8	456	4,105	29,128	13,678	15,450	47.0
23.1	612	5,508	40,581	8,559	32,022	21.1
63.3	516	4,643	47,309	27,206	20,103	57.5
67.2	441	3,966	44,725	27,548	17,177	61.1
27.7	551	4,961	39,991	10,102	29,889	25.3
27.2	474	4,264	42,612	10,764	31,848	25.3
62.9	782	7,040	106,611	62,965	43,646	59.1
52.8	801	7,207	88,601	43,319	45,282	48.9
15.3	356	3,205	26,652	3,897	22,755	14.6
60.3	1,090	9,811	119,026	66,147	52,879	55.6
80.8	670	6,026	72,042	53,472	18,570	74.2
73.1	1,006	9,052	80,256	52,332	27,924	65.2
11.7	44	5,831	24,525	2,219	22,306	9.0
48.4	511	7,113	44,758	18,478	26,280	41.3
29.9	333	8,630	48,610	12,193	36,417	25.1
0.6	5	22,695	64,717	256	64,461	0.4
16.7	90	11,301	37,698	4,495	33,203	11.9
47.3	10,120	182,288	1,186,234	479,414	706,820	40.4

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
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


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




UPPER SILESIA AND ENVIRONMENTS

- BOUNDARIES OF STATES
- BOUNDARIES OF VOIVODSHIPS OR REGENCIES
- BOUNDARIES OF COUNTIES
- KATOWICE** CAPITAL OF VOIVODSHIP
- OPOLE** " OF REGENCY
- NISA** COUNTY TOWN

- RAILWAYS
- RIVERS
- CANALS
- TOWNS WITH MORE THAN 100,000 INHABITANTS
- " " " 50,000 TO 100,000 " " " "
- " " " 20,000 TO 50,000 " " " "
- " " " 10,000 TO 20,000 " " " "
- " " " 2,000 TO 10,000 " " " "
- TOWNS AND VILLAGES FROM 2,000 TO 10,000 " " " "






UPPER SILESIA

GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS AFTER INCORPORATION OF POLISH AREAS

- BOUNDARY OF PROVINCE
- BOUNDARIES OF REGENCIES
- " " OF COUNTIES
- KATOWICE.....CAPITAL OF PROVINCE
- OPOLE....." " OF REGENCY
- NISA.....COUNTY TOWN
- RIVERS
- CANALS

	TOWNS WITH MORE THAN 100,000 INHABITANTS
	50,000 TO 100,000
	20,000 TO 50,000
	10,000 TO 20,000
	2,000 TO 10,000
	VILLAGES FROM 2,000 TO 10,000 AND TOWNS



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
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
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